O Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (CADE) deu mais um passo na apuração de supostas práticas anticompetitivas no Processo Administrativo nº 08700.009531/2022-04, que tem como representadas a Apple Inc. e a Apple Services LATAM LLC. A investigação foi instaurada após denúncia das empresas Ebazar.com.br Ltda. (Mercado Livre) e Mercado Pago Instituição de Pagamento Ltda., que alegam condutas prejudiciais à concorrência no setor de meios de pagamento e aplicativos.
A decisão, publicada na manhã desta quinta-feira no Diário Oficial da União (DOU), decidiu por indeferir o pedido da Apple para acesso irrestrito à versão confidencial da Nota Técnica nº 63/2024, argumentando que o sigilo protege informações sensíveis de terceiros e que a versão pública do documento é suficiente para garantir o contraditório e a ampla defesa. Por outro lado, o órgão autorizou a elaboração de uma perícia econômica e a apresentação de provas documentais até o final da fase instrutória, conforme previsto no artigo 155 do Regimento Interno.
Segundo a Representação, o Mercado Livre alega que a Apple adota práticas que restringem a concorrência, como a exclusão de distribuidores independentes de bens digitais no ecossistema iOS e a imposição de uso exclusivo do sistema de pagamentos da Apple para compras in-app. Essas restrições resultariam em aumento de custos para concorrentes e menor escolha para os consumidores. A denúncia também menciona que práticas semelhantes têm sido alvo de investigações por órgãos antitruste ao redor do mundo.
O caso permanece em instrução no CADE, com potencial para influenciar a regulação de grandes players do mercado digital.
Este é um informativo diário que traz para o(a) leitor (a) as decisões do CADE com relação a aprovação e movimentação de atos de concentração, ao arquivamento/condenação de processos administrativos de condutas anticompetitivas e as publicações do CADE.
Este conteúdo é apenas para associados Assinatura alfa. Cadastre-se
Este é um informativo diário que traz para o(a) leitor (a) notícias e casos de defesa da concorrência das principais jurisdições antitruste do mundo (CADE, FTC, Comissão Europeia, CMA etc).
Notícias da concorrência
MPF junto ao Cade abre processo seletivo para cargo de assessoria
Oportunidade é para candidatos formados em Direito. Inscrições vão até 13 de janeiro
Publicado em 14/01/2025 12h56
Ministério Público Federal (MPF) junto ao Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (Cade) está com processo seletivo aberto para o cargo de assessor jurídico. A vaga é destinada a profissionais com formação em Direito.
Os interessados devem enviar seus currículos para o e-mail pgr-mpfcade@mpf.mp.br até às 12h do dia 13 de janeiro, próxima segunda-feira.
A vaga exige graduação em Direito, pós-graduação em direito concorrencial ou comercial e experiência significativa em processos administrativos relacionados ao direito da concorrência. As principais responsabilidades do cargo incluem a elaboração de minutas de peças processuais e o apoio no gabinete do procurador do MPF junto ao Cade, em Brasília.
A remuneração para o cargo é de R$ 10.355,92, acrescida de R$ 1.393,11 de auxílio alimentação. Para os candidatos que necessitem se deslocar para Brasília, é oferecido um auxílio moradia correspondente a 25% do valor do cargo.
MPF no Cade
O papel do procurador do MPF no Cade envolve, entre outras atribuições, a emissão de pareceres sobre processos administrativos relacionados a infrações à ordem econômica. O procurador também é responsável pelo encaminhamento de denúncias e representações, participação nas sessões do Tribunal Administrativo e pela condução de audiências com advogados especializados em antitruste.
Reconhecimento
O Cade tem se destacado como um excelente ambiente de trabalho, tendo recebido o Certificado de Qualidade do Ambiente de Trabalho nos anos de 2020, 2021 e 2022. Essa certificação é concedida com base no índice de clima organizacional da pesquisa FIA Employee Experience (FEEx), reconhecendo o esforço dos colaboradores em manter um ambiente agradável e colaborativo.
Além disso, o Cade é, por cinco anos consecutivos, reconhecido como um dos melhores lugares para trabalhar no Brasil, de acordo com premiação da FIA Employee. A autarquia é também considerada uma das principais autoridades antitruste do mundo, segundo a revista Global Competition Review (GCR).
Justice Department and OSHA Issue Statement on Non-Disclosure Agreements That Deter Reporting of Antitrust Crimes
Tuesday, January 14, 2025Share
For Immediate Release
Office of Public Affairs
Today, the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division and Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), jointly affirmed that corporate non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) that deter individuals from reporting antitrust crimes undermine the goals of whistleblower protection laws, including the Criminal Antitrust Anti-Retaliation Act of 2019 (CAARA). CAARA prohibits employers from discharging or otherwise retaliating against a worker for (1) reporting potential criminal antitrust violations and related crimes to their employer or the federal government or (2) assisting a federal government investigation or proceeding.
NDAs that undermine CAARA or otherwise interfere with employees’ freedom to report potential crime will cost the employer when the Antitrust Division makes its charging decisions and sentencing recommendations. Companies should also be aware that using NDAs to obstruct or impede an investigation may also constitute separate federal criminal violations. Any company that so interferes with its employees’ cooperation would jeopardize its ability to satisfy its obligations under the Antitrust Division’s leniency policy, which requires an applicant to “use its best efforts to secure the timely, truthful, continuing, and complete cooperation of all current and former employees.” And the Antitrust Division’s Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs in Criminal Antitrust Investigations guidelines consider a company’s policies around NDA and anti-retaliation training in assessing the effectiveness of the company’s compliance program.
“Members of the public are often best positioned to detect and blow the whistle on antitrust crimes,” said Acting Assistant Attorney General Doha Mekki of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division. “The Antitrust Division values this information and works to ensure that individuals are free to report misconduct without fear of retaliation or retribution.”
“By working jointly with partner agencies to break down barriers to employee reporting, OSHA is committed to strengthening our enforcement of whistleblower laws and protecting workers’ voices,” said Deputy Assistant Secretary for Occupational Safety and Health Jim Frederick. “This collaboration fosters a culture of accountability and upholds the integrity of worker rights.”
What Companies Should Know
Whistleblower Protections for Reporting Antitrust Crimes
Antitrust crimes hurt consumers, workers, and taxpayers — and threaten our free-market economy and democratic institutions. For over 130 years, criminal prosecutors have used antitrust laws as a charter of economic freedom to protect and promote competition.
Members of the public are often best positioned to detect and blow the whistle on antitrust crimes. Leads from the public about potentially illegal conduct enable the Antitrust Division and its law enforcement partners to uncover antitrust cartels and monopolization schemes, prosecute those crimes and protect competition. The Antitrust Division values this information and works to ensure that members of the public are free to report misconduct without fear of retaliation or retribution. The Antitrust Division protects to the fullest extent of the law the identity of those who report antitrust violations.
CAARA protects company employees, contractors, subcontractors or agents who report certain criminal antitrust violations. CAARA prohibits employers from discharging or otherwise retaliating against a worker for (1) reporting potential criminal antitrust violations and related crimes to their employer or the federal government or (2) assisting a federal government investigation or proceeding. Therefore, CAARA helps to incentivize the reporting of antitrust crimes and supports the Antitrust Division’s criminal enforcement program.
NDAs and Contractual Restrictions on Reporting May Conflict with Antitrust Enforcement and CAARA
Individuals who seek to report antitrust violations must not be deterred or prevented from coming forward for fear of adverse employment consequences.
The Antitrust Division’s work prosecuting antitrust crimes is compromised when NDAs deter individuals from providing law enforcers with relevant information on wrongdoing. When individuals believe that a corporate NDA may prevent them from reporting illegal conduct to enforcers, crimes go undetected and competition suffers. For example, some NDAs are worded so broadly as to suggest that people who report potential crimes or cooperate with law enforcement could face lawsuits and adverse employment consequences as severe as termination. This fear of retribution leads to less reporting of illegal activity and less vigorous antitrust enforcement.
NDAs that discourage individuals from reporting wrongdoing or cooperating with an antitrust investigation also undermine CAARA’s goal of protecting whistleblowers. Even the mere implication that an NDA would bar employees from reporting illegal conduct or assisting an investigation or proceeding clashes with the basic principles behind CAARA that encourage self-reporting and disclosure of wrongdoing to the government.
