08.01.2025

Apresentação

Este é um informativo diário que traz para o(a) leitor (a) notícias e casos de defesa da concorrência das principais jurisdições antitruste do mundo (CADE, FTC, Comissão Europeia, CMA etc).

Notícias

Justice Department Sues Six Large Landlords for Algorithmic Pricing Scheme that Harms Millions of American Renters

Tuesday, January 7, 2025  right caret

For Immediate Release

Office of Public Affairs

Landlord Cortland Agrees to Cooperate with Justice Department and Enter into a Settlement to End the Use of Common Rental Pricing Algorithms and Competitively Sensitive Data to Set Rents

Attorneys General of Illinois and Massachusetts Join Suit Against RealPage and Apartment Landlords, Bringing Total State and Commonwealth Co-Plaintiffs to 10

The Justice Department, together with its state co-plaintiffs, filed an amended complaint today in its antitrust lawsuit against RealPage, to sue six of the nation’s largest landlords for participating in algorithmic pricing schemes that harmed renters.

The amended complaint alleges the landlords — Greystar Real Estate Partners LLC (Greystar); Blackstone’s LivCor LLC (LivCor); Camden Property Trust (Camden); Cushman & Wakefield Inc and Pinnacle Property Management Services LLC (Cushman); Willow Bridge Property Company LLC (Willow Bridge) and Cortland Management LLC (Cortland) — participated in an unlawful scheme to decrease competition among landlords in apartment pricing, harming millions of American renters. Together, these landlords operate more than 1.3 million units in 43 states and the District of Columbia. The Attorneys General of Illinois and Massachusetts joined the amended complaint as co-plaintiffs, increasing the total number of State and Commonwealth co-plaintiffs to 10. At the same time, the Justice Department filed a proposed consent decree with landlord Cortland that requires it to cooperate with the government, stop using its competitors’ sensitive data to set rents and stop using the same algorithm as its competitors without a corporate monitor.

“While Americans across the country struggled to afford housing, the landlords named in today’s lawsuit shared sensitive information about rental prices and used algorithms to coordinate to keep the price of rent high,” said Acting Assistant Attorney General Doha Mekki of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division. “Today’s action against RealPage and six major landlords seeks to end their practice of putting profits over people and make housing more affordable for millions of people across the country.”

The amended complaint alleges that the six landlords actively participated in a scheme to set their rents using each other’s competitively sensitive information through common pricing algorithms.  Along with using RealPage’s anticompetitive pricing algorithms, these landlords coordinated through a variety of means, including:

  • Directly communicating with competitors’ senior managers about rents, occupancy, and other competitively sensitive topics. In one example, Greystar supplied Camden with information not only about very recent renewal rates, but also its approach to pricing for the upcoming quarter, its acceptance of RealPage’s pricing recommendations, use of concessions and competitively sensitive information about occupancy. Likewise, executives at Camden and LivCor communicated over the course of months about their pricing strategies, including plans for certain price increases.
  • Regularly conducting “call arounds.” During these discussions, euphemistically referred to as “market surveys,” property managers called or emailed competitors to share, and sometimes discuss, competitively sensitive information about rents, occupancy, pricing strategies and discounts.
  • Participating in “user groups” hosted by RealPage. For instance, landlords discussed via user groups how to modify the software’s pricing methodology, as well as their own pricing strategies. In one example, LivCor and Willow Bridge executives participated in a user group discussion of plans for renewal increases, concessions and acceptance rates of RealPage rent recommendations.
  • Sharing information with competitors about parameters in RealPage’s software. As an example, at the request of Willow Bridge’s director of revenue management, Greystar’s director of revenue management supplied its standard auto-accept parameters for RealPage’s software, including the daily and weekly limits and the days of the week for which Greystar used “auto-accept.”

The Justice Department also announced a proposed consent decree that, if approved by the court, would resolve its claims against Cortland, a landlord that manages over 80,000 rental units in 13 states. Under the proposed consent decree, Cortland would cooperate in the Justice Department’s investigation and litigation and be barred from, among other things:

  • Using competitors’ competitively sensitive data to train or run any pricing model;
  • Using third-party software or algorithms to price apartments without the supervision of a court-appointed monitor; and
  • Soliciting, disclosing or using any competitively sensitive information with any other property manager as part of setting rental prices or generating rental pricing recommendations.

As required by the Tunney Act, the proposed consent decree, along with the competitive impact statement, will be published in the Federal Register. Any person may submit written comments concerning the proposed consent decree during a 60-day comment period to Chief, Technology and Digital Platforms Section, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, 450 Fifth Street NW, Suite 8600, Washington, D.C. 20530. At the conclusion of the 60-day comment period, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina may enter the final judgment upon finding it is in the public interest.

Co-plaintiffs in the case are the Attorneys General of California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, North Carolina, Oregon, Tennessee and Washington.

Greystar is headquartered in Charleston, South Carolina; LivCor and Cushman & Wakefield (whose residential property management business formerly operated independently as Pinnacle) are headquartered in Chicago; Willow Bridge (formerly known as Lincoln Residential) is headquartered in Dallas; Camden is headquartered in Houston; and Cortland is headquartered in Atlanta. All manage multifamily apartment buildings; several own some or all of the properties under their management.

Proposed Final Judgment – US et al. v. RealPage Inc.pdf

Amended Complaint – U.S. et al. v. RealPage Inc..pdf

Updated January 7, 2025


Topic

Antitrust

Component

Antitrust Division Press Release Number: 25-21


Oil Companies to Pay Record Civil Penalty for Violating Antitrust Pre-Transaction Notification Requirements

Tuesday, January 7, 2025Share right caret

For Immediate Release

Office of Public Affairs

The Justice Department’s Antitrust Division, at the request of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), filed a civil antitrust lawsuit today in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against crude-oil producers XCL Resources Holdings LLC (XCL), Verdun Oil Company II LLC (Verdun) and EP Energy LLC (EP).

The lawsuit alleges that the three companies violated the pre-transaction notification and waiting period requirements of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act of 1976 (HSR Act), following Verdun’s $1.4 billion purchase agreement for EP on July 26, 2021. At the time of transaction, Verdun was under common management with XCL.

According to the complaint, the three companies failed to observe a required waiting period following such a large transaction, in which federal agencies can investigate a potential merger before it closes. Instead, EP allowed Verdun and XCL to assume operational and decision-making control over significant aspects of its day-to-day business operations, including a stoppage to EP’s planned well-drilling and development at a time when the U.S. crude-oil market faced significant supply shortages and consumers faced soaring gasoline prices.

Simultaneous to filing its complaint, the department filed a proposed settlement, subject to approval by the court, under which the defendants have agreed to pay a $5.6 million civil penalty to resolve the lawsuit, a record civil penalty for illegal pre-merger coordination in violation of the HSR Act.

Further details about this matter are described in the FTC’s press release issued today, and in the complaint and competitive impact statement.

Consistent with the requirements of the Tunney Act, the proposed settlement, along with the competitive impact statement, will be published in the Federal Register. Any person may submit written comments concerning the proposed settlement during a 60-day comment period via email to bccompliance@ftc.gov or by post to Maribeth Petrizzi, Special Attorney, United States, c/o Federal Trade Commission, 600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, CC-8416, Washington, D.C. 20580. At the conclusion of the 60-day comment period, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia may approve the proposed settlement upon finding that it is in the public interest.

Updated January 7, 2025


Topic

Antitrust

Component

Antitrust DivisionPress Release Number: 25-20


Oil Companies to Pay Record FTC Gun-Jumping Fine for Antitrust Law Violation

XCL Resources, EP Energy, Verdun Oil to pay $5.6 million penalty for unlawful coordination that led to crude oil supply shortage for EP

January 7, 2025

Tags: 

Today, the Federal Trade Commission announced that crude oil producers XCL Resources Holdings, LLC (XCL), Verdun Oil Company II LLC (Verdun), and EP Energy LLC (EP) will pay a record $5.6 million civil penalty to settle allegations they engaged in illegal pre-merger coordination, known as gun jumping, in violation of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act (HSR Act).

According to the complaint, Verdun, which was under common management with XCL at the time of the transaction, agreed to acquire EP in a $1.4 billion transaction that was subject to the HSR Act. The HSR Act requires merging parties to submit an HSR form to the federal antitrust agencies and observe a waiting period before completing a transaction. EP, however, allowed XCL and Verdun to assume operational and decision-making control over significant aspects of EP’s day-to-day business operations prior to the transaction closing, in violation of the HSR Act’s waiting period requirements, the complaint states.

The three companies’ unlawful gun-jumping activities during the HSR waiting period included XCL and Verdun ordering a stoppage to EP’s planned well-drilling and development activities; XCL and EP coordinating to manage EP’s customer contracts, relationships, and deliveries in the Uinta Basin region of Utah; and Verdun and EP coordinating on prices for EP’s customers in the Eagle Ford region of Texas. This led to a crude oil supply shortage for EP when the U.S. market was facing significant supply shortages and multi-year highs in oil prices, resulting in Americans paying skyrocketing prices at the pump, the complaint states.

The civil penalty settlement reached with XCL, Verdun, and EP provides for the largest dollar penalty ever imposed for a gun-jumping violation in U.S. history.

The HSR Act requires companies and individuals to report large transactions, including securities acquisitions, over a certain threshold to the FTC and DOJ so that the federal agencies can investigate the deals before they close. The agencies have 30 days after a transaction has been reported to conduct an initial investigation and issue a “second request” demand for additional information. It is generally illegal to finalize an acquisition during this investigatory period.

FTC Investigation

The waiting-period obligation for this transaction went into effect on July 26, 2021, the date XCL, Verdun, and EP executed their purchase agreement and began engaging in gun-jumping activities, according to the FTC’s complaint.

The FTC’s investigation of Verdun’s acquisition of EP uncovered significant competitive concerns given that the deal, as originally structured, would have eliminated head-to-head competition between two of only four significant energy producers and would have harmed competition for the sale of Uinta Basin waxy crude oil to Salt Lake City refiners. To resolve those concerns, the FTC entered into a consent agreement with XCL, Verdun, and EP in March 2022 that required the divestiture of EP’s entire business and assets in Utah.

XCL, Verdun, and EP’s illegal gun-jumping conduct lasted through October 27, 2021, when they executed an amendment to the purchase agreement, which allowed EP to operate independently once again and in the ordinary course of business, without XCL’s or Verdun’s control over its day-to-day operations.

