Este é um informativo diário que traz para o(a) leitor (a) notícias e casos de defesa da concorrência das principais jurisdições antitruste do mundo (CADE, FTC, Comissão Europeia, CMA etc).
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The European Commission has launched today a public consultation inviting all interested parties to express their views on the functioning of the competition rules applicable to vertical agreements in the automotive sector. These rules include the Motor Vehicle Block Exemption Regulation (‘MVBER’) and the Supplementary Guidelines (‘SGL’), both as amended in April 2023, as well as the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation (‘VBER’) and the Guidelines on vertical restraints, as far as they apply to the automotive sector.
The public consultation is part of the ongoing evaluation of the MVBER and the SGL launched on 18 January 2024. These rules, which assist companies in the automotive sector in assessing the compatibility of their vertical agreements with Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’), are currently set to expire on 31 May 2028.
In parallel, the Commission launched on 30 January 2025 the Strategic Dialogue on the Future of the Automotive Industry. The Commission will soon present an Action Plan which will address issues relevant for the automotive sector, such as ensuring access to talent and resources, technological innovation and the development of next-generation vehicles, and establishing a predictable regulatory framework. The MVBER evaluation complements these efforts by ensuring a competitive automotive aftermarket.
Background on the evaluation process
On 17 April 2023, the Commission prolonged the MVBER for five years, until 31 May 2028, and updated the SGL to reflect the main technological developments in the automotive industry since 2010. This was the outcome of the previous evaluation of the framework, launched in 2018 and concluded on 28 May 2021, which indicated notably that the motor vehicle market was likely to evolve in the following years, due to the digitalisation of vehicles and new mobility patterns in particular.
The Commission launched the current evaluation on 18 January 2024 and a call for evidence on 27 May 2024. In its review, the Commission will take into account the current competitive situation in the automotive sector and include an assessment of the impact of the 2023 amendments to the SGL. The evaluation will also consider how the market is likely to evolve until 2028 based on current trends.
Next steps
All interested parties can submit their comments by 23 May 2025. More information on how to submit a contribution is available here.
The Commission will analyse the responses to the consultation and publish a summary of the main points and conclusions on the Commission’s “Have your say” portal. On the same page, the Commission will also publish the contributions made to the public consultation in the language in which they were submitted.
As part of the ongoing evaluation, the Commission will also seek feedback from national competition authorities. In addition, the Commission is working with the Commission’s Joint Research Centre on a study to collect sector-specific information pertaining to a list of relevant industry indicators, with particular focus on the digital transformation of the automotive markets.
After the evaluation is finalised, the Commission will analyse the possible policy options for the future of the MVBER, in a policy-making phase planned for 2026. The progress of the evaluation can be followed on the Commission’s “Have your say” portal.
Background on the MVBER
Vertical agreements are agreements between two or more companies operating at different levels of the production or distribution chain, and relating to the conditions under which the parties may purchase, sell or resell certain goods or services.
Article 101(1) TFEU prohibits agreements between companies that restrict competition. However, under Article 101(3) TFEU, such agreements can be declared compatible with the Single Market, provided they contribute to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefits without eliminating competition.
The MVBER states that the Commission’s general regime (i.e., the VBER) applies to agreements for the distribution of new vehicles. The VBER exempts vertical agreements that meet certain conditions from the prohibition in Article 101(1) TFEU, thus creating a safe harbour for those agreements. The Guidelines on vertical restraints provide guidance on how to interpret and apply the VBER and how to assess vertical agreements falling outside the safe harbour of the VBER.
As to agreements relating to the sale or resale of spare parts for motor vehicles or the provision of repair and maintenance services for motor vehicles, the MVBER provides that Article 101(1) TFEU does not apply, so long as these agreements fulfil the requirements for an exemption under the general regime of the VBER and do not contain any of the severe restrictions of competition listed in the MVBER (such restrictions would remove the benefit of the exemption).
For More Information
More information on the upcoming steps of the current evaluation is available on the dedicated webpage of the Commission’s competition website.
The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) has completed its remittal into the private healthcare market and has brought article 22 of the 2014 Order into force.
From: Competition and Markets Authority Published7 March 2016Last updated28 February 2025 — See all updates
Case type: Markets Case state: Closed
Market sector: Healthcare and medical equipment Outcome: Markets – phase 2 adverse effect on competition leading to remedies Opened:4 April 2012Closed:28 April 2017
Sector: Nota de prensa
Ámbito CNMC: Competencia
La Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia (CNMC) ha acordado, con fecha de 7 de febrero de 2025, el inicio de la segunda fase del análisis de la concentración Curium/Irab (C/1501/24).
La operación consiste en la adquisición del control exclusivo de Institut de Radiofarmacia Aplicada de Barcelona, S. L. (Irab) por parte de Curium Pharma Holding Spain, S. L. U. (Curium).
El sector económico afectado es el de la fabricación de productos farmacéuticos, en especial, la fabricación y comercialización de radiofármacos PET para diagnóstico del cáncer en los que solapan sus actividades.
La potencial adquisición puede suponer riesgos para la competencia, por lo que la CNMC analizará la operación en segunda fase. Este paso no prejuzga las conclusiones definitivas que puedan alcanzarse sobre la concentración.
Análisis previo
La CNMC ha analizado el funcionamiento y el nivel de competencia en los mercados afectados. En esta primera fase, ha encontrado elevadas cuotas conjuntas en varios de ellos, especialmente en el de radiofármacos PET para diagnóstico del cáncer de próstata.
La operación también permitiría a Curium entrar en mercados y ámbitos geográficos en los que no estaba presente, lo que reforzaría su cartera de radiofármacos.
Además, podría afectar al mercado de fabricación de radiofármacos PET en desarrollo para terceros, donde Irab juega un papel muy relevante. Ello podría afectar negativamente a la competencia potencial en estos mercados en España.
Durante la segunda fase, se estudiarán estos posibles riesgos y su alcance. Irab y otros terceros con interés legítimo podrán presentar alegaciones. Curium también podrá formular alegaciones y aportar más información. Además, se solicitará un informe preceptivo a las comunidades autónomas en las que la concentración incida de forma significativa.
La resolución final que apruebe la CNMC podrá autorizar, aceptar compromisos, imponer condiciones o prohibir la operación de concentración Curium/Irab.
Documento no oficial, destinado a los medios de comunicación, y que no vincula a la CNMC. Reproducción permitida solo si se cita la fuente.
Merger
Last decision date: 28.02.2025 Simplified procedure
https://webadvocacy.com.br/category/clipping-da-concorrencia
CADE – Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica
FTC – Federal Trade Commission
USDOJ – Departamento de Justiça dos EUA
Comissão Europeia – Responsável pela política da concorrência na Europa
CMA – Autoridade da Concorrência do Reino Unido
Autorité de la Concurrence – Autoridade da Concorrência da França
AdC -Autoridade da Concorrência de Portugal
CNMC – Autoridade Concorrência da Espanha
CNDC – Autoridade Concorrência da Argentina
AGCM – Autoridade Concorrência da Itália
COFECE – Autoridade Concorrência do México
Dois processos formam distribuídos entre os membros do Tribunal Administrativo
Publicado em 27/02/2025 12h07
OConselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (Cade) realizou, na última quarta-feira (26/2), a 325ª Sessão Ordinária de Distribuição. Nas sessões de distribuição, os casos em análise na autarquia são encaminhados para um conselheiro relator, designado por sorteio.
Confira abaixo os casos sorteados:
Recorrente: Itaú Unibanco S/A.
Advogados: Adriana Dias Radi, Barbara Rosenberg, Bruno Henrique Barros de Moura, Djhaynne Dalmonico Nunes, Flavio Augusto Ferreira do Nascimento, Guilherme Bosso Citolino, Julia Krein, Karina Granucci Rodeguer Bugano Gomes, Luiza Sahb Nobrega, Marcelo Antônio Cartaxo Queiroga Lopes Filho e Marcos Antônio Tadeu Exposto Junior.
Relator: Conselheiro Gustavo Augusto Freitas de Lima
Representante: Sindicato da Indústria Audiovisual do Estado de São Paulo.
Representados: Sindicato dos Artistas e Técnicos em Espetáculos de Diversões no Estado de São Paulo, Alessandra Marcia Silva Araújo, Dorberto Rocha de Carvalho e Ricardo Aparecido de Vasconcelos.
Advogados: Eduardo Antonio Bossolan, Vitor Monaquezi Fernandes e Yves Carneiro Finzetto.
Relatora: Conselheira Camila Cabral Pires Alves
Fraude prejudicou a competitividade e violou a ordem econômica no setor de transporte escolar público
Publicado em 27/02/2025 09h24
OConselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (Cade) condenou, nesta quarta-feira (26/2), duas empresas de transporte escolar por formação de cartel em pregão eletrônico, realizado em 2019, pela Secretaria de Educação do Estado de São Paulo (Seduc-SP), com o objetivo de contratar serviços de transporte escolar para a rede pública estadual no município de Fernandópolis, em São Paulo.
A investigação teve início a partir de denúncia da Seduc-SP, que relatou indícios de que as empresas Mayfran e New Hope teriam adotado práticas anticompetitivas durante o processo licitatório, prejudicando a competitividade do certame.
A evidência que motivou a instauração do processo foi a coincidência dos endereços de internet (“IP”) entre Mayfran e New Hope, um indício de que houve comunicação entre as empresas.
A análise dos autos indicou ainda a existência de indícios de colusão pelo comportamento das empresas Mayfran e New Hope nos lances em três lotes distintos do certame, bem como pela relação comercial prévia entre as empresas, materializada em um contrato de parceria empresarial, indicativo adicional da existência de um canal de comunicação entre as concorrentes.