NDAs that Deter Reporting Will Cost Companies at Charging and Sentencing
CAARA encourages individuals to provide tips to law enforcement and cooperate in antitrust investigations, incentivizes companies to promote compliance and complements leniency and cooperation credit policies. For these reasons, NDAs that undermine CAARA or otherwise interfere with employees’ freedom to report potential crime will cost the employer when the Antitrust Division makes its charging decisions and its sentencing recommendations. Companies should also be aware that using NDAs in efforts to obstruct or impede an investigation may also constitute separate federal criminal violations. And of course, a company that interferes with its employees’ cooperation would jeopardize its ability to fulfill its obligations under the Antitrust Division’s leniency policy, which requires an applicant to “use its best efforts to secure the timely, truthful, continuing, and complete cooperation of all current and former employees.”
The Antitrust Division’s Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs in Criminal Antitrust Investigations guidelines, which prosecutors use to assess the effectiveness of compliance programs when making charging decisions and sentencing recommendations, make clear that the sufficiency and efficacy of a compliance program depends on the existence of “reporting mechanisms that employees can use to report potential antitrust violations anonymously or confidentially and without fear of retaliation.” The questions prosecutors ask in evaluating a compliance program include:
Whether a company has an anti-retaliation policy;
Whether it trains employees, managers and supervisors on the provisions of CAARA;
Whether the company’s use of NDAs is consistent with ensuring that employees can report antitrust violations without fear of retaliation;
Whether NDAs are used in a way that deters whistleblowers or violates CAARA; and
Whether NDAs and other employee policies make clear that employees can report antitrust violations, including to government authorities.
Companies that fail to address retaliation, CAARA and NDAs in their policies and compliance structure risk losing out on the benefits associated with maintaining an effective compliance program when the Antitrust Division is making charging decisions and sentencing recommendations.
To report potential antitrust crimes to the Antitrust Division, contact the Complaint Center. If your complaint relates to potential antitrust crimes affecting government procurement, grant or program funding, contact the Procurement Collusion Strike Force Tip Center.
If you feel that you have been a victim of retaliation or would like to learn more about protections for whistleblowers, please see OSHA Fact Sheet.
Justice Department Sues KKR for Serial Violations of Federal Premerger Review Law
Tuesday, January 14, 2025Share
For Immediate Release
Office of Public Affairs
KKR Violated Hart-Scott-Rodino Act at Least 16 Times by Withholding and Altering Documents and Failing to Make Required Filings
The Justice Department today filed a civil lawsuit against KKR & Co. Inc. and over a dozen of its investment advisors and funds (collectively, KKR) for repeatedly flouting the premerger antitrust review process. Filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, the complaint alleges that KKR senior executives, deal teams and investment funds evaded antitrust scrutiny for at least 16 separate transactions by failing to comply with the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 (HSR Act).
“KKR’s rinse-and-repeat failures to provide complete and accurate information about its mergers and acquisitions were systemic,” said Acting Assistant Attorney General Doha Mekki of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division. “Through document omissions, alterations, and failures to report deals, KKR threatened the integrity of the Division’s premerger reviews and, in some cases, obscured the market impact of its deals and serial acquisitions.”
The HSR Act requires parties to a merger, acquisition, or other transaction above a certain size to submit a premerger filing to the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission to aid in the agencies’ enforcement of merger law. As a sophisticated private equity firm in the business of buying and selling companies, KKR is familiar with the HSR Act and its requirements. Since 2021, KKR was required to make more than 100 premerger filings under the HSR Act.
The department’s complaint alleges that over the course of two years — 2021 and 2022 — KKR failed to make complete and accurate premerger filings for at least 16 transactions. Specifically, KKR violated the HSR Act by:
Altering documents in HSR filings for at least eight transactions. For example, in April 2021, a KKR partner instructed a deal team member to edit a portion of an Investment Committee report in advance of the HSR review process by circling the “Competitive Behavior” section of a diligence chart and writing “[need to revise for HSR purposes]” in the document. The KKR deal team member did not merely revise the language but deleted it entirely before submitting the altered document to the Antitrust Division.
Failing to make any HSR filing for at least two transactions. KKR did not submit an HSR filing prior to consummating an acquisition valued at $6.9 billion. It also did not submit a filing prior to consummating an acquisition worth between $376 million and $919 million.
Systematically omitting required documents in HSR filings for at least 10 transactions. KKR repeatedly certified that it had complied with the HSR Act but did not include required documents in those filings. In many cases, KKR only identified such documents in response to an Antitrust Division investigation.
The complaint cites internal documents that reveal a pervasive culture of noncompliance with the HSR Act at KKR. One KKR employee who omitted and altered multiple documents from an HSR Act filing described KKR’s approach to its premerger filing obligations: “I’ve always been told less is more 😊.” In response, a more senior executive replied, “I believe in less is more too….”
As alleged in the complaint, KKR’s conduct allowed it to repeatedly evade legally mandated scrutiny of its investment business and reap millions of dollars in revenues from closing transactions without proper prior review by the federal antitrust agencies. In some cases, KKR’s misconduct obscured the threat its deals posed to competition, including serial acquisitions affecting important markets. By preventing the federal antitrust agencies from effectively investigating the potential anticompetitive effects of KKR’s transactions, KKR imperiled competition and potentially harmed consumers across the nation.
The HSR Act authorizes civil penalties for violations of the Act at more than $50,000 per day per violation. As a result, the maximum penalty for KKR’s alleged violations exceeds $650 million. The complaint also seeks structural relief as well as other equitable relief, including compliance measures.
KKR is a global investment firm headquartered in New York. It is one of the world’s largest investment firms with over $500 billion in total assets under management.
The Federal Trade Commission today issued a policy statement clarifying that independent contractors, including gig workers, are shielded from antitrust liability when engaging in protected bargaining and organizing activities—such as seeking better compensation and job conditions.
According to the FTC’s policy statement, the Commission will not challenge collective action by independent contractors and gig workers, which include rideshare and food delivery drivers, that provide labor services and are seeking better compensation and job conditions because such activities are exempted under the antitrust statutes.
“Companies increasingly rely on gig workers and independent contractors. As more of these workers consider unionizing to secure better pay and conditions, the FTC is making clear that the antitrust laws do not stand in the way of their efforts to collectively organize or bargain,” said FTC Chair Lina M. Khan.
“Gig workers shouldn’t be forced to accept low wages or poor working conditions just because they’re independent contractors,” said Hannah Garden-Monheit, Director of the FTC’s Office of Policy Planning. “The FTC’s policy statement today makes clear that the antitrust laws do not prevent gig workers from collectively organizing to fight for a better living.”
Under the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts, the ability of workers to organize and collectively bargain over wages and labor conditions is protected from antitrust liability. However, as more workers are increasingly classified as independent contractors and gig workers, they face a patchwork of cases regarding the potential application of the labor exemption.
The FTC’s policy statement makes clear that workers engaged in protected bargaining or organizing activity are not categorically excluded from the antitrust exemption simply because they do not have a formal employer-employee relationship with the firm with which they are negotiating regarding compensation or working conditions. According to the policy statement, the protection of all workers from antitrust liability when they are engaged in protected labor activities is firmly grounded in the statutory text, consistent with existing case law, and reflective of the original meaning of the labor exemption.
Categorically excluding all independent contractors from the protections of the labor exemption would give employers both the incentive and opportunity to exploit asymmetries in antitrust liability protection between workers, according to the policy statement. For example, businesses would have an opportunity and incentive to classify (or misclassify) their workers as independent contractors to suppress wages and to gain an unfair advantage against competitors who provide better compensation and job conditions to workers.
Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Andrew N. Ferguson Joined by Commissioner Melissa Holyoak Regarding the Enforcement Policy Statement on Exemption of Protected Labor Activity by Workers from Antitrust Liability
Investigation to determine if Google has strategic market status in search and search advertising activities and whether these services are delivering good outcomes for people and businesses in the UK.
The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) has today launched its first strategic market status (SMS) designation investigation under the new digital markets competition regime which came into force on 1 January 2025. The investigation will assess Google’s position in search and search advertising services and how this impacts consumers and businesses including advertisers, news publishers, and rival search engines.
Google’s innovative services have generated significant benefits in the UK. Its search services are a gateway through which millions of people and businesses access and navigate the internet. In the UK, Google accounts for more than 90% of all general search queries, and more than 200,000 UK advertisers use Google’s search advertising. Search is vital for economic growth. It facilitates businesses connecting with each other, with investors, and with their customers. And it generates a wealth of data that can be used to develop new AI products and services to foster innovation.