The HSR waiting period expired on March 25, 2022, which is the date the FTC accepted a consent agreement and granted termination of the waiting period. In total, XCL, Verdun, and EP were in violation of the HSR Act for 94 days.

The Commission vote to accept the settlement and refer the matter to the Department of Justice for filing was 4-0-1, with Commissioner Holyoak recused. The Department of Justice filed the complaint and proposed stipulated order on the FTC’s behalf in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.

As required by the Tunney Act, the proposed settlement, along with a competitive impact statement, will be published in the Federal Register. Any person may submit written comments concerning the proposed settlement during a 60-day comment period to Maribeth Petrizzi, Special Attorney, United States, c/o Federal Trade Commission, 600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20580 bccompliance@ftc.gov. At the conclusion of the 60-day comment period, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia may approve the proposed settlement upon finding that it is in the public interest.

The Federal Trade Commission works to promote competition, and protect and educate consumers.  The FTC will never demand money, make threats, tell you to transfer money, or promise you a prize. You can learn more about how competition benefits consumers or file an antitrust complaint.  For the latest news and resources, follow the FTC on social mediasubscribe to press releases and read our blog.

Press Release Reference

FTC Requires ENCAP to Sell Off EP Energy Corp.’s Entire Utah Oil Business amid Concerns that Deal would Increase Pain at the Pump

Contact Information

Media Contact

Victoria Graham 

Office of Public Affairs

415-848-5121


La CNMC investiga posibles prácticas restrictivas de la competencia en la gestión de derechos de artistas visuales

Sector: Nota de prensa

Ámbito CNMC: Competencia

Compartir

  • Se examina si VEGAP (Visual Entidad de Gestión de Artistas Plásticos) podría haber fijado precios de explotación singular de obras protegidas por derechos de propiedad intelectual de forma anticompetitiva.
  • También se investigan posibles condiciones comerciales no equitativas hacia titulares de derechos y usuarios.

La CNMC ha iniciado un expediente sancionador contra la entidad de gestión de derechos de propiedad intelectual VEGAP (Visual Entidad de Gestión de Artistas Plásticos) por posibles prácticas restrictivas de la competencia en la gestión de derechos de propiedad intelectual de los creadores visuales en España (S/0002/20).

Concretamente, la CNMC investiga si VEGAP habría establecido precios para licencias de explotación de obras que requieren la autorización individualizada de su titular, restringiendo así la competencia.

Además, se investigan posibles condiciones no equitativas hacia los titulares de derechos que encomiendan su gestión a VEGAP y hacia los usuarios que contratan licencias para usar estas obras.

Tras recopilar información durante la fase de información reservada, la CNMC considera que existen indicios racionales de la comisión, por parte de VEGAP, de una posible infracción de los artículos 1 y 2 de la Ley 15/2007, de 3 de julio, de Defensa de la Competencia (LDC) y de los artículos 101 y 102 del Tratado de Funcionamiento de la Unión Europea (TFUE).

La incoación de este expediente no prejuzga el resultado final de la investigación. Se abre ahora un periodo máximo de 24 meses para la instrucción del expediente y para su resolución por la CNMC.

Documento no oficial, destinado a los medios de comunicación, y que no vincula a la CNMC. Reproducción permitida solo si se cita la fuente.


Brose Sitech e Inversiones Carcarosa notificam a aquisição do controlo conjunto sobre a Covercar

Ficha do processo

Ficha do processo

Guia

How the UK’s digital markets competition regime works

Details on the new digital markets competition regime, and how it will promote competition in digital markets.

From: Competition and Markets Authority

Published7 January 2025

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Contents

  1. The digital markets competition regime
  2. Benefits of the regime for the UK
  3. Criteria for Strategic Market Status
  4. Stages of an SMS investigation
  5. What happens as a result of an investigation
  6. Design and approach
  7. Administering the regime

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The digital markets competition regime 

From January 2025, new responsibilities for the CMA came into force under the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024.

The new ‘digital markets competition regime’ enables the CMA to promote competition in fast-moving digital markets, while protecting UK consumers and businesses from unfair or harmful practices by the very largest technology firms.  

The regime will unlock opportunities for more innovation and economic growth across the UK tech sector, benefitting companies of all shapes and sizes – along with the investors who back them. It will also help people and businesses across the UK, who rely on access to critical digital markets, to get a fair deal.     

Benefits of the regime for the UK 

The regime provides a unique opportunity to encourage the benefits of investment and innovation from the largest digital firms, while ensuring a level playing-field for the many start-ups and scale-ups across the UK tech sector. The multitude of UK businesses and consumers who depend on the largest firms for critical products and services will also benefit from more innovation, more choice and more competitive prices.   

  • opportunities to harness the benefits of continued investment and innovation by the very largest firms 
  • unlocking expanded opportunities for investment and innovation by creating a level playing field for start-ups and scale-ups (many UK-based) to succeed  
  • strengthened opportunities for UK consumers and business customers, those who rely on key platform services, to benefit from greater choice, more innovation and lower prices 

People can:

  • make informed choices, with defaults and choice architecture aiding decision-making
  • use the products and services that best meet their needs, regardless of what other products and services they use and who they are provided by
  • easily switch providers, without losing access to their data and content
  • be protected from exploitation and unfair or misleading practices

To ensure that businesses:

  • that rely on Strategic Market Status (SMS) firms do not face exploitation or anti-competitive behaviour by those firms
  • have a fair chance to compete with SMS firms, including through appropriate access to data and functionality

Driving economic growth and improved productivity by:

  • harnessing the benefits of continued investment and innovation by the very largest firms
  • expanding opportunities for investment and innovation by creating a level playing field for start-ups and scale-ups (many UK-based) to succeed

Criteria for Strategic Market Status   

The heart of the regime is proportionality. It is designed to apply only to the very largest firms. If certain conditions are met, these firms can be designated with Strategic Market Status (SMS) in relation to a particular digital activity. The CMA will carry out investigations within a 9 month statutory timeframe to consider whether to designate a firm with SMS. 

To assess whether the conditions for an SMS designation are met, the CMA will carry out evidence-based investigations, consulting and engaging with a wide range of stakeholders.  

The conditions are: 

  • UK turnover of more than £1 billion or global turnover of more than £25 billion 
  • substantial and entrenched market power in relation to the digital activity 
  • a position of strategic significance  

The CMA must carry out a forward-looking, five-year assessment to decide whether a firm has ‘substantial and entrenched’ market power in a particular digital activity. To make sure the regime keeps up with developments in fast-moving digital markets, SMS designations are time-bound for review every 5 years.  

A firm has a position of strategic significance if it has at least 1 of the following: 

  • significant size or scale in the digital activity 
  • a significant number of other firms use the digital activity to carry out business  it can extend its market power to a range of other activities 
  • it can substantially influence how other firms behave, in respect of the digital activity or otherwise 

Stages of an SMS investigation 

An SMS investigation will usually last 9 months. The stages are: 

  • launch of the designation investigation
  • consultation period
  • provisional decision
  • consultation period
  • final decision

At least 9 months before the end of the five-year designation period, the CMA must open a new SMS investigation to re-assess the firm’s status.  

What happens as a result of an investigation 

If the CMA designates a firm with SMS, it will have 2 key tools: Conduct Requirements and Pro-Competition Interventions.  

Through Conduct Requirements, the CMA will be able to guide the behaviour of SMS firms, tackling conduct that could undermine fair competition, or exploit people and businesses.

Through Pro-Competition Interventions, the CMA will be able to address specific competition problems arising from a firm’s market power in a particular digital activity.   

The regime also provides for additional merger reporting requirements on SMS firms, to make sure the CMA has earlier sight of mergers and acquisitions that could harm competition in digital markets.  

Conduct requirements 

The CMA may put in place one or more tailored rules for SMS firms – steps that require them to take certain action or to stop a specific activity. These requirements may be put in place where doing so would be proportionate to achieve specific positive outcomes for users (or potential users) of the digital activity. These are fair dealing, open choices, or trust and transparency.  

Pro-competition interventions 

Once a firm has been designated with strategic market status, the CMA may investigate whether anything relating to the designated digital activity (for example, the behaviour of a firm or the structure of a sector) is harming competition.

If the CMA finds an adverse effect on competition, it can design and test interventions to address these competition problems and any harmful effects on users. This might include giving people the power to transfer their data easily between providers; or requiring firms to make sure different products and services work smoothly together (‘interoperability’), so businesses can more easily innovate and compete.  

New merger reporting requirements 

SMS firms must report mergers with a UK connection, and a value of £25 million or more, to the CMA before their completion. Where the CMA is concerned a merger might cause competition problems, it will launch a merger investigation under its normal merger review process.  

Design and approach  

The way rules are designed and applied matters if the UK is to maximise its international attractiveness to innovators and investors. The new regime has been created with this in mind, representing a unique combination of ‘best-in-class’ features, which the CMA is committed to implementing in an open, transparent, solutions-focused way.  

Proportionality 

The regime applies only to the very largest technology firms – those with substantial and entrenched market power in a particular digital activity. The CMA will also take a highly tailored, bespoke approach to identifying and addressing specific harms. 

Process 

The process for investigations and interventions will be participative and transparent, including constructive engagement with SMS firms and other stakeholders to resolve concerns quickly and effectively where possible. 

Predictability 

Interventions are developed through a forward-looking, iterative and open process, providing the predictability that is critically important to businesses. Designations are limited to a maximum of 5 years before the CMA must consider whether they should be renewed, varied or revoked. This provides certainty whilst enabling the CMA to take account of technological and broader market changes.  

Pace 

Designation investigations have a 9-month statutory timeline, with the CMA able to consult on remedies at the same time, helping us to reach positive outcomes faster. The Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act also provides for a new general duty of expedition for the CMA, including in relation to the digital markets competition regime, which means pace will be a key focus. 

Administering the regime 

The CMA will actively monitor interventions to make sure they are effective, avoid unintended consequences, and are targeted where they can have the most positive impact.  

The most significant decisions under the regime will be taken by the CMA Board and a new Digital Markets Board Committee.  

The CMA will coordinate with other regulators domestically and set out arrangements for doing this in published memoranda of understanding.