De acordo com a conselheira Camila Pires Alves, relatora do caso, a coincidência de endereços IP, embora não constitua prova definitiva de conluio, consiste em prova direta e corrobora a suspeita de comunicação prévia ou coordenação entre os agentes. “Em síntese, as evidências indiretas permitem a formulação de hipóteses explicativas dotadas de razoável plausibilidade”, disse.
A conselheira acrescentou que as empresas acusadas não precisam provar diretamente que o fato não aconteceu, mas precisam oferecer explicações razoáveis, mesmo que não consigam provar completamente que sua conduta foi correta. “Não se exige que as empresas acusadas provem a inocorrência do fato nos mesmos termos das provas diretas; basta que apresentem explicações minimamente racionais, sem que necessariamente exonerem por completo a conduta. Esse padrão de refutação já foi consagrado na jurisprudência do Cade, que preconiza o uso parcimonioso e holístico das provas indiretas para a inferência da ilicitude, apenas na ausência de justificativas alternativas plausíveis”. Além disso, a relatora concluiu que: “As representadas não apresentaram justificativas ou alternativas que afastassem as evidências indiretas constantes dos autos (…).”
Dessa forma, o Tribunal decidiu que as empresas pagarão multas que somam mais de R$ 1,6 milhão, sendo R$ 763.903,92 à empresa Mayfran e R$ 842.320,09 à empresa New Hope.
Foi determinado ainda expedição de ofício com cópia da decisão será encaminhado ao Ministério Público do Estado de São Paulo (MPE-SP) para ciência e possível propositura de ação visando ao ressarcimento de danos, bem como a adoção das providências julgadas cabíveis na seara penal.
Acesse o Processo Administrativo n° 08700.005876/2019-85.
MoU between the CMA and the Commissioner of Competition of Canada regarding international cooperation on the application of national competition laws.
From: Competition and Markets Authority Published27 February 2025Get emails about this page
PDF, 378 KB, 11 pages
This MoU establishes a framework for coordination between the CMA and the Competition Bureau Canada (CCB), on matters including:
Published 27 February 2025
Partes: CJM Participações e Investimentos Ltda., Posto de Combustível Torre Ltda. e Companhia Brasileira de Distribuição. Aprovação sem restrições.
Partes: CEAT Limited e Michelin Lanka (Private) Limited. Aprovação sem restrições.
Requerentes: Hitachi Global Life Solutions Inc. e Hitachi-Johnson Controls Air Conditioning Inc. Aprovação sem restrições.
https://webadvocacy.com.br/category/clipping-da-concorrencia
CADE – Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica
FTC – Federal Trade Commission
USDOJ – Departamento de Justiça dos EUA
Comissão Europeia – Responsável pela política da concorrência na Europa
CMA – Autoridade da Concorrência do Reino Unido
Autorité de la Concurrence – Autoridade da Concorrência da França
AdC -Autoridade da Concorrência de Portugal
CNMC – Autoridade Concorrência da Espanha
CNDC – Autoridade Concorrência da Argentina
AGCM – Autoridade Concorrência da Itália
COFECE – Autoridade Concorrência do México
Publicado 27/02/2025 às 06h56 – Atualização em 27/02/2025 às 08h41
Operação foi concretizada pelas empresas antes da notificação da autoridade antitruste
Publicado em 26/02/2025 17h52 Atualizado em 26/02/2025 18h59
O Tribunal do Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (Cade) determinou, nesta quarta-feira (26/02), a notificação, em até 30 dias, de atos de concentração envolvendo a empresa Mais Distribuidora de Veículos e seu grupo econômico, Grupo Sinal.
A instauração do Procedimento Administrativo de Apuração de Ato de Concentração (Apac) foi motivada por denúncia encaminhada à Superintendência-Geral do Cade em 2019.
Ao ser questionado, o Grupo Sinal informou a ocorrência de catorze diferentes possíveis atos de concentração entre os anos de 2010 e 2020. Em sua maioria, as operações em questão diziam respeito à compra e venda de ativos tangíveis e intangíveis, envolvendo, entre outros, aquisição de estoques, mobiliário, representação comercial de marcas de veículos, entre outros.
Após análise, o conselheiro relator considerou que algumas destas operações não seriam de notificação obrigatória, motivo pelo qual não se justificaria seu conhecimento em sede de análise de estruturas. Todavia, algumas das operações relatadas foram consideradas de notificação obrigatória. Em razão disto, determinou-se sua respectiva notificação no prazo de 30 (trinta) dias da publicação no DOU da ata da sessão de julgamento.
Conforme estabelecido pelo conselheiro relator, Carlos Jaques, o descumprimento da determinação de notificação sujeitará a cada uma das partes uma multa individual de R$ 5 mil por dia de atraso, para cada uma das operações que deixe de ser notificada no prazo determinado.
Neste contexto, o Plenário, por unanimidade, acompanhou todas as determinações apresentadas pelo conselheiro relator e determinou a suspensão da sanção pecuniária de que trata o § 3 do artigo 88, da Lei 12.529/11 até que haja decisão de mérito dos atos de concentração do caso.
Operação não apresenta risco à concorrência e busca estimular a competitividade no setor de compras on-line
Publicado em 26/02/2025 12h10 Atualizado em 26/02/2025 18h56
OTribunal do Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (Cade) aprovou, sem restrições, a aquisição de participação societária da Shopper pelo iFood. A decisão foi unânime e seguiu o voto do relator, conselheiro José Levi, durante sessão de julgamento nesta quarta-feira (26/2).
O iFood, empresa brasileira que atua como plataforma de delivery on-line, conectando consumidores a restaurantes, farmácias, mercados e outros setores, pretende utilizar sua experiência para impulsionar o crescimento da Shopper. A Shopper, por sua vez, é uma plataforma que oferece diretamente itens de mercado para consumidores finais em 129 cidades de São Paulo.
A operação tem como principais objetivos fortalecer a concorrência, expandir a presença da Shopper no mercado e complementar o modelo de negócios do iFood. Segundo as empresas, a aquisição pode trazer benefícios aos consumidores e estimular a competitividade no setor de compras on-line.
O plenário do Cade concluiu que a transação não apresenta riscos à concorrência, pois envolve apenas a aquisição de uma participação minoritária, pelo IFood, e a Shopper ainda tem uma atuação relativamente restrita ao estado de São Paulo.
O ato de concentração pode ser acessado pelo número 08700.008386/2024-06
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The European Commission has approved unconditionally, under the EU Merger Regulation, the proposed acquisition of Infinera Corporation (‘Infinera‘) by Nokia Corporation (‘Nokia‘). The Commission concluded that the transaction would raise no competition concerns in the European Economic Area (‘EEA’).
The Commission’s investigation
Both Nokia and Infinera supply optical transport equipment used to transmit data through optical fibre cables. According to the parties, the Transaction will allow the merged entity to attain the requisite scale in its optical networking business to accelerate its product roadmap and compete more vigorously with larger competitors in the market.
The Commission investigated the impact of the transaction on the global or EEA markets for the supply of optical transport equipment, as well as on the narrower segments of such markets based on the type/application of the equipment. Based on its market investigation, the Commission found that Nokia and Infinera’s combined market shares in the global or EEA markets for the supply of optical transport equipment, as well as on the narrower segments of such markets, are moderate. It also found that there are several credible competitors on those markets that, following the transaction, will continue to exert sufficient competitive pressure upon Nokia.
The Commission therefore concluded that the proposed acquisition would not raise competition concerns in the EEA and cleared the transaction unconditionally.
Companies and products
Nokia is a publicly traded company headquartered in Finland. It is active globally in a wide range of areas including network infrastructure, mobile networks, cloud & network services and technologies.
Infinera is a publicly traded company headquartered in the US. It is a global supplier of networking solutions, comprising networking equipment, optical semiconductors, software and services.
Merger control rules and procedure
The Commission has the duty to assess mergers and acquisitions involving companies with a turnover above certain thresholds (see Article 1 of the EU Merger Regulation) and to prevent concentrations that would significantly impede effective competition in the European Economic Area or any substantial part of it.
The vast majority of notified mergers do not pose competition problems and are cleared after a routine review. From the moment a transaction is notified, the Commission generally has 25 working days to decide whether to grant approval (Phase I) or to start an in-depth investigation (Phase II).
For More Information
More information will be available on the Commission’s competition website, in the public case register under the case number M.11663.
Commission approves acquisition of Infinera by Nokia
English
Se trata del nuevo valor aplicable a la unidad de cuenta prevista en el artículo 85 de la Ley 27.442 de Defensa de la Competencia y su decreto reglamentario
26 de febrero de 2025
En virtud de lo dispuesto por el artículo 85 de la Ley 27.442 de Defensa de la Competencia y conforme lo establecido por el mismo artículo del Decreto 480/2018, la Secretaría de Industria y Comercio dictó la Resolución 21/2025 actualizando el valor de la Unidad Móvil a partir del 26 de febrero de 2025, que se estableció en mil ciento dos pesos con veintiocho centavos ($ 1102,28).
Guidance
Published 26 February 2025
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From 24 February 2025, the new Procurement Act 2023 strengthens rules to exclude suppliers from taking part in public procurement where they pose particular risks. Changes include a new mandatory exclusion ground for participants in cartel activity, a discretionary exclusion ground for potential competition infringements and the introduction of a central debarment register.
The new exclusion and debarment regime has consequences for cartelists. Suppliers who break competition law risk mandatory exclusion from individual public procurements by a contracting authority. They are also at risk of being added to the new central debarment list, resulting in automatic exclusion from all public procurement contracts for up to 5 years.
There is now an increased incentive for suppliers involved in cartel activity to be the first to report the wrongdoing to the CMA: those first to report under the CMA’s leniency policy can avoid exclusion and debarment.
If you are a supplier that tenders for public sector contracts or a contracting authority that runs tender procedures, the new exclusions and debarment regime is relevant to you.
