Este é um informativo diário que traz para o(a) leitor (a) notícias e casos de defesa da concorrência das principais jurisdições antitruste do mundo (CADE, FTC, Comissão Europeia, CMA etc).
Publié le 14 mars 2025
La consultation publique lancée ce jour vise à enrichir les réflexions de l’Autorité de la concurrence sur le cadre applicable aux mandataires en charge du suivi des mesures correctives, engagements ou injonctions, de nature comportementale ou structurelle, prises par les entreprises ou imposées à celles-ci en matière de contrôle des concentrations lorsque ces dernières sont susceptibles de porter atteinte à la concurrence. Ces mesures correctives doivent répondre à la préoccupation de concurrence identifiée par l’Autorité et ainsi permettre d’autoriser une opération de concentration qui aurait été sinon interdite.
Les réponses à la consultation publique doivent être adressées au plus tard le 11 avril 2025 par courriel à l’adresse suivante : consultation.concentrations@autoritedelaconcurrence.fr
Les mesures correctives suivies par les mandataires sont de deux ordres et n’emportent pas les mêmes contraintes pour l’Autorité, les entreprises et les mandataires. Elles peuvent être structurelles (comme la cession d’un actif) ou alors comportementales (comme l’engagement à ne pas pratiquer des remises couplées par exemple, pour une durée minimale de cinq ans). Dans le premier cas, le travail des mandataires consiste à s’assurer du maintien de la viabilité des actifs cédés et de leur cession effective. Ils examinent les candidatures à la reprise et peuvent intervenir pour réaliser eux-mêmes la recherche de repreneurs et procéder à la cession à un tiers agréé par l’Autorité. Dans le second cas, ils s’assurent, durant une période déterminée, du respect des mesures correctives par les entreprises, qui peuvent prendre de multiples formes : interopérabilité, séparation de régies publicitaires, absence de remises commerciales… Dans les deux cas, leur travail fait l’objet de rapports transmis à l’Autorité qui peuvent donner lieu à l’ouverture d’une procédure contentieuse pour non-respect d’engagements et à des sanctions importantes (voir à cet égard les décisions SFR/Numéricable[1] ou Fnac/Darty[2]).
S’il n’existe pas de statut du mandataire défini réglementairement, son travail s’inscrit dans le cadre des Lignes directrices de l’Autorité relatives au contrôle des concentrations qui établissent, outre un mandat-type, des principes généraux sur le rôle et la procédure de nomination des mandataires et les modalités de suivi des remèdes[3]. Celles-ci sont notamment inspirées des principes définis par la Commission européenne et largement repris par les autorités nationales de concurrence.
Les questions de cette consultation portent sur le statut des mandataires, leur procédure de nomination, leur rôle dans l’exécution des injonctions ou engagements souscrits par les entreprises et enfin, le terme de leur mission.
Elles s’adressent non seulement aux mandataires agréés par l’Autorité depuis 2009, aux candidats mandataires intéressés ainsi qu’aux entreprises ayant fait l’objet du suivi de la mise en œuvre de remèdes comportementaux ou structurels par un mandataire. Elle est également ouverte à tous les tiers intéressés.
Les réponses à cette consultation publique doivent être adressées par courriel à l’adresse suivante : consultation.concentrations@autoritedelaconcurrence.fr.
Les contributions reçues dans le cadre de cette consultation seront rendues publiques, sous réserve des éléments relevant de la protection du secret d’affaires. Elles permettront de nourrir utilement les réflexions de l’Autorité, qui pourraient conduire à des propositions législatives ou réglementaires ou à une évolution de ses lignes directrices relatives au contrôle des concentrations.
[1] Décision n° 16-D-24 du 8 novembre 2016.
[2] Décision n° 16-DCC-111 du 27 juillet 2016.
[3] https://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/sites/default/files/Lignesdirectricesconcentrations2020.pdf
Consultation publique sur le statut, le rôle et les moyens des mandataires
PRESS RELEASE
The investigation focuses on the methods adopted by the company to inform its users about the renewal of economic supply conditions. The Authority received many complaints from consumers between May and September 2024
The Italian Competition Authority has launched an investigation into Eni Plenitude S.p.A. Società Benefit over a suspected unfair commercial practice. The proceedings concern the methods adopted by the company to inform customers about the renewal of economic supply conditions and its failure to implement measures to handle undelivered communications.
Between May and September 2024 many consumers complained to the Authority, stating that their electricity and gas supply contracts were renewed with revised economic conditions without any prior notice from the company. As a matter of fact, it appears that Eni Plenitude renewed its economic supply conditions despite a significant number of undelivered communications, thus denying users their right of withdrawal.
An inspection at the premises of Eni Plenitude and its holding company Eni S.p.A. was carried out yesterday by the Authority’s officials, assisted by the Special Antitrust Unit of the Italian Financial Police (Guardia di Finanza).
