Partes: Platinum Falcon B 2018 RSC Limited e Qlik Parent Inc. Aprovação sem restrições.
Ato de Concentração nº 08700.000088/2025-41
Partes: Alliance Administração de Ativos SPE Ltda. e General Mills Brasil Alimentos Ltda. Aprovação sem restrições.
Ato de Concentração nº 08700.010866/2024-29
Requerentes: Dow Brasil Indústria e Comércio de Produtos Químicos Ltda., Atlas Casablanca Holding Ltda., Atlas Casablanca Comercializadora de Energia S.A., Usina de Energia Fotovoltaica Lar do Sol IV S.A., Usina de Energia Fotovoltaica Lar do Sol V S.A. e Usina de Energia Fotovoltaica Lar do Sol VI S.A.
Ato de Concentração nº 08700.010864/2024-30
Requerentes: Centrais Elétricas Brasileiras S.A. – Eletrobras, Companhia de Geração e Transmissão de Energia Elétrica do Sul do Brasil – CGT Eletrosul, Companhia Paranaense de Energia – Copel e Copel Geração e Transmissão S.A. Aprovação sem restrições.
Ato de Concentração nº08700.000151/2025-49
Requerentes: Supermercado Bombom Ltda. e Bompreço Bahia Supermercados Ltda. Aprovação sem restrições.
Ato de Concentração nº 08700.000176/2025-42
Requerentes: Supermercados Kern Ltda. e WMS Supermercados do Brasil Ltda. Aprovação sem restrições.
Ato de Concentração nº 08700.000224/2025-01
Requerentes: CF Industries Blue Energy Ventures LLC, JERA Co. Inc. e Mitsui & Co. Ltd. Aprovação sem restrições.
Ato de Concentração nº 08700.000314/2025-93
Partes: Usina de Energia Fotovoltaica Pedro Leopoldo II Ltda., Solatio Energy Gestão de Projetos Solares Ltda., Supermercados BH Comércio de Alimentos S.A., Domingos Costa Indústrias Alimentícias S.A., Cereais Bramil Ltda. e Pedreira São Sebastião Ltda. Aprovação sem restrições.
The Justice Department’s Antitrust Division today issued its 10-year workload statistics report, summarizing the Division’s work enforcing the federal antitrust laws from 2015 through 2024. These statistics can be found here.
The report reflects the critical enforcement and advocacy work the Antitrust Division has done on behalf of American consumers, taxpayers, and workers. This includes efforts to put a stop to conduct by monopolists or groups of competitors that harm consumers and workers; block mergers that threaten competition; prosecute anticompetitive crimes; ensure proper application of the antitrust laws in courts throughout the United States; and advocate for pro-competition policies across federal and state governments and with other countries.
More information about the Antitrust Division can be found at www.justice.gov/atr.
“For more than a century, the antitrust laws have protected workers from unlawful schemes, abuses of bargaining power, and restrictions on their mobility,” said Acting Assistant Attorney General Doha Mekki of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division. “The Antitrust Division will continue to work with its federal and state partners to ensure the economic freedom and opportunity of American workers and their families.”
The guidelines provide examples and cite cases to explain how the agencies analyze business practices that may violate the antitrust laws, such as information sharing, restrictions on worker mobility, abuses of bargaining power and other restrictive, exclusionary or predatory employment conditions. The guidelines also explain that certain types of agreements between employers, such as wage-fixing or no-poach agreements, may expose companies and executives to criminal liability under the antitrust laws.
The agencies encourage members of the public to report potential antitrust violations, and the guidelines provide information on how to submit these complaints.
Tragsa y Tragsatec son las empresas públicas más utilizadas por las administraciones para realizar encargos.
La CNMC defiende el uso de los principios de buena regulación y administración para minimizar el daño a la libre competencia.
Propone, además, ajustes en el texto para que su uso, los precios y las publicaciones sean transparentes y eficientes.
La Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia (CNMC) ha analizado el proyecto de Real decreto que desarrolla el régimen jurídico de las empresas públicas del Grupo Tragsa (Tragsa y Tragsatec). (IPN/CNMC/031/24).
Ambas entidades son dos de las empresas públicas más utilizadas por las administraciones para atender necesidades de bienes o servicios a través de encargos directos, sin acudir a procesos de licitación abiertos a otros competidores.
Recomendaciones sobre los encargos
Aunque estos encargos pueden estar justificados por motivos de interés general, como agilidad o flexibilidad, su uso inadecuado puede afectar a la competencia (reducción del mercado, fortalecimiento de la posición de operadores) y reducir la eficiencia en la gestión de fondos públicos.
Por ello, al formular encargos es necesario reforzar el deber de motivación de los poderes públicos, que han de valorar el impacto de su actuación y elegir la forma de aprovisionamiento más beneficiosa desde la óptica del interés general.
La CNMC ha recordado que los encargos, además de cumplir rigurosamente con los requisitos legales, deben adecuarse a los principios de buena regulación y administración.
Se insta al Ministerio de Agricultura, Pesca y Alimentación, promotor de este Real Decreto, a liderar la implementación de estas recomendaciones, si bien son extensibles a todas las administraciones públicas.
Respecto al texto normativo objeto de informe, se proponen estas medidas:
Evitar el uso sistemático de encargos en casos de urgencia o ante el fracaso de licitaciones. En lugar de ello, explorar alternativas como nuevos procesos de contratación con ajustes en su diseño o tramitación acelerada.
Ajustarse a la literalidad de la ley de contratos en cuanto a las finalidades y funciones recogidas en el objeto social del Grupo Tragsa y respecto de los encargos vinculados a situaciones de emergencia
Ajustar los precios a los valores de mercado. Las retribuciones por los encargos deben evitar cualquier ventaja económica que pueda considerarse ayuda pública.
Mayor transparencia. Publicar rápidamente la formalización de los encargos y documentos relacionados, como memorias justificativas.
Limitar la contratación con terceros. Los encargos solo deberían subcontratarse en casos excepcionales, debidamente justificados y publicados.
La CNMC puede actuar de oficio (de acuerdo con el artículo 5.1.h de la Ley de creación) o a petición de las Cámaras Legislativas, el Gobierno, los departamentos ministeriales, las Comunidades Autónomas, las Corporaciones locales, los Colegios Profesionales, las Cámaras de Comercio y las Organizaciones Empresariales y de Consumidores y Usuarios (de acuerdo con su artículo 5.2).
Documento no oficial, destinado a los medios de comunicación, y que no vincula a la CNMC. Reproducción permitida solo si se cita la fuente.
The FTC filed a lawsuit against the three largest prescription drug benefit managers (PBMs)—Caremark Rx, Express Scripts (ESI), and OptumRx—and their affiliated group purchasing organizations (GPOs) for engaging in anticompetitive and unfair rebating practices that have artificially inflated the list price of insulin drugs.
The Federal Trade Commission ordered building services contractor Guardian Service Industries, Inc. (Guardian) to stop enforcing a no-hire agreement that prohibits building owners and managers from hiring Guardian’s employees. In a complaint filed against Guardian, the FTC alleges that Guardian—which operates in New York and New Jersey—includes no-hire agreements in its customer service agreements with residential building owners. These agreements prohibit building owners and competing building service contractors from hiring Guardian’s employees.
Cognosphere has agreed to pay $20 million and to block children under 16 from making in-game purchases without parental consent to settle FTC allegations the company violated a children’s privacy law and deceived children and other users about the real costs of in-game transactions and odds of obtaining rare prizes.
“For more than a century, the antitrust laws have protected workers from unlawful schemes, abuses of bargaining power, and restrictions on their mobility,” said Acting Assistant Attorney General Doha Mekki of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division. “The Antitrust Division will continue to work with its federal and state partners to ensure the economic freedom and opportunity of American workers and their families.”
The guidelines provide examples and cite cases to explain how the agencies analyze business practices that may violate the antitrust laws, such as information sharing, restrictions on worker mobility, abuses of bargaining power and other restrictive, exclusionary or predatory employment conditions. The guidelines also explain that certain types of agreements between employers, such as wage-fixing or no-poach agreements, may expose companies and executives to criminal liability under the antitrust laws.
The agencies encourage members of the public to report potential antitrust violations, and the guidelines provide information on how to submit these complaints.
Today, the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice Antitrust Division (DOJ) jointly issued antitrust guidelines for business activities affecting workers.
Competition among employers helps workers through better wages, benefits, and other terms and conditions for working people. Similarly, vibrant, open markets to recruit and retain workers are conducive to new business formation, innovation, and productivity. As the guidelines state, business practices may violate the antitrust laws when they harm competition among employers, which can lead to worse outcomes for workers and the broader economy.
“The antitrust laws protect all Americans, including workers, from illegal monopolization, collusion, and unfair methods of competition,” said FTC Chair Lina M. Khan. “These antitrust guidelines provide clarity to businesses about the practices that can violate the law—from agreements between firms to fix workers’ wages to coercive noncompetes.”
The guidelines outline specific types of agreements or business practices that may violate the antitrust laws, such as the use of noncompetes or the sharing of information about wages among companies that compete for workers. The guidelines also outline agreements and other activities that may lead to criminal liability, including agreements to fix wages or agreements not to poach employees. Additionally, the guidelines explain that false claims about workers’ potential earnings may violate federal law.
The guidelines also provide information about how to report potential antitrust violations to the FTC and DOJ.
The Commission vote approving the joint guidance was 3-2, with Commissioners Andrew N. Ferguson and Melissa Holyoak dissenting. Commissioner Ferguson issued a dissenting statement joined by Commissioner Holyoak.
Tragsa y Tragsatec son las empresas públicas más utilizadas por las administraciones para realizar encargos.
La CNMC defiende el uso de los principios de buena regulación y administración para minimizar el daño a la libre competencia.
Propone, además, ajustes en el texto para que su uso, los precios y las publicaciones sean transparentes y eficientes.
La Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia (CNMC) ha analizado el proyecto de Real decreto que desarrolla el régimen jurídico de las empresas públicas del Grupo Tragsa (Tragsa y Tragsatec). (IPN/CNMC/031/24).
Ambas entidades son dos de las empresas públicas más utilizadas por las administraciones para atender necesidades de bienes o servicios a través de encargos directos, sin acudir a procesos de licitación abiertos a otros competidores.
Recomendaciones sobre los encargos
Aunque estos encargos pueden estar justificados por motivos de interés general, como agilidad o flexibilidad, su uso inadecuado puede afectar a la competencia (reducción del mercado, fortalecimiento de la posición de operadores) y reducir la eficiencia en la gestión de fondos públicos.
Por ello, al formular encargos es necesario reforzar el deber de motivación de los poderes públicos, que han de valorar el impacto de su actuación y elegir la forma de aprovisionamiento más beneficiosa desde la óptica del interés general.
La CNMC ha recordado que los encargos, además de cumplir rigurosamente con los requisitos legales, deben adecuarse a los principios de buena regulación y administración.
Se insta al Ministerio de Agricultura, Pesca y Alimentación, promotor de este Real Decreto, a liderar la implementación de estas recomendaciones, si bien son extensibles a todas las administraciones públicas.
Respecto al texto normativo objeto de informe, se proponen estas medidas:
Evitar el uso sistemático de encargos en casos de urgencia o ante el fracaso de licitaciones. En lugar de ello, explorar alternativas como nuevos procesos de contratación con ajustes en su diseño o tramitación acelerada.
Ajustarse a la literalidad de la ley de contratos en cuanto a las finalidades y funciones recogidas en el objeto social del Grupo Tragsa y respecto de los encargos vinculados a situaciones de emergencia
Ajustar los precios a los valores de mercado. Las retribuciones por los encargos deben evitar cualquier ventaja económica que pueda considerarse ayuda pública.
Mayor transparencia. Publicar rápidamente la formalización de los encargos y documentos relacionados, como memorias justificativas.
Limitar la contratación con terceros. Los encargos solo deberían subcontratarse en casos excepcionales, debidamente justificados y publicados.
La CNMC puede actuar de oficio (de acuerdo con el artículo 5.1.h de la Ley de creación) o a petición de las Cámaras Legislativas, el Gobierno, los departamentos ministeriales, las Comunidades Autónomas, las Corporaciones locales, los Colegios Profesionales, las Cámaras de Comercio y las Organizaciones Empresariales y de Consumidores y Usuarios (de acuerdo con su artículo 5.2).
Documento no oficial, destinado a los medios de comunicación, y que no vincula a la CNMC. Reproducción permitida solo si se cita la fuente.
The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) is investigating the completed acquisition by Spreadex Limited of the B2C business of Sporting Index Limited.
Commission sends Supplementary Statement of Objections to Lufthansa to prevent harm to Frankfurt-New York air passengers
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The European Commission has sent a Supplementary Statement of Objections to Lufthansa indicating the Commission’s intention to order the airline to reinstateCondor’s access to Lufthansa’s feed traffic to and from Frankfurt airport under the conditions the two airlines agreed upon in June 2024.
This is a step in the Commission’s procedure related to interim measures in the context of its broader investigation into a potential restriction of competition on transatlantic routes to/from several European Economic Area (‘EEA’) airports by the A++ transatlantic joint venture (‘JV’) between Lufthansa, United and Air Canada.
In today’s Supplementary Statement of Objections, the Commission has preliminarily found that the A++ transatlantic JV restricts competition on the Frankfurt-New York route and that the adoption of interim measures enabling Condor to continue offering its services on that route is warranted to prevent serious and irreparable damage to competition from occurring in that market.
The Commission’s investigation into the A++ transatlantic JV
In May 2013, the Commission accepted commitments from Air Canada, United and Lufthansa to address its preliminary concerns that the A++ transatlantic JV may restrict competition for the provision of air transport services to premium passengers on the Frankfurt-New York route. The 2013 commitments consisted notably of making slots and feed traffic available to competitors willing to enter or expand on the Frankfurt-New York route. These commitments were legally binding for 10 years.
On the same day, the Commission sent Lufthansa a Statement of Objections where it preliminarily concluded that interim measuresmay be required to ensure the effectiveness of any final decision taken by the Commission in the future.
The Commission’s interim measures
Independently of the 2013 commitments, Lufthansa and Condor concluded several agreements allowing Condor to access, at special conditions, Lufthansa’s short-haul network to feed its long-haul flights (the ‘special prorate agreements’ or ‘SPAs’). In 2021, Condor started competing on the Frankfurt-New York route, and its operations on the route have expanded since then thanks to, in particular, its access to Lufthansa’s short-haul network based on the SPAs.
In 2020, Lufthansa notified Condor of the termination of their SPAs. Lufthansa and Condor nevertheless put in place transitional SPA-based arrangements for the continued provision by Lufthansa of feed traffic to Condor which, following various judgements by German Courts, ceased to apply in December 2024.
In this context, the Commission had preliminary concerns that without the SPA-based arrangements Condor may no longer be capable of operating sustainably on the Frankfurt-New York route and be forced to definitively exit. This would likely lead to the further deterioration of the competitive structure on the market for the provision of air transport services on the Frankfurt-New York route, which is already negatively affected by the A++ transatlantic JV due to the loss of competition between the JV partners.
The Commission has therefore decided to follow up on its August 2024 Statement of Objections with a Supplementary Statement of Objections preliminarily finding that, at first sight, the A++ transatlantic JV restricts competition for the provision of scheduled passenger air transport services on the Frankfurt-New York route and that interim measures are warranted to prevent serious and irreparable damage to competition from occurring in that market.
To ensure the effectiveness of any final decision following the full investigation into the A++ transatlantic JV, today’s Supplementary Statement of Objections considers that Lufthansa should reinstate the SPA-based arrangements for the provision of feed traffic to Condor to and from Frankfurt airport the two airlines agreed upon in June 2024.