Many of the issues the CMA will tackle are cross-border in nature, so it is also working closely with international partners to help shape a regulatory landscape that supports investment and innovation in the UK.   

Read the full  guidance for the digital markets competition regime and merger reporting requirements for SMS firms.

Updates to this page

Published 7 January 2025

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Contents

Decisões

Autorité de la concurrence

Secteur(s) :

25-DCC-02
relative à la prise de contrôle conjoint de la société Calao 83 par les sociétés Caponga et Levant Armor aux côtés de la société ITM Entreprises

Décision de contrôle des concentrations|

Publication du sens de la décision le : 08 janvier 2025

Secteur(s) :

Agriculture / Agro-alimentaire

25-DCC-01
relative à la prise de contrôle exclusif d’un actif industriel détenu par la société CPK Production France par la société Choco Barou

Décision de contrôle des concentrations|

Publication du sens de la décision le : 07 janvier 2025

07.01.2025

Apresentação

Este é um informativo diário que traz para o(a) leitor (a) notícias e casos de defesa da concorrência das principais jurisdições antitruste do mundo (CADE, FTC, Comissão Europeia, CMA etc).

Notícias

La CNDC y la Secretaría de Industria y Comercio impusieron una multa por notificación tardía en diciembre de 2024

La multa, que recae sobre la empresa Totalenergies, asciende a 484 millones de pesos argentinos.

06 de enero de 2025

El 30 de diciembre de 2024, y siguiendo la recomendación de la CNDC, el Secretario de Industria y Comercio impuso una multa a la empresa Totalenergies SE por notificar fuera del plazo legal la adquisición del control conjunto sobre la firma Total Eren Holding S.A. y su subsidiaria, la firma Total Eren S.A

En función de que la operación fue perfeccionada en diciembre de 2017, previo a la sanción de la Ley 27.442 de Defensa de la Competencia (LDC), vigente en la actualidad, la operación fue analizada bajo los parámetros de la ley vigente en el momento del cierre de la operación, Ley 25.156, y la multa por notificación tardía, calculada en función del criterio de dicha normativa.

En este sentido, la operación fue aprobada sin condicionamientos en los términos del artículo 13 de la Ley 25.156. Asimismo, la notificación de la adquisición mencionada se presentó con una demora de mil trescientos ochenta y un (1381) días hábiles administrativos, por lo que la CNDC decidió imponer una multa aplicando la norma anterior para la graduación de la sanción a la parte compradora.

En efecto, el Artículo 9° de Ley 25.156 dispone que, en caso de incumplimiento con el deber de notificar la concreción de una operación de concentración económica dentro del plazo estipulado, se aplicará la multa establecida en el Artículo 46, inciso d), la que puede ser fijada hasta el monto de $1.000.000 diarios. Asimismo, en lo que se refiere a la graduación de la multa, el Artículo 49 del mismo ordenamiento establece que la Autoridad de Aplicación deberá considerar la gravedad de la infracción, el daño causado, el tamaño del mercado afectado, la duración de la práctica o concentración y la reincidencia o antecedentes del responsable, así como también la capacidad económica.

En virtud de estos elementos, y considerando un conjunto de atenuantes, la CNDC estableció una multa de trescientos cincuenta mil pesos ($350.000) por cada día de retraso, lo que suma un total de $484.350.000.


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DBT and CMA memorandum of understanding: international cooperation

Memorandum of understanding between the Department for Business and Trade (DBT) and the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) regarding international cooperation on competition and consumer law enforcement.

From: Department for Business and Trade and Competition and Markets Authority

Published6 January 2025

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International cooperation on competition and consumer law enforcement

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Details

The Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers (DMCC) Act introduced provisions to enhance cooperation between the UK’s competition and consumer authorities and their overseas counterparts.

This MoU sets out expectations, roles and responsibilities related to cooperation between DBT and the CMA on matters including: 

  • the disclosure of relevant information for use in civil and criminal investigations and proceedings
  • the provision of investigative assistance to overseas regulators, and
  • international cooperation arrangements

Updates to this page

Published 6 January 2025

Atos de concentração – Decisões

CADE

Ato de Concentração nº 08700.010418/2024-25

Requerentes: Pintos S.A – Crédito, Financiamento e Investimento e Forest Holding Financeira Ltda. Aprovação sem restrições.

Ato de Concentração nº 08700.010261/2024-38

Partes: Pontal 2 Geração de Energia e Participações S.A., RZK Energia S.A., RZK Soluções e Participações S.A., RZK Energia Fundo de Investimentos em Participações Infraestrutura e NM RZK Energia Fundo de Investimentos em Participações Infraestrutura. Aprovação sem restrições.

Ato de Concentração nº 08700.010867/2024-73

Requerentes: Saneamento Ambiental Águas do Brasil S.A. e Irapuru I Energia S.A. Aprovação sem restrições.

Ato de Concentração nº 08700.010868/2024-18

Requerentes: Saneamento Ambiental Águas do Brasil S.A. e Irapuru III Energia S.A. Aprovação sem restrições.

Ato de Concentração nº 08700.010673/2024-78

Requerentes: CSI Remarketing Locação de Equipamentos Ltda., Somov Rental Ltda. e Somov S.A.. Aprovação sem restrições.

06.01.2025

Apresentação

Este é um informativo diário que traz para o(a) leitor (a) notícias e casos de defesa da concorrência das principais jurisdições antitruste do mundo (CADE, FTC, Comissão Europeia, CMA etc).

Notícias

La CNMC sanciona a Corporación Alimentaria Peñasanta S. A. con 135.000 euros

Sector: Nota de prensa

Ámbito CNMC: Competencia

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  • Compró la empresa Lácteas Flor de Burgos en diciembre de 2023 y lo notificó meses más tarde.
  • Antes de ejecutar una adquisición, las compañías están obligadas a notificárselo a la CNMC


La Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia (CNMC) ha multado a Corporación Alimentaria Peñasanta, S. A. (CAPSA) con 135.000 euros por adquirir, en diciembre de 2023, la empresa Lácteas Flor de Burgos S. L. sin haberlo notificado previamente (SNC/DC/045/24).

Esta práctica, conocida como gun jumping en el argot de competencia, supone incumplir el artículo 9.1 de la Ley 15/2007, de 3 de julio, de Defensa de la Competencia (LDC), que obliga a las empresas a notificar sus adquisiciones a la CNMC antes de ejecutarlas. 

Retraso de varios meses

CAPSA adquirió el control exclusivo de Flor de Burgos mediante un contrato de compraventa de 20 de diciembre de 2023, formalizado el 27 de diciembre de 2023, según informó a la CNMC tres meses después —ya en marzo de 2024—.

La notificación formal de la operación tuvo lugar el 8 de abril. El 17 de abril de 2024, la CNMC aprobó la compra en primera fase (C/1459/24). En septiembre de 2024, inició un procedimiento sancionador contra CAPSA por haber incumplido su deber de notificación.

Tras instruir el expediente, la CNMC declara a CAPSA responsable de una infracción grave del artículo 62.3.b) de la LDC y le impone una sanción de 135.000 euros.

Contra esta resolución podrá interponerse directamente recurso contencioso-administrativo ante la Audiencia Nacional en el plazo de dos meses a partir del día siguiente al de su notificación.

Documento no oficial, destinado a los medios de comunicación, y que no vincula a la CNMC. Reproducción permitida solo si se cita la fuente.


La CNDC modifica los criterios de inclusión y exclusión para el PROSUM

La disposición modifica los criterios de elegibilidad para que una operación de concentración pueda tramitar bajo el «procedimiento sumario», conforme lo prevé la Resolución 905/2023

03 de enero de 2025

El 3 de enero de 2025, se publicó en el Boletín Oficial la Disposición 156/2024 de la Comisión Nacional de Defensa de la Competencia (CNDC), la cual establece modificaciones en los criterios de inclusión y exclusión para que una operación de concentración económica pueda tramitar bajo el «procedimiento sumario» (PROSUM), que fuera reglamentado por la Resolución 905/2023 de la entonces Secretaría de Comercio.

La Resolución (ex) SC 905/2023 aprobó el «Reglamento para la Notificación de Operaciones de Concentración Económica», aplicable a todos los actos de concentración que se notifiquen para su autorización de acuerdo a lo dispuesto en el Capítulo III de la Ley 27.442 de Defensa de la Competencia (LDC). La resolución delegó en la CNDC determinar los criterios de elegibilidad que una operación de concentración económica debe reunir para que pueda tramitar bajo el PROSUM, que fueron establecidos por medio de la Disposición 62/2023 de la CNDC

La Disposición 156/2024 modifica estos criterios de inclusión y exclusión, basándose en la experiencia acumulada por la CNDC desde la implementación de los criterios originales, con el objetivo de incorporar nuevas pautas y realizar aclaraciones sobre determinados artículos de la Resolución SC 905/2023.

La CNDC considera que las modificaciones implementadas contribuirán a optimizar los recursos administrativos del organismo, fomentar un entorno regulatorio previsible que promueva la inversión y la competitividad, y garantizarán un análisis eficiente de los actos de concentración económica, en línea con lo establecido en la LDC.

Los cambios en los criterios para que una operación de concentración económica pueda tramitarse bajo el PROSUM que se describen a continuación.

Respecto a las concentraciones horizontales, se estableció que la participación de mercado conjunta en cada uno de los mercados relevantes afectados por la transacción notificada debe ser inferior al 50% (y no inferior al 35%, como se estipulaba originalmente), y el aumento del IHH debe ser menor a 150 puntos, para poder tramitar bajo el procedimiento sumario.

Respecto a los criterios de exclusión, se estableció que una operación de concentración económica no podrá tramitar bajo el PROSUM cuando un ente regulador, en ocasión de tomar la intervención que le compete en los términos del artículo 17 de la Ley 27.442, se oponga expresamente a la transacción notificada.

Asimismo, la nueva disposición eliminó los siguientes criterios de exclusión del PROSUM:

  • Cuando la operación notificada supone la creación de una empresa en participación (joint venture) por parte de empresas que permanecen independientes;
  • Cuando, en un cambio de control de conjunto a exclusivo, se presente alguna de las siguientes situaciones:
    • La empresa que adquiere el control exclusivo de la entidad objeto es a su vez competidora directa de dicha entidad, siempre que la participación de mercado sea sustancialmente alta.
    • La autoridad de aplicación no hubiera examinado la operación previa de adquisición del control conjunto respecto de la entidad objeto por parte de la empresa que adquiere el control la empresa que deja de ser controlante en virtud de la operación notificada.
  • Cuando, en forma contemporánea a la operación, la adquirente o la objeto tengan participaciones societarias en empresa/s competidora/s que sean superiores al 5% del capital social o de los votos.