Given the importance of search as a key digital service for people, businesses and the economy, it is critical that competition works well. Effective competition ensures people benefit from greater choice, new and innovative services, and have control over their data. Search services are also important as a route to access the news. Effective competition could help ensure that people can access a wide range of content and that publishers are treated fairly for the use of their content.
For businesses, effective competition could keep down the costs of search advertising, equivalent to nearly £500 per household per year, in turn lowering prices across the economy. An effective, competitive market could also allow businesses to innovate in a way which creates alternatives to traditional search services, including by, for example, ensuring that new AI start-ups can compete with Google and other existing players on an equal footing.
Under the digital markets competition regime, the CMA may designate firms with SMS in relation to a particular digital activity. Once designated, the CMA can impose conduct requirements or propose pro-competition interventions to achieve positive outcomes for UK consumers and businesses.
The CMA’s investigation will assess whether Google has SMS in the UK search and search advertising sectors and, in parallel, consider whether conduct requirements should be imposed in the event of a final designation decision.
The issues that will form part of the CMA’s investigation include:
Weak competition and barriers to entry and innovation in search. The CMA will assess how competition is working and if Google is using its position to prevent innovation by others. This includes whether barriers to entry are preventing other competitors from entering the market, in particular whether Google is able to shape the development of new AI services and interfaces, including ‘answer engines’, in ways which limit the competitive constraint they impose on Google Search.
Possible leveraging of market power and ensuring open markets. This will include investigating whether Google is using its position in the market to self-preference its own services, for example specialised search services covering shopping and travel.
Potential exploitative conduct. This will include investigating the collection and use of large quantities of consumer data without informed consent, and the use of publisher content without fair terms and conditions (including payment terms).
Potential conduct requirements could include, for example, requirements on Google to make the data it collects available to other businesses or giving publishers more control over how their data is used including in Google’s AI services.
The CMA will take a proportionate and transparent approach to this investigation which must be completed within 9 months. It will now focus on engaging a wide range of stakeholders – including advertising firms, news publishers and user groups – as well as gathering evidence from Google before reaching a decision by October 2025.
Sarah Cardell, Chief Executive of the CMA, said:
Millions of people and businesses across the UK rely on Google’s search and advertising services – with 90 per cent of searches happening on their platform and more than 200,000 UK businesses advertising there. That’s why it’s so important to ensure these services are delivering good outcomes for people and businesses and that there is a level playing field, especially as AI has the potential to transform search services.
It’s our job to ensure people get the full benefit of choice and innovation in search services and get a fair deal – for example in how their data is collected and stored. And for businesses, whether you are a rival search engine, an advertiser or a news organisation, we want to ensure there is a level playing field for all businesses, large and small, to succeed.
More information on the digital markets competition regime can be found via the CMA’s explainer page.
Notes to Editors
1 . Search advertising is where an advertiser pays for its advert to appear next to the results from a user’s search on an internet search engine. The investigation relates to Google’s general search and search advertising activities. A description of these activities and the main Google products included is set out in the investigation notice.
2 . The statutory deadline for this investigation is Monday 13 October 2025.
3 . Anyone with an interest in the CMA’s Google Search investigation is invited to comment until Monday 3 February.
4 . Under the digital markets competition regime, the CMA may designate firms with SMS in relation to a particular digital activity. If designated, the CMA could impose conduct requirements or introduce pro-competition interventions to achieve positive outcomes for UK consumers and businesses. For any business to be able to be designated with strategic market status it must be found to have:
Substantial and entrenched market power in a digital activity linked to the United Kingdom
A position of strategic significance
Global turnover of more than £25 billion or UK turnover of more than £1 billion
6 . The regime forms part of the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act which received Royal Assent in May 2024.
7 . Today’s announcement comes at a time when other authorities around the world, including in the US, Europe and Australia are also taking a close look at Google’s search activities. The CMA is in regular contact with these other authorities.
8 . For media enquiries, contact the CMA press office on 020 3738 6460 or press@cma.gov.uk
La CNMC inicia un estudio sobre la urbanización del suelo para mejorar el acceso a la vivienda
La escasez de suelo y las restricciones para el desarrollo urbanístico pueden limitar la vivienda disponible y elevar su precio.
El estudio formulará recomendaciones para agilizar la urbanización del suelo, reducir costes y acelerar plazos, en beneficio de los ciudadanos.
La Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia (CNMC) ha iniciado un estudio sobre la transformación urbanística del suelo para mejorar el acceso a la vivienda en nuestro país.
Impulso de la urbanización del suelo
El suelo es un elemento necesario para la construcción de vivienda y representa un porcentaje muy importante de su precio. Por eso, la escasez de suelo y las restricciones en el desarrollo urbanístico pueden reducir la vivienda disponible y elevar su coste. Para evitarlo, la urbanización del suelo debería ser un proceso ágil y rápido en la medida de lo posible, manteniendo las garantías necesarias.
En esta línea, el estudio de la CNMC identificará los elementos que restrinjan de forma innecesaria la eficiencia y competencia del sector, y formulará una serie de recomendaciones para mejorar su funcionamiento.
La CNMC anima a cualquier persona con información relevante sobre el sector a ponerse en contacto con la Subdirección de Estudios e Informes del Departamento de Promoción de la Competencia a través de la siguiente dirección de correo electrónico: dp.estudios@cnmc.es.
El Plan Estratégico 2021-2026 de la CNMC incluye entre sus objetivos la protección de los consumidores, particularmente los más vulnerables, así como el impulso de la productividad y la eficiencia económica.
La CNMC, de acuerdo con el artículo 5.1 de la Ley de creación, tiene entre sus funciones la promoción de una competencia efectiva en los mercados mediante, entre otros, la realización de estudios y trabajos de investigación en materia de competencia, así como informes generales sobre sectores económicos, en su caso, con propuestas de liberalización, desregulación o modificación normativa.
Documento no oficial, destinado a los medios de comunicación, y que no vincula a la CNMC. Reproducción permitida solo si se cita la fuente.
La CNMC multa al Ilustre Colegio de Abogados de Barcelona por incumplir sus resoluciones
En 2018, la CNMC sancionó al ICAB y a otros ocho colegios de abogados por elaborar, publicar y difundir baremos de honorarios.
Tras la sanción, el ICAB aportó unos criterios orientativos para la tasación de costas adecuados al cumplimiento de la resolución sancionadora.
En la vigilancia del expediente, la CNMC detectó que en realidad el ICAB estaba aplicando y difundiendo esos criterios como verdaderos baremos.
La Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia (CNMC) ha sancionado al Ilustre Colegio de Abogados de Barcelona (ICAB) con 500.000 euros por incumplir dos resoluciones dictadas en un expediente sancionador por recomendaciones de precios sobre los honorarios que cobran los abogados a sus clientes en los procesos judiciales (SNC/100/24 ICAB).
En marzo de 2018, la CNMC sancionó al ICAB y a ocho Colegios de Abogados por realizar recomendaciones de precios mediante la elaboración, publicación y difusión de baremos de honorarios, conductas prohibidas por el artículo 1 de la Ley 15/2007 de 3 de julio, de Defensa de la Competencia (LDC) (nota de prensa).
Tras la sanción, el ICAB aportó a la CNMC unos nuevos criterios orientativos para la tasación de costas. En este documento el ICAB establecía pautas o directrices generales para la tasación de costas, en lugar de los baremos o instrumentos para la cuantificación directa de los honorarios por los que había sido sancionado.
En febrero de 2020, la CNMC dictó una Resolución —como parte del procedimiento de vigilancia (VS/0587/16) del expediente de 2018— en la que declaró que los criterios orientativos para la tasación de costas presentados por el ICAB eran adecuados para cumplir la Resolución de 2018. En la misma resolución la CNMC advertía que seguiría vigilando la actuación de los colegios “con vistas a garantizar que no utilicen ni difundan los antiguos criterios ya sancionados u otros similares”.
Expediente sancionador
Sin embargo, la CNMC acreditó después que el ICAB había difundido los criterios orientativos validados por la CNMC para que se aplicasen en la práctica como verdaderos baremos de honorarios. Con esta difusión, realizada especialmente en sesiones de formación, se transformaban las indicaciones genéricas de los criterios orientativos en unos porcentajes concretos y, en definitiva, en un sistema de cálculo automático para la tasación de costas. La difusión se produjo entre más de 4.000 abogados del ICAB, además de entre profesionales colegiados en colegios de abogados de otras demarcaciones territoriales.
Esta práctica constituye un incumplimiento de las resoluciones de 2018 y 2020, tipificado como una infracción muy grave en el artículo 62.4.c) de la Ley de Defensa de la Competencia.