Background
Lufthansa, headquartered in Germany,is a global full-service carrier with domestic and international operations in passenger and cargo air transport. It operates a network with hubs at Frankfurt, Munich, Brussels, Zurich and Vienna airports. Lufthansa is a member of the A++ transatlantic JV and the Star Alliance.
Condor, headquartered in Germany, offers short- and long-haul air transport passenger services. Condor operates scheduled and charter flights from German airports to destinations in the Mediterranean, Asia, Africa, North America, South America and Caribbean. Its main base is at Frankfurt airport.
The A++ transatlantic JV includes Lufthansa, United and Air Canada. The JV partners cooperate on pricing, scheduling, capacity and marketing on transatlantic routes linking their hub airports, as well as on routes that connect those hubs to certain ‘behind and beyond’ destinations in Europe and North America.
Feed traffic refers to passengers who in their journey stop in a hub airport to connect to long-haul flights. Essentially, the short-haul flight “feeds” passengers into the long-haul network, allowing the airline to fill its long-haul aircraft with more passengers. The main types of agreements covering the provision of feed traffic are: (i) IATA standard interlining agreements; (ii) SPAs; (iii) codeshare agreements; and (iv) alliance memberships.
Procedural background
Article 101 TFEU and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement prohibit agreements and concerted practices which may affect trade and prevent or restrict competition. The implementation of Article 101 TFEU is defined in Regulation 1/2003.
Pursuant to Article 8(1) of Regulation 1/2003, interim measures may be imposed if, at first sight, there is an infringement of competition law rules, as well as an urgent need for protective measures due to the risk of serious and irreparable damage to competition.
There is no legal deadline to complete an antitrust investigation. Its duration depends on a number of factors, including the complexity of the case, the extent to which the companies concerned cooperate with the Commission, and the exercise of the rights of defence.
More information will be available on the Commission’s competition website, in the public case register under the case number AT.40940.
La remuneración media de los depósitos de hogares en la zona euro era en junio de 2024 más del doble que la de los españoles.
Los indicadores de concentración no permiten por sí solos valorar la intensidad de la competencia en el mercado de depósitos.
La concentración bancaria puede afectar negativamente a la remuneración de los depósitos, pero tiene un poder explicativo bajo en la determinación de los tipos de interés.
Los costes asociados a cambiar de banco, la comparabilidad de la información ofrecida a los clientes, la escasez de productos alternativos o la necesidad de profundizar en iniciativas de educación financiera podrían afectar a las diferencias observadas entre países y entre entidades con presencia en el territorio español.
La baja remuneración de los depósitos bancarios en España durante la subida de los tipos de interés del Banco Central Europeo, iniciada a mediados de 2022, se explica por factores que van más allá de la concentración bancaria, según el informe realizado a petición del Ministerio de Economía, Comercio y Empresa (1) (INF/CNMC/149/24).
Entre otros factores, los costes y problemas de información asociados a cambiar de banco (portabilidad entre entidades), la escasez de alternativas para contratar productos de ahorro distintos a los depósitos o la necesidad de profundizar en iniciativas de educación financiera son algunos de los elementos relevantes que condicionan esta situación (2).
Multiplicidad de factores
A nivel nacional, los índices de concentración en España se encuentran en niveles moderados, pero considerablemente mayores a los registrados en grandes economías comparables de la eurozona.
Los índices de concentración bancaria a nivel provincial son muy heterogéneos y particularmente altos en aquellas provincias con población concentrada en ciudades pequeñas. CaixaBank, BBVA y Santander son entidades que están muy extendidas por todo el territorio, pero hay otras, como algunas cajas rurales, con cuotas muy relevantes en ciertos ámbitos geográficos.
Sin embargo, los indicadores de concentración no permiten por sí solos valorar la intensidad de la competencia en el mercado de depósitos.
Los análisis econométricos indican que la concentración bancaria puede afectar negativamente a la remuneración de los depósitos, pero este factor tiene un poder explicativo bajo en la determinación de los tipos de interés. En este sentido, existen muchos otros factores que podrían afectar de forma más intensa a las diferencias observadas entre países y entre entidades con presencia en el territorio español.
Estos factores están relacionados con la estructura de la demanda y la presión competitiva de productos alternativos:
Los costes asociados a cambiar de banco (efectos lock-in) pueden reducir la movilidad de los clientes en ciertos segmentos. A este fenómeno pueden contribuir las políticas de fidelización —como bonificar el interés de la hipoteca por domiciliar la nómina, contratar productos adicionales o mantener un nivel de saldo en cuenta—, los problemas asociados al proceso de búsqueda de alternativas —por falta de estandarización y comparabilidad de la información comercial de los productos de depósitos— y algunas dificultades prácticas en la portabilidad de cuentas entre bancos.
Los productos financieros parcialmente sustitutivos de los depósitos a plazo (fondos de inversión, Letras del Tesoro, etc.) ejercen todavía poca presión competitiva. Las mismas entidades de crédito que comercializan los depósitos son las que ofrecen otros productos de ahorro como los fondos de inversión. Otros productos ofrecidos por terceros actores, como las Letras del Tesoro o productos de los mercados de capitales, tienen aún un peso limitado, a pesar de su rápido crecimiento.
La educación financiera en España es inferior a la mayoría de los países de la eurozona. Ello puede limitar la capacidad de comparar ofertas y de contratar productos sustitutivos de los depósitos que son más complejos.
La penetración de nuevas entidades que operan exclusivamente a nivel digital sigue siendo limitada, pero es una fuente creciente de presión competitiva, especialmente en los segmentos más jóvenes.
El informe analiza también el impacto que pueden haber tenido otros factores, como la elevada liquidez de las entidades bancarias.
Recomendaciones
La CNMC aconseja varias medidas para facilitar una oferta amplia de productos financieros a los hogares y empresas, mitigar problemas de información y facilitar la movilidad entre entidades:
Promover el acceso a una oferta amplia de depósitos y otros productos financieros sustitutivos
o Impulsar la asociación público-privada en las zonas en riesgo de exclusión financiera y facilitar el acceso directo de inversores minoristas a los mercados de capitales.
Mitigar los problemas de información de los clientes mediante acciones formativas y mayor transparencia
o Reforzar y coordinar mejor las iniciativas existentes de educación financiera y capacitación digital. o Mejorar la transparencia en las ofertas de depósitos, en particular, con estándares para las webs de comparación y una ampliación del alcance del comparador público. o Ofrecer información regular por parte de las entidades a sus clientes.
Reducir los costes de movilidad entre entidades
o Mejorar los mecanismos de “portabilidad bancaria”. o Reducir la carga administrativa y las trabas asociadas a contratar depósitos con entidades extranjeras.
(1) Solicitud del (SEEAE) de 17 de julio de 2023 sobre los factores ligados a la estructura y funcionamiento del mercado bancario español que podrían afectar a los incentivos para que la banca remunerara el ahorro.
(2) A junio de 2024 (fecha de corte del informe), la remuneración media del stock de depósitos de los hogares de la zona euro (1,17 %) fue más del doble que la de los hogares españoles (0,48 %). En el caso de las empresas, aunque las diferencias son menores, la remuneración media de la eurozona (1,60 %) sigue siendo un 31 % superior a la española (1,22 %).
Documento no oficial, destinado a los medios de comunicación, y que no vincula a la CNMC. Reproducción permitida solo si se cita la fuente.
La CNMC inicia un estudio sobre la urbanización del suelo para mejorar el acceso a la vivienda
La escasez de suelo y las restricciones para el desarrollo urbanístico pueden limitar la vivienda disponible y elevar su precio.
El estudio formulará recomendaciones para agilizar la urbanización del suelo, reducir costes y acelerar plazos, en beneficio de los ciudadanos.
La Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia (CNMC) ha iniciado un estudio sobre la transformación urbanística del suelo para mejorar el acceso a la vivienda en nuestro país.
Impulso de la urbanización del suelo
El suelo es un elemento necesario para la construcción de vivienda y representa un porcentaje muy importante de su precio. Por eso, la escasez de suelo y las restricciones en el desarrollo urbanístico pueden reducir la vivienda disponible y elevar su coste. Para evitarlo, la urbanización del suelo debería ser un proceso ágil y rápido en la medida de lo posible, manteniendo las garantías necesarias.
En esta línea, el estudio de la CNMC identificará los elementos que restrinjan de forma innecesaria la eficiencia y competencia del sector, y formulará una serie de recomendaciones para mejorar su funcionamiento.
La CNMC anima a cualquier persona con información relevante sobre el sector a ponerse en contacto con la Subdirección de Estudios e Informes del Departamento de Promoción de la Competencia a través de la siguiente dirección de correo electrónico: dp.estudios@cnmc.es.
El Plan Estratégico 2021-2026 de la CNMC incluye entre sus objetivos la protección de los consumidores, particularmente los más vulnerables, así como el impulso de la productividad y la eficiencia económica.
La CNMC, de acuerdo con el artículo 5.1 de la Ley de creación, tiene entre sus funciones la promoción de una competencia efectiva en los mercados mediante, entre otros, la realización de estudios y trabajos de investigación en materia de competencia, así como informes generales sobre sectores económicos, en su caso, con propuestas de liberalización, desregulación o modificación normativa.
Documento no oficial, destinado a los medios de comunicación, y que no vincula a la CNMC. Reproducción permitida solo si se cita la fuente.
ACO II notifica a aquisição do controlo exclusivo sobre o Monte Rei Golf & Country Club
2024, année historique pour l’Autorité de la concurrence : 1,4 milliard d’euros de sanctions prononcées et un nombre record de 295 opérations de concentration examinées
Publié le 15 janvier 2025
L’essentiel
En 2024, l’Autorité de la concurrence a rendu 11 décisions contentieuses et prononcé au total plus d’1,4 milliard d’euros de sanctions. Parmi les décisions marquantes de 2024 figurent la décision 24-D-03 sanctionnant Google pour non-respect de ses engagements en matière de droits voisins de la presse (250 millions d’euros) et plusieurs décisions sanctionnant des ententes, telles que la décision 24-D-06 concernant le secteur des produits préfabriqués en béton (76,6 millions d’euros), la décision 24-D-09 concernant plusieurs fabricants actifs dans le secteur du matériel électrique basse tension (470 millions d’euros), la décision 24-D-11 concernant 10 fabricants et 2 distributeurs d’appareils électroménagers (611 millions d’euros) ou encore la décision 24-D-10 sanctionnant une entente entre les compagnies aériennes Air Antilles et Air Caraïbes.
Dans le cadre de sa mission de contrôle des concentrations, l’Autorité a cette année encore examiné un nombre record d’opérations (295 opérations), représentant une hausse de 10 % par rapport au précédent record de 2021. Cette activité soutenue a été particulièrement marquée par la transformation du secteur de la distribution alimentaire, comme en témoignent les décisions concernant le rachat de magasins Casino (24-DCC-02, 24-DCC-255 et 24-DCC-288). L’Autorité a examiné des marchés novateurs comme ceux des solutions de paiement de stationnement, de la publicité en ligne non liée à la recherche ou encore de la mobilité domicile-travail. Enfin, l’année a été jalonnée par les autorisations de plusieurs opérations structurantes dans des secteurs aussi divers que la distribution au détail de jouets (reprise d’actifs de Ludendo par JouéClub), l’audiovisuel (rachat d’OCS par Canal Plus et de la branche média d’Altice par CMA CGM), la nutrition animale (rachat d’Axéréal par le groupe Avril), les jeux en ligne (rachat de Kindred par FDJ) ou encore l’aéronautique (rachat de Cobham Aerospace par Thalès).
Poursuivant son engagement en faveur du développement durable, l’Autorité a, pour la première fois, publié un communiqué relatif aux orientations informelles qu’elle pourra donner aux entreprises désireuses de vérifier la compatibilité de leurs projets de développement durable avec les règles de concurrence.
Une année exceptionnelle par l’ampleur des sanctions
Pour la quatrième fois de son histoire, l’Autorité de la concurrence a dépassé le seuil symbolique du milliard d’euros de sanctions cumulées sur une année. Avec un total de 1,4 milliard d’euros, 2024 s’inscrit au deuxième rang des années enregistrant les sanctions les plus importantes, témoignant de son engagement déterminé et résolu contre les pratiques anticoncurrentielles1.
La décision 24-D-02 du 6 février 2024 relative à des pratiques mises en œuvre dans le secteur de la distribution de chocolats
4 068 000 €
La décision 24-D-03 du 15 mars 2024 relative au respect des engagements figurant dans la décision de l’Autorité de la concurrence n° 22-D-13 du 21 juin 2022 relative à des pratiques mises en œuvre par Google dans le secteur de la presse
250 000 000 €
La décision 24-D-06 du 21 mai 2024 relative à des pratiques mises en œuvre dans le secteur des produits préfabriqués en béton
76 645 000 €
La décision 24-D-07 du 17 juillet 2024 relative à des pratiques mises en œuvre dans le secteur de la commercialisation des vins sous IGP Côtes de Gascogne
500 000 €
La décision 24-D-08 du 24 septembre 2024 relative à des pratiques d’obstruction mises en œuvre par le groupe Loste
900 000 €
La décision 24-D-09 du 29 octobre 2024 relative à des pratiques mises en œuvre dans le secteur du matériel électrique basse tension
470 000 000 €
La décision 24-D-10 du 4 décembre 2024 relative à des pratiques mises en œuvre dans le secteur du transport aérien de passagers inter-îles
14 570 000 €
La décision 24-D-11 du 19 décembre 2024 relative à des pratiques mises en œuvre dans le secteur de la fabrication et de la distribution de produits électroménagers
611 000 000 €
TOTAL
1 427 683 000 €
Parallèlement, l’Autorité a poursuivi son travail de détection. Au cours des douze derniers mois, l’instruction et les services du Rapporteur général ont examiné attentivement l’ensemble des secteurs économiques et ont procédé à l’envoi de plusieurs notifications de griefs. Les services d’instruction ont également réalisé 4 opérations de visites et de saisies2 ainsi que des auditions et des constatations dans le cadre d’une vérification des engagements pris par le groupe Parfait en Martinique à l’occasion d’une opération de concentration. A cet égard, l’Autorité de la concurrence a continué à prêter une attention particulière aux territoires d’outre-mer, avec une décision contentieuse sanctionnant une entente entre les compagnies aériennes Air Antilles et Air Caraïbes dans les Caraïbes (24-D-10) et 5 décisions de contrôle des concentrations3. Le Rapporteur général a également procédé à l’envoi de notification de griefs et organisé des opérations de visites et de saisies dans plusieurs de ces territoires.
Au total, ces 1,4 milliard de sanctions prononcées par l’Autorité de la concurrence contribuent à alimenter le budget de l’Etat, les amendes devant être réglées directement au Trésor Public. Elles peuvent être mises en regard des crédits budgétaires alloués à l’Autorité, soit 24,3 millions d’euros en 2024. Les fonds ainsi collectés permettent ensuite de financer diverses politiques publiques mises en œuvre par l’Etat.
Le contrôle des concentrations : Croissance et défis dans un contexte économique complexe
En constante augmentation ces dernières années, le nombre de concentrations examinées par l’Autorité de la concurrence a atteint le nombre record de 295 opérations en 2024. Ce chiffre témoigne de la résilience du marché des fusions-acquisitions en France, malgré un environnement économique plus difficile. Parmi ces décisions, 97 % concernent des autorisations sans engagements.
L’activité du contrôle des concentrations a, cette année, été marquée par d’importants bouleversements dans le secteur de la distribution alimentaire, l’Autorité ayant été amenée à se prononcer à plusieurs reprises sur la vente de magasins Casino (24-DCC-02, 24-DCC-255 et 24-DCC-288).