Accedé para ver la Disposición con las modificaciones en los criterios de inclusión y exclusión del PROSUM


EQT Fund Management notifica a aquisição do controlo exclusivo sobre o Negócio de Estações Terrestres do Grupo Eutelsat

Ficha do processo

Ficha do processo

Atos de concentração – Decisões

Comissão Europeia

SAGAX / SWISS LIFE / JV

Merger

M.11794

Last decision date: 03.01.2025 Simplified procedure

03.01.2025

Apresentação

Este é um informativo diário que traz para o(a) leitor (a) notícias e casos de defesa da concorrência das principais jurisdições antitruste do mundo (CADE, FTC, Comissão Europeia, CMA etc).

Notícias

Statement of Chair Lina M. Khan Joined by Commissioners Rebecca Kelly Slaughter and Alvaro M. Bedoya In the Matter of The Kroger Company and Albertsons Companies, Inc.

Date

January 2, 2025

Docket Number 9428

By

Lina M. Khan, Chair;

Rebecca Kelly Slaughter, Commissioner;

Alvaro Bedoya, Commissioner

File

Statement of Chair Lina M. Khan Joined by Commissioners Rebecca Kelly Slaughter and Alvaro M. Bedoya In the Matter of The Kroger Company and Albertsons Companies, Inc. Commission File No. D9428 (269.12 KB)

Atos de concentração – Decisões

CADE

Ato de Concentração nº 08700.009331/2024-13

Requerentes: Telefónica Innovación Digital, S.L.U. e Ericsson US Dhaulagiri LLC. Aprovação sem restrições.

Ato de Concentração nº 08700.010657/2024-85

Requerentes: Fortis 333, Inc., INEOS Composites Holdings Company (UK) Limited, INEOS Enterprises US Holdco LLC, INEOS Composites International Holdings LLC e INEOS Composites Finland Oy. Aprovação sem restrições.D

Ato de Concentração nº 08700.010637/2024-12

Requerentes: Afya Participações S.A. e Faculdade Masterclass Ltda. Aprovação sem restrições.

Ato de Concentração nº 08700.010746/2024-21

Requerentes: Itochu Corporation, Kawasaki Motors Ltd. e Kawasaki Heavy Industries Ltd. Aprovação sem restrições.


CMA

IBM / HashiCorp merger inquiry

  • The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) is investigating the anticipated acquisition by IBM of HashiCorp.
    • Updated: 30 December 2024

05.01.2025

Apresentação

Este é um informativo diário que traz para o(a) leitor (a) notícias e casos de defesa da concorrência das principais jurisdições antitruste do mundo (CADE, FTC, Comissão Europeia, CMA etc).

Notícias

Prioridades 2025: AdC quer contribuir para crescimento económico, investimento e inovação

Prioridades 2025 imagem

Comunicado 28/2024
30 de dezembro de 2024

A Autoridade da Concorrência (AdC) publica hoje na sua página eletrónica as Prioridades de Política de Concorrência para 2025.
A AdC orienta-se pelo critério do interesse público na promoção e defesa da concorrência, podendo atribuir diferentes graus de prioridade às questões analisadas.
As Prioridades da Política de Concorrência para o ano seguinte são divulgadas no último trimestre de cada ano, garantindo uma visão clara e estratégica sobre os objetivos da AdC, mas sem qualquer referência setorial no que se refere ao exercício dos poderes sancionatórios.
As prioridades pretendem contribuir para o crescimento económico, o investimento e a inovação, nomeadamente, através da recomendação de remoção de barreiras à entrada e expansão em diversos setores da economia nacional.
Assim, para 2025, as prioridades da AdC incluem:

Combate a práticas anticoncorrenciais
A AdC intensificará os esforços para investigar práticas anticoncorrenciais que geram maior impacto negativo na economia e nos consumidores, como cartéis e outras práticas horizontais, com especial atenção aos setores da contratação pública e dos mercados de trabalho. Paralelamente, a AdC continuará a examinar restrições verticais e decisões tomadas por associações empresariais que lesem a concorrência.
A capacidade de deteção proativa de infrações será reforçada pela concretização de novos modelos de organização interna e pela utilização mais generalizada de ferramentas de informática forense.
O instituto da clemência continuará a ser promovido como um instrumento essencial para combater práticas anticoncorrenciais.

Abuso de posição dominante
A deteção e investigação de abusos de posição dominante será uma prioridade, especialmente em setores de elevada relevância económica e impacto direto nos consumidores.

Controlo de operações de concentração
A análise de operações de concentração continuará a ser realizada de forma célere e rigorosa. Será dada especial atenção às cláusulas restritivas acessórias. A AdC iniciará também uma reflexão sobre a adequação do atual regime jurídico aplicável ao controlo das concentrações, em especial no que se refere a mercados caraterizados por elevada dinâmica de inovação.

Promoção da concorrência
A AdC lançará um ciclo de divulgação e diálogo com setores estruturantes da economia portuguesa, destinado a reforçar a perceção dos agentes para a importância do combate ao conluio na contratação pública e para a promoção de mercados de trabalho competitivos e para a interação entre concorrência e sustentabilidade.

Acompanhamento da economia digital e da inteligência artificial (IA)
A AdC acompanhará a evolução dos mercados digitais, não só na perspetiva de identificação de potenciais constrangimentos jusconcorrenciais, como também tendo em vista a aplicação do Regulamento dos Mercados Digitais (DMA), em estreita colaboração com a Comissão Europeia.
A AdC continuará a explorar os impactos do desenvolvimento da IA generativa na política de concorrência, incluindo a publicação de análises temáticas que, além de promoverem a contestabilidade, previnam que estrangulamentos no mercado se materializem numa consolidação do poder de mercado.

Implementação de tecnologias inovadoras
Para fortalecer a sua capacidade de deteção de práticas anticoncorrenciais, a AdC introduzirá ferramentas de informática forense inovadoras, integrando a Inteligência Artificial nos processos de investigação.


Luz Saúde e C2 MedCapital notificam a aquisição do controlo conjunto sobre o Grupo Hospitalar das Beiras, a Infrapetagi e o Hospital de Loulé

Ficha do processo

Ficha do processo


Energy network mergers: CMA190

Guidance on the CMA’s procedure and approach to its assessment when reviewing mergers involving energy network enterprises. From: Competition and Markets Authority Published3 April 2024 Last updated2 January 2025 — See all updates Get emails about this page

Documents

Energy network mergers: Guidance on the CMA’s procedure and assessment CMA190 (2025)

PDF, 408 KB, 36 pages

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Energy network mergers: Guidance on the CMA’s procedure and assessment CMA190 (2024)

PDF, 414 KB, 37 pages

Details

This guidance provides advice and general information on the Competition and Markets Authority’s procedures and assessment in energy network mergers in Great Britain under the Enterprise Act 2002 as amended by the Energy Act 2023.

2 January 2025: updated guidance published 

The guidance has been updated to reflect the changes introduced by the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024 which commenced on 1 January 2025.

Updates to this page

Published 3 April 2024
Last updated 2 January 2025 + show all updates


Mergers exceptions to the duty to refer and undertakings in lieu

How the CMA applies exceptions to the duty to refer in operating the merger control regime. From: Competition and Markets Authority Published12 March 2014Last updated 2 January 2025 —  ee all updates Get emails about this page

Documents

Mergers: Exceptions to the duty to refer (2025)

PDF, 397 KB, 17 pages

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Merger: Exceptions to the duty to refer (2024)

PDF, 297 KB, 17 pages

Mergers: Exceptions to the duty to refer (2018)

PDF, 360 KB, 26 pages

Details

This document provides guidance on the circumstances where the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) has a discretion not to make a reference for a Phase 2 investigation despite the fact that there is a realistic prospect that the merger will lead to a substantial lessening of competition (SLC). 

Those circumstances are:  

  • when the markets concerned are not of sufficient importance to justify a reference 
  • in the case of anticipated mergers, when the arrangements concerned are insufficiently far advanced, or insufficiently likely to proceed, to justify a reference; or 
  • when any relevant customer benefits arising from the merger outweigh the SLC concerned and any adverse effects of the SLC concerned

2 January 2025: revised guidance published 

The guidance has been updated to draw a distinction between the markets of insufficient importance exception to the duty to refer and the new hybrid jurisdictional test introduced by the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024 (DMCCA24) which commenced on 1 January 2025. 

The revised guidance replaces the previous version of the Mergers: Exceptions to the duty to refer (dated 25 April 2024).

Updates to this page

Published 12 March 2014
Last updated 2 January 2025 + show all updates


Mergers – the CMA’s jurisdiction and procedure: CMA2

Guidance for businesses and their advisers on CMA’s procedures for operating the merger control regime under the Enterprise Act 2002. From: Competition and Markets Authority Published10 January 2014 Last updated2 January 2025 — See all updates Get emails about this page

Documents

Mergers: Guidance on the CMA’s jurisdiction and procedure (2025 – revised guidance)

PDF, 1.41 MB, 180 pages

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Mergers: Guidance on the CMA’s jurisdiction and procedure (2024 – revised guidance)

PDF, 1.32 MB, 162 pages

Mergers: Guidance on the CMA’s jurisdiction and procedure (2022 – revised guidance)

PDF, 1.05 MB, 140 pages

Details

This guidance provides advice and general information to companies and their advisers on the procedures used by the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) in operating the merger control regime set out in the Enterprise Act 2002, as amended. It also includes guidance on when the CMA will have jurisdiction to review mergers under the Act. 

This guidance reflects the jurisdictional and procedural changes to the mergers regime made by the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024 (DMCCA24) which commenced on 1 January 2025. 

2 January 2025: revised guidance published

The revised guidance takes effect on 1 January 2025 and applies to all merger cases subject to the subject to the transitional provisions in the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024 (Commencement No.1 and Savings and Transitional Provisions) Regulations 2024 (SI 2024/1226) summarised below. 

For more information, see the updated mergers guidance consultation page.  