Rome, 14 March 2025
Partes: Oi S.A. – Em Recuperação Judicial e Datora Telecomunicações Ltda. Aprovação sem restrições.
Requerentes: Publicis Groupe Holdings B.V. e BR Influenciadores Marketing Ltda. Aprovação sem restrições.
Requerentes: Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies Corporation e Evident Corporation. Aprovação sem restrições.
Requerentes: Companhia Hidroelétrica do São Francisco, Centrais Elétricas Brasileiras S.A. – Eletrobras S.A. e Eneva S.A. Aprovação sem restrições.
Requerentes: Omnicom Group Inc., EXT Subsidiary Inc. e The Interpublic Group of Companies Inc. Aprovação sem restrições.
Requerentes: Carioca Holding Ltda, e Blokton Motocar Ltda. Aprovação sem restrições.
Requerentes: Latin American Private Equity Fund VII, AI Soar (Netherlands) B.V., AI Pearl (Netherlands) B.V. e 25SHLC Co-Investment Limited Partnership. Aprovação sem restrições.
Requerentes: Louis Dreyfus Company Suisse S.A, Grunau Illertissen GmbH, BASF Personal Care & Nutrition GmbH, Cognis IP Management GmbH e BASF SE. Aprovação sem restrições.
Requerentes: Banvox Holding Financeira S.A. e Banco Digimais S.A. Aprovação sem restrições.
Requerentes: XP Malls Fundo de Investimento Imobiliário – FII e Iguatemi S.A. Aprovação sem restrições.
Requerentes: Fosfatados Centro SPE Ltda., Patos de Minas Fosfatados Ltda. e Mosaic Fertilizantes P&K Ltda. Advogados: Antonio Henrique Noronha, Alexandre Magalhães Blois, Sérgio Varella Bruna, Natalia S. Pinheiro da Silveira e Marina Lissa Oda Horita. Decido pela aprovação sem restrições.
Requerentes: Notre Dame Veículos Ltda. e Repecon Automóveis Ltda. Aprovação sem restrições.
Requerentes: Oxiteno S.A. Indústria e Comércio, Oleoquímica Indústria e Comércio de Produtos Químicos Ltda., Casa dos Ventos S.A. e Ventos de São Júlio I Energias Renováveis S.A. Aprovação sem restrições.
Requerentes: Zarelli Supermercados Ltda e Companhia Brasileira de Distribuição. Aprovação sem restrições.
Requerentes: Klabin S.A. e Kimberly-Clark Brasil Indústria e Comércio de Produtos de Higiene Ltda. Não conhecimento da operação.
Requerentes: Health Logística Hospitalar S.A. e DFLOG – Transportes de Cargas Ltda. Aprovação sem restrições.
Secteur(s) :
Décision de contrôle des concentrations|
Publication du sens de la décision le : 14 mars 2025
Secteur(s) :
Décision de contrôle des concentrations|
Publication du sens de la décision le : 14 mars 2025
Secteur(s) :
Décision de contrôle des concentrations|
Publication du sens de la décision le : 14 mars 2025
https://webadvocacy.com.br/category/clipping-da-concorrencia
CADE – Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica
FTC – Federal Trade Commission
USDOJ – Departamento de Justiça dos EUA
Comissão Europeia – Autoridade da concorrência Europa
CMA – Autoridade da concorrência do Reino Unido
Autorité de la Concurrence – Autoridade da França
AdC -Autoridade da concorrência de Portugal
CNMC – Autoridade da concorrência da Espanha
CNDC – Autoridade da concorrência da Argentina
AGCM – Autoridade da concorrência da Itália
COFECE – Autoridade da concorrencia do México
Este é um informativo diário que traz para o(a) leitor (a) notícias e casos de defesa da concorrência das principais jurisdições antitruste do mundo (CADE, FTC, Comissão Europeia, CMA etc).
Este é um informativo diário que traz para o(a) leitor (a) notícias e casos de defesa da concorrência das principais jurisdições antitruste do mundo (CADE, FTC, Comissão Europeia, CMA etc).d
Publicado em12/03/2025 às 06h53
Tuesday, March 11, 2025Share 
For Immediate Release
Office of Public Affairs
The U.S. Department of Justice today announced that eight defendants have pleaded guilty for their conduct in a long-running and violent conspiracy to monopolize the transmigrante forwarding agency industry in the Los Indios, Texas, border region near Harlingen and Brownsville, Texas. The three remaining defendants to the superseding indictment remain at large as fugitives. Transmigrantes are individuals who transport used vehicles and other goods from the United States through Mexico for resale in Central America. Transmigrante forwarding agencies are U.S.-based businesses that provide services to transmigrante clients, including helping those clients complete the customs paperwork required to export vehicles into Mexico.
“The Criminal Division is committed to holding violent criminal organizations accountable in whatever markets in which they operate,” said Matthew R. Galeotti, head of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division. “Transnational criminal organizations that use violence to dominate industries will be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law.”