S’agissant des autres opérations autorisées sous conditions, on peut citer :
Le rachat d’OCS et d’Orange Studio par Canal Plus (24-DCC-04)
La reprise d’actifs de Ludendo (la Grande Récré) par JouéClub (24-DCC-129)
Le rachat de la branche média du groupe Altice par CMA CGM (24-DCC-141)
Le rachat de Kindred par la Française des Jeux (24-DCC-197)
Une activité consultative nourrie
Dans le cadre de sa mission consultative, l’Autorité de la concurrence joue un rôle réactif et proactif, agissant comme un laboratoire d’idées pour identifier les secteurs à renforcer et formuler des recommandations visant à améliorer l’efficacité économique et protéger les consommateurs. Elle peut agir de sa propre initiative ou sur saisine du gouvernement, du parlement, d’autorités de régulation ou d’organisations professionnelles. L’Autorité a rendu 8 avis en 2024, dont deux enquêtes sectorielles. Pour la première fois, elle a eu l’occasion d’examiner le marché de l’intelligence artificielle générative dans le cadre de son avis 24-A-05. Elaboré dans un délai record, cet avis dresse un panorama du secteur et analyse les risques que l’émergence de cette innovation pourrait faire peser sur l’économie française.
Parallèlement à ces avis sectoriels, l’Autorité a rendu plusieurs avis au gouvernement et aux régulateurs sectoriels, partageant son expertise sur des sujets stratégiques tels que les tarifs réglementés de vente d’électricité, les offres de gros de télécommunications haut-débit activées (ou « bitstream »), ou encore la protection des données personnelles sur les magasins d’applications mobiles.
En 2024, l’Autorité s’est autosaisie ou a été saisie sur plusieurs sujets dont les conclusions ont été et seront rendues en 2025, incluant notamment :
Este é um informativo diário que traz para o(a) leitor (a) notícias e casos de defesa da concorrência das principais jurisdições antitruste do mundo (CADE, FTC, Comissão Europeia, CMA etc).
Notícias
MPF junto ao Cade abre processo seletivo para cargo de assessoria
Oportunidade é para candidatos formados em Direito. Inscrições vão até 13 de janeiro
Publicado em 14/01/2025 12h56
Ministério Público Federal (MPF) junto ao Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (Cade) está com processo seletivo aberto para o cargo de assessor jurídico. A vaga é destinada a profissionais com formação em Direito.
Os interessados devem enviar seus currículos para o e-mail pgr-mpfcade@mpf.mp.br até às 12h do dia 13 de janeiro, próxima segunda-feira.
A vaga exige graduação em Direito, pós-graduação em direito concorrencial ou comercial e experiência significativa em processos administrativos relacionados ao direito da concorrência. As principais responsabilidades do cargo incluem a elaboração de minutas de peças processuais e o apoio no gabinete do procurador do MPF junto ao Cade, em Brasília.
A remuneração para o cargo é de R$ 10.355,92, acrescida de R$ 1.393,11 de auxílio alimentação. Para os candidatos que necessitem se deslocar para Brasília, é oferecido um auxílio moradia correspondente a 25% do valor do cargo.
MPF no Cade
O papel do procurador do MPF no Cade envolve, entre outras atribuições, a emissão de pareceres sobre processos administrativos relacionados a infrações à ordem econômica. O procurador também é responsável pelo encaminhamento de denúncias e representações, participação nas sessões do Tribunal Administrativo e pela condução de audiências com advogados especializados em antitruste.
Reconhecimento
O Cade tem se destacado como um excelente ambiente de trabalho, tendo recebido o Certificado de Qualidade do Ambiente de Trabalho nos anos de 2020, 2021 e 2022. Essa certificação é concedida com base no índice de clima organizacional da pesquisa FIA Employee Experience (FEEx), reconhecendo o esforço dos colaboradores em manter um ambiente agradável e colaborativo.
Além disso, o Cade é, por cinco anos consecutivos, reconhecido como um dos melhores lugares para trabalhar no Brasil, de acordo com premiação da FIA Employee. A autarquia é também considerada uma das principais autoridades antitruste do mundo, segundo a revista Global Competition Review (GCR).
Justice Department and OSHA Issue Statement on Non-Disclosure Agreements That Deter Reporting of Antitrust Crimes
Tuesday, January 14, 2025Share
For Immediate Release
Office of Public Affairs
Today, the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division and Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), jointly affirmed that corporate non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) that deter individuals from reporting antitrust crimes undermine the goals of whistleblower protection laws, including the Criminal Antitrust Anti-Retaliation Act of 2019 (CAARA). CAARA prohibits employers from discharging or otherwise retaliating against a worker for (1) reporting potential criminal antitrust violations and related crimes to their employer or the federal government or (2) assisting a federal government investigation or proceeding.
NDAs that undermine CAARA or otherwise interfere with employees’ freedom to report potential crime will cost the employer when the Antitrust Division makes its charging decisions and sentencing recommendations. Companies should also be aware that using NDAs to obstruct or impede an investigation may also constitute separate federal criminal violations. Any company that so interferes with its employees’ cooperation would jeopardize its ability to satisfy its obligations under the Antitrust Division’s leniency policy, which requires an applicant to “use its best efforts to secure the timely, truthful, continuing, and complete cooperation of all current and former employees.” And the Antitrust Division’s Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs in Criminal Antitrust Investigations guidelines consider a company’s policies around NDA and anti-retaliation training in assessing the effectiveness of the company’s compliance program.
“Members of the public are often best positioned to detect and blow the whistle on antitrust crimes,” said Acting Assistant Attorney General Doha Mekki of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division. “The Antitrust Division values this information and works to ensure that individuals are free to report misconduct without fear of retaliation or retribution.”
“By working jointly with partner agencies to break down barriers to employee reporting, OSHA is committed to strengthening our enforcement of whistleblower laws and protecting workers’ voices,” said Deputy Assistant Secretary for Occupational Safety and Health Jim Frederick. “This collaboration fosters a culture of accountability and upholds the integrity of worker rights.”
What Companies Should Know
Whistleblower Protections for Reporting Antitrust Crimes
Antitrust crimes hurt consumers, workers, and taxpayers — and threaten our free-market economy and democratic institutions. For over 130 years, criminal prosecutors have used antitrust laws as a charter of economic freedom to protect and promote competition.
Members of the public are often best positioned to detect and blow the whistle on antitrust crimes. Leads from the public about potentially illegal conduct enable the Antitrust Division and its law enforcement partners to uncover antitrust cartels and monopolization schemes, prosecute those crimes and protect competition. The Antitrust Division values this information and works to ensure that members of the public are free to report misconduct without fear of retaliation or retribution. The Antitrust Division protects to the fullest extent of the law the identity of those who report antitrust violations.
CAARA protects company employees, contractors, subcontractors or agents who report certain criminal antitrust violations. CAARA prohibits employers from discharging or otherwise retaliating against a worker for (1) reporting potential criminal antitrust violations and related crimes to their employer or the federal government or (2) assisting a federal government investigation or proceeding. Therefore, CAARA helps to incentivize the reporting of antitrust crimes and supports the Antitrust Division’s criminal enforcement program.
NDAs and Contractual Restrictions on Reporting May Conflict with Antitrust Enforcement and CAARA
Individuals who seek to report antitrust violations must not be deterred or prevented from coming forward for fear of adverse employment consequences.
The Antitrust Division’s work prosecuting antitrust crimes is compromised when NDAs deter individuals from providing law enforcers with relevant information on wrongdoing. When individuals believe that a corporate NDA may prevent them from reporting illegal conduct to enforcers, crimes go undetected and competition suffers. For example, some NDAs are worded so broadly as to suggest that people who report potential crimes or cooperate with law enforcement could face lawsuits and adverse employment consequences as severe as termination. This fear of retribution leads to less reporting of illegal activity and less vigorous antitrust enforcement.
NDAs that discourage individuals from reporting wrongdoing or cooperating with an antitrust investigation also undermine CAARA’s goal of protecting whistleblowers. Even the mere implication that an NDA would bar employees from reporting illegal conduct or assisting an investigation or proceeding clashes with the basic principles behind CAARA that encourage self-reporting and disclosure of wrongdoing to the government.
NDAs that Deter Reporting Will Cost Companies at Charging and Sentencing
CAARA encourages individuals to provide tips to law enforcement and cooperate in antitrust investigations, incentivizes companies to promote compliance and complements leniency and cooperation credit policies. For these reasons, NDAs that undermine CAARA or otherwise interfere with employees’ freedom to report potential crime will cost the employer when the Antitrust Division makes its charging decisions and its sentencing recommendations. Companies should also be aware that using NDAs in efforts to obstruct or impede an investigation may also constitute separate federal criminal violations. And of course, a company that interferes with its employees’ cooperation would jeopardize its ability to fulfill its obligations under the Antitrust Division’s leniency policy, which requires an applicant to “use its best efforts to secure the timely, truthful, continuing, and complete cooperation of all current and former employees.”
The Antitrust Division’s Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs in Criminal Antitrust Investigations guidelines, which prosecutors use to assess the effectiveness of compliance programs when making charging decisions and sentencing recommendations, make clear that the sufficiency and efficacy of a compliance program depends on the existence of “reporting mechanisms that employees can use to report potential antitrust violations anonymously or confidentially and without fear of retaliation.” The questions prosecutors ask in evaluating a compliance program include:
Whether a company has an anti-retaliation policy;
Whether it trains employees, managers and supervisors on the provisions of CAARA;
Whether the company’s use of NDAs is consistent with ensuring that employees can report antitrust violations without fear of retaliation;
Whether NDAs are used in a way that deters whistleblowers or violates CAARA; and
Whether NDAs and other employee policies make clear that employees can report antitrust violations, including to government authorities.
Companies that fail to address retaliation, CAARA and NDAs in their policies and compliance structure risk losing out on the benefits associated with maintaining an effective compliance program when the Antitrust Division is making charging decisions and sentencing recommendations.
To report potential antitrust crimes to the Antitrust Division, contact the Complaint Center. If your complaint relates to potential antitrust crimes affecting government procurement, grant or program funding, contact the Procurement Collusion Strike Force Tip Center.
If you feel that you have been a victim of retaliation or would like to learn more about protections for whistleblowers, please see OSHA Fact Sheet.
Justice Department Sues KKR for Serial Violations of Federal Premerger Review Law
Tuesday, January 14, 2025Share
For Immediate Release
Office of Public Affairs
KKR Violated Hart-Scott-Rodino Act at Least 16 Times by Withholding and Altering Documents and Failing to Make Required Filings
The Justice Department today filed a civil lawsuit against KKR & Co. Inc. and over a dozen of its investment advisors and funds (collectively, KKR) for repeatedly flouting the premerger antitrust review process. Filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, the complaint alleges that KKR senior executives, deal teams and investment funds evaded antitrust scrutiny for at least 16 separate transactions by failing to comply with the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 (HSR Act).
“KKR’s rinse-and-repeat failures to provide complete and accurate information about its mergers and acquisitions were systemic,” said Acting Assistant Attorney General Doha Mekki of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division. “Through document omissions, alterations, and failures to report deals, KKR threatened the integrity of the Division’s premerger reviews and, in some cases, obscured the market impact of its deals and serial acquisitions.”
The HSR Act requires parties to a merger, acquisition, or other transaction above a certain size to submit a premerger filing to the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission to aid in the agencies’ enforcement of merger law. As a sophisticated private equity firm in the business of buying and selling companies, KKR is familiar with the HSR Act and its requirements. Since 2021, KKR was required to make more than 100 premerger filings under the HSR Act.
The department’s complaint alleges that over the course of two years — 2021 and 2022 — KKR failed to make complete and accurate premerger filings for at least 16 transactions. Specifically, KKR violated the HSR Act by:
Altering documents in HSR filings for at least eight transactions. For example, in April 2021, a KKR partner instructed a deal team member to edit a portion of an Investment Committee report in advance of the HSR review process by circling the “Competitive Behavior” section of a diligence chart and writing “[need to revise for HSR purposes]” in the document. The KKR deal team member did not merely revise the language but deleted it entirely before submitting the altered document to the Antitrust Division.
Failing to make any HSR filing for at least two transactions. KKR did not submit an HSR filing prior to consummating an acquisition valued at $6.9 billion. It also did not submit a filing prior to consummating an acquisition worth between $376 million and $919 million.
Systematically omitting required documents in HSR filings for at least 10 transactions. KKR repeatedly certified that it had complied with the HSR Act but did not include required documents in those filings. In many cases, KKR only identified such documents in response to an Antitrust Division investigation.
The complaint cites internal documents that reveal a pervasive culture of noncompliance with the HSR Act at KKR. One KKR employee who omitted and altered multiple documents from an HSR Act filing described KKR’s approach to its premerger filing obligations: “I’ve always been told less is more 😊.” In response, a more senior executive replied, “I believe in less is more too….”
As alleged in the complaint, KKR’s conduct allowed it to repeatedly evade legally mandated scrutiny of its investment business and reap millions of dollars in revenues from closing transactions without proper prior review by the federal antitrust agencies. In some cases, KKR’s misconduct obscured the threat its deals posed to competition, including serial acquisitions affecting important markets. By preventing the federal antitrust agencies from effectively investigating the potential anticompetitive effects of KKR’s transactions, KKR imperiled competition and potentially harmed consumers across the nation.
The HSR Act authorizes civil penalties for violations of the Act at more than $50,000 per day per violation. As a result, the maximum penalty for KKR’s alleged violations exceeds $650 million. The complaint also seeks structural relief as well as other equitable relief, including compliance measures.
KKR is a global investment firm headquartered in New York. It is one of the world’s largest investment firms with over $500 billion in total assets under management.
The Federal Trade Commission today issued a policy statement clarifying that independent contractors, including gig workers, are shielded from antitrust liability when engaging in protected bargaining and organizing activities—such as seeking better compensation and job conditions.
According to the FTC’s policy statement, the Commission will not challenge collective action by independent contractors and gig workers, which include rideshare and food delivery drivers, that provide labor services and are seeking better compensation and job conditions because such activities are exempted under the antitrust statutes.
“Companies increasingly rely on gig workers and independent contractors. As more of these workers consider unionizing to secure better pay and conditions, the FTC is making clear that the antitrust laws do not stand in the way of their efforts to collectively organize or bargain,” said FTC Chair Lina M. Khan.
“Gig workers shouldn’t be forced to accept low wages or poor working conditions just because they’re independent contractors,” said Hannah Garden-Monheit, Director of the FTC’s Office of Policy Planning. “The FTC’s policy statement today makes clear that the antitrust laws do not prevent gig workers from collectively organizing to fight for a better living.”
Under the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts, the ability of workers to organize and collectively bargain over wages and labor conditions is protected from antitrust liability. However, as more workers are increasingly classified as independent contractors and gig workers, they face a patchwork of cases regarding the potential application of the labor exemption.
The FTC’s policy statement makes clear that workers engaged in protected bargaining or organizing activity are not categorically excluded from the antitrust exemption simply because they do not have a formal employer-employee relationship with the firm with which they are negotiating regarding compensation or working conditions. According to the policy statement, the protection of all workers from antitrust liability when they are engaged in protected labor activities is firmly grounded in the statutory text, consistent with existing case law, and reflective of the original meaning of the labor exemption.
Categorically excluding all independent contractors from the protections of the labor exemption would give employers both the incentive and opportunity to exploit asymmetries in antitrust liability protection between workers, according to the policy statement. For example, businesses would have an opportunity and incentive to classify (or misclassify) their workers as independent contractors to suppress wages and to gain an unfair advantage against competitors who provide better compensation and job conditions to workers.
Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Andrew N. Ferguson Joined by Commissioner Melissa Holyoak Regarding the Enforcement Policy Statement on Exemption of Protected Labor Activity by Workers from Antitrust Liability
Investigation to determine if Google has strategic market status in search and search advertising activities and whether these services are delivering good outcomes for people and businesses in the UK.
The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) has today launched its first strategic market status (SMS) designation investigation under the new digital markets competition regime which came into force on 1 January 2025. The investigation will assess Google’s position in search and search advertising services and how this impacts consumers and businesses including advertisers, news publishers, and rival search engines.
Google’s innovative services have generated significant benefits in the UK. Its search services are a gateway through which millions of people and businesses access and navigate the internet. In the UK, Google accounts for more than 90% of all general search queries, and more than 200,000 UK advertisers use Google’s search advertising. Search is vital for economic growth. It facilitates businesses connecting with each other, with investors, and with their customers. And it generates a wealth of data that can be used to develop new AI products and services to foster innovation.
Given the importance of search as a key digital service for people, businesses and the economy, it is critical that competition works well. Effective competition ensures people benefit from greater choice, new and innovative services, and have control over their data. Search services are also important as a route to access the news. Effective competition could help ensure that people can access a wide range of content and that publishers are treated fairly for the use of their content.
For businesses, effective competition could keep down the costs of search advertising, equivalent to nearly £500 per household per year, in turn lowering prices across the economy. An effective, competitive market could also allow businesses to innovate in a way which creates alternatives to traditional search services, including by, for example, ensuring that new AI start-ups can compete with Google and other existing players on an equal footing.
Under the digital markets competition regime, the CMA may designate firms with SMS in relation to a particular digital activity. Once designated, the CMA can impose conduct requirements or propose pro-competition interventions to achieve positive outcomes for UK consumers and businesses.
The CMA’s investigation will assess whether Google has SMS in the UK search and search advertising sectors and, in parallel, consider whether conduct requirements should be imposed in the event of a final designation decision.
The issues that will form part of the CMA’s investigation include:
Weak competition and barriers to entry and innovation in search. The CMA will assess how competition is working and if Google is using its position to prevent innovation by others. This includes whether barriers to entry are preventing other competitors from entering the market, in particular whether Google is able to shape the development of new AI services and interfaces, including ‘answer engines’, in ways which limit the competitive constraint they impose on Google Search.
Possible leveraging of market power and ensuring open markets. This will include investigating whether Google is using its position in the market to self-preference its own services, for example specialised search services covering shopping and travel.
Potential exploitative conduct. This will include investigating the collection and use of large quantities of consumer data without informed consent, and the use of publisher content without fair terms and conditions (including payment terms).
Potential conduct requirements could include, for example, requirements on Google to make the data it collects available to other businesses or giving publishers more control over how their data is used including in Google’s AI services.
The CMA will take a proportionate and transparent approach to this investigation which must be completed within 9 months. It will now focus on engaging a wide range of stakeholders – including advertising firms, news publishers and user groups – as well as gathering evidence from Google before reaching a decision by October 2025.
Sarah Cardell, Chief Executive of the CMA, said:
Millions of people and businesses across the UK rely on Google’s search and advertising services – with 90 per cent of searches happening on their platform and more than 200,000 UK businesses advertising there. That’s why it’s so important to ensure these services are delivering good outcomes for people and businesses and that there is a level playing field, especially as AI has the potential to transform search services.
It’s our job to ensure people get the full benefit of choice and innovation in search services and get a fair deal – for example in how their data is collected and stored. And for businesses, whether you are a rival search engine, an advertiser or a news organisation, we want to ensure there is a level playing field for all businesses, large and small, to succeed.
More information on the digital markets competition regime can be found via the CMA’s explainer page.
Notes to Editors
1 . Search advertising is where an advertiser pays for its advert to appear next to the results from a user’s search on an internet search engine. The investigation relates to Google’s general search and search advertising activities. A description of these activities and the main Google products included is set out in the investigation notice.
2 . The statutory deadline for this investigation is Monday 13 October 2025.
3 . Anyone with an interest in the CMA’s Google Search investigation is invited to comment until Monday 3 February.
4 . Under the digital markets competition regime, the CMA may designate firms with SMS in relation to a particular digital activity. If designated, the CMA could impose conduct requirements or introduce pro-competition interventions to achieve positive outcomes for UK consumers and businesses. For any business to be able to be designated with strategic market status it must be found to have:
Substantial and entrenched market power in a digital activity linked to the United Kingdom
A position of strategic significance
Global turnover of more than £25 billion or UK turnover of more than £1 billion
6 . The regime forms part of the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act which received Royal Assent in May 2024.
7 . Today’s announcement comes at a time when other authorities around the world, including in the US, Europe and Australia are also taking a close look at Google’s search activities. The CMA is in regular contact with these other authorities.
8 . For media enquiries, contact the CMA press office on 020 3738 6460 or press@cma.gov.uk
La CNMC inicia un estudio sobre la urbanización del suelo para mejorar el acceso a la vivienda
La escasez de suelo y las restricciones para el desarrollo urbanístico pueden limitar la vivienda disponible y elevar su precio.
El estudio formulará recomendaciones para agilizar la urbanización del suelo, reducir costes y acelerar plazos, en beneficio de los ciudadanos.
La Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia (CNMC) ha iniciado un estudio sobre la transformación urbanística del suelo para mejorar el acceso a la vivienda en nuestro país.
Impulso de la urbanización del suelo
El suelo es un elemento necesario para la construcción de vivienda y representa un porcentaje muy importante de su precio. Por eso, la escasez de suelo y las restricciones en el desarrollo urbanístico pueden reducir la vivienda disponible y elevar su coste. Para evitarlo, la urbanización del suelo debería ser un proceso ágil y rápido en la medida de lo posible, manteniendo las garantías necesarias.
En esta línea, el estudio de la CNMC identificará los elementos que restrinjan de forma innecesaria la eficiencia y competencia del sector, y formulará una serie de recomendaciones para mejorar su funcionamiento.
La CNMC anima a cualquier persona con información relevante sobre el sector a ponerse en contacto con la Subdirección de Estudios e Informes del Departamento de Promoción de la Competencia a través de la siguiente dirección de correo electrónico: dp.estudios@cnmc.es.
El Plan Estratégico 2021-2026 de la CNMC incluye entre sus objetivos la protección de los consumidores, particularmente los más vulnerables, así como el impulso de la productividad y la eficiencia económica.
La CNMC, de acuerdo con el artículo 5.1 de la Ley de creación, tiene entre sus funciones la promoción de una competencia efectiva en los mercados mediante, entre otros, la realización de estudios y trabajos de investigación en materia de competencia, así como informes generales sobre sectores económicos, en su caso, con propuestas de liberalización, desregulación o modificación normativa.
Documento no oficial, destinado a los medios de comunicación, y que no vincula a la CNMC. Reproducción permitida solo si se cita la fuente.
La CNMC multa al Ilustre Colegio de Abogados de Barcelona por incumplir sus resoluciones
En 2018, la CNMC sancionó al ICAB y a otros ocho colegios de abogados por elaborar, publicar y difundir baremos de honorarios.
Tras la sanción, el ICAB aportó unos criterios orientativos para la tasación de costas adecuados al cumplimiento de la resolución sancionadora.
En la vigilancia del expediente, la CNMC detectó que en realidad el ICAB estaba aplicando y difundiendo esos criterios como verdaderos baremos.
La Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia (CNMC) ha sancionado al Ilustre Colegio de Abogados de Barcelona (ICAB) con 500.000 euros por incumplir dos resoluciones dictadas en un expediente sancionador por recomendaciones de precios sobre los honorarios que cobran los abogados a sus clientes en los procesos judiciales (SNC/100/24 ICAB).
En marzo de 2018, la CNMC sancionó al ICAB y a ocho Colegios de Abogados por realizar recomendaciones de precios mediante la elaboración, publicación y difusión de baremos de honorarios, conductas prohibidas por el artículo 1 de la Ley 15/2007 de 3 de julio, de Defensa de la Competencia (LDC) (nota de prensa).
Tras la sanción, el ICAB aportó a la CNMC unos nuevos criterios orientativos para la tasación de costas. En este documento el ICAB establecía pautas o directrices generales para la tasación de costas, en lugar de los baremos o instrumentos para la cuantificación directa de los honorarios por los que había sido sancionado.
En febrero de 2020, la CNMC dictó una Resolución —como parte del procedimiento de vigilancia (VS/0587/16) del expediente de 2018— en la que declaró que los criterios orientativos para la tasación de costas presentados por el ICAB eran adecuados para cumplir la Resolución de 2018. En la misma resolución la CNMC advertía que seguiría vigilando la actuación de los colegios “con vistas a garantizar que no utilicen ni difundan los antiguos criterios ya sancionados u otros similares”.
Expediente sancionador
Sin embargo, la CNMC acreditó después que el ICAB había difundido los criterios orientativos validados por la CNMC para que se aplicasen en la práctica como verdaderos baremos de honorarios. Con esta difusión, realizada especialmente en sesiones de formación, se transformaban las indicaciones genéricas de los criterios orientativos en unos porcentajes concretos y, en definitiva, en un sistema de cálculo automático para la tasación de costas. La difusión se produjo entre más de 4.000 abogados del ICAB, además de entre profesionales colegiados en colegios de abogados de otras demarcaciones territoriales.
Esta práctica constituye un incumplimiento de las resoluciones de 2018 y 2020, tipificado como una infracción muy grave en el artículo 62.4.c) de la Ley de Defensa de la Competencia.
Pago voluntario y reducción de la multa
Antes de aprobarse la resolución, el ICAB pagado voluntariamente la multa propuesta (500.000 euros), acogiéndose al artículo 85.3 de la Ley 39/2015, que permite reducir, como mínimo, un 20 % la sanción si la entidad paga por anticipado. El importe de la multa, una vez aplicada la reducción, ha sido de 400.000 euros.
Documento no oficial, destinado a los medios de comunicación, y que no vincula a la CNMC. Reproducción permitida solo si se cita la fuente.
La CNMC analizará la concentración Bondalti Chemicals/Ercros en segunda fase
Bondalti notificó la adquisición del control exclusivo de Ercros el pasado 9 de julio de 2024.
La operación puede suponer riesgos para la competencia en los mercados de sosa cáustica e hipoclorito sódico, por lo que requiere un análisis en mayor profundidad.
La Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia (CNMC) ha acordado, con fecha 18 de diciembre de 2024, el inicio de la segunda fase del análisis de la concentración Bondalti Chemicals/Ercros (C/1480/24).
La operación consiste en la adquisición del control exclusivo de Ercros por parte de Bondalti, a través de una oferta pública de adquisición (OPA) hostil que fue presentada el 5 de marzo de 2024.
Apertura de la segunda fase
El sector económico afectado por la operación es la fabricación de productos básicos de química orgánica e inorgánica, en especial los mercados del cloro y sus derivados, en los que se solapa la actividad de las partes.
La potencial adquisición puede suponer riesgos para la competencia en los mercados de sosa cáustica e hipoclorito sódico y, por ello, la CNMC ha acordado analizar la operación en segunda fase. Este paso no prejuzga las conclusiones definitivas que la CNMC pueda alcanzar sobre la concentración.
Análisis en profundidad
Durante la primera fase del procedimiento, la CNMC ha investigado la situación de competencia en los mercados afectados. Esto facilitará el análisis en segunda fase, que estudiará en mayor profundidad la operación y, en particular, los mercados afectados de sosa cáustica e hipoclorito sódico.
Durante esta fase, Ercros y otros terceros con interés legítimo podrán presentar alegaciones. Bondalti, por su parte, también podrá formular alegaciones y aportar más información. Además, se solicitará un informe preceptivo a las comunidades autónomas en las que la concentración incida de forma significativa.
La resolución final que apruebe la CNMC podrá autorizar, aceptar compromisos, imponer condiciones o prohibir la operación de concentración Bondalti Chemicals/Ercros.
Documento no oficial, destinado a los medios de comunicación, y que no vincula a la CNMC. Reproducción permitida solo si se cita la fuente.
Ouverture d’une consultation publique sur l’introduction d’un système de contrôle des concentrations pour les opérations sous les seuils de notification
Publié le 14 janvier 2025
Tirant les conséquences de l’arrêt Illumina/Grail de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne du 3 septembre 2024, l’Autorité de la concurrence s’est engagée à identifier les moyens existants ou nécessaires pour s’assurer qu’aucune concentration, même non soumise à une notification préalable, ne porte atteinte à la concurrence sur le territoire français.
Dans ce cadre, l’Autorité ouvre la présente consultation publique pour recueillir les observations des parties prenantes jusqu’au 16 février 2025.
Communiqué de presse du 14 janvier 2025
L’Autorité de la concurrence ouvre une consultation publique jusqu’au 16 février 2025 sur les modalités d’introduction d’un système de contrôle des concentrations susceptibles de porter atteinte à la concurrence et ne franchissant pas les seuils de notification en vigueur
From January 2025, new responsibilities for the CMA came into force under the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024.
The new ‘digital markets competition regime’ enables the CMA to promote competition in fast-moving digital markets, while protecting UK consumers and businesses from unfair or harmful practices by the very largest technology firms.
The regime will unlock opportunities for more innovation and economic growth across the UK tech sector, benefitting companies of all shapes and sizes – along with the investors who back them. It will also help people and businesses across the UK, who rely on access to critical digital markets, to get a fair deal.
On 14 January 2025, the CMA launched the first investigation under the regime, focused on Google’s activities in search and search advertising.
The regime provides a unique opportunity to encourage the benefits of investment and innovation from the largest digital firms, while ensuring a level playing-field for the many start-ups and scale-ups across the UK tech sector. The multitude of UK businesses and consumers who depend on the largest firms for critical products and services will also benefit from more innovation, more choice and more competitive prices.
opportunities to harness the benefits of continued investment and innovation by the very largest firms
unlocking expanded opportunities for investment and innovation by creating a level playing field for start-ups and scale-ups (many UK-based) to succeed
strengthened opportunities for UK consumers and business customers, those who rely on key platform services, to benefit from greater choice, more innovation and lower prices
People can:
make informed choices, with defaults and choice architecture aiding decision-making
use the products and services that best meet their needs, regardless of what other products and services they use and who they are provided by
easily switch providers, without losing access to their data and content
be protected from exploitation and unfair or misleading practices
To ensure that businesses:
that rely on Strategic Market Status (SMS) firms do not face exploitation or anti-competitive behaviour by those firms
have a fair chance to compete with SMS firms, including through appropriate access to data and functionality
Driving economic growth and improved productivity by:
harnessing the benefits of continued investment and innovation by the very largest firms
expanding opportunities for investment and innovation by creating a level playing field for start-ups and scale-ups (many UK-based) to succeed
Criteria for Strategic Market Status
The heart of the regime is proportionality. It is designed to apply only to the very largest firms. If certain conditions are met, these firms can be designated with Strategic Market Status (SMS) in relation to a particular digital activity.
In the first investigation under the regime, the CMA will consider whether Google, which accounts for more than 90% of all general search queries in the UK, has SMS in the provision of search and search advertising services.
The CMA will carry out investigations within a 9 month statutory timeframe to consider whether to designate a firm with SMS.
To assess whether the conditions for an SMS designation are met, the CMA will carry out evidence-based investigations, consulting and engaging with a wide range of stakeholders.