The following forms and templates will be updated to reflect the relevant DMCC Act changes in due course: 

Any merger that qualifies for reference for a phase 2 investigation is subject to a fee. This is irrespective of whether a reference is made. Further information on the fees and how to pay them are in the merger fees information document.

Summary of transitional provisions

The parts of the 2025 revised guidance dealing with the DMCC Act changes related to jurisdiction, ie the increased turnover threshold (paragraphs 4.3, and 4.52 to 4.57), the share of supply test incorporating the new safe harbour threshold (paragraphs 4.58 to 4.71), and the new hybrid test (paragraphs 4.72 to 4.91) will apply to (i) completed mergers where completion took place on or after 1 January 2025 and (ii) anticipated mergers where the formal Phase 1 investigation (ie the start of the 40 working day initial period) commences on or after 1 January 2025. Chapter 4 of the April 2024 guidance will continue to apply to (i) completed cases where completion took place prior to 1 January 2025, (ii) anticipated cases where the formal Phase 1 investigation (ie the start of the 40 working day initial period) commenced prior to 1 January 2025. For the avoidance of doubt, Chapter 4 of the 2024 guidance will also apply to all cases referred to phase 2 prior to 1 January 2025.   

The parts of the 2025 revised guidance dealing with the new statutory phase 2 fast track process (paragraphs 7.13 to 7.26) will apply to mergers (excluding mergers of water enterprises and mergers of energy networks) where the formal Phase 1 investigation (ie start of the 40 working day initial period) commences on or after 1 January 2025. The administrative fast track process explained in the April 2024 guidance (paragraphs 7.14 to 7.17) will continue to apply to all cases where the formal Phase 1 investigation (ie the start of the 40 working day initial period) commenced prior to 1 January 2025.  

The parts of the 2025 revised guidance dealing with the extension of the phase 2 timetable by mutual agreement between the CMA and the merger parties (paragraph 11.70) will apply to mergers (including energy and public interest mergers) referred to Phase 2 on or after 1 January 2025. The extensions explained in the April 2024 guidance (paragraphs 11.69 and 11.70) will continue to apply to all cases referred to Phase 2 prior to 1 January 2025.  

The parts of the 2025 revised guidance dealing with penalties for supplying false or misleading information (paragraphs 9.34 to 9.37) will apply to cases where false or misleading information was provided in relation to a section 109 notice or a section 5 information request issued on or after 1 January 2025. The April 2024 guidance (paragraphs 9.12 and 9.18) will apply to false or misleading information provided in relation to a section 109 notice or a section 5 information request issued prior to 1 January 2025.  

The parts of the 2025 revised guidance dealing with penalties for breaches of section 109 notices (paragraphs 9.38 to 9.43) will apply in relation to section 109 notices issued on or after 1 January 2025. The April 2024 guidance (paragraphs 9.11, 9.19, and 11.22) will apply in relation to section 109 notices issued prior to 1 January 2025.  

Updates to this page

Published 10 January 2014
Last updated 2 January 2025 + show all updates

Atos de concentração – Decisões

Ato de Concentração nº 08700.010294/2024-88

Requerentes: Peabody SMC Pty Ltd, Peabody MNG Pty Ltd e Anglo American plc. Aprovação sem restrições.

Ato de Concentração nº 08700.010496/2024-20

Requerentes: Ipiranga Produtos de Petróleo S.A. e SP Indústria e Distribuidora de Petróleo Ltda. Aprovação sem restrições.

Ato de Concentração nº 08700.010303/2024-31

Requerentes: National Space Company, UP42 GmbH e Airbus Defence and Space GmbH. Aprovação sem restrições.

Ato de Concentração nº 08700.010674/2024-12

Requerentes: JVM Administração e Participações Ltda. e WMS Supermercados do Brasil Ltda. Aprovação sem restrições.

Ato de Concentração nº 08700.010695/2024-38

Requerentes: Salinas Administração e Participações S.A., Unimed-Rio Participações e Investimentos S.A. e Domus Cuidados e Serviços em Saúde S.A. Aprovação sem restrições.

Ato de Concentração nº 08700.010761/2024-70

Requerentes: Melnick Desenvolvimento Imobiliário S.A., Even SP 105 Empreendimentos Imobiliários Ltda., Even Construtora e Incorporadora S.A. e Evenpar Participações Societárias Ltda. Aprovação sem restrições.

Ato de Concentração nº 08700.010754/2024-78

Requerentes: Goldcup 101357 AB (alteração de nome pendente para Mohinder FinCo AB), MacGregor Pte Ltd, MacGregor Norway AS e Cargotec Corporation. Aprovação sem restrições.

30.12.2024

Apresentação

Este é um informativo diário que traz para o(a) leitor (a) notícias e casos de defesa da concorrência das principais jurisdições antitruste do mundo (CADE, FTC, Comissão Europeia, CMA etc).

Notícias

Superintendência-Geral do Cade recomenda condenação de empresa de tecnologia em cartel internacional

Prática impactou mercado global de componentes de discos rígidos

Publicado em 27/12/2024 11h37 Atualizado em 27/12/2024 13h59

Banner site HD disco rigido 1.png

Nesta sexta-feira (27/12), a Superintendência-Geral do Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (SG/Cade) recomendou a condenação de uma empresa e três pessoas físicas pela prática de cartel internacional no mercado global de suspension assemblies, com efeitos no Brasil.

suspensions assembly é um componente de discos rígidos (HDs) que, por sua vez, funcionam como um sistema de armazenamento de dados e são usados em diversos dispositivos, como computadores pessoais (PCs – desktops e laptops), gravadores de vídeo, jogos, leitores de MP3, navegação, sistemas para carros e telefones celulares.

Segundo a SG/Cade, o cartel teria atuado de forma coordenada para estabelecer acordos anticompetitivos envolvendo a divisão de mercado, a combinação de preços em resposta a pedidos de cotação de clientes e a troca de informações comercial e concorrencialmente sensíveis, consolidando, assim, o controle do mercado.

As irregularidades teriam sido registradas, ao menos, pelo período de 2003 até abril de 2016.

Agora, o processo será enviado ao Tribunal Administrativo do Cade e será distribuído a um conselheiro-relator para posterior decisão do colegiado. Se condenada, a empresa estará sujeita ao pagamento de multa de até 20% de seu faturamento bruto, enquanto os administradores eventualmente responsáveis pela infração podem pagar até 20% do valor aplicado à empresa.

Acesso ao processo administrativo nº 08700.006006/2017-61.


Market Study on Transactions Between Performers and Entertainment Agencies in the Music and Broadcasting Industry (Market Study on Ensuring Fair Transactions to Support Creators)

December 26, 2024
Japan Fair Trade Commission

1. Purpose of the Market Study
Content such as animation, music, broadcasting programs, films, games, and manga are proud assets of Japan. With advancements in technology, the source of competitiveness in content creation is increasingly shifting to individual creators. On the other hand, there is a growing demand to address transactional practices that hinder appropriate return of earnings to creators, in order to establish an environment where individual creators can fully realize their creative potential.

The Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) has undertaken various initiatives to promote fair and free competition in the human resource and entertainment fields. These efforts include the publication of the “Report of Study Group on Human Resource and Competition Policy” by the Competition Policy Research Center in February 2018 and the release of “Examples of Practices in the Entertainment Sector That May Violate the Antimonopoly Act” in September 2019.

Subsequently, the Content Industry Revitalization Strategy (formulated and specified in the “Grand Design and Action Plan for a New Form of Capitalism 2024 Revised Version,” approved by the Cabinet on June 21, 2024) stated “It is essential to correct trade practices in order to create a comfortable working environment for performers and others. In light of the current technological innovation, the content industry is shifting its emphasis to individual creativity. With the cooperation of the Japan Fair Trade Commission, we will conduct a fact-finding survey on trade practices in the music and broadcast program fields with an emphasis on preventing abuse of a superior bargaining position and protecting individuals, ….”

In light of these circumstances, the JFTC conducted a market study on contracts and other arrangements between performers in fields such as music and broadcasting (including artists, actors, and talents) and the entertainment agencies or production companies they are affiliated with (hereinafter referred to simply as “entertainment agencies”). This initiative aims to establish a transactional environment where individual creators can fully realize their creative potential.

2. Methods of Study
(1) Questionnaire
From August to November 2024, a questionnaire was conducted targeting 2,628 entertainment agencies. A total of 810 responses were received, resulting in a response rate of 30.8%.

(2) Voluntary Interview
From April to November 2024, interviews were conducted with a total of 95 persons and entities, as outlined below.
Performers: 29 persons
Entertainment Agencies: 37 entities
Broadcasting Companies and Program Production Companies: 10 entities
Record Companies: 8 entities
Industry Organizations: 9 entities
Experts (Lawyers): 2 persons

(3) Information Submission Form
In April 2024, the JFTC launched an information submission form on its official website. By November 2024, a total of 901 submissions were received.

3. Study Results
Please refer to the main report, summary, and key points for details.

* This announcement is a tentative translation. Please refer to the original text written in Japanese.
https://www.jftc.go.jp/houdou/pressrelease/2024/dec/241226_geinou.html

* English translation of the main report and summary will be posted at later date.

Market Study on Transactions Between Performers and Entertainment Agencies in the Music and Broadcasting Industry (Market Study on Ensuring Fair Transactions to Support Creators)


La CNMC recomienda no imponer la presencialidad en la preparación del teórico de moto y mejorar el sistema para dar de baja los vehículos

Sector: Nota de prensa

Ámbito CNMC: Promoción de Competencia

Compartir

  • Analiza un proyecto de Orden Ministerial y un proyecto de Convenio entre la Jefatura de Tráfico y la Asociación de Desguace del Automóvil (AEDRA).
  • Los cursos teóricos del permiso de moto podrían impartirse no solo en presencial y debería examinarse la reserva de actividad de las autoescuelas. 
  • En vez de un convenio bilateral entre Tráfico y AEDRA, sería más recomendable tramitar las bajas de los vehículos a través de otro sistema.
     

La Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia (CNMC) ha analizado el proyecto de Orden Ministerial (POM) por el que se regula la formación para el acceso progresivo al permiso de conducción de la clase A (IPN/CNMC/029/24) y el proyecto de convenio entre la Jefatura Central de Tráfico y la Asociación Española de Desguace y Reciclaje del Automóvil (AEDRA) (INF/CNMC/183/24).