Pago voluntario y reducción de la multa
Antes de aprobarse la resolución, el ICAB pagado voluntariamente la multa propuesta (500.000 euros), acogiéndose al artículo 85.3 de la Ley 39/2015, que permite reducir, como mínimo, un 20 % la sanción si la entidad paga por anticipado. El importe de la multa, una vez aplicada la reducción, ha sido de 400.000 euros.
Documento no oficial, destinado a los medios de comunicación, y que no vincula a la CNMC. Reproducción permitida solo si se cita la fuente.
La CNMC analizará la concentración Bondalti Chemicals/Ercros en segunda fase
Bondalti notificó la adquisición del control exclusivo de Ercros el pasado 9 de julio de 2024.
La operación puede suponer riesgos para la competencia en los mercados de sosa cáustica e hipoclorito sódico, por lo que requiere un análisis en mayor profundidad.
La Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia (CNMC) ha acordado, con fecha 18 de diciembre de 2024, el inicio de la segunda fase del análisis de la concentración Bondalti Chemicals/Ercros (C/1480/24).
La operación consiste en la adquisición del control exclusivo de Ercros por parte de Bondalti, a través de una oferta pública de adquisición (OPA) hostil que fue presentada el 5 de marzo de 2024.
Apertura de la segunda fase
El sector económico afectado por la operación es la fabricación de productos básicos de química orgánica e inorgánica, en especial los mercados del cloro y sus derivados, en los que se solapa la actividad de las partes.
La potencial adquisición puede suponer riesgos para la competencia en los mercados de sosa cáustica e hipoclorito sódico y, por ello, la CNMC ha acordado analizar la operación en segunda fase. Este paso no prejuzga las conclusiones definitivas que la CNMC pueda alcanzar sobre la concentración.
Análisis en profundidad
Durante la primera fase del procedimiento, la CNMC ha investigado la situación de competencia en los mercados afectados. Esto facilitará el análisis en segunda fase, que estudiará en mayor profundidad la operación y, en particular, los mercados afectados de sosa cáustica e hipoclorito sódico.
Durante esta fase, Ercros y otros terceros con interés legítimo podrán presentar alegaciones. Bondalti, por su parte, también podrá formular alegaciones y aportar más información. Además, se solicitará un informe preceptivo a las comunidades autónomas en las que la concentración incida de forma significativa.
La resolución final que apruebe la CNMC podrá autorizar, aceptar compromisos, imponer condiciones o prohibir la operación de concentración Bondalti Chemicals/Ercros.
Documento no oficial, destinado a los medios de comunicación, y que no vincula a la CNMC. Reproducción permitida solo si se cita la fuente.
Ouverture d’une consultation publique sur l’introduction d’un système de contrôle des concentrations pour les opérations sous les seuils de notification
Publié le 14 janvier 2025
Tirant les conséquences de l’arrêt Illumina/Grail de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne du 3 septembre 2024, l’Autorité de la concurrence s’est engagée à identifier les moyens existants ou nécessaires pour s’assurer qu’aucune concentration, même non soumise à une notification préalable, ne porte atteinte à la concurrence sur le territoire français.
Dans ce cadre, l’Autorité ouvre la présente consultation publique pour recueillir les observations des parties prenantes jusqu’au 16 février 2025.
Communiqué de presse du 14 janvier 2025
L’Autorité de la concurrence ouvre une consultation publique jusqu’au 16 février 2025 sur les modalités d’introduction d’un système de contrôle des concentrations susceptibles de porter atteinte à la concurrence et ne franchissant pas les seuils de notification en vigueur
From January 2025, new responsibilities for the CMA came into force under the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024.
The new ‘digital markets competition regime’ enables the CMA to promote competition in fast-moving digital markets, while protecting UK consumers and businesses from unfair or harmful practices by the very largest technology firms.
The regime will unlock opportunities for more innovation and economic growth across the UK tech sector, benefitting companies of all shapes and sizes – along with the investors who back them. It will also help people and businesses across the UK, who rely on access to critical digital markets, to get a fair deal.
On 14 January 2025, the CMA launched the first investigation under the regime, focused on Google’s activities in search and search advertising.
The regime provides a unique opportunity to encourage the benefits of investment and innovation from the largest digital firms, while ensuring a level playing-field for the many start-ups and scale-ups across the UK tech sector. The multitude of UK businesses and consumers who depend on the largest firms for critical products and services will also benefit from more innovation, more choice and more competitive prices.
opportunities to harness the benefits of continued investment and innovation by the very largest firms
unlocking expanded opportunities for investment and innovation by creating a level playing field for start-ups and scale-ups (many UK-based) to succeed
strengthened opportunities for UK consumers and business customers, those who rely on key platform services, to benefit from greater choice, more innovation and lower prices
People can:
make informed choices, with defaults and choice architecture aiding decision-making
use the products and services that best meet their needs, regardless of what other products and services they use and who they are provided by
easily switch providers, without losing access to their data and content
be protected from exploitation and unfair or misleading practices
To ensure that businesses:
that rely on Strategic Market Status (SMS) firms do not face exploitation or anti-competitive behaviour by those firms
have a fair chance to compete with SMS firms, including through appropriate access to data and functionality
Driving economic growth and improved productivity by:
harnessing the benefits of continued investment and innovation by the very largest firms
expanding opportunities for investment and innovation by creating a level playing field for start-ups and scale-ups (many UK-based) to succeed
Criteria for Strategic Market Status
The heart of the regime is proportionality. It is designed to apply only to the very largest firms. If certain conditions are met, these firms can be designated with Strategic Market Status (SMS) in relation to a particular digital activity.
In the first investigation under the regime, the CMA will consider whether Google, which accounts for more than 90% of all general search queries in the UK, has SMS in the provision of search and search advertising services.
The CMA will carry out investigations within a 9 month statutory timeframe to consider whether to designate a firm with SMS.
To assess whether the conditions for an SMS designation are met, the CMA will carry out evidence-based investigations, consulting and engaging with a wide range of stakeholders.
The conditions are:
UK turnover of more than £1 billion or global turnover of more than £25 billion
substantial and entrenched market power in relation to the digital activity
a position of strategic significance
The CMA must carry out a forward-looking, five-year assessment to decide whether a firm has ‘substantial and entrenched’ market power in a particular digital activity. To make sure the regime keeps up with developments in fast-moving digital markets, SMS designations are time-bound for review every 5 years.
A firm has a position of strategic significance if it has at least 1 of the following:
significant size or scale in the digital activity
a significant number of other firms use the digital activity to carry out business it can extend its market power to a range of other activities
it can substantially influence how other firms behave, in respect of the digital activity or otherwise
Stages of an SMS investigation
An SMS investigation will usually last 9 months. The stages are:
launch of the designation investigation
consultation period
proposed decision
consultation period
final decision
At least 9 months before the end of the five-year designation period, the CMA must open a new SMS investigation to re-assess the firm’s status.
What happens as a result of an investigation
If the CMA designates a firm with SMS, it will have 2 key tools: Conduct Requirements and Pro-Competition Interventions.
Through Conduct Requirements, the CMA will be able to guide the behaviour of SMS firms, tackling conduct that could undermine fair competition, or exploit people and businesses.
Through Pro-Competition Interventions, the CMA will be able to address specific competition problems arising from a firm’s market power in a particular digital activity.
The regime also provides for additional merger reporting requirements on SMS firms, to make sure the CMA has earlier sight of mergers and acquisitions that could harm competition in digital markets.
Conduct requirements
The CMA may put in place one or more tailored rules for SMS firms – steps that require them to take certain action or to stop a specific activity. These requirements may be put in place where doing so would be proportionate to achieve specific positive outcomes for users (or potential users) of the digital activity. These are fair dealing, open choices, or trust and transparency.
Pro-competition interventions
Once a firm has been designated with strategic market status, the CMA may investigate whether anything relating to the designated digital activity (for example, the behaviour of a firm or the structure of a sector) is harming competition.
If the CMA finds an adverse effect on competition, it can design and test interventions to address these competition problems and any harmful effects on users. This might include giving people the power to transfer their data easily between providers; or requiring firms to make sure different products and services work smoothly together (‘interoperability’), so businesses can more easily innovate and compete.
New merger reporting requirements
SMS firms must report mergers with a UK connection, and a value of £25 million or more, to the CMA before their completion. Where the CMA is concerned a merger might cause competition problems, it will launch a merger investigation under its normal merger review process.