The conditions are:
UK turnover of more than £1 billion or global turnover of more than £25 billion
substantial and entrenched market power in relation to the digital activity
a position of strategic significance
The CMA must carry out a forward-looking, five-year assessment to decide whether a firm has ‘substantial and entrenched’ market power in a particular digital activity. To make sure the regime keeps up with developments in fast-moving digital markets, SMS designations are time-bound for review every 5 years.
A firm has a position of strategic significance if it has at least 1 of the following:
significant size or scale in the digital activity
a significant number of other firms use the digital activity to carry out business it can extend its market power to a range of other activities
it can substantially influence how other firms behave, in respect of the digital activity or otherwise
Stages of an SMS investigation
An SMS investigation will usually last 9 months. The stages are:
launch of the designation investigation
consultation period
proposed decision
consultation period
final decision
At least 9 months before the end of the five-year designation period, the CMA must open a new SMS investigation to re-assess the firm’s status.
What happens as a result of an investigation
If the CMA designates a firm with SMS, it will have 2 key tools: Conduct Requirements and Pro-Competition Interventions.
Through Conduct Requirements, the CMA will be able to guide the behaviour of SMS firms, tackling conduct that could undermine fair competition, or exploit people and businesses.
Through Pro-Competition Interventions, the CMA will be able to address specific competition problems arising from a firm’s market power in a particular digital activity.
The regime also provides for additional merger reporting requirements on SMS firms, to make sure the CMA has earlier sight of mergers and acquisitions that could harm competition in digital markets.
Conduct requirements
The CMA may put in place one or more tailored rules for SMS firms – steps that require them to take certain action or to stop a specific activity. These requirements may be put in place where doing so would be proportionate to achieve specific positive outcomes for users (or potential users) of the digital activity. These are fair dealing, open choices, or trust and transparency.
Pro-competition interventions
Once a firm has been designated with strategic market status, the CMA may investigate whether anything relating to the designated digital activity (for example, the behaviour of a firm or the structure of a sector) is harming competition.
If the CMA finds an adverse effect on competition, it can design and test interventions to address these competition problems and any harmful effects on users. This might include giving people the power to transfer their data easily between providers; or requiring firms to make sure different products and services work smoothly together (‘interoperability’), so businesses can more easily innovate and compete.
New merger reporting requirements
SMS firms must report mergers with a UK connection, and a value of £25 million or more, to the CMA before their completion. Where the CMA is concerned a merger might cause competition problems, it will launch a merger investigation under its normal merger review process.
Design and approach
The way rules are designed and applied matters if the UK is to maximise its international attractiveness to innovators and investors. The new regime has been created with this in mind, representing a unique combination of ‘best-in-class’ features, which the CMA is committed to implementing in an open, transparent, solutions-focused way.
Proportionality
The regime applies only to the very largest technology firms – those with substantial and entrenched market power in a particular digital activity. The CMA will also take a highly tailored, bespoke approach to identifying and addressing specific harms.
Process
The process for investigations and interventions will be participative and transparent, including constructive engagement with SMS firms and other stakeholders to resolve concerns quickly and effectively where possible.
Predictability
Interventions are developed through a forward-looking, iterative and open process, providing the predictability that is critically important to businesses. Designations are limited to a maximum of 5 years before the CMA must consider whether they should be renewed, varied or revoked. This provides certainty whilst enabling the CMA to take account of technological and broader market changes.
Pace
Designation investigations have a 9-month statutory timeline, with the CMA able to consult on conduct requirements at the same time, helping us to reach positive outcomes faster. The Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act also provides for a new general duty of expedition for the CMA, including in relation to the digital markets competition regime, which means pace will be a key focus.
Administering the regime
The CMA will actively monitor interventions to make sure they are effective, avoid unintended consequences, and are targeted where they can have the most positive impact.
The most significant decisions under the regime will be taken by the CMA Board and a new Digital Markets Board Committee.
The CMA will coordinate with other regulators domestically and set out arrangements for doing this in published memoranda of understanding.
Many of the issues the CMA will tackle are cross-border in nature, so it is also working closely with international partners to help shape a regulatory landscape that supports investment and innovation in the UK.
The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) has investigated the completed acquisition by Sonoco Products Company of the Eviosys group, from entities managed by KPS Capital Partners LP and Crown Holdings, Inc.
Este é um informativo diário que traz para o(a) leitor (a) notícias e casos de defesa da concorrência das principais jurisdições antitruste do mundo (CADE, FTC, Comissão Europeia, CMA etc).
Notícias
La CNMC analizará la concentración Bondalti Chemicals/Ercros en segunda fase
Bondalti notificó la adquisición del control exclusivo de Ercros el pasado 9 de julio de 2024.
La operación puede suponer riesgos para la competencia en los mercados de sosa cáustica e hipoclorito sódico, por lo que requiere un análisis en mayor profundidad.
La Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia (CNMC) ha acordado, con fecha 18 de diciembre de 2024, el inicio de la segunda fase del análisis de la concentración Bondalti Chemicals/Ercros (C/1480/24).
La operación consiste en la adquisición del control exclusivo de Ercros por parte de Bondalti, a través de una oferta pública de adquisición (OPA) hostil que fue presentada el 5 de marzo de 2024.
Apertura de la segunda fase
El sector económico afectado por la operación es la fabricación de productos básicos de química orgánica e inorgánica, en especial los mercados del cloro y sus derivados, en los que se solapa la actividad de las partes.
La potencial adquisición puede suponer riesgos para la competencia en los mercados de sosa cáustica e hipoclorito sódico y, por ello, la CNMC ha acordado analizar la operación en segunda fase. Este paso no prejuzga las conclusiones definitivas que la CNMC pueda alcanzar sobre la concentración.
Análisis en profundidad
Durante la primera fase del procedimiento, la CNMC ha investigado la situación de competencia en los mercados afectados. Esto facilitará el análisis en segunda fase, que estudiará en mayor profundidad la operación y, en particular, los mercados afectados de sosa cáustica e hipoclorito sódico.
Durante esta fase, Ercros y otros terceros con interés legítimo podrán presentar alegaciones. Bondalti, por su parte, también podrá formular alegaciones y aportar más información. Además, se solicitará un informe preceptivo a las comunidades autónomas en las que la concentración incida de forma significativa.
La resolución final que apruebe la CNMC podrá autorizar, aceptar compromisos, imponer condiciones o prohibir la operación de concentración Bondalti Chemicals/Ercros.
Documento no oficial, destinado a los medios de comunicación, y que no vincula a la CNMC. Reproducción permitida solo si se cita la fuente.
L’Autorité réforme, à droit constant, sa procédure de traitement du secret des affaires dans le cadre de l’instruction des dossiers
Publié le 13 janvier 2025
Cette réforme vise à réduire les délais de traitement du secret des affaires à travers :
– l’application rigoureuse par les parties de la notion de secret des affaires ;
– la réduction du nombre de décisions de traitement du secret des affaires multiples. L’objectif est de n’adopter, par principe, qu’une seule décision par partie concernée, accordant, refusant partiellement ou totalement la protection et, le cas échéant, une seule décision levant cette protection.
Artigos e análises
Research and analysis
Wider benefits of competition policy and enforcement
A review of recent evidence on the deterrent effects of competition policy and enforcement, and its wider impacts on growth and productivity.
This file may not be suitable for users of assistive technology.Request an accessible format.
Details
This review summarises recent evidence on the deterrent effect of competition authorities’ work and the relationship between competition and productivity. This builds on previous reports on these topics published in 2017 and 2015 respectively.
The review finds new evidence continues to support those previous reports. We identify additional evidence of the existence of a substantial deterrent effect from enforcement action and merger control. We also find further evidence that effective competition policy has positive impacts on innovation, productivity and growth.
Updates to this page
Published 13 January 2025
Collection
Microeconomics Unit research
An overview of the CMA’s Microeconomics Unit’s research into competition, innovation, and productivity
The Microeconomics Unit (part of the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA)) conducts economic research focusing on issues of competition, innovation and productivity to support growth in the UK economy.
The role of the unit is to provide expertise and ensure the CMA and wider government remain informed of emerging economic trends helping people, businesses and the UK economy by promoting competitive markets and tackling unfair behaviour.
The discussion papers describe research in progress. They are published to encourage comment and further debate on issues of competition, innovation and productivity.
Partes: Companhia Nacional de Cimento, Companhia de Cimento da Paraíba, Companhia de Cimento Campeão Alvorada, Casa dos Ventos S.A., Ventos de Santa Jacinta Energias Renováveis S.A., Ventos de São Rafael Energias Renováveis S.A., Ventos de Santa Doroteia Energias Renováveis S.A. e Ventos de Santa Cristina Energias Renováveis S.A. Aprovação sem restrições.
Este é um informativo diário que traz para o(a) leitor (a) notícias e casos de defesa da concorrência das principais jurisdições antitruste do mundo (CADE, FTC, Comissão Europeia, CMA etc).
Notícias
Justice Department Sues to Block Global Business Travel Group’s Proposed Acquisition of CWT Holdings
Friday, January 10, 2025Share
For Immediate Release
Office of Public Affairs
$570M Acquisition Would Allow the World’s Largest Travel Management Company to Eliminate its Second-Largest Rival, Limiting Travel Management Options for American Businesses
The Justice Department filed a civil antitrust lawsuit today to stop Global Business Travel Group Inc. (Amex GBT), the largest business travel management company in the world, from acquiring its rival, CWT Holdings LLC (CWT), the third-largest business travel management company in the world. The complaint, filed today in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, alleges that the proposed $570 million transaction — Amex GBT’s fifth acquisition of another travel management company since 2018 — would harm competition for business travel management services to U.S. global and multinational businesses.
“American businesses rely on travel management companies to connect employees, control travel costs, make travel booking and expense management easier, and ensure their employees’ safety during travel,” said Acting Assistant Attorney General Doha Mekki of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division. “This acquisition is the latest in a series of acquisitions by Amex GBT that will further consolidate an already consolidated market with only a handful of competitive options capable of serving customers with the most need for travel management services. American businesses will face the consequences, seeing higher prices, less innovation and fewer choices.”
As alleged in the complaint, Amex GBT and CWT anticipated that the proposed acquisition would harm competition and benefit the merged firm at the expense of its customers. The complaint alleges that senior Amex GBT executives viewed the acquisition as an opportunity for “consolidation” of the market for business travel management services for global and multinational customers and a respite from its recent customer losses to CWT. The complaint further alleges that Amex GBT recognized that its valuation of the proposed acquisition should reflect the financial benefit of avoiding future loss business to CWT. For example, its CEO wrote to its president that the company “need[ed] to consider how much we might lose to [CWT] each year in a [business as usual] scenario.” During deal negotiations, CWT’s owners likewise believed Amex GBT should pay a higher price for CWT in recognition of the increased revenues Amex GBT would enjoy post-merger due to the reduction in “price pressure” from “removing [a] big competitor.”
The complaint alleges that the combination of Amex GBT and CWT would combine two of the three largest players in business travel management services for global and multinational companies located in the United States, giving the combined firm a significant share in a market that one of the largest owners of CWT has acknowledged is “oligopolistic.” Few other companies can effectively provide travel management services to global and multinational companies located in the United States at the scale of Amex GBT and CWT.
Today, Amex GBT and CWT compete fiercely to provide travel management services for large businesses and those with complex travel needs. CWT had recently begun pursuing new and innovative strategies to improve service and reduce prices in order to win over business from Amex GBT. As a result, Amex GBT recently lost several significant bid opportunities for large business customers to CWT. If Amex GBT is permitted to acquire CWT, this intense competition would be lost, risking higher prices, less innovation and fewer choices — costs that will be borne by the many businesses and employees for whom these services are critical to their productivity and operations.
Amex GBT is a publicly traded Delaware corporation with its principal executive office located in New York City and its operational headquarters located in London. In 2023, Amex GBT managed a total transaction value of approximately $28.2 billion, earning revenues of $2.29 billion.
CWT is a privately held company headquartered in Minnetonka, Minnesota. In 2023, CWT managed a total transaction volume of approximately $14 billion, earning revenues of about $850 million.
Former President of Asphalt Paving Company Pleads Guilty to Bid Rigging
Friday, January 10, 2025Share
For Immediate Release
Office of Public Affairs
Seventh Individual Pleads Guilty in Ongoing Investigation of Collusion Involving Michigan-Area Asphalt Industry
The former president of a Michigan asphalt paving company pleaded guilty Wednesday for his role in a conspiracy to rig bids for asphalt paving services contracts in Michigan.
According to court documents filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Timothy Baugher, former president of Pontiac-based Asphalt Specialists LLC (ASI), conspired with F. Allied Construction Company Inc. (Allied), and employees from those companies to rig bids in each other’s favor. Baugher participated in the conspiracy from July 2017 through May 2021.
Wednesday’s guilty plea is the 10th in the Antitrust Division’s ongoing investigation into collusion in the Michigan asphalt paving industry. Baugher’s former employer, ASI, and another former ASI executive also pleaded guilty for their participation in the conspiracy with Allied in January 2024. Allied and two of its executives previously pleaded guilty in August 2023 for their participation in the conspiracy. On Aug. 15, 2024, ASI was sentenced to pay a fine of $6,500,000.
Under the terms of the conspiracy, the co-conspirators coordinated each other’s bid prices so that the agreed-upon losing company would submit intentionally non-competitive bids. These bids gave customers the false impression of competition when, in fact, the co-conspirators already had decided among themselves who would win the contracts.
“Americans deserve to pay a fair, competitive price to fix transportation infrastructure,” said Acting Assistant Attorney General Doha Mekki of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division. “The division and our law enforcement partners will continue to hold accountable executives who cheat consumers by undermining the competitive process.”
“Fair and open marketplace competition is essential in providing consumers and taxpayers the integrity expected in procuring contracts funded with public dollars” said Special Agent in Charge Anthony Licari of the Department of Transportation’s Office of Inspector General, Midwestern Region. “Corporate executives who collude to fixing prices and rigging bids will be held accountable.”
“Activities related to bid-rigging and collusion do not promote an environment conducive to open competition which harms the consumer,” said Executive Special Agent in Charge Kenneth Cleevely of the U.S. Postal Service Office of Inspector General. “The guilty plea in this case represents a win for all law enforcement agencies who investigate those who engage in this type of harmful conduct to ensure that justice is served.”
Baugher pleaded guilty to one count of violating Section 1 of the Sherman Act. He faces a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison and a $1 million criminal fine for the charge. The maximum penalty for corporations is a $100 million criminal fine. The fine may be increased to twice the gain derived from the crime or twice the loss suffered by the victims of the crime if either amount is greater than the statutory maximum fine. A sentencing hearing will be scheduled at a later date. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.
Wednesday’s guilty plea resulted from an ongoing federal antitrust investigation into bid rigging and other anticompetitive conduct in the asphalt paving services industry being conducted by the Antitrust Division’s Chicago Office and the Offices of Inspectors General for the U.S. Department of Transportation and U.S. Postal Service.
Anyone with information in connection with this investigation should contact the Antitrust Division’s Complaint Center at 888-647-3258 or visit www.justice.gov/atr/report-violations.
The Federal Trade Commission has approved revised jurisdictional thresholds for Section 8 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits interlocking directorates, which is an arrangement that occurs when an officer or director of one firm simultaneously serves as an officer or director of a competing firm.For 2025, thresholds under Section 8 of the Act that trigger prohibitions on certain interlocking memberships on corporate boards of directors are $51,380,000 for Section 8(a)(l) and $5,138,000 for Section 8(a)(2)(A).
The Federal Trade Commission has approved a revised jurisdictional and a revised filing fee schedule for the Hart‑Scott‑Rodino (HSR) Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976. Section 7A(a)(2) of the Act requires the Commission to revise the jurisdictional thresholds annually, based on the change in gross national product. The FTC is also required to revise the related HSR filing fee schedule annually based on changes in the gross national product and in the consumer price index under Division GG of the 2023 Consolidated Appropriations Act.