Permiso de clase A

La norma regula el contenido y duración del curso teórico y práctico para obtener el permiso de clase A —permite conducir cualquier tipo de motocicletas y triciclos de motor—. Además, considera a las autoescuelas los únicos centros autorizados para impartir los cursos. 

  • Las limitaciones de la norma deben adecuarse a los principios de buena regulación. La CNMC recomienda:
  • Permitir que la formación teórica del curso pueda ser presencial, online o híbrida. 
  • Si se mantiene que sea presencial, considerar el impacto negativo sobre la competencia y justificarlo bajo los citados principios.
  • Desarrollar el reglamento pendiente para evitar la reserva de actividad de los centros autorizados para impartir la formación.
  • Considerar que los alumnos puedan aportar los vehículos para el curso, o que la escuela acredite que está facultada para utilizar estos vehículos.
  • Justificar la prohibición de aplazar los cursos en más de una ocasión y especificar que se realizará sin coste para el alumno.

Convenio entre Tráfico y AEDRA

Digitalizar los expedientes de baja definitiva que gestionan los centros autorizados de tratamiento de vehículos es el objetivo del convenio. 

La CNMC lo considera positivo, pero propone al Ministerio del Interior utilizar alternativas al convenio —como instrucciones regulatorias o actuaciones de aprovisionamiento—. Estas no plantean riesgos para la competencia, como podría ser fortalecer la posición de los operadores, AEDRA en este caso. 

En caso de mantener el convenio, recomienda: 

  • Garantizar la no exclusividad a la hora de firmar convenios análogos con otros operadores.
  • Asegurar un acceso a la plataforma de digitalización de expedientes en igualdad de condiciones a todos los operadores.
  • Verificar que ni AEDRA ni los centros autorizados de tratamiento de vehículos tengan acceso a información comercial sensible.
  • Garantizar la neutralidad tecnológica

La CNMC puede actuar de oficio (de acuerdo con el artículo 5.1.h de la Ley 3/2013, de 4 de junio, de creación de la Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia) o a petición de las Cámaras Legislativas, el Gobierno, los departamentos ministeriales, las Comunidades Autónomas, las Corporaciones locales, los Colegios Profesionales, las Cámaras de Comercio y las Organizaciones Empresariales y de Consumidores y Usuarios (de acuerdo con su artículo 5.2).


El Consejo General de Protésicos Dentales debería reconsiderar algunas de las medidas de su futuro Código deontológico

Sector: Nota de prensa

Ámbito CNMC: Promoción de Competencia

Compartir

  • Incluye aspectos muy restrictivos sobre la base de conceptos que pueden generar inseguridad jurídica en los propios protésicos.
  • Son deberes que no están justificados por razones de interés general, como es la protección de la salud pública de los pacientes. 
  • La normativa exige a la CNMC informar sobre las propuestas de Códigos deontológicos.

La Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia (CNMC) considera que el futuro Código deontológico del Consejo General de Colegios de Protésicos Dentales de España contiene artículos que deberían ser más proporcionales y menos restrictivos. (INF/CNMC/125/24).

Los protésicos dentales son profesionales que se dedican al diseño, preparación, elaboración, fabricación y reparación de prótesis dentales. Estas únicamente pueden ser prescritas y colocadas al paciente por un odontólogo.

La legislación diferencia entre la actividad de ambos profesionales (protésicos y odontólogos) y señala que debe ejercerse en libre competencia y respetando el derecho de los pacientes a elegir a su protésico dental. 

Nuevo código

La CNMC es responsable de analizar las propuestas de códigos deontológicos profesionales aplicando la normativa derivada del test de proporcionalidad, obligatorio para las normas que regulan el acceso y ejercicio de profesiones en la Unión Europea (Real Decreto 472/2021).

El Consejo General de Protésicos plantea algunos artículos muy restrictivos, como evitar que el odontólogo o dentista —cuando prescribe una prótesis a un paciente— intermedie en dicha relación o que el protésico tenga una relación de dependencia económica con respecto a aquel.

Por tanto, debe reforzarse la argumentación para probar que el ordenamiento jurídico no es suficiente para proteger la salud de los pacientes y que el ejercicio de la profesión de los protésicos y su relación con los odontólogos —en los términos problemáticos en que, según el Consejo general, se está aparentemente produciendo en la práctica— supone también un riesgo para los pacientes y explicar de qué manera y en qué grado las medidas concretas del Código contribuirán a alcanzar los objetivos perseguidos. 

El informe señala que buena parte de los conceptos son jurídicamente indeterminados (por ejemplo, no se define qué debe considerarse dependencia económica o si toda intermediación del dentista asesorando al paciente debe considerarse prohibida) por lo que van a introducir inseguridad jurídica en los propios protésicos, ya que no hay que olvidar las consecuencias disciplinarias que conllevaría su incumplimiento.

Recomendaciones

  • Reforzar la justificación de los objetivos de interés público que persiguen ciertas medidas y su proporcionalidad, de acuerdo con la normativa.
  • Reconsiderar las obligaciones impuestas a los protésicos y analizar alternativas menos restrictivas, pero igual de efectivas, como garantizar que los dentistas informan a los pacientes sobre su derecho de elección, o clarificar el precio de los servicios protésicos en los presupuestos y facturas.
  • Eliminar cualquier obligación de colegiarse mientras no esté contemplada en ley estatal, sin perjuicio de la normativa autonómica vigente.
  • Garantizar la existencia de canales de denuncia anónimos de comportamientos ilícitos entre compañeros con las debidas garantías de protección del denunciante.
  • Replantear la prohibición relativa a la publicidad comparativa para ajustarla a las previsiones de la Ley de Competencia Desleal.
  • Eliminar juicios de valor a la hora de referirse a los honorarios y precisar que su fijación será libre, en consonancia con la normativa de defensa de la competencia.
  • Aclarar el régimen disciplinario aplicable y que la intervención del colegio vía conciliación o arbitraje es voluntaria y adicional a otras formas de reclamación.

La CNMC puede actuar de oficio (de acuerdo con el artículo 5.1.h de la Ley de creación de la CNMC) o a petición de las Cámaras Legislativas, el Gobierno, los departamentos ministeriales, las Comunidades Autónomas, las Corporaciones locales, los Colegios Profesionales, las Cámaras de Comercio y las Organizaciones Empresariales y de Consumidores y Usuarios (artículo 5.2).


Boyden notifica a aquisição do controlo exclusivo sobre um conjunto de Ativos da Stahl Holdings.

Ficha do processo

Ficha do processo

Atos de concentração – Decisões

CADE

Ato de Concentração nº 08700.010419/2024-70

Requerentes: Eólica Serra do Assuruá 17 Ltda. e A. Angeloni & Cia Ltda. Aprovação sem restrições.

Ato de Concentração nº 08700.009997/2024-63

Requerentes: BRF S.A., Archer-Daniels-Midland Company e PlantPlus Foods LLC. Aprovação sem restrições.

Ato de Concentração nº 08700.010136/2024-28

Requerentes: Electra Hydra Participações Societárias Ltda., Pitangui Geração de Energia S.A., Salto do Vau S.A., Melissa Geração de Energia S.A., Chopim I S.A., Marumbi Geração de Energia S.A., São Jorge S.A., Apucaraninha S.A., Palmas Energias Renováveis S.A., Cavernoso I Geração de Energia S.A., Cavernoso II Geração de Energia S.A., Chaminé Geração de Energia S.A., Guaricana Geração de Energia S.A., UTE Figueira S.A. e Copel Geração e Transmissão S.A. Aprovação sem restrições.

Ato de Concentração nº 08700.010047/2024-81

Partes: Robert Bosch Internationale Beteiligungen AG, Bosch (China) Investment Ltd. e Jiangling Motors Group Co. Ltd. Aprovação sem restrições.

Ato de Concentração nº 08700.010514/2024-73

Requerentes: Irmãos Muffato S.A. e WMS Supermercados do Brasil Ltda. Aprovação sem restrições.

Ato de Concentração nº 08700.010517/2024-15

Requerentes: Cia Beal de Alimentos e WMS Supermercados do Brasil Ltda. Aprovação sem restrições.

Ato de Concentração nº 08700.010636/2024-60

Requerentes: Rede Central de Comunicação Ltda. e Sistema Araçá de Comunicação Ltda. Aprovação sem restrições.

Ato de Concentração nº 08700.010318/2024-07

Arila Fundo de Investimento Financeiro Multimercado, DIA Brasil Sociedade Limitada – Em Recuperação Judicial, DBZ Administração, Gestão de Ativos e Serviços Imobiliários Ltda. – Em Recuperação Judicial e Lyra Fundo de Investimento Multimercado Crédito Privado Investimento no Exterior. Aprovação sem restrições.

Ato de Concentração nº 08700.010497/2024-74

Requerentes: Novo Holdings A/S, Benchmark Genetics Limited e Benchmark Genetics Norway AS. Aaprovação sem restrições.

Ato de Concentração nº 08700.010336/2024-81

Partes: Colégio Eleva Educação Ltda e NE200 Investimento Imobiliário S/A. Aprovação sem restrições.

Ato de Concentração nº 08700.010420/2024-02

Requerentes: Palmyra do Brasil Indústria e Comércio de Silício Metálico e Recursos Naturais Ltda. e Casa dos Ventos S.A. Aprovação sem restrições.

Ato de Concentração nº 08700.010255/2024-81

Partes: Plano Fosfato Empreendimentos Imobiliários Ltda., São José Desenvolvimento Imobiliário 18 Ltda., Jorge’s Imóveis e Participações Ltda. e Frec Desenvolvimento Imobiliário Ltda. Aprovação sem restrições.

Ato de Concentração nº 08700.010435/2024-62

Requerentes: Newview 43 Gestão Patrimonial e Participações Ltda. e Banco BTG Pactual S.A. Aprovação sem restrições.

27.12.2024

Apresentação

Este é um informativo diário que traz para o(a) leitor (a) notícias e casos de defesa da concorrência das principais jurisdições antitruste do mundo (CADE, FTC, Comissão Europeia, CMA etc).