Design and approach
The way rules are designed and applied matters if the UK is to maximise its international attractiveness to innovators and investors. The new regime has been created with this in mind, representing a unique combination of ‘best-in-class’ features, which the CMA is committed to implementing in an open, transparent, solutions-focused way.
Proportionality
The regime applies only to the very largest technology firms – those with substantial and entrenched market power in a particular digital activity. The CMA will also take a highly tailored, bespoke approach to identifying and addressing specific harms.
Process
The process for investigations and interventions will be participative and transparent, including constructive engagement with SMS firms and other stakeholders to resolve concerns quickly and effectively where possible.
Predictability
Interventions are developed through a forward-looking, iterative and open process, providing the predictability that is critically important to businesses. Designations are limited to a maximum of 5 years before the CMA must consider whether they should be renewed, varied or revoked. This provides certainty whilst enabling the CMA to take account of technological and broader market changes.
Pace
Designation investigations have a 9-month statutory timeline, with the CMA able to consult on conduct requirements at the same time, helping us to reach positive outcomes faster. The Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act also provides for a new general duty of expedition for the CMA, including in relation to the digital markets competition regime, which means pace will be a key focus.
Administering the regime
The CMA will actively monitor interventions to make sure they are effective, avoid unintended consequences, and are targeted where they can have the most positive impact.
The most significant decisions under the regime will be taken by the CMA Board and a new Digital Markets Board Committee.
The CMA will coordinate with other regulators domestically and set out arrangements for doing this in published memoranda of understanding.
Many of the issues the CMA will tackle are cross-border in nature, so it is also working closely with international partners to help shape a regulatory landscape that supports investment and innovation in the UK.
The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) has investigated the completed acquisition by Sonoco Products Company of the Eviosys group, from entities managed by KPS Capital Partners LP and Crown Holdings, Inc.
Os efeitos do by-pass em setores regulados de infraestrutura começaram a ser estudados a partir de modificações na teoria econômica dos preços regulados ótimos de Ramsey por empresas multi-produto. Nestas últimas, supunha-se que os vários produtos/serviços prestados por uma mesma empresa são ofertados em regime de monopólio. Assim, a questão regulatória relevante seria como o regulador deveria distribuir os preços regulados de forma eficiente entre os vários produtos/serviços deste monopólio.
Uma firma de infraestrutura de transporte, por exemplo, que realiza vários pares origem/destino é multiproduto, considerando cada par um produto diferente. A questão aqui é como distribuir a recuperação dos custos pela regulação de preços entre os vários produtos/serviços que são estas origens/destinos. O mesmo vale para o setor de gás que usualmente têm mais de um par origem/destino. A telefonia, quando era um monopólio natural, também tinha essa questão de regulação de preços multi produto. No Brasil, a telefonia local tinha sete tipos de preços regulados e não era regida por origem/destino (mas sim habilitação, assinatura como tarifas fixas e pulso como tarifa variável), cento e vinte de longa distância com combinações de hora do dia e distância, sendo esta última tipicamente variável de origem/destino e internacional.
A introdução de alternativas de concorrência para esta empresa regulada que era e deixou de ser monopolista multi-produto em uma ou algumas áreas/mercados, usualmente as mais atrativas, constitui o chamado by-pass. Ou seja, um ou mais concorrentes passam a ameaçar áreas/mercados específicos do monopolista multiproduto regulado. E isso altera o formato básico deste tipo clássico de regulação de preços para considerar o desvio de quantidades da firma regulada para a firma que oferece a alternativa de competição, by-passando o antigo monopolista multi-produto. Por exemplo, suponha que existe o serviço regulado representado por uma infraestrutura de gasoduto transportando e distribuindo gás natural para os consumidores e uma alternativa de by-pass que vende Gás Natural Liquefeito (GNL) transportado por caminhão.
A próxima seção sumaria a teoria dos preços regulados ótimos de monopolistas multi-produto sem by-pass. A terceira seção coloca o by-pass na teoria dos preços regulados ótimos de monopolistas multi-produto. A quarta seção discorre sobre o problema de implementação prática dos preços regulados em firmas multi-produto com by-pass, indicando as alternativas e seus inevitáveis trade-offs.
II. Preços Regulados Ótimos de Ramsey/Boiteaux sem Bypass
A análise econômica do by-pass em infraestrutura se inicia dentro dos desenvolvimentos da teoria sobre preços regulados ótimos em firmas multiproduto[1]. As economias de escala geradas por elevados custos fixos em infraestrutura indicavam claramente que os preços regulados ótimos não podiam ser iguais aos respectivos custos marginais, a regra de ouro resultado do mecanismo de mercado nos setores em concorrência perfeita e que, pelo primeiro teorema do bem-estar, gera um resultado pareto eficiente.
De fato, elevados custos fixos geram economias de escala significativas. E assim, a regra de fazer os preços regulados de cada produto iguais aos respectivos custos marginais implica não recuperar os custos fixos, grande parte dos quais são comuns a vários “produtos”[2]. A não ser que se conte com recursos externos (do governo) para financiar os custos fixos, estes têm que ser recuperados apenas pelos preços cobrados e a referência ao custo marginal (que não incorpora custos fixos) não permite isto.
De qualquer forma, se houvesse apenas o preço de um bem ou serviço sendo regulado, a solução seria simples. Distribui-se o custo fixo por todas as unidades vendidas e soma-se ao custo marginal. Seria uma regulação, na verdade, do preço regulado pelo custo médio (custo variável médio + custo fixo médio). Troca-se o custo marginal pelo custo médio e a regulação de preços permite a recuperação tanto de custos variáveis como fixos.
Mas sendo uma firma regulada que oferta vários bens ou serviços (uma firma multiproduto), o uso desta regra meramente contábil de recuperação do custo fixo pela regra do preço igual ao custo médio deixa de ser desejável. A questão da regulação de preços nesta firma multiproduto é como distribuir os custos fixos entre os diversos produtos ou serviços vendidos de forma a gerar o maior bem-estar possível. Para ser mais preciso, a questão é em quanto os preços de cada bem ou serviço devem ser diferentes da regra canônica de preço igual ao respectivo custo marginal para que todo o financiamento da atividade seja coberto pelos preços (restrição do autofinanciamento), incluindo os custos fixos, gerando o maior bem-estar possível.
A solução deste problema foi buscada na teoria da taxação ótima de Ramsey (1927)[3] que basicamente maximiza uma função de bem-estar com a restrição de que todas as despesas devem ser financiadas por impostos sobre os bens. O principal achado do autor, que virou uma grande referência teórica na teoria econômica da taxação, é que cabe tributar mais (menos) os bens de menor (maior) elasticidade-preço da demanda. Isso porque tributos maiores geram preços maiores que reduzem proporcionalmente mais as quantidades dos produtos/serviços mais elásticos. Para minimizar o efeito da queda conjunta das quantidades dos produtos tributados, chega-se à regra de tributar mais (menos) os produtos/serviços cujas quantidades reagem menos (mais) aos aumentos dos seus preços, ou seja, os menos (mais) elásticos.
Essa mesma lógica da teoria da tributação foi utilizada para a análise dos preços regulados ótimos em uma firma multiproduto para o problema de distribuir o custo fixo entre os vários produtos/serviços. Essa é a chamada regra de Ramsey/Boiteaux[4], desenvolvida por Baumol e Bradford (1970)[5]. Uma hipótese chave para simplificar o problema pelos autores, no entanto, é que as elasticidades preços cruzadas da demanda entre os bens ou serviços vendidos sejam zero. Ou seja, todos os produtos ou serviços vendidos não são substitutos entre si nem com outros existentes no mercado.
A quebra desta hipótese é o principal ingrediente na discussão sobre como a existência de by-pass modifica a regra de Ramsey de distribuição do custo fixo entre os produtos/serviços. É o que veremos na próxima seção.
III. Preços Regulados Ótimos de Ramsey-Boiteaux com Bypass
A introdução do by-pass na teoria econômica da regulação ocorre por uma extensão deste modelo para monopolistas multiproduto de Baumol e Bradford (1970) para o caso em que se admite a presença da chamada “competição intermodal” tal como proposto por Braeutigam (1979)[6]. Esta competição intermodal se refere à possibilidade de competidores em alguns dos mercados servidos pelo “monopolista multi-produto”[7] substituírem os produtos/serviços deste último, o que seria a fonte do by-pass[8].
Em síntese, a “competição intermodal” faz com que a elasticidade-preço cruzada da demanda com produtos/serviços de outros agentes econômicos seja diferente de zero.