For 2025, the size-of-transaction threshold for reporting proposed mergers and acquisitions under Section 7A of the Clayton Act will adjust from $119.5 million to $126.4 million.
No Despacho SG nº 49/2024, de 08 de janeiro de 2025 (SEI nº 1498321), publicado no DOU em 10 de janeiro de 2025, Edição nº 7, Seção 1, página 42, onde se lê: “Cotrasa Veículos e Serviços Ltda., Empreendedor Brasil – Fundo de Investimento em Participações Multiestratégia, Brasil Portos e Ativos Logísticos – Fundo de Investimento em Participação Multiestratégia, N.O.G.S.P.E Empreendimentos e Participações S.A., Portinvest Participações S.A., Itapoá Terminais Portuários S.A., LOGZ Logística Brasil S.A., SATI RJ Participações S.A. e Regina Indústria e Comércio S.A. Advogados: Bruno Drago, Mariana Llamazalez Ou, Rodrigo Zilio, Luis Nagalli, Julia Haddad Niemeyer e Sofia Esmanhoto Andrioli. Decido pela aprovação sem restrições.”, leia-se: “Ato de Concentração nº 08700.010766/2024-01. Partes: Cotrasa Veículos e Serviços Ltda., Empreendedor Brasil – Fundo de Investimento em Participações Multiestratégia, Brasil Portos e Ativos Logísticos – Fundo de Investimento em Participação Multiestratégia, N.O.G.S.P.E Empreendimentos e Participações S.A., Portinvest Participações S.A., Itapoá Terminais Portuários S.A., LOGZ Logística Brasil S.A., SATI RJ Participações S.A. e Regina Indústria e Comércio S.A. Advogados: Bruno Drago, Mariana Llamazalez Ou, Rodrigo Zilio, Luis Nagalli, Julia Haddad Niemeyer e Sofia Esmanhoto Andrioli. Decido pela aprovação sem restrições.”.
The CMA is investigating suspected exchanges of competitively sensitive information by 8 housebuilders in Great Britain under the Competition Act 1998.
Este é um informativo diário que traz para o(a) leitor (a) notícias e casos de defesa da concorrência das principais jurisdições antitruste do mundo (CADE, FTC, Comissão Europeia, CMA etc).
Notícias
Investigation into suspected anti-competitive conduct by housebuilders
The CMA is investigating suspected exchanges of competitively sensitive information by 8 housebuilders in Great Britain under the Competition Act 1998.
Further investigation: including additional evidence gathering, and CMA analysis and review
February 2024 to December 2024
Initial investigation: including information gathering, analysis and review of information gathered
26 February 2024
Investigation opened
Case information
On 26 February 2024, the CMA launched an investigation under Chapter I of the Competition Act 1998 into suspected breaches of competition law by 8 housebuilders, relating to concerns that they may have exchanged competitively sensitive information.
On 22 August 2024, 2 of the housebuilders that are parties to the CMA’s investigation, namely Barratt Developments plc and Redrow plc, merged to form Barratt Redrow plc.
Further to that merger, the 7 housebuilders whose activities are being investigated are:
Barratt Redrow plc and its group companies
Bellway plc and its group companies
The Berkeley Group plc and its group companies
Bloor Homes Limited and its group companies
Persimmon plc and its group companies
Taylor Wimpey plc and its group companies
Vistry Group plc and its group companies
Notes
The CMA has not reached a view as to whether there is sufficient evidence of an infringement or infringements of competition law for it to issue a statement of objections to any party under investigation. Not all cases result in the CMA issuing a statement of objections.
The CMA will consider any representations it receives before any decision is taken as to whether competition law has been infringed.
Further detail of the CMA’s procedures in Competition Act 1998 cases is available in our guidance.
Changes to the timing of original entries in the case timetable will be made if the estimated timing changes.
Personal data
The CMA may collect, use and share personal data for its investigations, including investigations under the Competition Act 1998. This includes processing personal data for the purposes of the UK General Data Protection Regulation and the Data Protection Act 2018.
You can find more information about how the CMA handles personal information in the CMA’s Personal Information Charter.
Contacts
Any media enquiries should be directed to a member of our Press Office: 020 3738 6460, press@cma.gov.uk
Published 26 February 2024 Last updated 10 January 2025 + show all updates
The JFTC Issued a Cease and Desist Order to Seki Furniture Co., Ltd.
December 19, 2024 Japan Fair Trade Commission
The Japan Fair Trade Commission today issued a cease and desist order against Seki Furniture Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Seki Furniture”) pursuant to the provisions of the Antimonopoly Act (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”). In this case, Seki Furniture violated the provision of the Article 19 (falling under Article 2, paragraph (9), item (iv) [Resale Price Maintenance]) of the Act.
Outline of Violations
Seki Furniture engaged in the following actions to compel its retailers to sell chairs marked with the Ergohuman trademark (hereinafter referred to as “Ergohuman”) at a retail price specified by Seki Furniture referred to as the reference price (hereinafter referred to as the “reference price”), no later than February 2020.
(1) Based on its policy of selling Ergohuman only to retailers who agreed to sell them at the reference price, Seki Furniture required new retailers to commit to this condition when initiating transactions involving Ergohuman. Furthermore, whenever the reference price for Ergohuman was increased, Seki Furniture ensured that retailers selling Ergohuman agreed to sell the products at the updated reference price.
(2) By monitoring the online sales prices of Ergohuman offered by its retailers and receiving complaints from these retailers about other retailers selling Ergohuman below the reference price (hereinafter referred to as “discounted sales”), Seki Furniture identified retailers engaging in discounted sales. In such cases, Seki Furniture requested the identified retailers to comply with the reference price when selling Ergohuman.
(3) Seki Furniture implemented measures such as raising the shipment price of Ergohuman for retailers who continued to engage in discounted sales despite the aforementioned requests.
* This announcement is a tentative translation. Please refer to the original text written in Japanese.
Approval of the Commitment Plan Submitted by HASHIMOTO SOGYO CO., LTD.
December 12, 2024 Japan Fair Trade Commission
The Japan Fair Trade Commission (hereinafter referred to as the “JFTC”) has investigated HASHIMOTO SOGYO CO., LTD. (hereinafter referred to as “Hashimoto Sogyo”) in accordance with the provisions of the Antimonopoly Act (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”), and suspected that Hashimoto Sogyo’s conducts described below might violate the Article 19 (falling under paragraph (1), item (ii) [payment reduction], paragraph (1), item (iii) [unfair price cutting] and paragraph (1), item (vi) [unjust requests for the provision of economic benefits]of Specific Unfair Trade Practices when Specified Shippers Assign the Transport or Custody of Articles) of the Act. Recognizing that competition would be promptly restored, through the Commitment Procedure, by measures to be swiftly taken by Hashimoto Sogyo to eliminate its conducts described below, the JFTC issued the Notice of Commitment Procedures to Hashimoto Sogyo on November 7, 2024, pursuant to Article 48-2 of the Act. Hashimoto Sogyo submitted the Commitment Plan to the JFTC for an approval of measures necessary to eliminate its conducts described below, pursuant to the Article 48-3, paragraph (1) of the Act. The JFTC today approved the Commitment Plan, pursuant to the Article 48-3, paragraph (3) of the Act recognizing that the plan is sufficient to eliminate the alleged conducts and expected to be reliably implemented (Note 1) (Note 2). This Commitment Plan includes a five-year implementation period for the commitment measures and the entrustment of monitoring the overall implementation of these measures to a third party (Note 3). It is noted that today’s approval does not mean that Hashimoto Sogyo’s conducts violated the Act. (Note 1) An approval of the Commitment Plan is an administrative disposition under the Act. (Note 2) The JFTC is to render a decision to rescind the approval pursuant to the Article 48-5, paragraph (1) of the Act and resume the investigation procedure conducted before the Notice of Commitment Procedures is issued, for instance, if the JFTC recognizes that the Commitment Plan is not being conducted according to the approved Commitment Plan. (Note 3) At the regular press conference of the Secretary General held on July 3, 2024, measures to ensure more effective and practical implementation of the Commitment Procedures were announced.
1.Overview of Hashimoto Sogyo’s Business
(1)Hashimoto Sogyo, headquartered in Tokyo, operates as a wholesaler of plumbing materials, housing equipment, and related products across Japan. (2)Hashimoto Sogyo is one of the leading companies in terms of sales revenue in Japan’s wholesale trade (machinery and equipment) industry. (3)Hashimoto Sogyo entrusts the transportation of products to logistics operators.
2.Overview of the Alleged Conducts
Hashimoto Sogyo has committed the following conducts on the logistics operators at latest from July 2017.
(1) For some of the logistics operators, Hashimoto Sogyo has engaged in the following conducts without any fault attributable to the logistics operators: (a) Deducting an amount calculated by applying a fixed rate to the predetermined payment amount; (b) Deducting bank transfer fees from the payment when depositing it into the logistics operators’ bank accounts.
(2)For some of the logistics operators, Hashimoto Sogyo has not agreed in advance the daily working hours for the entrusted transportation services and the freight charges for work exceeding those hours. In such a situation, Hashimoto Sogyo adopted fixed daily or monthly freight charges. Consequently, in cases where the transportation services involve extended working hours, including overtime beyond statutory limits, the hourly freight charges paid to these operators have been significantly lower than the standard hourly rates typically paid for similar transportation services.
(3)Hashimoto Sogyo has set fixed daily or monthly freight charges for some of the logistics operators, based on predetermined daily working hours for the entrusted transportation services. However, though the required working hours have exceeded these predetermined limits, Hashimoto Sogyo has not agreed in advance with the logistics operators on freight charges for the additional hours. Consequently, these operators have been compelled to perform additional transportation work beyond the agreed hours without receiving any compensation.
(4) For some of the logistics operators, Hashimoto Sogyo has required them to perform specific ancillary tasks related to the transportation services, which have not been included in the scope of the entrusted services. This has been done without agreeing on the terms of the arrangement in advance with the logistics operators, effectively compelling them to perform these tasks without compensation.
3.Overview of the Commitment Plan
(1)Ceasing the conducts described in section 2 above. (2)Resolving following matters at a meeting of the Board of directors. (a)To cease the conducts described in section 2; (b)To decide not to engage in conducts similar to those described in section 2 and to implement this measure for the next 5 years. (3)Notifying the logistics operators entrusted with the transportation services of the measures taken based on (2) above, as well as the intent to implement the measures described in (1) above, and ensure that these measures are thoroughly communicated to the company’s employees. (4)Recovering the lost monetary value incurred by the conducts described in section 2 (1) through (3) to the logistics operators. (5)Refraining from engaging in conducts similar to those described in section 2 and implement this measure for the next 5 years. (6)Taking necessary measures to perform following items: (a)Compiling guidelines for compliance with the Act related to transactions with logistics operators and disseminating these guidelines to all of its employees; (b)Periodic training for its executives and employees and periodic supervision by legal section for compliance with the Act regarding transactions with logistics operators. (7)Delegating the monitoring of the implementation of the measures described in (1) through (6) above to a third party, limited to those approved by the JFTC. (8)Requiring the third party entrusted under (7) to report to the JFTC on the implementation status of the measures described in (1) through (4) and (6). (9)Requiring the third party entrusted under (7) to report annually to the JFTC, for the next five years, on the implementation status of the measures described in (5) and the measures taken based on (6)(b).
With the implementation of the Commitment Plan, the recovery of the lost monetary value described in section 3 (4) above is expected to be about 38 million yen in total for approximately 25 logistics operators at present. * This announcement is a tentative translation. Please refer to the original text written in Japanese.
La conducción acompañada por un tutor no profesional, ya presente en otros países, podría mejorar el aprendizaje.
Simplificar los requisitos para autoescuelas y profesores ampliaría la oferta disponible.
Fomentar la transparencia en exámenes y tasas de aprobados beneficiaría a los futuros conductores.
La CNMC ha analizado el sector de la formación para conductores en España y propone medidas para hacerlo más accesible, eficiente y flexible (E/CNMC/001/22).
En concreto, la CNMC ha examinado la formación que ofrecen las autoescuelas para los distintos carnets de conducir, para la recuperación de puntos y para permisos especiales de conducción profesional de camiones y autobuses (el CAP) y mercancías peligrosas (permiso ADR).
Estos servicios son esenciales para garantizar la seguridad vial, así como para facilitar la movilidad personal y profesional de los ciudadanos, y para el sector del transporte. La mayoría de los demandantes son jóvenes, que en general tienen ingresos por debajo de la media. Además, tener el carnet de conducir es muy importante en las zonas menos pobladas y menos conectadas.
Barreras a la competencia
Este sector está formado por empresas pequeñas, enfocadas al ámbito municipal, y muy reguladas para garantizar la seguridad vial. En España, solo las autoescuelas autorizadas pueden enseñar a conducir, mientras que en muchos países de nuestro entorno es posible practicar con un tutor no profesional.
Las autoescuelas deben obtener una autorización específica para cada tipo de formación que quieran impartir, además de contar con locales o vehículos. También se regula la cualificación de los profesores y directores de los centros.
Por otra parte, las autoridades de tráfico tienen un sistema de reparto de los exámenes de conducir entre autoescuelas, ya que hay más demanda que capacidad. A pesar de que este sistema de reparto ha mejorado en los últimos años, aún existe margen para hacerlo más equilibrado y transparente y, también, para dar mayor capacidad de elección a los alumnos.
La falta de transparencia y acceso a información clave puede perjudicar a los alumnos. Los futuros conductores no pueden consultar fácilmente datos importantes, como las tasas de aprobados de cada autoescuela, ni realizar gestiones directamente con la DGT.
Por último, las autoescuelas también tienen dificultades para acceder a terrenos municipales donde practicar o a centros de examen, así como problemas para adaptarse a la herramienta informática de la DGT para tramitar expedientes.
Recomendaciones de la CNMC
Para mejorar el sector en beneficio de la ciudadanía, la CNMC plantea:
Flexibilizar el aprendizaje de la conducción. Permitir la conducción acompañada con tutores no profesionales, como en otros países, y facilitar más alternativas de formación, incluyendo métodos digitales y online.
Reducir barreras a la actividad de las autoescuelas. Revisar la obligación de ser titular de un vehículo y un local físico, o las duplicidades en los trámites. También se propone facilitar que un mismo centro imparta diferentes tipos de formación.
Facilitar el acceso a la profesión. Simplificar los requisitos para ser profesor o director y mejorar la formación para los profesionales del sector.
Mejorar la gestión de los exámenes. Aumentar la transparencia del sistema, reforzando su equilibrio y dando más capacidad de decisión a los alumnos. Se podría considerar asignar los exámenes a los alumnos en vez de a las autoescuelas.
Fomentar la transparencia y el equilibrio competitivo. Publicar información sobre las tasas de aprobados y permitir que los alumnos gestionen directamente con la DGT sus trámites. También se propone garantizar un acceso adecuado a terrenos de práctica y de examen, y facilitar el uso directo de la herramienta de gestión de expedientes de la DGT.
La CNMC es el organismo independiente regulador de los mercados que garantiza y promueve la existencia de una competencia efectiva en beneficio de los consumidores y usuarios. Este estudio se realiza en el marco de sus funciones de promoción de la competencia.
Documento no oficial, destinado a los medios de comunicación, y que no vincula a la CNMC. Reproducción permitida solo si se cita la fuente.