Refers to a supplier not being permitted to participate in a tender, or to be awarded a public contract, following an assessment of exclusion grounds by a contracting authority.
A supplier may be placed on a central debarment list by a Minister of the Crown. This will prevent the supplier from participating in any covered procurements (for example, those over a designated threshold for the type of contract and not exempted) or being awarded public contracts for up to 5 years. The list will be managed by the Procurement Review Unit (PRU) and published on GOV.UK.
Debarment is linked to exclusions in that a supplier can only be considered for debarment following an assessment of exclusion grounds.
There are 2 types of competition exclusions that can occur under the new Procurement Act: mandatory (Schedule 6 of the Act) and discretionary (Schedule 7 of the Act).
If a supplier falls within the mandatory exclusion ground or is on the debarment register for a mandatory exclusion ground, contracting authorities must exclude it from a procurement.
If a supplier falls within a discretionary exclusion or is on the debarment register for a discretionary exclusion ground, contracting authorities may exclude it from a procurement.
Suppliers should note that they may be excluded from public procurement contracts if an exclusion ground applies to a ‘connected’ or ‘associated’ person. This can include directors, parent or subsidiary companies, and key sub-contractors.
A supplier will not be excluded, either on a mandatory or discretionary basis, if it is an immunity recipient or an individual who is immune from prosecution for cartel conduct. This applies to all leniency recipients that benefit from a 100% reduction in a fine.
In addition, suppliers who have engaged in cartel activity, but do not benefit from immunity, may avoid exclusion or debarment on competition law grounds if they can demonstrate that they have ‘self-cleaned’.
Determining whether the mandatory or discretionary competition exclusions apply to a supplier requires an assessment of whether the circumstances giving rise to the exclusion ground are continuing or likely to occur again. This involves an assessment of whether the supplier has ‘self-cleaned’. The Procurement Act sets out a number of factors a contracting authority or Minister can take into account when assessing whether a supplier has self-cleaned (in Section 58) and include:
Applying for and being granted leniency and/or entering into a settlement agreement with the CMA under the Competition Act 1998 may be relevant evidence that a supplier can introduce to demonstrate that it has taken the circumstances giving rise to the application of an exclusion ground seriously for the purposes of the self-cleaning assessment.
For suppliers, the best way to avoid exclusion or debarment on competition grounds is to understand and remain compliant with competition law. Read our compliance advice on our Cheating or Competing campaign page and share compliance materials with all staff.
However, if you realise you have been involved in cartel activity which breaks competition law, there are steps you can take:
If a supplier is the first to report cartel activity to the CMA and is granted a 100% discount on any financial penalty under the CMA’s leniency policy, it will not be excluded from public procurement or appear on the central debarment list
Before deciding whether a supplier should be excluded, the contracting authority must give the supplier a reasonable opportunity to provide evidence to demonstrate that it has ‘self-cleaned’ – as noted above, if applicable, a supplier may want to provide evidence of being granted leniency and/or entering into a settlement agreement with the CMA as these may be relevant evidence for the purposes of the self-cleaning assessment
The new regime applies to all contracting authorities in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland, but not in Scotland. It is however applicable to suppliers which operate and/or are incorporated in Scotland. From 24 February 2025, prior to awarding public contracts, contracting authorities must determine whether exclusions apply to potential suppliers including assessing if a supplier has ‘self-cleaned’. To help them with that assessment, contracting authorities can:
It is for a contracting authority to determine whether an exclusion applies to a particular supplier. However, the CMA can help in a number of ways. Contracting authorities can contact the CMA by emailing cma_procurementsupport@cma.gov.uk to:
Contracting authorities can also reduce bid-rigging risk by following the CMA’s bid-rigging advice for public sector procurers. If you suspect bid-rigging or would like a free CMA teach-in on bid-rigging red flags, please contact us by emailing cma_procurementsupport@cma.gov.uk.
Anti-competitive behaviour can take many forms, such as abusing a dominant market position, colluding with other businesses to fix prices or rig bids or restricting how much other businesses can sell your product for.
Public sector procurement is particularly vulnerable to bid-rigging which can, on average, increase costs by 20% or more and prevent honest businesses from competing on a level playing field.
How to watch this YouTube videoThere’s a YouTube video on this page. You can’t access it because of your cookie settings.You can change your cookie settings or watch the video on YouTube instead:Bid rigging: cheating or competing? UK’s Competition and Markets Authority
The CMA has advanced data science capabilities to help spot suspicious bidding patterns in public sector procurement, as well as robust investigative powers at our disposal.
The risk of getting caught breaking competition law is, therefore, high, and the consequences are serious including big fines for companies and for individuals, director disqualification (up to 15 years) and in most serious criminal cases – prison (up to 5 years). Now, under the new regime, there is also the additional risk of exclusion and debarment from public sector frameworks.
If you witness or suspect another business breaking the law:
If you’ve been involved:
If you want to know more:
Partes: Mercantil do Brasil Marketplace e Empreendimentos Imobiliários S.A. e Agência Estado S.A. Aaprovação sem restrições.
Requerentes: JBS Holding Brasil S.A. e Mantiqueira Alimentos Ltda. Adprovação sem restrições.
Requerentes: Via Appia Concessões S.A., Castello Fund SCSp, SICAV-RAIF, Castello Global Alpha e Concessionária Rodovias do Tietê S.A. Aprovação sem restrições.
Partes: Dubai Aerospace Enterprise (DAE) Ltd e Nordic Aviation Capital Designated Activity Company. Aprovação sem restrições.
Requerentes: Nova Marinas S.A., BR Marinas S.A., Angramar Administradora de Bens Ltda. e Glamis Fundo de Investimento em Participações Multiestratégia. Aprovação sem restrições.
Merger
Last decision date: 26.02.2025 Simplified procedure
Merger
Last decision date: 26.02.2025
Secteur(s) :
Décision de contrôle des concentrations|
Publication du sens de la décision le : 26 février 2025
Secteur(s) :
Décision de contrôle des concentrations|
Publication du sens de la décision le : 26 février 2025
https://webadvocacy.com.br/category/clipping-da-concorrencia
CADE – Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica
FTC – Federal Trade Commission
USDOJ – Departamento de Justiça dos EUA
Comissão Europeia – Responsável pela política da concorrência na Europa
CMA – Autoridade da Concorrência do Reino Unido
Autorité de la Concurrence – Autoridade da Concorrência da França
AdC -Autoridade da Concorrência de Portugal
CNMC – Autoridade Concorrência da Espanha
CNDC – Autoridade Concorrência da Argentina
AGCM – Autoridade Concorrência da Itália
COFECE – Autoridade Concorrência do México
Sector: Nota de prensa
Ámbito CNMC: Competencia
La Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia (CNMC) ha acordado, con fecha 7 de febrero de 2025, el inicio de la segunda fase del análisis de la concentración Esseco / Ercros (C/1479/24).
La operación consiste en la adquisición del control exclusivo de Ercros por parte de Esseco a través de una oferta pública de adquisición (OPA) hostil que fue presentada el 27 de junio de 2024.
El sector económico afectado es el de la fabricación de productos básicos de química orgánica e inorgánica, en especial los mercados de comercialización de hidróxido de potasio, en estado sólido y líquido, y de carbonato de potasio, en los que se solapa la actividad de las partes.
La potencial adquisición puede suponer riesgos para la competencia en dichos mercados. Por ello, la CNMC ha acordado analizar la operación en segunda fase. Este paso no prejuzga las conclusiones definitivas que la CNMC pueda alcanzar sobre la concentración.
Apertura de la segunda fase
Durante la primera fase, la CNMC ha investigado la situación de competencia en los mercados afectados, en los que las cuotas de las partes son muy elevadas.
En segunda fase analizará en mayor profundidad la operación y, en particular, los mercados afectados de hidróxido de potasio, en estado sólido y líquido, y de carbonato de potasio.
Ercros y otros terceros con interés legítimo podrán presentar alegaciones. Esseco, por su parte, también podrá formular alegaciones y aportar más información.
La resolución final que apruebe la CNMC podrá autorizar, aceptar compromisos, imponer condiciones o prohibir la operación de concentración Esseco / Ercros.
Documento no oficial, destinado a los medios de comunicación, y que no vincula a la CNMC. Reproducción permitida solo si se cita la fuente.
PRESS RELEASE
The proceedings concerns the alleged failure to comply with the targets concerning the frequency and quality of services for 2021-2023.
The Italian Competition Authority has launched an investigation against Atac S.p.A. over a suspected unfair commercial practice. The investigation concerns the frequency and quality of services offered in the 2021-2023 period compared to what was established in the service contract with the Municipality of Rome and presented to consumers also through the Public Transport Service Quality Charter. Specifically, Atac seems to have repeatedly fallen short of its targets regarding the regularity of surface and metro transport services, security checkpoints in metro stations, the functioning of elevators, stairlifts, and escalators/moving walkways, as well as metro station lighting.
Faced with these seemingly unfulfilled targets, Atac does not appear to have taken adequate corrective measures to address its repeated shortcomings, nor has it adjusted and/or partially reimbursed fares to mitigate potential disruptions experienced by consumers. An inspection at the premises of the company Atac S.p.A. was carried out yesterday by the Authority’s officials, with the support of the Special Antitrust Unit of the Italian Financial Police (Guardia di Finanza).
Rome, 25 February 2025
press releases 24.02.2025
published on:24.02.2025
The Bundeskartellamt has cleared the indirect acquisition of Uckermärker Milch GmbH (Uckermärker), a subsidiary of Ostmilch Handels GmbH, by EDEKA ZENTRALE Stiftung & Co. KG (EDEKA).