O autor usa o exemplo de transporte por ferrovia que pode ser substituído ou “bypassado”, ainda que de forma imperfeita, por outros meios de transporte como rodovias, ferrovias ou aquático[9]. Um desses meios, por exemplo o ferroviário, tem economias de escala[10].
A grande diferença aqui com o modelo de precificação Ramsey/Boiteaux puro é que as elasticidades preço cruzadas da demanda entre os produtos/serviços quando o monopolista multiproduto tem esta “competição intermodal” em alguns produtos/serviços deixa de ser zero. Nesse caso, o regulador deve escolher não só os preços dos produtos ou serviços da firma regulada como de seus substitutos, considerando as relações de substituição entre eles ou mais simplesmente as suas elasticidades preços cruzadas da demanda.
De fato, dada a reação da demanda destes substitutos de outra empresa em função dos preços regulados da empresa regulada, há efeitos não computados nos problemas de Ramsey/Boiteaux que são considerados no modelo de Braeutigam (1979). O conjunto dos produtos/serviços alternativos do by-pass tornam a resposta da demanda da empresa multiproduto nesses produtos/serviços mais elástica do que quando não havia o by-pass. As elasticidades cruzadas entre ferrovia/rodovia, ferrovia/hidrovia, por exemplo, se tornam relevantes no cálculo dos preços regulados ótimos. Quanto mais os by-pass puderem desviar demanda da empresa regulada multiproduto, maior deverá ser o preço ótimo regulado do by-pass, evitando muito desvio de demanda para este substituto (o by-pass), erodindo a base de financiamento do custo fixo da empresa regulada.
Note que, pelo menos teoricamente, o regulador passa a ter que regular também os preços do by-pass junto com os da empresa monopolista multiproduto. Se não o fizer, a concorrência do by-pass nos produtos/serviços em que há substitubilidade inviabilizam preços maiores que o custo marginal na empresa regulada e, portanto, tornam impossível o financiamento do seu custo fixo por meio de seus preços. Outra hipótese colocada pelo autor é o regulador, em lugar de regular diretamente os preços dos produtos/serviços do by-pass, impor taxas sobre eles de forma a induzir preços superiores na medida correta.
Assim, mesmo sem custos fixos nos produtos/serviços do bypass, seus preços regulados ótimos serão superiores aos respectivos custos marginais, dados os seus efeitos sobre a demanda dos preços ótimos da firma multiproduto, medidos pela elasticidade-preço cruzada da demanda.
Note-se que como não há economias de escala no by-pass, a concorrência sem regulação os levaria a fazer preços iguais aos respectivos custos marginais, ou seja, o livre funcionamento do mercado levaria a um resultado (preço =custo marginal) diferente do preço ótimo da firma regulada que é acima do custo marginal. Daí que cabe ao regulador estender a regulação de preços ao by-pass ainda que sem custos fixos a financiar. E seriam, curiosamente, preços regulados maiores do que os dados pelo livre mercado!
Caso regular preços para mais no by-pass e não para menos como é usual seja algo desconfortável ao regulador cabe a ele avaliar se ainda faz sentido regular preços da firma regulada multiproduto ou questionar se a entrada do by-pass deve ser permitida.
IV. Desafios da Implementação Prática da Regulação de Preços por Ramsey/Boiteaux com Bypass
Se já há desafios teóricos relevantes, a implementação concreta da teoria dos preços ótimos do monopolista multiproduto a la Ramsey/Boiteaux proposta por Baumol e Bradford (1970) não é nada trivial, incluindo a regulação dos preços do bypass. Cabe calcular as elasticidades da demanda de cada um dos produtos/serviços, os respectivos custos marginais e o preço sombra da restrição ligada à necessidade de financiamento do custo fixo.
Mas se esta questão de ordem prática já impõe severas dificuldades operacionais, pior ainda quando pensamos na extensão do problema de achar os preços regulados ótimos considerando a possibilidade de by-pass ou de competição intermodal na linha de Braeutigam (1979). Isso porque para achar os preços regulados ótimos adiciona-se a necessidade de calcular as elasticidades preço cruzadas dos produtos/serviços da empresa com os produtos/serviços dos concorrentes intermodais ou by-pass. Além de passar a ter que regular também os preços dos produtos/serviços destes concorrentes intermodais ou by-pass, aduzindo mais complexidade à regulação.
Conforme este último autor isso se tornaria um “pesadelo administrativo” que “representa um enorme empreendimento regulatório” pois “a informação requerida nas várias elasticidades preço cruzadas da demanda por si só já é o suficiente para fazer a implementação do programa muito difícil”.
Ademais, reguladores não têm o poder em geral de impor taxas sobre produtores específicos. Sendo assim, há quatro alternativas:
simplesmente “proibir a livre entrada nesses mercados” para o by-pass, o que gera um custo em termos de redução da concorrência potencial na área/mercado que poderiam ser cobertos pelo bypass;
prover subsídios à firma regulada de forma que esta possa reduzir seus preços na área/mercado de competição com o by-pass, o que gera gastos ao governo e, portanto, pressão fiscal;
abrir mão em grande parte da regulação de preços, o que implicará permitir redução de preços nas áreas/segmentos ameaçadas pela concorrência do by-pass, compensada por incremento de preços onde tal ameaça não se verifica de forma a manter o negócio auto-sustentável. Nesse caso, no entanto, boa parte da política de expansão do serviço nas áreas subsidiadas mais pobres e distantes deve ser abandonada em favor de concorrência da empresa regulada com o by-pass nas áreas mais ricas, o que seria uma “política social às avessas”. No limite, abrir mão da regulação, até porque havendo concorrência ela se torna desnecessária quando a falha de mercado diz respeito à falta de concorrência;
deixar a empresa regulada se comprometer financeiramente em uma típica “expropriação desregulatória” de agentes regulados que investiram em custos afundados em uma área de infraestrutura com objetivos de política pública. A sinalização sobre a segurança jurídica para investimento em infraestrutura no país é comprometida para o setor em questão e outros.
Ou seja, todas as quatro alternativas de solução do problema apresentam custos e benefícios. Caberá ao regulador avaliar quais trade-offs entre as opções será o mais agudo no caso prático de by-pass. A última, com certeza, é aquela mais destrutiva para o investimento no Brasil. Daí que a opção por uma ou um mix das três primeiras alternativas seria o mais recomendado.
[1] Uma firma de infraestrutura de transporte, por exemplo, que realiza vários pares origem/destino é multiproduto, considerando cada par um produto diferente. O mesmo vale para o setor de gás ou telefonia. Cada combinação origem/destino do gás pode ser definido como um produto distinto.
[2] Em um gasoduto que transporta gás do ponto “0” às localidades 1,2,3,4 e 5 que estão em uma sequência linear, e entregando gás em todas elas compartilha fisicamente os custos fixos do mesmo gasoduto entre a origem 0 e a localidade 1. O serviço de entrega para as localidades 2 a 5 compartilha os custos fixos da origem 0 à localidade 2 e assim por diante. Já na contabilidade regulatória, em geral, considera-se que todo o custo fixo do gasoduto é compartilhado por todos as localidades.
[3] Ramsey, Frank P. (1927). “A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation”. The Economic Journal. 37 (145): 47–61. O autor usou para a teoria econômica da tributação, mas depois foi estendida para a teoria dos preços regulados de firmas multiproduto.
[4] Boiteux, Marcel (January 1956). “Sur la Gestation des Monopoles Publics astreints a l’equilibre budgetaire” (PDF). Econometrica. 24 (1): 22–40. Boiteaux aplicou quase 20 anos depois, o instrumental de Ramsey utilizado na teoria econômica da tributação para a teoria econômica da precificação regulatória ótima multiproduto.
[5] Baumol,W. e Bradford,D.: “Optimal Departures From Marginal Cost Pricing”. The American Economic Review, Vol. 60, No. 3 (Jun., 1970).
[6] Braeutigam,R.: Optimal Pricing with Intermodal Competition. The American Economic Review, Vol. 69, No. 1 (Mar., 1979), pp. 38-49.
[7] Que nesse caso não será exatamente um monopolista nos produtos/serviços para os quais há substitutos, mas sim em outros.
[8] A palavra by-pass ainda não havia sido utilizada por Braeutigam (1979).
[9] Como coloca o autor, não são substitutos perfeitos, pois “rodovias, rios e ferrovias podem diferir quanto à velocidade de transporte, confiabilidade e outros aspectos da qualidade do serviço”.