Systèmes de notation des produits et services de consommation: l’Autorité de la concurrence fournit des orientations au regard des règles de concurrence
Publié le 09 janvier 2025
L’essentiel
En février dernier, l’Autorité de la concurrence a décidé de s’autosaisir pour avis afin d’analyser le fonctionnement concurrentiel du secteur des systèmes de notation visant à informer les consommateurs sur les caractéristiques liées au développement durable des produits et services de consommation.
Dans le cadre de l’instruction, l’Autorité a ensuite lancé en avril 2024 une consultation publique et a interrogé un grand nombre d’acteurs du secteur qui interviennent directement ou indirectement dans l’élaboration ou le fonctionnement d’un système de notation : des éditeurs de systèmes de notation, des entreprises et des acteurs de la société civile (ONG et associations de consommateurs).
L’Autorité constate dans le présent avis, que les systèmes de notation sont en plein essor dans de nombreux secteurs. S’ils sont très divers dans la mesure où ils touchent à des secteurs d’activités et à des produits et services hétéroclites, ils ont comme objectif commun de donner une appréciation graduée d’un produit ou d’un service afin de rendre lisible un ensemble d’informations pour le consommateur.
Surtout, l’Autorité souligne que ces systèmes, en fournissant une information simplifiée et didactique aux consommateurs sur des caractéristiques liées au développement durable répondent à certaines attentes du consommateur, incitent les entreprises à innover et peuvent contribuer à l’animation du jeu concurrentiel sur les marchés de produits ou services qu’ils évaluent.
Dans le présent avis et sans préjudice des lignes directrices de la Commission européenne sur les accords de coopération horizontale, l’Autorité fournit des orientations afin d’aider les acteurs à appréhender les systèmes de notation au regard des règles de concurrence.
Les conditions relatives à la conception des systèmes de notation
Depuis plusieurs années, les consommateurs sont destinataires d’un volume croissant d’informations sur les caractéristiques de durabilité des biens ou des services de consommation. Cette information leur est notamment fournie par le biais de systèmes de notation qui livrent une information, sous la forme de chiffres, de lettres ou de couleurs, facilitant la compréhension des consommateurs concernant les caractéristiques de durabilité des produits et des services qu’ils entendent acheter.
Les systèmes de notation sont, par leur simplicité, particulièrement utiles pour fournir aux consommateurs un ensemble d’informations sur les caractéristiques liées à la durabilité des produits ou des services sous une forme simplifiée et agrégée. Ils permettent dès lors d’aider les consommateurs dans leur arbitrage au moment de leur acte d’achat et peuvent inciter les entreprises à se démarquer en innovant et en proposant des produits ou services plus vertueux pour l’environnement. Ainsi, les systèmes de notation peuvent avoir une influence sur un ou des paramètres de concurrence tenant à la qualité ou à l’innovation des produits.
L’intensité de ce paramètre peut varier selon la considération de développement durable évaluée par le système de notation, le secteur concerné et la sensibilité des consommateurs à d’autres paramètres, comme les prix.
Ainsi, l’éditeur d’un système de notation, en ce qu’il fournit des informations sur un produit ou un service susceptible d’influencer l’acte d’achat du consommateur, doit veiller à la solidité de la méthode de calcul du système de notation et à la fiabilité des données qu’il utilise. En effet, l’établissement d’un système de notation implique la sélection de critères de notation et de la pondération appliquée à ces critères. À cet égard, il convient de noter que plus la notation permet de différencier les produits ou services notés, plus le consommateur sera en mesure de comparer les produits entre eux et, par conséquent, plus le système de notation participera à l’animation de la concurrence. À contrario, l’Autorité émet des réserves sur les systèmes de notation élaborés ou construits conjointement par des concurrents, lorsqu’ils aboutissent à ce qu’une grande majorité de leurs produits reçoivent une notation similaire sur un produit donné, autrement que par les mérites. Elle souligne, en particulier, que la notation doit reposer, sur des caractéristiques objectives et non résulter d’une action concertée visant pour les entreprises à éviter de se faire concurrence sur ce paramètre et qui pourrait constituer une pratique contraire au droit de la concurrence.
L’Autorité attire, par ailleurs, l’attention des éditeurs sur la tenue des travaux préparatoires d’un système de notation lorsqu’ils impliquent de réunir des concurrents (page 42). Elle rappelle les règles relatives aux échanges d’informations et aux risques de collusion dans ce contexte et souligne les enjeux de la représentativité des participants à ces réunions, notamment lorsque les entreprises qui y participent fabriquent ou distribuent les produits qui seront notés ou lorsque le système de notation émane des pouvoirs publics ou revêt un caractère contraignant.
Enfin, pour permettre un choix éclairé du consommateur, l’Autorité rappelle la nécessité pour les éditeurs de fournir aux utilisateurs une transparence sur la gouvernance et le fonctionnement du système.
L’Autorité recommande aux éditeurs de systèmes de notation de :
Faire preuve de transparence vis-à-vis des entreprises dont les produits ou services sont notés et vis-à-vis des consommateurs concernant la gouvernance du système de notation (sources de financement et, le cas échéant, de rémunération du système de notation, éventuels liens avec des entités tierces ou tout autre élément susceptible d’avoir une incidence sur le choix de la méthode de calcul du système de notation) et concernant les participants à la conception du système de notation (entreprises notées, équipe scientifique, participation des pouvoirs publics, etc.).
Informer les entreprises dont les produits ou services sont notés ainsi que les consommateurs des caractéristiques de durabilité évaluées, ainsi que de l’ensemble des éléments permettant la construction de la note (données, critères, pondération) et son actualisation. Ces informations doivent être claires, lisibles et accessibles rapidement et facilement.
Veiller à la solidité de la méthode (critères de notation et pondération accordée à chacun d’entre eux) et à la fiabilité (précision et exactitude) des données qu’ils utilisent, en procédant à des vérifications sur les sources de données et en permettant un mécanisme de correction (changement de composition d’un produit ou erreur) dans un délai raisonnable.
La mise en œuvre des systèmes de notation
L’accès aux bases de données et aux intrants
Les éditeurs de systèmes de notation interrogés dans le cadre de l’instruction indiquent que les données nécessaires à la notation des produits ou services concernés sont largement accessibles et, principalement, à titre gratuit. Il ne peut toutefois être exclu que certaines bases de données puissent ne pas être rendues accessibles aux éditeurs de systèmes de notation, ou ne soient fournies qu’à certaines conditions restrictives. La question de l’accès aux données, et plus largement aux intrants nécessaires pour exercer une activité sur un marché, soulève des préoccupations en droit de la concurrence (page 47).
L’Autorité précise, qu’en droit de la concurrence, le refus d’accès à un intrant soit par une entreprise détenant une position dominante individuelle, soit par un ensemble d’entreprises détenant une position dominante collective peut avoir un caractère abusif dans certaines circonstances. Ce type de pratiques peut également soulever des préoccupations de concurrence lorsqu’elles sont mises en œuvre par plusieurs entreprises indépendantes agissant ensemble, par exemple, dans le cadre d’un organisme professionnel détenteur d’une base de données.
Les éventuelles pratiques de dénigrement
L’avis revient également sur une question soulevée par plusieurs entreprises dans leur contribution, qui s’interrogent sur la pratique qui consiste, pour un système de notation, à attribuer de mauvaises notes aux produits qui contiennent des substances qu’il considère comme néfastes alors même que ces substances sont autorisées par les autorités sanitaires. L’avis propose une grille d’analyse pour apprécier une telle pratique sous l’angle du dénigrement en droit de la concurrence et précise que l’Autorité appréhende le plus souvent les cas de dénigrement sous l’angle des abus de position dominante (page 48).
La démonstration d’une pratique de dénigrement sur le fondement de l’abus de position dominante exige la réunion de plusieurs conditions. Par ailleurs, l’avis relève l’importance de la liberté d’expression accordée par les juridictions judiciaires dans l’examen de la pratique de dénigrement lorsque le discours litigieux vise à contribuer à un débat sur la santé.
Les éventuelles pratiques de lobbying
Les systèmes de notation publics font l’objet de nombreuses actions de représentation d’intérêts auprès des pouvoirs publics qui sont à l’origine de leur création ou en charge de leur fonctionnement. Si ces actions sont tout à fait légitimes, elles peuvent soulever des préoccupations de concurrence au regard du droit de la concurrence. Tel pourrait être le cas, par exemple, lorsqu’un organisme professionnel ou des entreprises s’accordent pour communiquer des informations trompeuses pour tenter de rallier une autorité publique à son opinion en la conduisant à prendre une décision sur la base des faits erronés ou partiels.
L’Autorité rappelle aux entreprises que les actions de représentation d’intérêts, légitimes en tant que telles, sont, dans certaines circonstances, susceptibles de soulever des préoccupations de concurrence.
Par ailleurs, pour répondre aux exigences de robustesse mentionnées ci-avant, un système de notation émanant des pouvoirs publics ne doit pas reposer sur des considérations étrangères à l’objectif de durabilité qu’il poursuit, que cela soit dans sa méthode de calcul ou dans son mode de fonctionnement.
La communication sélective des notes
La communication sélective de notes issues d’un système de notation consiste à ne pas afficher les résultats générés par un système de notation lorsque ceux-ci ne sont pas suffisamment satisfaisants. Elle peut résulter par exemple d’un règlement d’utilisation d’un système de notation ou de la politique commerciale de distributeurs qui ne souhaitent pas pénaliser leurs fournisseurs.
Ce type de pratiques risque de réduire le pouvoir informatif des systèmes de notation, et partant, la possibilité offerte aux consommateurs de comparer effectivement les produits entre eux sur la base des notes générées par le système de notation et éventuellement de reporter leurs achats vers des produits plus vertueux (page 51).
En droit de la concurrence, si la pratique consistant à laisser aux entreprises la possibilité de ne communiquer que sur les produits qu’elles sélectionnent et a fortiori sur ceux qui obtiennent une bonne note, peut s’entendre pour encourager les entreprises à s’inscrire dans une démarche vertueuse en recourant progressivement à un système de notation, elle ne doit pas être le fruit d’une coordination entre entreprises. Se coordonner pour éviter de se livrer à une concurrence saine et non faussée sur ce paramètre en s’abstenant de mettre en lumière les produits obtenant une note peu favorable pourrait être, en effet, susceptible de constituer une entente anticoncurrentielle.
L’imposition d’un système de notation à un partenaire commercial
L’imposition d’un système de notation à un partenaire commercial peut également, dans certains cas, soulever des préoccupations de concurrence au regard du droit de la concurrence, dès lors que l’éditeur est en position dominante sur le marché concerné (page 53). À titre d’exemple, certains distributeurs ont élaboré leur propre système de notation et peuvent l’imposer directement ou indirectement à leurs fabricants. L’Autorité précise les circonstances dans lesquelles cette pratique pourrait être qualifiée d’imposition de conditions de transaction inéquitables.
En outre, si un éditeur actif dans la distribution applique des règles différentes selon qu’il s’agit de ses propres marques ou de celles de ses concurrents, utilise son système de notation pour obtenir des informations avantageuses sur ses fournisseurs, ou discrimine des fournisseurs dans des situations similaires, cela pourrait constituer un abus de position dominante.
Est qualifié d’abus de position dominante le fait pour un opérateur dominant sur un marché d’imposer des conditions de transaction non équitables à ses partenaires ou de mettre en œuvre des pratiques discriminatoires. Une telle qualification répond à un standard de preuve exigeant, défini en jurisprudence.
Pour finir, l’Autorité rappelle les conditions devant être réunies afin que d’éventuelles pratiques contraires au droit de la concurrence puissent être justifiées ou exemptées, compte tenu de l’objectif de protection du consommateur ou de durabilité poursuivi (page 54).
Avis 25-A-01 du 09 janvier 2025
relatif aux systèmes de notation visant à informer les consommateurs sur les caractéristiques liées au développement durable des produits et des services de consommation
AdC adotou uma decisão de não oposição na operação de concentração 87/2024 – PNI/Kozowood
Em 8 de janeiro de 2025, o Conselho de Administração da Autoridade da Concorrência, no uso da competência que lhe é conferida pela alínea d) do n.º 1 do artigo 19.º dos Estatutos, aprovados pelo Decreto-Lei n.º 125/2014, de 18 de agosto, delibera adotar uma decisão de não oposição à operação de concentração, nos termos da alínea b) do n.º 1 do artigo 50.º da Lei da Concorrência, uma vez que a mesma não é suscetível de criar entraves significativos à concorrência efetiva no mercado nacional ou numa parte substancial deste.
Requerentes: Hartree Partners LP, ED&F Man Intermediary Limited e ED&F Man Commodities Limited. Aprovação sem restrições.
Cotrasa Veículos e Serviços Ltda., Empreendedor Brasil – Fundo de Investimento em Participações Multiestratégia, Brasil Portos e Ativos Logísticos – Fundo de Investimento em Participação Multiestratégia, N.O.G.S.P.E Empreendimentos e Participações S.A., Portinvest Participações S.A., Itapoá Terminais Portuários S.A., LOGZ Logística Brasil S.A., SATI RJ Participações S.A. e Regina Indústria e Comércio S.A. Aprovação sem restrições.
Este é um informativo diário que traz para o(a) leitor (a) notícias e casos de defesa da concorrência das principais jurisdições antitruste do mundo (CADE, FTC, Comissão Europeia, CMA etc).
Este conteúdo é apenas para associados Assinatura alfa. Cadastre-se
Este é um informativo diário que traz para o(a) leitor (a) notícias e casos de defesa da concorrência das principais jurisdições antitruste do mundo (CADE, FTC, Comissão Europeia, CMA etc).
Notícias
Justice Department Sues Six Large Landlords for Algorithmic Pricing Scheme that Harms Millions of American Renters
Tuesday, January 7, 2025
For Immediate Release
Office of Public Affairs
Landlord Cortland Agrees to Cooperate with Justice Department and Enter into a Settlement to End the Use of Common Rental Pricing Algorithms and Competitively Sensitive Data to Set Rents
Attorneys General of Illinois and Massachusetts Join Suit Against RealPage and Apartment Landlords, Bringing Total State and Commonwealth Co-Plaintiffs to 10
The Justice Department, together with its state co-plaintiffs, filed an amended complaint today in its antitrust lawsuit against RealPage, to sue six of the nation’s largest landlords for participating in algorithmic pricing schemes that harmed renters.
The amended complaint alleges the landlords — Greystar Real Estate Partners LLC (Greystar); Blackstone’s LivCor LLC (LivCor); Camden Property Trust (Camden); Cushman & Wakefield Inc and Pinnacle Property Management Services LLC (Cushman); Willow Bridge Property Company LLC (Willow Bridge) and Cortland Management LLC (Cortland) — participated in an unlawful scheme to decrease competition among landlords in apartment pricing, harming millions of American renters. Together, these landlords operate more than 1.3 million units in 43 states and the District of Columbia. The Attorneys General of Illinois and Massachusetts joined the amended complaint as co-plaintiffs, increasing the total number of State and Commonwealth co-plaintiffs to 10. At the same time, the Justice Department filed a proposed consent decree with landlord Cortland that requires it to cooperate with the government, stop using its competitors’ sensitive data to set rents and stop using the same algorithm as its competitors without a corporate monitor.
“While Americans across the country struggled to afford housing, the landlords named in today’s lawsuit shared sensitive information about rental prices and used algorithms to coordinate to keep the price of rent high,” said Acting Assistant Attorney General Doha Mekki of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division. “Today’s action against RealPage and six major landlords seeks to end their practice of putting profits over people and make housing more affordable for millions of people across the country.”