Andreas Mundt, President of the Bundeskartellamt: “The Bundeskartellamt always takes a very close look when food producers are acquired by large food retailers. Our task is to ensure that such acquisitions do not lead to market foreclosure to the detriment of other producers or retailers. In this case, however, there is no reason to believe that this will happen. EDEKA has so far not been involved in the production of dairy products and Uckermärker only has relatively small market shares in the different markets for raw milk, butter, curd and milk powder. There are many larger dairy companies in Germany, leaving both the retailers and the different dairy companies with sufficient alternatives even after the merger.
”
Uckermärker operates a dairy in Prenzlau in the northern part of Brandenburg. Most of the raw milk it uses to make its products comes from farms in the Uckermark region. The company’s products include butter, curd and milk powder.
The EDEKA group is the leading food retailer in Germany, with a turnover of more than 70 billion euros in 2023. The group has a three-tier structure consisting of the EDEKA Zentrale in Hamburg, the regional companies and regional EDEKA cooperatives, and the approximately 3,400 independent retailers throughout Germany belonging to the regional cooperatives. The Bundeskartellamt regards the EDEKA group as a single economic entity (see the press releases of 15 May 2024 and 2 December 2024). The EDEKA group’s operations also include EDEKA Fruchtkontor (specialising in fruit, vegetables and flowers), a winery, its own meat factories and bakeries, a pasta factory and its own juice production. All of its products are mainly produced for sale in the group’s own bakery shops and food retail stores. EDEKA has so far not been active in the production of dairy products.
Secteur(s) :
Décision de contrôle des concentrations|
Publication du sens de la décision le : 26 février 2025
Secteur(s) :
Décision de contrôle des concentrations|
Publication du sens de la décision le : 25 février 2025
Secteur(s) :
Décision de contrôle des concentrations|
Publication du sens de la décision le : 25 février 2025
Em 24 de Fevereiro de 2025, o Conselho de Administração da Autoridade da Concorrência, no uso da competência que lhe é conferida pela alínea d) do n.º 1 do artigo 19.º dos Estatutos, aprovados pelo Decreto-Lei n.º 125/2014, de 18 de agosto, delibera adotar uma decisão de não oposição à operação de concentração, nos termos da alínea b) do n.º 1 do artigo 50.º da Lei da Concorrência, uma vez que a mesma não é suscetível de criar entraves significativos à concorrência efetiva no mercado nacional ou numa parte substancial deste.
https://webadvocacy.com.br/category/clipping-da-concorrencia
CADE – Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica
FTC – Federal Trade Commission
USDOJ – Departamento de Justiça dos EUA
Comissão Europeia – Responsável pela política da concorrência na Europa
CMA – Autoridade da Concorrência do Reino Unido
Autorité de la Concurrence – Autoridade da Concorrência da França
AdC -Autoridade da Concorrência de Portugal
CNMC – Autoridade Concorrência da Espanha
CNDC – Autoridade Concorrência da Argentina
AGCM – Autoridade Concorrência da Itália
COFECE – Autoridade Concorrência do México
Sector: Nota de prensa
Ámbito CNMC: Competencia
La Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia (CNMC) ha acordado, con fecha 7 de febrero de 2025, el inicio de la segunda fase del análisis de la concentración Esseco / Ercros (C/1479/24).
La operación consiste en la adquisición del control exclusivo de Ercros por parte de Esseco a través de una oferta pública de adquisición (OPA) hostil que fue presentada el 27 de junio de 2024.
El sector económico afectado es el de la fabricación de productos básicos de química orgánica e inorgánica, en especial los mercados de comercialización de hidróxido de potasio, en estado sólido y líquido, y de carbonato de potasio, en los que se solapa la actividad de las partes.
La potencial adquisición puede suponer riesgos para la competencia en dichos mercados. Por ello, la CNMC ha acordado analizar la operación en segunda fase. Este paso no prejuzga las conclusiones definitivas que la CNMC pueda alcanzar sobre la concentración.
Apertura de la segunda fase
Durante la primera fase, la CNMC ha investigado la situación de competencia en los mercados afectados, en los que las cuotas de las partes son muy elevadas.
En segunda fase analizará en mayor profundidad la operación y, en particular, los mercados afectados de hidróxido de potasio, en estado sólido y líquido, y de carbonato de potasio.
Ercros y otros terceros con interés legítimo podrán presentar alegaciones. Esseco, por su parte, también podrá formular alegaciones y aportar más información.
La resolución final que apruebe la CNMC podrá autorizar, aceptar compromisos, imponer condiciones o prohibir la operación de concentración Esseco / Ercros.
Documento no oficial, destinado a los medios de comunicación, y que no vincula a la CNMC. Reproducción permitida solo si se cita la fuente.
Requerentes: NXP B.V. e TTTechAuto AG. Aprovação sem restrições.
Partes: Eduardo José Giaretta, Benton Connor Kirk, Campo Rico USA, LCC, Fertitex Agro – Fertilizantes e Produtos Agropecuários Ltda., Campo Rico Brasil Comércio de Fertilizantes S.A., 2KS Empreendimentos S.A., RSS Ag Products LLC e Sipal Indústria e Comércio Ltda. Aprovação sem restrições.
Requerentes: Salus – Fundo de Investimento em Participações Multiestratégia, Ventos de São Carlos Energias Renováveis S.A. e Ventos de Santa Bibiana Energias Renováveis S.A.. provação sem restrições.
Requerentes: Via Appia Concessões S.A. e Concessionária Rodovias do Tietê S.A. Aprovação sem restrições.
Partes: Vicunha Têxtil S.A.,Enel Green Power Ventos de São Roque 01 S.A., Enel Green Power Ventos de São Roque 02 S.A., Enel Green Power Ventos de São Roque 04 S.A., Enel Green Power Ventos de São Roque 11 S.A. e Enel Green Power Ventos de São Roque 16 S.A. Aprovação sem restrições.
Requerentes: Cix Citizen Experience S.A., Ceará Participações Societária S.A. e Ceará Serviços de Atendimento ao Cidadão S.A. Aprovação sem restrições.
Requerentes: COMPANHIA ULTRAGAZ S.A. e SUPERGASBRAS ENERGIA LTDA.
Peticionante: QUEIROZ PARTICIPAÇÕES S.A.
Com fulcro no §1º do art. 50 da Lei nº 9.784, de 1999, integro as razões da Notas Técnica nº 12/2025/CGAA4/SGA1/SG/CADE (SEI 1518735) à presente decisão, inclusive como suas motivações. Pelos fundamentos apontados na Notas Técnica citada, decido pelo deferimento do pedido de intervenção como terceiro interessado formulado pela QUEIROZ PARTICIPAÇÕES S.A. (“GEQ”), nos termos do art. 50, I, da Lei nº 12.529/2011.
Requerentes: Interlagos Shopping Center Comercial Ltda., Savimóvel Comercial e Imóveis Ltda., Novo Centro Comercial R P Ltda., Centerleste Empreendimentos Comerciais Ltda., São Marcos Empreendimentos Imobiliários S.A. e Ancar Ivanhoe Shopping Centers – Fundo de Investimento em Participações Multiestratégia. Aprovação sem restrições.
Partes: Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional e Estrela Comércio e Participações S.A. Aprovação sem restrições.
Requerentes: Banco Safra S.A. e J. Safra Holding S.A. Decido pelo não conhecimento da operação.
Merger
Last decision date: 24.02.2025 Simplified procedure
Merger
Last decision date: 24.02.2025 Super simplified procedure
Merger
Last decision date: 24.02.2025 Simplified procedure
Em 24 de Fevereiro de 2025, o Conselho de Administração da Autoridade da Concorrência, no uso da competência que lhe é conferida pela alínea d) do n.º 1 do artigo 19.º dos Estatutos, aprovados pelo Decreto-Lei n.º 125/2014, de 18 de agosto, delibera adotar uma decisão de não oposição à operação de concentração, nos termos da alínea b) do n.º 1 do artigo 50.º da Lei da Concorrência, uma vez que a mesma não é suscetível de criar entraves significativos à concorrência efetiva no mercado nacional ou numa parte substancial deste.
Em 24 de Fevereiro de 2025, o Conselho de Administração da Autoridade da Concorrência, no uso da competência que lhe é conferida pela alínea d) do n.º 1 do artigo 19.º dos Estatutos, aprovados pelo Decreto-Lei n.º 125/2014, de 18 de agosto, delibera adotar uma decisão de não oposição à operação de concentração, nos termos da alínea b) do n.º 1 do artigo 50.º da Lei da Concorrência, uma vez que a mesma não é suscetível de criar entraves significativos à concorrência efetiva no mercado nacional ou numa parte substancial deste.
20250224_Press_release_9_BCA_0.pdf
https://webadvocacy.com.br/category/clipping-da-concorrencia
CADE – Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica
FTC – Federal Trade Commission
USDOJ – Departamento de Justiça dos EUA
Comissão Europeia – Responsável pela política da concorrência na Europa
CMA – Autoridade da Concorrência do Reino Unido
Autorité de la Concurrence – Autoridade da Concorrência da França
AdC -Autoridade da Concorrência de Portugal
CNMC – Autoridade Concorrência da Espanha
CNDC – Autoridade Concorrência da Argentina
AGCM – Autoridade Concorrência da Itália
COFECE – Autoridade Concorrência do México
PRESS RELEASE
The investigations focus on the information provided to consumers regarding EV driving range, battery capacity degradation and limitations on standard battery warranties.
The Italian Competition Authority has launched four investigations into BYD Industria Italia s.r.l., Stellantis Europe S.p.A., Tesla Italy s.r.l. and Volkswagen Group Italia S.p.A. over suspected unfair commercial practices. The investigations look into the information provided to consumers on EV driving range, battery capacity degradation and limitations on standard battery warranties, potentially in breach of the Consumer Code.
In particular, the companies’ websites appear to have displayed generic – and at times contradictory – information regarding the driving range of their marketed electric vehicles, without clarifying which factors impact the advertised maximum range and the extent to which they affect the actual range.