[10] O autor assume, por simplificação, que os outros dois “concorrentes imperfeitos” da ferrovia não possuem economias de escala.
César Mattos. Doutor em economia. Ex-conselheiro do CADE e Ex-secretário da SEAE. Consultor legislativo da Câmara dos Deputados.
Saiba mais
Fique informado com as Notícias da Regulação Econômica da WebAdvocacy:
O Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (CADE) aprovou, sem restrições, a aquisição de ativos da Turbo Diesel Comércio de Combustíveis Ltda. pela Serra Diesel Transportador Revendedor Retalhista S.A., operação que envolve o segmento de Transportador Revendedor Retalhista (TRR) no Rio Grande do Sul. O caso foi analisado no âmbito do Processo nº 08700.010795/2024-64 e a decisão foi publicada na manhã dessa terça-feira (14).
A operação consiste na compra de ativos da Turbo Diesel pela Serra Diesel, visando expandir a eficiência logística no estado e gerar economias de escala. Para a Turbo Diesel, a transação representa a possibilidade de retorno sobre o capital empregado.
Após sua aprovação pelo CADE a operação deverá ser comunicada à Agência Nacional de Petróleo, Gás Natural e Biocombustíveis (ANP), nos termos da Resolução ANP nº 938/2023.
Este é um informativo diário que traz para o(a) leitor (a) notícias e casos de defesa da concorrência das principais jurisdições antitruste do mundo (CADE, FTC, Comissão Europeia, CMA etc).
Notícias da concorrência
La CNMC analizará la concentración Bondalti Chemicals/Ercros en segunda fase
Bondalti notificó la adquisición del control exclusivo de Ercros el pasado 9 de julio de 2024.
La operación puede suponer riesgos para la competencia en los mercados de sosa cáustica e hipoclorito sódico, por lo que requiere un análisis en mayor profundidad.
La Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia (CNMC) ha acordado, con fecha 18 de diciembre de 2024, el inicio de la segunda fase del análisis de la concentración Bondalti Chemicals/Ercros (C/1480/24).
La operación consiste en la adquisición del control exclusivo de Ercros por parte de Bondalti, a través de una oferta pública de adquisición (OPA) hostil que fue presentada el 5 de marzo de 2024.
Apertura de la segunda fase
El sector económico afectado por la operación es la fabricación de productos básicos de química orgánica e inorgánica, en especial los mercados del cloro y sus derivados, en los que se solapa la actividad de las partes.
La potencial adquisición puede suponer riesgos para la competencia en los mercados de sosa cáustica e hipoclorito sódico y, por ello, la CNMC ha acordado analizar la operación en segunda fase. Este paso no prejuzga las conclusiones definitivas que la CNMC pueda alcanzar sobre la concentración.
Análisis en profundidad
Durante la primera fase del procedimiento, la CNMC ha investigado la situación de competencia en los mercados afectados. Esto facilitará el análisis en segunda fase, que estudiará en mayor profundidad la operación y, en particular, los mercados afectados de sosa cáustica e hipoclorito sódico.
Durante esta fase, Ercros y otros terceros con interés legítimo podrán presentar alegaciones. Bondalti, por su parte, también podrá formular alegaciones y aportar más información. Además, se solicitará un informe preceptivo a las comunidades autónomas en las que la concentración incida de forma significativa.
La resolución final que apruebe la CNMC podrá autorizar, aceptar compromisos, imponer condiciones o prohibir la operación de concentración Bondalti Chemicals/Ercros.
Documento no oficial, destinado a los medios de comunicación, y que no vincula a la CNMC. Reproducción permitida solo si se cita la fuente.
L’Autorité réforme, à droit constant, sa procédure de traitement du secret des affaires dans le cadre de l’instruction des dossiers
Publié le 13 janvier 2025
Cette réforme vise à réduire les délais de traitement du secret des affaires à travers :
– l’application rigoureuse par les parties de la notion de secret des affaires ;
– la réduction du nombre de décisions de traitement du secret des affaires multiples. L’objectif est de n’adopter, par principe, qu’une seule décision par partie concernée, accordant, refusant partiellement ou totalement la protection et, le cas échéant, une seule décision levant cette protection.
Artigos e análises
Research and analysis
Wider benefits of competition policy and enforcement
A review of recent evidence on the deterrent effects of competition policy and enforcement, and its wider impacts on growth and productivity.
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Details
This review summarises recent evidence on the deterrent effect of competition authorities’ work and the relationship between competition and productivity. This builds on previous reports on these topics published in 2017 and 2015 respectively.
The review finds new evidence continues to support those previous reports. We identify additional evidence of the existence of a substantial deterrent effect from enforcement action and merger control. We also find further evidence that effective competition policy has positive impacts on innovation, productivity and growth.
Updates to this page
Published 13 January 2025
Collection
Microeconomics Unit research
An overview of the CMA’s Microeconomics Unit’s research into competition, innovation, and productivity
The Microeconomics Unit (part of the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA)) conducts economic research focusing on issues of competition, innovation and productivity to support growth in the UK economy.
The role of the unit is to provide expertise and ensure the CMA and wider government remain informed of emerging economic trends helping people, businesses and the UK economy by promoting competitive markets and tackling unfair behaviour.
The discussion papers describe research in progress. They are published to encourage comment and further debate on issues of competition, innovation and productivity.
Partes: Companhia Nacional de Cimento, Companhia de Cimento da Paraíba, Companhia de Cimento Campeão Alvorada, Casa dos Ventos S.A., Ventos de Santa Jacinta Energias Renováveis S.A., Ventos de São Rafael Energias Renováveis S.A., Ventos de Santa Doroteia Energias Renováveis S.A. e Ventos de Santa Cristina Energias Renováveis S.A. Aprovação sem restrições.
Este é um informativo diário que traz para o(a) leitor (a) as decisões do CADE com relação a aprovação e movimentação de atos de concentração, ao arquivamento/condenação de processos administrativos de condutas anticompetitivas e as publicações do CADE.
Este conteúdo é apenas para associados Assinatura alfa. Cadastre-se
Este é um informativo semanal que traz para o(a) leitor (a) todas as tomadas de subsídios, consultas públicas e audiências públicas das agências reguladoras do Brasil.
Este conteúdo é apenas para associados Assinatura alfa. Cadastre-se
O Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (CADE) aprovou sem restrições a operação envolvendo a aquisição de controle compartilhado da Sauber Holding AG (SHO) pela Qatar Holding LLC (QH). A decisão foi publicada na manhã desta segunda-feira (13) no Diário Oficial da União.
A transação consiste na aquisição de 33,33% do capital social da Sauber Holding AG pela Qatar Holding, resultando no controle conjunto da empresa pela Audi e pela QH. A Sauber, que gerencia a equipe de Fórmula 1 Stake F1 Team Kick Sauber, é conhecida por suas atividades de desenvolvimento e promoção de carros de corrida, bem como pela prestação de serviços de engenharia e testes a terceiros.
A operação foi notificada ao CADE em 2 de janeiro de 2025 e atende aos critérios legais previstos na Lei nº 12.529/2011. O valor exato da transação, no entanto, permanece sob acesso restrito. Sobre os objetivos da operação, para a Qatar Holding, torna-se um meio de diversificar seus investimentos no setor de eventos de automobilismo, enquanto a Audi busca fortalecer os seus recursos financeiros.
A operação ainda depende da aprovação da Federação Internacional de Automobilismo (FIA). Se aprovada, a parceria Qatar Holding-Audi-Sauber promete trazer inovações significativas para o automobilismo.
Este é um informativo diário que traz para o(a) leitor (a) notícias e casos de defesa da concorrência das principais jurisdições antitruste do mundo (CADE, FTC, Comissão Europeia, CMA etc).
Notícias da concorrência
Justice Department Sues to Block Global Business Travel Group’s Proposed Acquisition of CWT Holdings
Friday, January 10, 2025Share
For Immediate Release
Office of Public Affairs
$570M Acquisition Would Allow the World’s Largest Travel Management Company to Eliminate its Second-Largest Rival, Limiting Travel Management Options for American Businesses
The Justice Department filed a civil antitrust lawsuit today to stop Global Business Travel Group Inc. (Amex GBT), the largest business travel management company in the world, from acquiring its rival, CWT Holdings LLC (CWT), the third-largest business travel management company in the world. The complaint, filed today in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, alleges that the proposed $570 million transaction — Amex GBT’s fifth acquisition of another travel management company since 2018 — would harm competition for business travel management services to U.S. global and multinational businesses.