The amended complaint alleges that the six landlords actively participated in a scheme to set their rents using each other’s competitively sensitive information through common pricing algorithms. Along with using RealPage’s anticompetitive pricing algorithms, these landlords coordinated through a variety of means, including:
Directly communicating with competitors’ senior managers about rents, occupancy, and other competitively sensitive topics. In one example, Greystar supplied Camden with information not only about very recent renewal rates, but also its approach to pricing for the upcoming quarter, its acceptance of RealPage’s pricing recommendations, use of concessions and competitively sensitive information about occupancy. Likewise, executives at Camden and LivCor communicated over the course of months about their pricing strategies, including plans for certain price increases.
Regularly conducting “call arounds.” During these discussions, euphemistically referred to as “market surveys,” property managers called or emailed competitors to share, and sometimes discuss, competitively sensitive information about rents, occupancy, pricing strategies and discounts.
Participating in “user groups” hosted by RealPage. For instance, landlords discussed via user groups how to modify the software’s pricing methodology, as well as their own pricing strategies. In one example, LivCor and Willow Bridge executives participated in a user group discussion of plans for renewal increases, concessions and acceptance rates of RealPage rent recommendations.
Sharing information with competitors about parameters in RealPage’s software. As an example, at the request of Willow Bridge’s director of revenue management, Greystar’s director of revenue management supplied its standard auto-accept parameters for RealPage’s software, including the daily and weekly limits and the days of the week for which Greystar used “auto-accept.”
The Justice Department also announced a proposed consent decree that, if approved by the court, would resolve its claims against Cortland, a landlord that manages over 80,000 rental units in 13 states. Under the proposed consent decree, Cortland would cooperate in the Justice Department’s investigation and litigation and be barred from, among other things:
Using competitors’ competitively sensitive data to train or run any pricing model;
Using third-party software or algorithms to price apartments without the supervision of a court-appointed monitor; and
Soliciting, disclosing or using any competitively sensitive information with any other property manager as part of setting rental prices or generating rental pricing recommendations.
As required by the Tunney Act, the proposed consent decree, along with the competitive impact statement, will be published in the Federal Register. Any person may submit written comments concerning the proposed consent decree during a 60-day comment period to Chief, Technology and Digital Platforms Section, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, 450 Fifth Street NW, Suite 8600, Washington, D.C. 20530. At the conclusion of the 60-day comment period, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina may enter the final judgment upon finding it is in the public interest.
Co-plaintiffs in the case are the Attorneys General of California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, North Carolina, Oregon, Tennessee and Washington.
Greystar is headquartered in Charleston, South Carolina; LivCor and Cushman & Wakefield (whose residential property management business formerly operated independently as Pinnacle) are headquartered in Chicago; Willow Bridge (formerly known as Lincoln Residential) is headquartered in Dallas; Camden is headquartered in Houston; and Cortland is headquartered in Atlanta. All manage multifamily apartment buildings; several own some or all of the properties under their management.
Oil Companies to Pay Record Civil Penalty for Violating Antitrust Pre-Transaction Notification Requirements
Tuesday, January 7, 2025Share
For Immediate Release
Office of Public Affairs
The Justice Department’s Antitrust Division, at the request of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), filed a civil antitrust lawsuit today in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against crude-oil producers XCL Resources Holdings LLC (XCL), Verdun Oil Company II LLC (Verdun) and EP Energy LLC (EP).
The lawsuit alleges that the three companies violated the pre-transaction notification and waiting period requirements of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act of 1976 (HSR Act), following Verdun’s $1.4 billion purchase agreement for EP on July 26, 2021. At the time of transaction, Verdun was under common management with XCL.
According to the complaint, the three companies failed to observe a required waiting period following such a large transaction, in which federal agencies can investigate a potential merger before it closes. Instead, EP allowed Verdun and XCL to assume operational and decision-making control over significant aspects of its day-to-day business operations, including a stoppage to EP’s planned well-drilling and development at a time when the U.S. crude-oil market faced significant supply shortages and consumers faced soaring gasoline prices.
Simultaneous to filing its complaint, the department filed a proposed settlement, subject to approval by the court, under which the defendants have agreed to pay a $5.6 million civil penalty to resolve the lawsuit, a record civil penalty for illegal pre-merger coordination in violation of the HSR Act.
Consistent with the requirements of the Tunney Act, the proposed settlement, along with the competitive impact statement, will be published in the Federal Register. Any person may submit written comments concerning the proposed settlement during a 60-day comment period via email to bccompliance@ftc.gov or by post to Maribeth Petrizzi, Special Attorney, United States, c/o Federal Trade Commission, 600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, CC-8416, Washington, D.C. 20580. At the conclusion of the 60-day comment period, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia may approve the proposed settlement upon finding that it is in the public interest.
Today, the Federal Trade Commission announced that crude oil producers XCL Resources Holdings, LLC (XCL), Verdun Oil Company II LLC (Verdun), and EP Energy LLC (EP) will pay a record $5.6 million civil penalty to settle allegations they engaged in illegal pre-merger coordination, known as gun jumping, in violation of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act (HSR Act).
According to the complaint, Verdun, which was under common management with XCL at the time of the transaction, agreed to acquire EP in a $1.4 billion transaction that was subject to the HSR Act. The HSR Act requires merging parties to submit an HSR form to the federal antitrust agencies and observe a waiting period before completing a transaction. EP, however, allowed XCL and Verdun to assume operational and decision-making control over significant aspects of EP’s day-to-day business operations prior to the transaction closing, in violation of the HSR Act’s waiting period requirements, the complaint states.
The three companies’ unlawful gun-jumping activities during the HSR waiting period included XCL and Verdun ordering a stoppage to EP’s planned well-drilling and development activities; XCL and EP coordinating to manage EP’s customer contracts, relationships, and deliveries in the Uinta Basin region of Utah; and Verdun and EP coordinating on prices for EP’s customers in the Eagle Ford region of Texas. This led to a crude oil supply shortage for EP when the U.S. market was facing significant supply shortages and multi-year highs in oil prices, resulting in Americans paying skyrocketing prices at the pump, the complaint states.
The civil penalty settlement reached with XCL, Verdun, and EP provides for the largest dollar penalty ever imposed for a gun-jumping violation in U.S. history.
The HSR Act requires companies and individuals to report large transactions, including securities acquisitions, over a certain threshold to the FTC and DOJ so that the federal agencies can investigate the deals before they close. The agencies have 30 days after a transaction has been reported to conduct an initial investigation and issue a “second request” demand for additional information. It is generally illegal to finalize an acquisition during this investigatory period.
FTC Investigation
The waiting-period obligation for this transaction went into effect on July 26, 2021, the date XCL, Verdun, and EP executed their purchase agreement and began engaging in gun-jumping activities, according to the FTC’s complaint.
The FTC’s investigation of Verdun’s acquisition of EP uncovered significant competitive concerns given that the deal, as originally structured, would have eliminated head-to-head competition between two of only four significant energy producers and would have harmed competition for the sale of Uinta Basin waxy crude oil to Salt Lake City refiners. To resolve those concerns, the FTC entered into a consent agreement with XCL, Verdun, and EP in March 2022 that required the divestiture of EP’s entire business and assets in Utah.
XCL, Verdun, and EP’s illegal gun-jumping conduct lasted through October 27, 2021, when they executed an amendment to the purchase agreement, which allowed EP to operate independently once again and in the ordinary course of business, without XCL’s or Verdun’s control over its day-to-day operations.
The HSR waiting period expired on March 25, 2022, which is the date the FTC accepted a consent agreement and granted termination of the waiting period. In total, XCL, Verdun, and EP were in violation of the HSR Act for 94 days.
The Commission vote to accept the settlement and refer the matter to the Department of Justice for filing was 4-0-1, with Commissioner Holyoak recused. The Department of Justice filed the complaint and proposed stipulated order on the FTC’s behalf in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
As required by the Tunney Act, the proposed settlement, along with a competitive impact statement, will be published in the Federal Register. Any person may submit written comments concerning the proposed settlement during a 60-day comment period to Maribeth Petrizzi, Special Attorney, United States, c/o Federal Trade Commission, 600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20580 bccompliance@ftc.gov. At the conclusion of the 60-day comment period, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia may approve the proposed settlement upon finding that it is in the public interest.
Se examina si VEGAP (Visual Entidad de Gestión de Artistas Plásticos) podría haber fijado precios de explotación singular de obras protegidas por derechos de propiedad intelectual de forma anticompetitiva.
También se investigan posibles condiciones comerciales no equitativas hacia titulares de derechos y usuarios.
La CNMC ha iniciado un expediente sancionador contra la entidad de gestión de derechos de propiedad intelectual VEGAP (Visual Entidad de Gestión de Artistas Plásticos) por posibles prácticas restrictivas de la competencia en la gestión de derechos de propiedad intelectual de los creadores visuales en España (S/0002/20).
Concretamente, la CNMC investiga si VEGAP habría establecido precios para licencias de explotación de obras que requieren la autorización individualizada de su titular, restringiendo así la competencia.
Además, se investigan posibles condiciones no equitativas hacia los titulares de derechos que encomiendan su gestión a VEGAP y hacia los usuarios que contratan licencias para usar estas obras.
La incoación de este expediente no prejuzga el resultado final de la investigación. Se abre ahora un periodo máximo de 24 meses para la instrucción del expediente y para su resolución por la CNMC.
Documento no oficial, destinado a los medios de comunicación, y que no vincula a la CNMC. Reproducción permitida solo si se cita la fuente.
Brose Sitech e Inversiones Carcarosa notificam a aquisição do controlo conjunto sobre a Covercar
From January 2025, new responsibilities for the CMA came into force under the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024.
The new ‘digital markets competition regime’ enables the CMA to promote competition in fast-moving digital markets, while protecting UK consumers and businesses from unfair or harmful practices by the very largest technology firms.
The regime will unlock opportunities for more innovation and economic growth across the UK tech sector, benefitting companies of all shapes and sizes – along with the investors who back them. It will also help people and businesses across the UK, who rely on access to critical digital markets, to get a fair deal.
Benefits of the regime for the UK
The regime provides a unique opportunity to encourage the benefits of investment and innovation from the largest digital firms, while ensuring a level playing-field for the many start-ups and scale-ups across the UK tech sector. The multitude of UK businesses and consumers who depend on the largest firms for critical products and services will also benefit from more innovation, more choice and more competitive prices.
opportunities to harness the benefits of continued investment and innovation by the very largest firms
unlocking expanded opportunities for investment and innovation by creating a level playing field for start-ups and scale-ups (many UK-based) to succeed
strengthened opportunities for UK consumers and business customers, those who rely on key platform services, to benefit from greater choice, more innovation and lower prices
People can:
make informed choices, with defaults and choice architecture aiding decision-making
use the products and services that best meet their needs, regardless of what other products and services they use and who they are provided by
easily switch providers, without losing access to their data and content
be protected from exploitation and unfair or misleading practices
To ensure that businesses:
that rely on Strategic Market Status (SMS) firms do not face exploitation or anti-competitive behaviour by those firms
have a fair chance to compete with SMS firms, including through appropriate access to data and functionality
Driving economic growth and improved productivity by:
harnessing the benefits of continued investment and innovation by the very largest firms
expanding opportunities for investment and innovation by creating a level playing field for start-ups and scale-ups (many UK-based) to succeed
Criteria for Strategic Market Status
The heart of the regime is proportionality. It is designed to apply only to the very largest firms. If certain conditions are met, these firms can be designated with Strategic Market Status (SMS) in relation to a particular digital activity. The CMA will carry out investigations within a 9 month statutory timeframe to consider whether to designate a firm with SMS.
To assess whether the conditions for an SMS designation are met, the CMA will carry out evidence-based investigations, consulting and engaging with a wide range of stakeholders.
The conditions are:
UK turnover of more than £1 billion or global turnover of more than £25 billion
substantial and entrenched market power in relation to the digital activity
a position of strategic significance
The CMA must carry out a forward-looking, five-year assessment to decide whether a firm has ‘substantial and entrenched’ market power in a particular digital activity. To make sure the regime keeps up with developments in fast-moving digital markets, SMS designations are time-bound for review every 5 years.
A firm has a position of strategic significance if it has at least 1 of the following:
significant size or scale in the digital activity
a significant number of other firms use the digital activity to carry out business it can extend its market power to a range of other activities
it can substantially influence how other firms behave, in respect of the digital activity or otherwise
Stages of an SMS investigation
An SMS investigation will usually last 9 months. The stages are:
launch of the designation investigation
consultation period
provisional decision
consultation period
final decision
At least 9 months before the end of the five-year designation period, the CMA must open a new SMS investigation to re-assess the firm’s status.
What happens as a result of an investigation
If the CMA designates a firm with SMS, it will have 2 key tools: Conduct Requirements and Pro-Competition Interventions.
Through Conduct Requirements, the CMA will be able to guide the behaviour of SMS firms, tackling conduct that could undermine fair competition, or exploit people and businesses.
Through Pro-Competition Interventions, the CMA will be able to address specific competition problems arising from a firm’s market power in a particular digital activity.
The regime also provides for additional merger reporting requirements on SMS firms, to make sure the CMA has earlier sight of mergers and acquisitions that could harm competition in digital markets.
Conduct requirements
The CMA may put in place one or more tailored rules for SMS firms – steps that require them to take certain action or to stop a specific activity. These requirements may be put in place where doing so would be proportionate to achieve specific positive outcomes for users (or potential users) of the digital activity. These are fair dealing, open choices, or trust and transparency.
Pro-competition interventions
Once a firm has been designated with strategic market status, the CMA may investigate whether anything relating to the designated digital activity (for example, the behaviour of a firm or the structure of a sector) is harming competition.
If the CMA finds an adverse effect on competition, it can design and test interventions to address these competition problems and any harmful effects on users. This might include giving people the power to transfer their data easily between providers; or requiring firms to make sure different products and services work smoothly together (‘interoperability’), so businesses can more easily innovate and compete.
New merger reporting requirements
SMS firms must report mergers with a UK connection, and a value of £25 million or more, to the CMA before their completion. Where the CMA is concerned a merger might cause competition problems, it will launch a merger investigation under its normal merger review process.
Design and approach
The way rules are designed and applied matters if the UK is to maximise its international attractiveness to innovators and investors. The new regime has been created with this in mind, representing a unique combination of ‘best-in-class’ features, which the CMA is committed to implementing in an open, transparent, solutions-focused way.
Proportionality
The regime applies only to the very largest technology firms – those with substantial and entrenched market power in a particular digital activity. The CMA will also take a highly tailored, bespoke approach to identifying and addressing specific harms.
Process
The process for investigations and interventions will be participative and transparent, including constructive engagement with SMS firms and other stakeholders to resolve concerns quickly and effectively where possible.
Predictability
Interventions are developed through a forward-looking, iterative and open process, providing the predictability that is critically important to businesses. Designations are limited to a maximum of 5 years before the CMA must consider whether they should be renewed, varied or revoked. This provides certainty whilst enabling the CMA to take account of technological and broader market changes.
Pace
Designation investigations have a 9-month statutory timeline, with the CMA able to consult on remedies at the same time, helping us to reach positive outcomes faster. The Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act also provides for a new general duty of expedition for the CMA, including in relation to the digital markets competition regime, which means pace will be a key focus.
Administering the regime
The CMA will actively monitor interventions to make sure they are effective, avoid unintended consequences, and are targeted where they can have the most positive impact.
The most significant decisions under the regime will be taken by the CMA Board and a new Digital Markets Board Committee.
The CMA will coordinate with other regulators domestically and set out arrangements for doing this in published memoranda of understanding.
Many of the issues the CMA will tackle are cross-border in nature, so it is also working closely with international partners to help shape a regulatory landscape that supports investment and innovation in the UK.
Publication du sens de la décision le : 07 janvier 2025
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