Notícias

Market Study on Transactions Between Performers and Entertainment Agencies in the Music and Broadcasting Industry (Market Study on Ensuring Fair Transactions to Support Creators)

December 26, 2024
Japan Fair Trade Commission

1. Purpose of the Market Study
Content such as animation, music, broadcasting programs, films, games, and manga are proud assets of Japan. With advancements in technology, the source of competitiveness in content creation is increasingly shifting to individual creators. On the other hand, there is a growing demand to address transactional practices that hinder appropriate return of earnings to creators, in order to establish an environment where individual creators can fully realize their creative potential.

The Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) has undertaken various initiatives to promote fair and free competition in the human resource and entertainment fields. These efforts include the publication of the “Report of Study Group on Human Resource and Competition Policy” by the Competition Policy Research Center in February 2018 and the release of “Examples of Practices in the Entertainment Sector That May Violate the Antimonopoly Act” in September 2019.

Subsequently, the Content Industry Revitalization Strategy (formulated and specified in the “Grand Design and Action Plan for a New Form of Capitalism 2024 Revised Version,” approved by the Cabinet on June 21, 2024) stated “It is essential to correct trade practices in order to create a comfortable working environment for performers and others. In light of the current technological innovation, the content industry is shifting its emphasis to individual creativity. With the cooperation of the Japan Fair Trade Commission, we will conduct a fact-finding survey on trade practices in the music and broadcast program fields with an emphasis on preventing abuse of a superior bargaining position and protecting individuals, ….”

In light of these circumstances, the JFTC conducted a market study on contracts and other arrangements between performers in fields such as music and broadcasting (including artists, actors, and talents) and the entertainment agencies or production companies they are affiliated with (hereinafter referred to simply as “entertainment agencies”). This initiative aims to establish a transactional environment where individual creators can fully realize their creative potential.

2. Methods of Study
(1) Questionnaire
From August to November 2024, a questionnaire was conducted targeting 2,628 entertainment agencies. A total of 810 responses were received, resulting in a response rate of 30.8%.

(2) Voluntary Interview
From April to November 2024, interviews were conducted with a total of 95 persons and entities, as outlined below.
Performers: 29 persons
Entertainment Agencies: 37 entities
Broadcasting Companies and Program Production Companies: 10 entities
Record Companies: 8 entities
Industry Organizations: 9 entities
Experts (Lawyers): 2 persons

(3) Information Submission Form
In April 2024, the JFTC launched an information submission form on its official website. By November 2024, a total of 901 submissions were received.

3. Study Results
Please refer to the main report, summary, and key points for details.

* This announcement is a tentative translation. Please refer to the original text written in Japanese.
https://www.jftc.go.jp/houdou/pressrelease/2024/dec/241226_geinou.html

* English translation of the main report and summary will be posted at later date.

Market Study on Transactions Between Performers and Entertainment Agencies in the Music and Broadcasting Industry (Market Study on Ensuring Fair Transactions to Support Creators)

Atos de concentração – Decisões

CADE

Ato de Concentração n° 08700.00006781/2024-46

Requerentes: Amil Assistência Médica Internacional S.A. e Diagnósticos das Américas S.A.

Aprovação sem restrições.

26.12.2024

Apresentação

Este é um informativo diário que traz para o(a) leitor (a) notícias e casos de defesa da concorrência das principais jurisdições antitruste do mundo (CADE, FTC, Comissão Europeia, CMA etc).

Notícias

Superintendência-Geral do Cade aprova operação envolvendo as empresas Amil e Dasa

Joint Venture envolve controle de hospitais, clínicas oncológicas e clínicas médicas

Publicado em 24/12/2024 12h56

Superintendência-Geral do Cade aprova operação envolvendo as empresas Amil e Dasa

ASuperintendência-Geral do Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (SG/Cade) aprovou, nesta terça-feira (24), a operação referente à combinação dos ativos da Amil e da Dasa. Por meio da transação, 25 hospitais, seis clínicas oncológicas e seis clínicas médicas, anteriormente pertencentes a Amil e Dasa, passarão a ser controlados pela Ímpar Serviços Hospitalares, joint venture de gestão compartilhada entre as duas empresas. 

A Amil e seu grupo controlador atuam em todo território nacional na oferta de planos de saúde médico-hospitalares e de planos odontológicos. O grupo possui ainda hospitais e centros médicos, além de contar com rede credenciada de médicos, hospitais, clínicas e laboratórios. Já a Dasa atua no mercado de serviço de apoio diagnóstico (SAD) em seus laboratórios, bem como no mercado de hospitais gerais, clínicas médicas e clínicas odontológicas.  

A operação implicará em sobreposição horizontal, ou seja, atuação conjunta das duas empresas, nos mercados de hospitais gerais, centros médicos, hemodinâmica e SAD nos municípios do Rio de Janeiro/RJ, São Paulo/SP e Brasília/DF. Nos serviços de oncologia ambulatorial, a sobreposição foi identificada nesses mesmos municípios, além da cidade de Niterói/RJ. 

No entanto, a análise conduzida pela SG/Cade indica a presença de elementos de entrada e rivalidade suficientes para afastar a probabilidade de exercício de poder de mercado por parte das empresas em todos os mercados relevantes. 

Já em relação à verticalização, a operação resultará na integração vertical entre diversas atividades desempenhadas pela joint venture, incluindo serviços de apoio diagnóstico (SAD), hospitais gerais, centros médicos, hemodinâmica e oncologia ambulatorial (quimioterapia), com os serviços de planos de saúde oferecidos pela Amil. Além disso, a operação gerará integração vertical entre os serviços de apoio a terceiros prestados pela Dasa e os serviços de SAD fornecidos pela Amil, bem como entre a distribuição de medicamentos e materiais médico-hospitalares, incluindo vacinas, realizada pela Dasa, e os serviços de planos de saúde ofertados pela Amil. 

Sobre essa questão, a análise da SG/Cade indicou que a operação não acarretaria risco de fechamento de mercado. 

Acesse o ato de concentração nº 08700.006781/2024-46. 


Private Motor Insurance Market Investigation Order 2015

The order provides measures to increase competition in the car insurance market and reduce the cost of premiums for drivers.

From: Competition and Markets Authority

Published18 March 2015Last updated24 December 2024 — See all updates

Get emails about this page

Documents

Private Motor Insurance Market Investigation Order 2015

PDF, 333 KB, 21 pages

Explanatory note

PDF, 271 KB, 21 pages

Atos de concentração – Decisões

CMA

Alphabet Inc. (Google LLC) / Anthropic merger inquiry

  • The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) investigated Alphabet Inc.’s (Google LLC) partnership with Anthropic PBC.
    • Updated: 24 December 2024

Lindab / HAS-Vent merger inquiry

  • The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) is investigating the completed acquisition by Lindab International AB of HAS-Vent Holdings Limited.
    • Updated: 24 December 2024

Global Business Travel Group, Inc / CWT Holdings, LLC merger inquiry

  • The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) is investigating the anticipated acquisition by Global Business Travel Group, Inc of CWT Holdings, LLC.
    • Updated: 24 December 2024

Autorité de la concurrence

Secteur(s) :

BTP

24-DCC-271
relative à la prise de contrôle exclusif de Weetec par Ortec Energies

Décision de passage en examen approfondi|

Publication de la décision le : 24 décembre 2024

24.12.2024

Apresentação

Este é um informativo diário que traz para o(a) leitor (a) notícias e casos de defesa da concorrência das principais jurisdições antitruste do mundo (CADE, FTC, Comissão Europeia, CMA etc).

Notícias

【The 7th CPRC Osaka Symposium】Statement by the Secretary General at a regular press conference (December 18, 2024)

December 18, 2024
Japan Fair Trade Commission

The 7th CPRC Osaka Symposium

Today, I would like to introduce the 7th Osaka Symposium to be held by the Competition Policy Research Center (CPRC) on Friday, January 24, 2025. The symposium is scheduled to take place at a venue in Osaka Prefecture and will also be accessible online. We just started accepting registrations for participation today.

The theme of this symposium is “Civil Litigation in Antimonopoly Cases.” The Antimonopoly Act (the Act) provides civil remedies in the form of claims for damages and injunctions. These remedies allow enterprises and consumers who have suffered damage due to violations of the Act to take independent measures to prevent further harm or recover their losses.

This symposium will include lectures and a panel discussion regarding civil litigation under the Act including the claims by researchers and practitioners of the Act on the current situation of the utilization in Japan, issues for its further utilization, the role to be played by the JFTC, and comparisons with other countries.

The civil remedies system under the Act was established in 2001, and nearly a quarter-century has passed since then. However, there are opinions that it has not been fully utilized. Furthermore, some suggest that the JFTC’s enforcements and recommendations should be leveraged more effectively in civil litigation. At this symposium, discussions among experts on the future direction of civil remedies will provide meaningful insights and contribute significantly to the ongoing development of this system.

Details about the symposium, including the speakers and lecture topics, are available in the flyer (in Japanese) we are distributing. The event is supported by the Kansai Economic Federation and co-organized by the Osaka Bar Association, the Osaka Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Japan Electronics and Information Technology Industries Association, the Fair Trade Institute, the Kobe University Center for Social Systems Innovation, etc.

We encourage your active participation.


El Consejo General de Protésicos Dentales debería reconsiderar algunas de las medidas de su futuro Código deontológico

Sector: Nota de prensa

Ámbito CNMC: Promoción de Competencia

Compartir

  • Incluye aspectos muy restrictivos sobre la base de conceptos que pueden generar inseguridad jurídica en los propios protésicos.
  • Son deberes que no están justificados por razones de interés general, como es la protección de la salud pública de los pacientes. 
  • La normativa exige a la CNMC informar sobre las propuestas de Códigos deontológicos.

La Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia (CNMC) considera que el futuro Código deontológico del Consejo General de Colegios de Protésicos Dentales de España contiene artículos que deberían ser más proporcionales y menos restrictivos. (INF/CNMC/125/24).

Los protésicos dentales son profesionales que se dedican al diseño, preparación, elaboración, fabricación y reparación de prótesis dentales. Estas únicamente pueden ser prescritas y colocadas al paciente por un odontólogo.

La legislación diferencia entre la actividad de ambos profesionales (protésicos y odontólogos) y señala que debe ejercerse en libre competencia y respetando el derecho de los pacientes a elegir a su protésico dental. 

Nuevo código

La CNMC es responsable de analizar las propuestas de códigos deontológicos profesionales aplicando la normativa derivada del test de proporcionalidad, obligatorio para las normas que regulan el acceso y ejercicio de profesiones en la Unión Europea (Real Decreto 472/2021).