“American businesses rely on travel management companies to connect employees, control travel costs, make travel booking and expense management easier, and ensure their employees’ safety during travel,” said Acting Assistant Attorney General Doha Mekki of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division. “This acquisition is the latest in a series of acquisitions by Amex GBT that will further consolidate an already consolidated market with only a handful of competitive options capable of serving customers with the most need for travel management services. American businesses will face the consequences, seeing higher prices, less innovation and fewer choices.”
As alleged in the complaint, Amex GBT and CWT anticipated that the proposed acquisition would harm competition and benefit the merged firm at the expense of its customers. The complaint alleges that senior Amex GBT executives viewed the acquisition as an opportunity for “consolidation” of the market for business travel management services for global and multinational customers and a respite from its recent customer losses to CWT. The complaint further alleges that Amex GBT recognized that its valuation of the proposed acquisition should reflect the financial benefit of avoiding future loss business to CWT. For example, its CEO wrote to its president that the company “need[ed] to consider how much we might lose to [CWT] each year in a [business as usual] scenario.” During deal negotiations, CWT’s owners likewise believed Amex GBT should pay a higher price for CWT in recognition of the increased revenues Amex GBT would enjoy post-merger due to the reduction in “price pressure” from “removing [a] big competitor.”
The complaint alleges that the combination of Amex GBT and CWT would combine two of the three largest players in business travel management services for global and multinational companies located in the United States, giving the combined firm a significant share in a market that one of the largest owners of CWT has acknowledged is “oligopolistic.” Few other companies can effectively provide travel management services to global and multinational companies located in the United States at the scale of Amex GBT and CWT.
Today, Amex GBT and CWT compete fiercely to provide travel management services for large businesses and those with complex travel needs. CWT had recently begun pursuing new and innovative strategies to improve service and reduce prices in order to win over business from Amex GBT. As a result, Amex GBT recently lost several significant bid opportunities for large business customers to CWT. If Amex GBT is permitted to acquire CWT, this intense competition would be lost, risking higher prices, less innovation and fewer choices — costs that will be borne by the many businesses and employees for whom these services are critical to their productivity and operations.
Amex GBT is a publicly traded Delaware corporation with its principal executive office located in New York City and its operational headquarters located in London. In 2023, Amex GBT managed a total transaction value of approximately $28.2 billion, earning revenues of $2.29 billion.
CWT is a privately held company headquartered in Minnetonka, Minnesota. In 2023, CWT managed a total transaction volume of approximately $14 billion, earning revenues of about $850 million.
Former President of Asphalt Paving Company Pleads Guilty to Bid Rigging
Friday, January 10, 2025Share
For Immediate Release
Office of Public Affairs
Seventh Individual Pleads Guilty in Ongoing Investigation of Collusion Involving Michigan-Area Asphalt Industry
The former president of a Michigan asphalt paving company pleaded guilty Wednesday for his role in a conspiracy to rig bids for asphalt paving services contracts in Michigan.
According to court documents filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Timothy Baugher, former president of Pontiac-based Asphalt Specialists LLC (ASI), conspired with F. Allied Construction Company Inc. (Allied), and employees from those companies to rig bids in each other’s favor. Baugher participated in the conspiracy from July 2017 through May 2021.
Wednesday’s guilty plea is the 10th in the Antitrust Division’s ongoing investigation into collusion in the Michigan asphalt paving industry. Baugher’s former employer, ASI, and another former ASI executive also pleaded guilty for their participation in the conspiracy with Allied in January 2024. Allied and two of its executives previously pleaded guilty in August 2023 for their participation in the conspiracy. On Aug. 15, 2024, ASI was sentenced to pay a fine of $6,500,000.
Under the terms of the conspiracy, the co-conspirators coordinated each other’s bid prices so that the agreed-upon losing company would submit intentionally non-competitive bids. These bids gave customers the false impression of competition when, in fact, the co-conspirators already had decided among themselves who would win the contracts.
“Americans deserve to pay a fair, competitive price to fix transportation infrastructure,” said Acting Assistant Attorney General Doha Mekki of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division. “The division and our law enforcement partners will continue to hold accountable executives who cheat consumers by undermining the competitive process.”
“Fair and open marketplace competition is essential in providing consumers and taxpayers the integrity expected in procuring contracts funded with public dollars” said Special Agent in Charge Anthony Licari of the Department of Transportation’s Office of Inspector General, Midwestern Region. “Corporate executives who collude to fixing prices and rigging bids will be held accountable.”
“Activities related to bid-rigging and collusion do not promote an environment conducive to open competition which harms the consumer,” said Executive Special Agent in Charge Kenneth Cleevely of the U.S. Postal Service Office of Inspector General. “The guilty plea in this case represents a win for all law enforcement agencies who investigate those who engage in this type of harmful conduct to ensure that justice is served.”
Baugher pleaded guilty to one count of violating Section 1 of the Sherman Act. He faces a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison and a $1 million criminal fine for the charge. The maximum penalty for corporations is a $100 million criminal fine. The fine may be increased to twice the gain derived from the crime or twice the loss suffered by the victims of the crime if either amount is greater than the statutory maximum fine. A sentencing hearing will be scheduled at a later date. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.
Wednesday’s guilty plea resulted from an ongoing federal antitrust investigation into bid rigging and other anticompetitive conduct in the asphalt paving services industry being conducted by the Antitrust Division’s Chicago Office and the Offices of Inspectors General for the U.S. Department of Transportation and U.S. Postal Service.
Anyone with information in connection with this investigation should contact the Antitrust Division’s Complaint Center at 888-647-3258 or visit www.justice.gov/atr/report-violations.
The Federal Trade Commission has approved revised jurisdictional thresholds for Section 8 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits interlocking directorates, which is an arrangement that occurs when an officer or director of one firm simultaneously serves as an officer or director of a competing firm.For 2025, thresholds under Section 8 of the Act that trigger prohibitions on certain interlocking memberships on corporate boards of directors are $51,380,000 for Section 8(a)(l) and $5,138,000 for Section 8(a)(2)(A).
The Federal Trade Commission has approved a revised jurisdictional and a revised filing fee schedule for the Hart‑Scott‑Rodino (HSR) Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976. Section 7A(a)(2) of the Act requires the Commission to revise the jurisdictional thresholds annually, based on the change in gross national product. The FTC is also required to revise the related HSR filing fee schedule annually based on changes in the gross national product and in the consumer price index under Division GG of the 2023 Consolidated Appropriations Act.
For 2025, the size-of-transaction threshold for reporting proposed mergers and acquisitions under Section 7A of the Clayton Act will adjust from $119.5 million to $126.4 million.
No Despacho SG nº 49/2024, de 08 de janeiro de 2025 (SEI nº 1498321), publicado no DOU em 10 de janeiro de 2025, Edição nº 7, Seção 1, página 42, onde se lê: “Cotrasa Veículos e Serviços Ltda., Empreendedor Brasil – Fundo de Investimento em Participações Multiestratégia, Brasil Portos e Ativos Logísticos – Fundo de Investimento em Participação Multiestratégia, N.O.G.S.P.E Empreendimentos e Participações S.A., Portinvest Participações S.A., Itapoá Terminais Portuários S.A., LOGZ Logística Brasil S.A., SATI RJ Participações S.A. e Regina Indústria e Comércio S.A. Advogados: Bruno Drago, Mariana Llamazalez Ou, Rodrigo Zilio, Luis Nagalli, Julia Haddad Niemeyer e Sofia Esmanhoto Andrioli. Decido pela aprovação sem restrições.”, leia-se: “Ato de Concentração nº 08700.010766/2024-01. Partes: Cotrasa Veículos e Serviços Ltda., Empreendedor Brasil – Fundo de Investimento em Participações Multiestratégia, Brasil Portos e Ativos Logísticos – Fundo de Investimento em Participação Multiestratégia, N.O.G.S.P.E Empreendimentos e Participações S.A., Portinvest Participações S.A., Itapoá Terminais Portuários S.A., LOGZ Logística Brasil S.A., SATI RJ Participações S.A. e Regina Indústria e Comércio S.A. Advogados: Bruno Drago, Mariana Llamazalez Ou, Rodrigo Zilio, Luis Nagalli, Julia Haddad Niemeyer e Sofia Esmanhoto Andrioli. Decido pela aprovação sem restrições.”.
The CMA is investigating suspected exchanges of competitively sensitive information by 8 housebuilders in Great Britain under the Competition Act 1998.
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