Moreover, it seems that the companies’ websites failed to provide consumers with clear and complete information on battery capacity degradation resulting from normal vehicle use, and on the terms/limitations applied to the standard battery warranty.
An inspection at the premises of the companies BYD Industria Italia s.r.l., Stellantis Europe S.p.A., Tesla Italy s.r.l. and Volkswagen Group Italia S.p.A. was carried out yesterday by the Authority’s officials, assisted by the Special Antitrust Unit of the Italian Financial Police (Guardia di Finanza).
Rome, 21 February 2025
press releases 19.02.2025
published on:19.02.2025
Risks due to price assessments – Limited alternative options for regional ex-refinery fuel procurement – Very frequent price changes at petrol stations.
The Bundeskartellamt has today concluded its sector inquiry into the refining and wholesale of fuels with a comprehensive final report. In its report, the Bundeskartellamt explains the structures and pricing mechanisms at these market levels of the mineral oil sector and identifies parameters which can be adjusted to strengthen competition. The Bundeskartellamt also looked at the effects of the frequent changes in fuel prices charged at petrol stations.
Andreas Mundt, President of the Bundeskartellamt: “The inquiry has once again shown that the conditions for effective competition in the German mineral oil sector are difficult. Germany is highly dependent on crude oil imports, the markets are characterised by vertical integration and interdependences between oil companies, and market transparency is high at all levels of the value chain.
The last amendment to the German Competition Act has equipped us with a new tool to take action in markets affected by a considerable malfunctioning of competition. Based on our inquiry, we have found indications of such a malfunctioning in the markets for the wholesale of fuels and we will examine whether to open proceedings, especially to analyse the risks associated with the price assessments widely used in the industry.
”
The effect of price assessments on pricing
The inquiry has found that price assessments play an important part in pricing at several levels of the value chain. Already at international level crude oil sales are usually based on such price assessments. After the oil has been processed in refineries, the oil products are sold on wholesale markets mainly on the basis of long-term supply contracts (term contracts); the volumes traded on the spot market are much smaller. In most cases, the pricing of mineral oil products in term contracts is also based on price assessments; prices are calculated using the latest price assessment value at the contractually agreed time, for example the time of delivery.
The price assessments used in Germany are largely published by two price assessment providers that offer price assessments as a paid service to the industry. They base their calculations on the latest reports and information provided by market players and usually publish their daily price assessments at the end of the trading day. In some cases they also provide sensitive market information, such as on specific transactions. As a result of the inquiry, the Bundeskartellamt has gained insights into how price assessments are compiled and how these price assessment systems affect the industry.
Andreas Mundt: “While we do not consider price assessments to be categorically anti-competitive, we have found that the way they are currently compiled poses considerable risks to competition. One is that the publication of very detailed market information creates additional transparency as to the pricing behaviour of individual competitors. This increases the risk of collusion, meaning the risk that market players could tacitly agree on a price level above the one that would have evolved in a competitive environment. In addition, there is a risk that individual market players may manipulate price assessments to their advantage, for example by selectively reporting data
.”
The Bundeskartellamt’s final report also recommends that a stricter legal framework be introduced for price assessments in the mineral oil sector and proposes that the IOSCO Principles for Oil Price Reporting Agencies be revised.
Limited alternative options for regional procurement
The trade flow analysis has shown that commercial buyers of fuels and heating oil often depend on suppliers in their region. The mineral oil products produced in Germany or imported into Germany are sold either directly ex refinery or through wholesalers. Due to high transport costs and capacity constraints, it is often uneconomical to procure oil products from more distant suppliers, making it necessary to transport them over larger distances. While tank farms are used by market players for regional distribution and intermediate storage, the inquiry has shown that they are irrelevant when it comes to pricing. With only a small number of relevant fuel and heating oil suppliers in most regions, the options for traders to switch to alternative suppliers are often limited.
Increasingly frequent price changes at petrol stations
The number of price changes at petrol stations over the course of a day has continuously increased in recent years. While prices were changed around four to five times a day in 2014, the number of price changes already reached an average of 18 times a day in early 2024 and is still on the rise. The analysis of sales data provided by individual petrol stations indicated that motorists are now less likely to succeed in refuelling during so-called “price dips” than in the past.
The Bundeskartellamt’s president, Andreas Mundt: “The frequent price changes at petrol stations are making it harder and harder for consumers to compare prices using data from our Market Transparency Unit for Fuels and to adjust their refuelling behaviour to save money
.”
The Bundeskartellamt therefore suggests that the effects of the frequent price changes at petrol stations be further examined. Based on these examinations, adequate regulatory steps could then also be considered.
Background
The sector inquiry was launched in response to the fuel price developments immediately following Russia’s attack on Ukraine in February 2022. The subsequent sharp rise in prices, which were at times decoupled from the price of crude oil, was analysed in an interim report published at the end of 2022. The report looked at the production and cost-related conditions which caused the fluctuations in prices and at how the refineries’ capacities developed. The interim report also examined the extent to which the three-month tax cut on fuels introduced in summer 2022 had been passed on to consumers (the interim report (in German only) is available here).
The final report presented today is the result of the inquiry’s second phase. Taking a broader approach, it focused on the supply streams, contractual terms and pricing structures involved in fuel trading in Germany. For this purpose, the Bundeskartellamt had asked not only tank farm operators, wholesalers and petrol stations to provide information, but also price assessment providers.
The full final report (in German only) is available here; a summary is available here.
News 20.02.2025
published on:20.02.2025
The Bundeskartellamt has discontinued its proceedings examining the takeover of JenaValve Technology Inc. (in the following JenaValve) by Edwards Lifesciences Corporation (in the following Edwards), which was notified in September 2024. The proposed transaction was not subject to notification under merger control. The Bundeskartellamt’s examination has shown that the national notification thresholds were not met in this case. The transaction could have been subject to merger control in Germany under the so-called transaction value threshold as the value of the consideration for the takeover exceeded 400 million euros. However, another requirement for a transaction to be notifiable under the value threshold is that the target company already has substantial operations in Germany at the time of the acquisition. The investigations have shown that this was not the case for JenaValve. As a consequence, the Bundeskartellamt discontinued its proceedings.
JenaValve produces a new type of heart valve to treat patients with aortic regurgitation (AR). Edwards is a global leader in medical innovations for structural heart disease.
Requerentes: Vale S.A. e Itaminas Comércio de Minério S.A. Aprovação sem restrições.
Requerentes: Tratorcase Máquinas Agrícolas S/A e Hwill – Peças para Tratores Ltda. não conhecimento da operação.
Tipo de Processo: Ato de Concentração Ordinário
Requerentes: Allpark Empreendimentos, Participações e Serviços S.A. e Top Center Fundo de Investimento Imobiliário
Arquivamento do presente Ato de Concentração, sem análise de mérito.
Requerentes: Premiere Distribuidora de Veículos Ltda., Saga France Comércio de Veículos, Peças e Serviços Ltda., Saga Paris Comércio de Veículos, Peças e Serviços Ltda. Aprovação sem restrições.
Secteur(s) :
Décision de contrôle des concentrations|
Publication du sens de la décision le : 21 février 2025
https://webadvocacy.com.br/category/clipping-da-concorrencia
CADE – Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica
FTC – Federal Trade Commission
USDOJ – Departamento de Justiça dos EUA
Comissão Europeia – Responsável pela política da concorrência na Europa
CMA – Autoridade da Concorrência do Reino Unido
Autorité de la Concurrence – Autoridade da Concorrência da França
AdC -Autoridade da Concorrência de Portugal
CNMC – Autoridade Concorrência da Espanha
CNDC – Autoridade Concorrência da Argentina
AGCM – Autoridade Concorrência da Itália
COFECE – Autoridade Concorrência do México
Debate reuniu empresas, especialistas e sociedade para discutir questões concorrenciais em mercados digitais relacionados aos sistemas operacionais iOS e Android.
Publicado em 20/02/2025 09h24 Atualizado em 20/02/2025 14h49
O Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (Cade) realizou nesta quarta-feira (19/2) audiência pública para discutir os ecossistemas digitais relacionados aos sistemas operacionais iOS e Android.
O evento contou com a presença de autoridades do poder público, representantes do setor empresarial, sociedade civil e academia, com o objetivo de debater as questões concorrenciais envolvendo os sistemas operacionais iOS, da Apple, e Android, do Google, e suas respectivas lojas de aplicativos, a App Store e o Google Play.
A audiência foi dividida em diversas etapas, começando com a mesa de abertura. O presidente do Cade, Alexandre Cordeiro, destacou a importância da análise aprofundada do tema. “Estamos em um momento de discussão sobre regulação da economia digital. A ideia desse encontro é ‘jogar um pouco de luz’ nessa discussão, diminuindo a assimetria de informações para que a autoridade concorrencial possa, dentro de seus casos, tomar a decisão que maximize a utilização da sociedade de uma maneira geral”, afirmou.
A secretária Nacional de Direitos Digitais do Ministério da Justiça, Lílian Cintra, definiu o encontro como uma “abertura para a inovação”, declarando que o caráter é desafiador dos mercados digitais, amplamente discutido em diversas frentes, com o objetivo de promover seu aperfeiçoamento. “As informações trazidas aqui serão úteis para que o Cade, que sempre teve um perfil aberto ao diálogo, possa avançar nessa frente de trabalho”, disse.
Na mesa, também estavam presentes o superintendente-geral do Cade, Alexandre Barreto, o procurador-chefe do Cade, André Freire, os conselheiros Diogo Thomson, Victor Fernandes, José Levi e Camila Pires-Alves, além do advogado Guilherme Guimarães, membro da Advocacia-Geral da União (AGU), e Carlos Almeida, representante do Banco Central do Brasil (Bacen).