El Consejo General de Protésicos plantea algunos artículos muy restrictivos, como evitar que el odontólogo o dentista —cuando prescribe una prótesis a un paciente— intermedie en dicha relación o que el protésico tenga una relación de dependencia económica con respecto a aquel.

Por tanto, debe reforzarse la argumentación para probar que el ordenamiento jurídico no es suficiente para proteger la salud de los pacientes y que el ejercicio de la profesión de los protésicos y su relación con los odontólogos —en los términos problemáticos en que, según el Consejo general, se está aparentemente produciendo en la práctica— supone también un riesgo para los pacientes y explicar de qué manera y en qué grado las medidas concretas del Código contribuirán a alcanzar los objetivos perseguidos. 

El informe señala que buena parte de los conceptos son jurídicamente indeterminados (por ejemplo, no se define qué debe considerarse dependencia económica o si toda intermediación del dentista asesorando al paciente debe considerarse prohibida) por lo que van a introducir inseguridad jurídica en los propios protésicos, ya que no hay que olvidar las consecuencias disciplinarias que conllevaría su incumplimiento.

Recomendaciones

  • Reforzar la justificación de los objetivos de interés público que persiguen ciertas medidas y su proporcionalidad, de acuerdo con la normativa.
  • Reconsiderar las obligaciones impuestas a los protésicos y analizar alternativas menos restrictivas, pero igual de efectivas, como garantizar que los dentistas informan a los pacientes sobre su derecho de elección, o clarificar el precio de los servicios protésicos en los presupuestos y facturas.
  • Eliminar cualquier obligación de colegiarse mientras no esté contemplada en ley estatal, sin perjuicio de la normativa autonómica vigente.
  • Garantizar la existencia de canales de denuncia anónimos de comportamientos ilícitos entre compañeros con las debidas garantías de protección del denunciante.
  • Replantear la prohibición relativa a la publicidad comparativa para ajustarla a las previsiones de la Ley de Competencia Desleal.
  • Eliminar juicios de valor a la hora de referirse a los honorarios y precisar que su fijación será libre, en consonancia con la normativa de defensa de la competencia.
  • Aclarar el régimen disciplinario aplicable y que la intervención del colegio vía conciliación o arbitraje es voluntaria y adicional a otras formas de reclamación.

La CNMC puede actuar de oficio (de acuerdo con el artículo 5.1.h de la Ley de creación de la CNMC) o a petición de las Cámaras Legislativas, el Gobierno, los departamentos ministeriales, las Comunidades Autónomas, las Corporaciones locales, los Colegios Profesionales, las Cámaras de Comercio y las Organizaciones Empresariales y de Consumidores y Usuarios (artículo 5.2).


Crest II e Manuel Saraiva dos Santos notificam a aquisição do controlo conjunto sobre a Vigobloco

Ficha do processo

Ficha do processo


CUF notifica a aquisição do controlo exclusivo sobre a SPSI

médico junto a fachada de edifício

Ficha do processo

Ficha do processo

Atos de concentração – Decisões

CADE

Ato de Concentração nº 08700.009718/2024-61

Requerentes: Yeti Private Holdings I LLC, Ginsberg Intermediate LP e Gigamon Inc. Advogados: Daniela Maria Tavares Moreira da Silva, Marcos Drummond Malvar e Isabela Pannunzio. Decido pela aprovação sem restrições.

Ato de Concentração nº 08700.008206/2024-88

Requerentes: Direcional Engenharia S.A., GTIS L Participações Ltda. e Pateo do Cambuci Lote 06 Empreendimentos e Participações Ltda. Advogados: Luiz Eduardo Salles, Lucas Mandelbaum Bianchini, Ana Clara Appolinário de Almeida e Marco Chung. Decido pela aprovação sem restrições.

Ato de Concentração nº 08700.008425/2024-67

Requerentes: Allrede Participações Ltda. e Ligga Telecomunicações S.A. Advogados: Bruno Crepaldi Esteves, Rafael dos Santos Queiroz, Felipe Vieira de Melo, Paula Neves, Denise Junqueira, Maíra Isabel Saldanha Rodrigues, Felipe Carvalho Eleutério de Lima e Marcos Tadeu Pastor. Decido pela aprovação sem restrições.

Ato de Concentração nº 08700.009727/2024-52

Requerentes: Sylvamo do Brasil Ltda. e Engie Brasil Energias Complementares Participações Ltda. Advogados: Luciana Martorano, Ana Paula Paschoalini, Izabella Passos e Beatriz Kenchian. Decido pela aprovação sem restrições.

Ato de Concentração nº 08700.010091/2024-91

Partes: Mosaic Fertilizantes P&K Ltda., Casa dos Ventos S.A. e São Canuto IV Energias Renováveis S.A. Advogados: Fabricio A. Cardim de Almeida, Gláucia Gomes Menato, Gustavo Amaral Santos Köhnen e Ivan Lago Mariotto. Decido pela aprovação sem restrições.

Ato de Concentração nº 08700.009809/2024-05

Requerentes: Vinci Impacto e Retorno IV Fundo de Investimento em Participações Multiestratégia, Vinci Impacto e Retorno IV Master P Fundo de Investimento em Participações Multiestratégia, Vinci Strategic Partners I Fundo de Investimento em Participações Multiestratégia e O Varejão Auto Peças Ltda. Advogados: Ricardo Lara Gaillard, Mayara Lins Ogea e Lucas Longhitano. Decido pelo não conhecimento da operação.

Ato de Concentração nº 08700.009802/2024-85

Requerentes: Nacional Cimentos Participações S.A. e ETP Paraíba Participações S.A. Advogados: Luis Nagalli, Julia Haddad Niemeyer e Marco Volpini Micheli. Decido pela aprovação sem restrições.

Ato de Concentração nº 08700.009863/2024-42

Requerentes: Be8 S.A., Biopar Produção de Biodiesel Parecis Ltda., Unibras Indústria e Comércio de Biocombustível Ltda., União Indústria e Comércio do Pará Ltda. e Biopar Participações e Gestão de Negócios Ltda. Advogados: Ana Paula Paschoalini, Izabella Passos e Beatriz Kenchian. Decido pela aprovação sem restrições.

Ato de Concentração nº 08700.009795/2024-11

Partes: Rio Energy Participações S.A. e UFV Verdão Geradora de Energia Ltda. Advogados: Enrico Spini Romanielo e Fernanda Lins Nemer. Decido pela aprovação sem restrições.

Ato de Concentração nº 08700.009765/2024-13

Partes: Ibero Indústria Brasileira de Equipamentos Rodoviários S.A. e Zurlo Implementos Rodoviários Ltda. Advogados: Eduardo Caminati, Marcio Bueno, André Ferraz, Vítor Fuks, Fernando Zanotti Schneider, Pedro Saad Abud, Danilo Henrique Zanichelli, Zulmar Neves e Fábio Branchi. Decido pela aprovação sem restrições.

Ato de Concentração nº 08700.009955/2024-22

Requerentes: Minasligas S.A., Jaíba V Holding S.A., Jaíba NO2 Energias Renováveis S.A., Jaíba CE Energias Renováveis S.A. e Jaíba SO Energias Renováveis S.A. Advogados: Marcela Matiuzzo e Vívian Ianelli. Decido pela aprovação sem restrições.

Ato de Concentração nº 08700.009706/2024-37

Partes: Ultrapar Logística Ltda. e Hidrovias do Brasil S.A. Advogados: Barbara Rosenberg, Maria Sampaio e Maria Eduarda de Jesus Genova. Decido pela aprovação sem restrições.

Ato de Concentração nº 08700.009772/2024-15

Requerentes: IHS Brasil – Cessão de Infraestruturas S.A. e Oi S.A. – Em Recuperação Judicial. Advogados: Milena Mundim, Pedro Milhomem e Rafaela Sanches. Decido pela aprovação sem restrições.

Ato de Concentração nº 08700.009771/2024-62

Requerentes: Iguana Fix Desenvolvimento e Intermediação Ltda. e Juntos Somos Mais Fidelização S.A. Advogados: Sérgio Varella Bruna, Natalia Salzedas Pinheiro da Silveira e Marina Lissa Oda Horita. Decido pela aprovação sem restrições.

Ato de Concentração nº 08700.009931/2024-73

Requerentes: Assuruá 5 Energia S.A. e Cargill Agrícola S.A. Advogados: Eduardo Caminati, Marcio Bueno, Guilherme Misale e Tatiane Zichi. Decido pela aprovação sem restrições.

Ato de Concentração nº 08700.010123/2024-59

Requerentes: Daimler Truck AG e AB Volvo. Advogados: Renê G. S. Medrado e José Rubens Battazza Iasbech. Decido pela aprovação sem restrições.

Ato de Concentração nº 08700.009752/2024-36

Requerentes: Indorama Ventures Oxides LLC, Cargill Bioindustrial UK Limited e Cargill Incorporated. Advogados: Eduardo Frade e Maria Izabella Vilas Boas. Decido pela aprovação sem restrições.

Ato de Concentração nº 08700.010117/2024-00

Requerentes: Banco Santander (Brasil) S.A. e Construtora Tenda S.A. Advogados: Luiz Fernando Santos Lippi Coimbra, Eduardo Caminati, Marcio Bueno, Guilherme Misale, Maria Wagner e Marcela Carvalho. Decido pela aprovação sem restrições.

Ato de Concentração nº 08700.010254/2024-36

Requerentes: CDP Supermercados Ltda. e Bompreço Bahia Supermercados Ltda. Advogados: Barbara Rosenberg, Guilherme Morgulis, Marcela Abras Lorenzetti e Giulia Gizzi Smith Angelo. Decido pela aprovação sem restrições.

Ato de Concentração nº 08700.009644/2024-63

Partes: Lesaffre et Compagnie S.A., SAF do Brasil Produtos Alimentícios Ltda. e Biorigin S.A. Advogados: Cristianne Zarzur, Jackson Ferreira, Daniel Williams, Renata Zuccolo, Raphaela Boffe Palma e Roney Olimpio Barbosa Junior. Decido pela aprovação sem restrições.


CMA

Lindab / HAS-Vent merger inquiry

  • The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) is investigating the completed acquisition by Lindab International AB of HAS-Vent Holdings Limited.
    • Updated: 23 December 2024