No segundo bloco da audiência, representantes do setor empresarial realizaram manifestações orais: Apple Inc., Google Inc., Epic Games Inc., Match Group Inc., Zetta, Coalition for App Fairness, Associação Brasileira de Internet (ABRANET) e FS Security. Em seguida, manifestaram-se representantes da sociedade civil e academia, com intervenções das organizações Coalizão Direitos na Rede (CDR), Artigo 19, Proteste | Euroconsumers-Brasil, Instituto de Defesa de Consumidores (IDEC), Data Privacy, Sleeping Giants Brasil, Núcleo de Estudos E-Commerce e Centro de Tecnologia e Sociedade da FGV Direito Rio e também de pesquisadores da Comissão Europeia (Centro de Pesquisa) e da Universidade de Glasgow. O encerramento contou com fala da Conselheira Camila Pires-Alves.
As contribuições recebidas serão incorporadas a um documento de trabalho, que, posteriormente, ficará disponível no site do Cade.
O debate está disponível no canal do Cade no YouTube, assista na íntegra!
Por Flávio Lacerda
Quatro casos serão apreciados durante a 243ª reunião do Tribunal Administrativo
Publicado em 20/02/2025 08h59 Atualizado em 20/02/2025 13h29
Foi publicada, no Diário Oficial da União desta quinta-feira (20/2), a pauta da próxima sessão de julgamento do Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (Cade). A 243ª Sessão Ordinária de Julgamento, que terá quatro casos apreciados pelo Tribunal, acontecerá no dia 26/2, às 10h, com transmissão pelo YouTube.
Confira a pauta de julgamento:
1. Ato de Concentração nº 08700.008386/2024-06
Requerentes: iFood Holdings B.V. e Shopper Holdings, LTD.
Relator: conselheiro José Levi
2. Procedimento Administrativo de Apuração de Ato de Concentração nº 08700.005460/2019-67
Representados: Mais Distribuidora de Veículos S.A., M&L Comércio de Veículos Automotores Ltda., Green Star Peças e Veículos Ltda., Geniali Distribuidora de Veículos Ltda., Etrusca Distribuidora de Veículos Ltda., United Auto São Paulo Comércio de Veículos Ltda., André Britto Novis e Christiana de Souza Ramos Novis, Soma Automóveis Ltda., Dijon Administradora de Imóveis Ltda., Strada Veículos e Peças Ltda., Roberto Luiz Faberge e Itavema France Veículos Ltda.
Relator: conselheiro Carlos Jacques
3. Processo Administrativo nº 08700.005876/2019-85
Representante: Secretaria de Estado da Educação – Governo do Estado de São Paulo.
Representados: Auto Viação Jauense Ltda., Mayfran Locação de Veículos e Transportes Ltda., New Hope Terceirização e Transportes Catanduva Ltda. e Viação Sudeste EIRELI.
Relatora: conselheira Camila Cabral
4. Embargos de Declaração no Processo Administrativo nº 08700.002124/2016-10
Representante: Associação Evangélica Beneficente Espírito Santense – AEBES.
Representados: Federação Brasileira das Cooperativas de Especialidades Médicas (Febracem), Cooperativa de Anestesiologia do Estado do Espírito Santo (COOPANEST/ES), Cooperativa dos Médicos Intensivistas do Espírito Santo (Cooperati), Cooperativa dos Cirurgiões Plásticos do Estado do Espirito Santo (Cooplastes), Cooperativa dos Cirurgiões Gerais do Estado do Espírito Santo (Cooperciges), Cooperativa dos Cirurgiões Pediátricos do Estado do Espírito Santo (Coopercipes), Cooperativa dos Cirurgiões Cardiovasculares do Estado do Espírito Santo (Coopcardio), Cooperativa dos Neurocirurgiões do Estado do Espírito Santo (Coopneuro), Cooperativa de Ortopedistas e Traumatologistas do Espírito Santo (Cootes), Cooperativa dos Angiologistas e Cirurgiões Vasculares do Espírito Santo (Coopangio), Conselho Regional de Medicina do Espírito Santo (CRM-ES), Sociedade Brasileira de Neurocirurgia (SBN), Erick Freitas Curi, Paulo Roberto Paiva, Modesto Cerioni Junior e Clemente Augusto de Brito Pereira.
Relator: conselheiro Gustavo Augusto
The CMA has issued five separate infringement decisions under the Competition Act 1998 after investigating suspected anti-competitive arrangements in relation to UK government bonds.
From: Competition and Markets Authority Published16 November 2018Last updated21 February 2025 — See all updates Case type: CA98 and civil cartels Case state: Open Market sector:Financial services Outcome: CA98 – infringement Chapter I Opened:13 November 2018
| Date | Action |
|---|---|
| 21 February 2025 | Infringement decisions issued to the parties and post-SO settlement announced |
| May 2023 | Statement of objections issued to the parties and pre-SO settlement announced |
| April 2022 to Spring 2023 | Investigation continuing |
| January 2021 to March 2022 | Investigation continuing, including further gathering and analysis of information and evidence |
| August 2019 to December 2020 | Initial investigation continuing, including review and analysis of information gathered |
| November 2018 to August 2019 | Initial investigation: information gathering, including issue of formal or informal information requests and responses |
| November 2018 | Investigation opened |
On 21 February 2025, the CMA issued five separate infringement decisions finding that 5 pairs of banks broke competition law by unlawfully sharing competitively sensitive information, and imposed fines totalling over £100 million.
The unlawful exchanges occurred in separate online Bloomberg chatrooms between individual traders at 2 banks at a time on various dates between 2009 to 2013.
The decisions are addressed (in alphabetical order) to: Citigroup Global Markets Limited and its ultimate parent company Citigroup Inc. (together ‘Citi’), Deutsche Bank Aktiengesellschaft (‘Deutsche Bank’), HSBC Bank Plc and its ultimate parent company HSBC Holdings Plc (together ‘HSBC’), Morgan Stanley & Co. International Plc and its ultimate parent company, Morgan Stanley (together ‘Morgan Stanley’) and RBC Europe Limited and its ultimate parent company Royal Bank of Canada (together ‘Royal Bank of Canada’).
Four banks – Citi, HSBC, Morgan Stanley and Royal Bank of Canada – have settled and agreed to pay fines totalling £104,460,000:
Deutsche Bank alerted the CMA to its participation in the unlawful conduct under the CMA’s leniency policy and benefits from immunity from any fine.
On 24 May 2023, the CMA issued a statement of objections provisionally finding that 5 major banks – Citi, Deutsche Bank, HSBC, Morgan Stanley and Royal Bank of Canada – broke competition law by each unlawfully sharing competitively sensitive information through one or more series of one-to-one conversations in chatrooms. The alleged conduct concerned the buying and selling of UK government bonds – specifically gilts and gilt asset swaps. These one-to-one conversations took place at varying times between 2009 and 2013.
The statement of objections is addressed to Citigroup Global Markets Limited and its ultimate parent company Citigroup Inc. (together ‘Citi’), Deutsche Bank Aktiengesellschaft (‘Deutsche Bank’), HSBC Bank Plc and its ultimate parent company HSBC Holdings Plc (together ‘HSBC’), Morgan Stanley & Co. International Plc and its ultimate parent company, Morgan Stanley (together ‘Morgan Stanley’) and RBC Europe Limited and its ultimate parent company Royal Bank of Canada (together ‘Royal Bank of Canada’).
Deutsche Bank alerted the CMA to its participation in the alleged unlawful behaviour under the CMA’s leniency policy, and Citi applied for leniency during the CMA’s investigation. Both banks have admitted their involvement in anti-competitive activity and providing they continue to cooperate and comply with the conditions of leniency, Deutsche Bank will not be fined and any fine that Citi receives will be discounted.
Citi has also entered into a settlement agreement with the CMA and providing it complies with the terms of settlement, will receive a further discount to any fine imposed.
HSBC, Morgan Stanley and Royal Bank of Canada have not admitted any wrongdoing.
The CMA’s findings are provisional. Parties have the opportunity to make representations on the matters set out in the statement of objections. At this stage, no assumption should be made that the banks have broken the law.
On 13 November 2018, the CMA launched an investigation into suspected anti-competitive arrangements in the financial services sector which may infringe the Chapter I prohibition of the Competition Act 1998 (CA98) and/or Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Following the end of the EU Exit Transition Period, the CMA’s investigation continues into suspected anti-competitive arrangements which may infringe the Chapter I prohibition of the CA98.
The CMA and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) have concurrent functions to enforce competition law infringements in the financial services sector. It has been agreed (pursuant to regulation 4 of the Competition Act 1998 (Concurrency) Regulations 2014) that the CMA will exercise those functions in relation to this investigation.
The investigation is ongoing and no assumption should be made at this point that competition law has been infringed. The CMA has not reached a view as to whether there is sufficient evidence of an infringement of competition law for it to issue a statement of objections to any of the parties under investigation. Not all cases result in the CMA issuing a statement of objections. Further detail of the CMA’s procedures in CA98 cases is available in our guidance.
As a result, it would not be appropriate to include any further estimates of the timing of any later investigative steps at this stage.
The CMA may collect, use and share personal data for its investigations, including investigations under the Competition Act 1998. This includes processing personal data for the purposes of the UK General Data Protection Regulation and the Data Protection Act 2018.
You can find more information about how the CMA handles personal information in the CMA’s Personal Information Charter.
020 3738 6460, press@cma.gov.uk
Juliette Enser (020 3738 6857, juliette.enser@cma.gov.uk)
Tamara Todorovic (020 3738 6598, tamara.todorovic@cma.gov.uk)
Kate Houston (020 3738 6482, kate.houston@cma.gov.uk)
Nicholas Scola (02037386931, nicholas.scola@cma.gov.uk)
Published 16 November 2018
Last updated 21 February 2025 + show all updates
Banks agree to pay fines for past exchanges of sensitive information about UK government bonds.
From: Competition and Markets Authority Published21 February 2025
Gilts are an important type of UK government bond that help to finance public spending. Investors in gilts lend money to the UK government and in return receive a steady and stable stream of cash interest payments.
Healthy competition drives investment, innovation and growth, and it is important that competitors decide their price and strategies independently in order to ensure effective competition in a market.
Following an investigation by the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), the banks have agreed to pay fines for specific instances in which traders shared competitively sensitive information about aspects of the pricing of UK bonds. The sharing of information occurred in one-to-one exchanges between traders about the buying and selling of gilts and gilt asset swaps.
This conduct took place on various dates between 2009-2013, with the last exchanges occurring in 2010 for HSBC, 2012 for Morgan Stanley, and 2013 for each of Citi, Deutsche Bank and Royal Bank of Canada. Since then, the banks have implemented extensive compliance measures to ensure this behaviour does not happen again.
Juliette Enser, Executive Director of Competition Enforcement at the CMA, said:
Following constructive engagement between the banks and the CMA, we are pleased that we have been able to settle these 5 cases involving the past sharing of competitively sensitive information about pricing.
The financial services sector is an integral part of the UK economy, contributing billions every year, and it’s essential that it functions effectively. Only through healthy and competitive markets can we ensure businesses and investors have confidence to invest and grow – for the benefit of all in the UK.
The fines imposed today reflect the CMA’s commitment to dealing with competition law breaches and deterring anti-competitive conduct. The fines would have been substantially higher had the banks not already taken unusually extensive steps to make sure that this doesn’t happen again.
Each of the exchanges took place in separate bilateral online Bloomberg chatrooms between individual traders at 2 banks [see Figure 1] and included information relevant to the pricing of UK government bonds – specifically, gilts and gilt asset swaps.
In particular, each one-to-one exchange of information took place in relation to one or more of the following: firstly, the sale of gilts by the UK Debt Management Office via auctions on behalf of HM Treasury, secondly the subsequent buying and selling, i.e. trading, of gilts and gilt asset swaps, and thirdly the selling of gilts to the Bank of England – known as ‘buy back’. Not all banks were involved in unlawful exchanges in all 3 contexts.
Figure 1 – Parties to the separate one-to-one exchanges
Four banks – Citi, HSBC, Morgan Stanley and Royal Bank of Canada – have settled and agreed to pay fines totalling £104,460,000.
Deutsche Bank is exempt from a financial penalty as it alerted the CMA to its participation in the chats via the authority’s leniency policy. Citi applied for leniency during the CMA’s investigation and as a result has received a reduced fine.
In agreeing to settle with the CMA, the banks have agreed to pay these fines, bringing the investigation to a close.
The fines for each bank are:
The fines take into account the length of time that has passed since the end of the infringements and the extensive compliance measures that the banks have implemented since then – some of which were in place before the start of the CMA’s investigation.
The firms have until 22 April 2025 to pay their fines.
More information on this investigation and the CMA’s update is available on the UK government bonds: suspected anti-competitive arrangements case page.
Publié le 20 février 2025
L’Autorité de la concurrence a été saisie sur le fondement de l’article L.462-1 du code de commerce par le ministre de l’Économie, des finances et de la souveraineté industrielle et numérique d’une demande d’avis concernant un accord collectif signé le 19 décembre 2023 dans le cadre du dialogue social spécifique au secteur des services de transport par voitures de transport avec chauffeur (ci-après « VTC »).
L’ARPE (Autorité des relations sociales des plateformes d’emploi) est chargée par la loi de d’homologuer chaque accord signé, c’est-à-dire d’étendre l’accord à l’ensemble des acteurs du secteur ou non. Elle peut refuser de le faire « pour des motifs d’intérêt général, notamment pour atteinte excessive à la libre concurrence ». C’est dans ce cadre et conformément à l’article L. 7343-50 du code du travail qu’elle a demandé au ministre de l’Économie de saisir l’Autorité de la concurrence, qui se voit ainsi amenée à se prononcer, pour la première fois, sur un accord collectif de ce type.
L’accord faisant l’objet de la saisine, prévoit l’obligation pour les plateformes de se doter d’un dispositif permettant à chaque chauffeur de choisir une base de revenu minimal par kilomètre de course, à partir de laquelle lui seront faites par préférence des propositions de course par la plateforme. Signé par une seule organisation professionnelle de plateformes (dont le principal adhérent est Uber, acteur détenant une position très forte sur le marché) et par deux des sept syndicats de chauffeurs ayant pris part aux négociations, l’accord une fois homologué conduirait à généraliser un système que seul Uber semble en mesure de mettre en œuvre.
L’Autorité de la concurrence considère que si l’accord ne porte pas en lui-même atteinte à la libre concurrence, de nombreuses interrogations restent sans réponse. En l’état actuel, il est impossible d’affirmer que l’acquisition d’un tel dispositif pourrait constituer un facteur d’éviction ni qu’il améliorerait effectivement les conditions de travail des chauffeurs de VTC indépendants.
Pour ses raisons, l’Autorité appelle l’ARPE à la vigilance car l’Autorité n’exclut pas que l’extension de cet accord à l’ensemble du secteur soit de nature à porter une atteinte à la concurrence, ce qui engagerait la responsabilité de l’État. L’Autorité précise qu’il serait opportun, avant toute homologation de cet accord, de faire réaliser une étude d’impact préalable approfondie des conséquences économiques, sociales et financières. L’Autorité n’étant pas en mesure de procéder à de telles études, elle invite l’Etat à octroyer à l’ARPE les moyens juridiques et financiers nécessaires.
Afin de doter les chauffeurs de VTC non-salariés de garanties et droits similaires à ceux des travailleurs salariés et de contribuer ainsi à apaiser les relations entre plateformes et chauffeurs, le législateur a rendu obligatoire un dialogue social entre les plateformes de mise en relation et ces travailleurs indépendants par l’intermédiaire de leurs organisations professionnelles représentatives.
Ces négociations, menées sous l’égide de l’Autorité des relations sociales des plateformes d’emploi (ARPE), ont permis d’aboutir à la conclusion de plusieurs accords et avenants depuis le début de l’année 2023 (notamment concernant l’instauration de revenus minimum par course et par heure d’activité). C’est dans le cadre de ces négociations que s’inscrit l’accord soumis, pour avis, à l’Autorité.
Le présent accord soumis à l’avis de l’Autorité prévoit l’obligation, pour chaque plateforme, de se doter d’un dispositif permettant à chaque chauffeur de choisir un revenu minimal par kilomètre de course à partir duquel il souhaite recevoir par préférence des propositions de course par la plateforme. Signé par une seule organisation professionnelle de plateformes (et dont le principal adhérent, Uber, détient sur le marché français un poids particulièrement important et par deux des sept syndicats de chauffeurs ayant pris part aux négociations en 2023), il remplit les conditions de l’article L. 7343-29 du code du travail et s’applique aux signataires.
L’ARPE envisage d’homologuer cet accord et donc de l’étendre à toutes les plateformes et tous les chauffeurs de VTC indépendants. La décision d’homologation, comme la décision d’extension d’un accord de branche en droit du travail, n’étant prise qu’après un contrôle de légalité du texte de l’accord, l’ARPE est en charge de vérifier que cet accord ne porte pas atteinte à la libre concurrence.
Si le présent accord prévoyant la mise en place par les plateformes d’un dispositif permettant à chaque exploitant de choisir un revenu minimum par kilomètre de course, il n’est actuellement proposé que par Uber.
Pour l’Autorité, la détention par un seul opérateur du marché d’une technologie dont ses concurrents ne disposent pas, ou dont l’acquisition représente un coût significatif, ou sur laquelle un opérateur a pris une avance considérable dans la conception et le développement même si la technologie n’est pas encore pleinement opérationnelle au moment de l’analyse ne constitue pas en soi une atteinte aux règles du droit de la concurrence.
Si l’accord ne porte pas en lui-même atteinte à la concurrence, sa généralisation soulève un certain nombre de questions sans réponse qui pourraient avoir des conséquences anti-concurrentielles. D’abord, les différents acteurs ne sont pas en mesure de confirmer le coût qu’impliquerait le développement de ce dispositif de sorte qu’il est en l’état impossible d’éviter la possibilité que cet accord permette en réalité à Uber d’évincer ses concurrents. Il convient d’ailleurs de noter qu’Uber dispose de volumes de données sans commune mesure par rapport à ses concurrents pour développer et tester des technologies, en raison du nombre de chauffeurs VTC qui font appel à son service de mise en relation en France et du nombre de courses qu’ils effectuent.
Par ailleurs, l’Autorité appelle l’ARPE à vérifier que l’accord soit suffisamment équilibré entre les objectifs sociaux et la prise en compte des éventuels risques concurrentiels. En l’espèce, l’avancée sociale pour les chauffeurs n’étant pas établie, il convient de procéder à une étude d’impact, étude que l’Autorité de la concurrencer ne peut réaliser, faute d’éléments suffisants qui lui permettraient d’arbitrer.
relatif à l’accord du 19 décembre 2023 renforçant la liberté de choix de leurs courses par les chauffeurs VTC ayant recours à une plateforme de mise en relation
Merger
Last decision date: 20.02.2025 Simplified procedure
Merger
Last decision date: 20.02.2025 Simplified procedure
Secteur(s) :
Décision de contrôle des concentrations|
Publication du sens de la décision le : 20 février 2025
Secteur(s) :
Décision de contrôle des concentrations|
Publication du sens de la décision le : 20 février 2025
Secteur(s) :
Décision de contrôle des concentrations|
Publication du sens de la décision le : 20 février 2025
https://webadvocacy.com.br/category/clipping-da-concorrencia
CADE – Autoridade do Brasil
FTC – Federal Trade Commission
USDOJ – Departamento de Justiça dos EUA
Comissão Europeia – Responsável pela política da concorrência na Europa
CMA – Autoridade do Reino Unido
Autorité de la Concurrence – Autoridade da França
AdC -Autoridade de Portugal
CNMC – Autoridade da Espanha
CNDC – Autoridade da Argentina
AGCM – Autoridade da Itália
COFECE – Autoridade do México
Requerentes: Grupo Mateus S.A., Novo Atacado Comercio de Alimentos Ltda.
Com fulcro no §1º do artigo 50 da Lei 9.784, de 1999, integro as razões do Parecer N° 1/2025/CGAA2/SGA1/SG/CADE (SEI 1518287) à presente decisão, inclusive quanto à sua motivação. Nos termos dos artigos 13, inciso XII, e 57, inciso I, da Lei nº 12.529, de 30 de novembro de 2011, combinados com os artigos 10, inciso XII, e 121, inciso I, do Regimento Interno do Cade, decido pela aprovação sem restrições do presente Ato de Concentração.
Requerentes: Requerente Banvox Holding Financeira S.A. e JK031 Empreendimentos e Participações S.A. Aprovação sem restrições.
Partes: AEQH32 GmbH, JTEKT Bearings Deutschland GmbH, JTEKT Bearings France SAS e JTEKT Bearings Czech Republic S.R.O. Aprovação sem restrições.
Partes: Rima Industrial S.A. e TGR Subholding 1 S.A. Aprovação sem restrições.
Requerentes: Kantar Media Netherlands Holdings B.V., Kantar Media Netherlands TGI Holdings B.V., Kantar Media Intelligence SAS, Kantar Media France SAS, Greenwich BidCo Limited e Greenwich France BidCo SAS. Aprovação sem restrições.
Partes: Stellantis Automóveis Brasil Ltda. e MA Automotive Brasil Ltda. Aprovação sem restrições.
Merger
Last decision date: 19.02.2025 Simplified procedure
Secteur(s) :
Décision de contrôle des concentrations|
Publication du sens de la décision le : 19 février 2025
Comunicado 01/2025
19 de fevereiro de 2025
A Autoridade da Concorrência (AdC) condenou três empresas do grupo multinacional de consultoria tecnológica Inetum, a uma coima de €3.092.000 por práticas anticoncorrenciais no mercado laboral, ocorridas durante, pelo menos, sete anos.
A Investigação
A investigação teve início em março de 2022, após a AdC identificar indícios de que diversas empresas, incluindo o grupo Inetum haviam estabelecido acordos bilaterais de não-contratação de trabalhadores, também conhecidos como acordos de “no-poach”.
Estes acordos implicavam um compromisso entre as empresas de não recrutar e/ou realizar propostas espontâneas aos trabalhadores das empresas envolvidas.
De acordo com a investigação da AdC, o grupo Inetum participou no acordo, pelo menos, entre março de 2014 e agosto de 2021.
Em 27 de maio de 2024, a AdC emitiu uma Nota de Ilicitude (acusação) dirigida à empresa que participou diretamente na prática anticoncorrencial, bem como às suas sociedades-mãe.
No âmbito do mesmo processo, a AdC já havia sancionado três outras empresas a operar no mesmo mercado – duas multinacionais e uma empresa nacional do setor da consultoria tecnológica – por condutas semelhantes entre 2014 e 2022, num total de 4.082.000€, valor reduzido em decorrência da colaboração prestada à AdC durante a investigação.
Estas três últimas empresas recorreram ao procedimento de transação, ao colaborarem com a AdC, abdicando de litigar a imputação factual e apresentando prova relevante da existência da infração e efetuando o pagamento voluntário da coima.
O recurso ao procedimento de transação permite alcançar ganhos processuais relevantes, sem deixar de sancionar as empresas que cometem infrações à concorrência. Uma destas empresas havia aderido também ao regime de clemência.
A Prática em Causa
As empresas envolvidas celebraram um acordo de “no-poach”, obrigando-se- reciprocamente a não recrutar e/ou não abordar espontaneamente os seus trabalhadores. Com essa conduta, restringiram a concorrência no mercado laboral, repartindo a oferta de mão de obra e limitando a mobilidade dos referidos profissionais.
Este é o segundo processo sancionatório relativo a práticas restritivas da concorrência no mercado laboral desde que, em 2020, a AdC começou a intervir nesta área.
Os acordos de “no-poach” são proibidos pela Lei da Concorrência, pois limitam a autonomia das empresas na definição das suas condições comerciais e afetam diretamente os trabalhadores, reduzindo seu poder negocial, mobilidade laboral e, consequentemente a sua progressão salarial.
Para prevenir tais práticas, a AdC publicou, em setembro de 2021, um Relatório e um Guia de Boas Práticas, com recomendações para evitar a celebração de acordos de não-contratação.
As práticas restritivas da concorrência no mercado de trabalho impactam negativamente na competitividade das empresas, no bem-estar dos trabalhadores e na economia do país. Por esse motivo, a AdC reforçou a sua atuação neste domínio, destacando o combate a este tipo de práticas como uma das Prioridades de Política de Concorrência para 2025. O objetivo é assegurar o normal funcionamento do mercado laboral, alinhando assim os interesses dos cidadãos e da economia.
As Coimas
As coimas impostas pela AdC são determinadas com base no volume de negócios das empresas no mercado afetado durante os anos da prática e cujo valor, de acordo com a Lei da Concorrência, não pode ultrapassar 10% do volume de negócios da empresa no ano anterior à decisão.
Ao definir o montante da coima, a AdC considera, entre outros, fatores como a gravidade e duração da infração, o grau de participação das empresas e a situação económica das entidades envolvidas.
Mais detalhes sobre a metodologia utilizada estão disponíveis nas Linhas de Orientação da AdC sobre a aplicação de coimas.
https://webadvocacy.com.br/category/clipping-da-concorrencia
CADE – Autoridade do Brasil
FTC – Federal Trade Commission
USDOJ – Departamento de Justiça dos EUA
Comissão Europeia – Responsável pela política da concorrência na Europa
CMA – Autoridade do Reino Unido
Autorité de la Concurrence – Autoridade da França
AdC -Autoridade de Portugal
CNMC – Autoridade da Espanha
CNDC – Autoridade da Argentina
AGCM – Autoridade da Itália
COFECE – Autoridade do México
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Federal Trade Commission Chairman Andrew N. Ferguson announced today that the FTC and Department of Justice’s joint 2023 Merger Guidelines are in effect and will serve as the framework for the FTC’s merger-review analysis.
“Stability is good for the enforcement agencies. The wholesale rescission and reworking of guidelines is time consuming and expensive,” Chairman Ferguson said. “We should undertake this process sparingly. We have limited resources to patrol the beat and constant turnover undermines agency credibility.”
Chairman Ferguson’s memo to staff on the Merger Guidelines can be found here.
The Federal Trade Commission works to promote competition, and protect and educate consumers. The FTC will never demand money, make threats, tell you to transfer money, or promise you a prize. You can learn more about consumer topics and report scams, fraud, and bad business practices online at ReportFraud.ftc.gov. Follow the FTC on social media, read our blogs and subscribe to press releases for the latest FTC news and resources.
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Publié le 18 février 2025
Le 29 janvier 2025, l’Autorité de la concurrence a été saisie sur le fondement de l’article L. 462-1 du code de commerce par le Ministre des Outre-mer et le Ministre de l’Economie d’une demande d’avis portant sur les marges des importateurs-grossistes et des distributeurs en Martinique.
Cette saisine intervient à la suite de la signature du protocole de lutte contre la vie chère en Martinique du 16 octobre 2024 qui vise notamment à renforcer la transparence sur la formation des prix des produits alimentaires et prévoit la saisine de l’Autorité de la concurrence.
Dans cet avis, l’Autorité procédera à une analyse de la formation des prix et des marges et de leur possible accumulation sur l’ensemble de la chaîne de valeur de la grande distribution alimentaire en Martinique, et formulera toute recommandation utile.
Saisie par le Gouvernement, l’Autorité rendra un avis sur les marges des importateurs-grossistes et des distributeurs de produits alimentaires de première nécessité en Martinique
Requerentes: TIM S.A., Telefônica Brasil S.A.
Advogados das Requerentes: Enrico Spini Romanielo, Fernando Stival, Leonor Cordovil, Beatriz Cravo e Letícia Barros e outros
Com fulcro no §1º do art. 50 da Lei nº 9.784, de 1999, integro as razões das Notas Técnica nº 8/2025/CGAA4/SGA1/SG/CADE (SEI 1516321) e nº 9/2025/CGAA4/SGA1/SG/CADE (SEI 1516329) à presente decisão, inclusive como suas motivações. Pelos fundamentos apontados nas Notas Técnicas citadas, decido pelo indeferimento do pedido de intervenção como terceiro interessado formulado pela Associação Brasileira de Infraestrutura para Telecomunicações (“Abrintel”) e pelo deferimento do pedido de intervenção como terceiro interessado formulado pela ASSOCIAÇÃO NEO (“NEO”), nos termos do art. 50, I, da Lei nº 12.529/2011. Publique-se
Merger
Last decision date: 18.02.2025
https://webadvocacy.com.br/category/clipping-da-concorrencia
CADE – Autoridade da concorrência do Brasil
FTC – Federal Trade Commission
USDOJ – Departamento de Justiça dos EUA
Comissão Europeia – Responsável pela política da concorrência na Europa
CMA – Autoridade da concorrência do Reino Unido
Autorité de la Concurrence – Autoridade da concorrência da França
AdC -Autoridade da Concorrência de Portugal
CNMC – Autoridade da concorrência da Espanha
CNDC – Autoridade da concorrência da Argentina
AGCM – Autoridade da concorrência da Itália
COFECE – Autoridade da concorrência do México