“These guilty pleas bring to justice individuals who used violence and extortion to fix prices and monopolize the market for essential services that Americans rely on to earn a living,” said Director of Criminal Enforcement Emma Burnham of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division. “The Antitrust Division will continue to use every tool at its disposal to protect the public by prosecuting violent criminals – including those who aim to corrupt America’s free markets.”
“Price fixing harms both the public and the business community,” said U.S. Attorney Nicholas J. Ganjei for the Southern District of Texas. “Schemes like this artificially drive up prices, forcing consumers to pay more than they ordinarily would. At its core, such market collusion is nothing more than theft from consumers.”
“These defendants tried to rule through fear, using threats, violence and intimidation to eliminate competition,” said Assistant Director Chad Yarbrough of the FBI Criminal Investigative Division. “Their guilty pleas send a clear message that price fixing and market allocation are serious crimes, and we will hold those accountable who put profits over the law and fair commerce.”
“Today’s pleas reflect the relentlessness of the federal government’s pursuit of transnational criminal organizations that exploit international trade and the U.S. economy,” said Special Agent in Charge Craig Larrabee of Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) San Antonio. “This violent scheme was fueled by greed that undermined the safety and economic security of the border region; HSI has prioritized significant resources to protect the U.S. and our legitimate trade.”
According to documents filed in the U.S. District Court in Houston, defendants Carlos Martinez also known as “Cuate,” Pedro Antonio Calvillo Hernandez, Roberto Garcia Villareal, Sandra Guerra Medina, and Mireya Miranda pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to fix prices and allocate the market for transmigrante forwarding agency services in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, and one count of conspiracy to monopolize the same market in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The conspirators fixed the prices for transmigrante forwarding agency services and created a centralized entity known as the “Pool” to collect and divide revenues among the conspirators, limit competition from other agencies, and increase prices for their services. Market participants who were not part of the conspiracy had to join and pay into the Pool. Pool members enforced the rules of the Pool by monitoring whether forwarding agencies were charging the agreed-upon prices, including by posting prices publicly on social media, and monitoring whether agencies were paying into the Pool as required.
Martinez, Calvillo, Villareal, and Carlos Yzaguirre pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to interfere with commerce by extortion. Martinez also pleaded guilty to one count of interference with commerce by extortion. The defendants conspired to force forwarding agencies to pay money to the Pool and to pay other extortion fees, including a “piso” for every transaction processed in the industry as well as a “fine” for operating in the market outside of Pool rules. The conspirators perpetrated acts of intimidation, coercion, and violence in furtherance of the antitrust and extortion conspiracies. Defendant Martinez was responsible for at least $9.5 million in extortion payments.
Martinez and Jose de Jesus Tapia Fernandez also pleaded guilty to a money laundering conspiracy, through which they laundered extortion proceeds. Cash obtained from the extortion conspiracy was deposited into bank accounts controlled by Martinez and his family, and those deposits were made to conceal and disguise the nature, source, ownership, and control of the proceeds. Juan Hector Ramirez Avila pleaded guilty to one count of structuring a financial transaction to evade reporting requirements.
Martinez agreed to forfeit four real properties and $375,000 in seized U.S. currency, to pay a fine, and to pay full restitution to extortion victims. Guerra, Miranda, Calvillo, and Villareal have also agreed to pay fines as part of their plea agreements.
Rigoberto Brown and Miguel Hipolito Caballero Aupart, and Diego Ceballos-Soto were also charged in the superseding indictment and remain fugitives. Anyone with information about their whereabouts is asked to contact the Antitrust Division’s Complaint Center at 888-647-3258, or visit www.justice.gov/atr/report-violations.
Conspiracies to allocate the market, fix prices, or monopolize in violation of the Sherman Act carry a maximum penalty of 10 years’ imprisonment and a maximum $1 million fine for an individual. Conspiracy to interfere with commerce by extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act carries a maximum penalty of 20 years’ imprisonment and a maximum $250,000 fine. Money laundering conspiracy carries a maximum penalty of 20 years’ imprisonment and a maximum $500,000 fine. Structuring a financial transaction to evade reporting requirements carries a maximum penalty of five years’ imprisonment and a $250,000 fine. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.
The Justice Department’s Antitrust Division, the Criminal Division’s Violent Crime and Racketeering Section (VCRS), the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Texas, HSI, and the FBI are investigating the case.
Trial Attorneys Brittany E. McClure, Anne Veldhuis, and Michael G. Lepage of the Antitrust Division, Trial Attorney Christina Taylor of VCRS, and Assistant U.S. Attorney Alexander L. Alum for the Southern District of Texas are prosecuting the case.
Anyone with information in connection with this investigation should contact the Antitrust Division’s Complaint Center at 888-647-3258, or visit www.justice.gov/atr/report-violations.
Updated March 11, 2025
Topic
Antitrust
Components
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)Press Release Number: 25-247
March 11, 2025
Japan Fair Trade Commission
The Cabinet today approved of the bill to amend the Subcontract Act and the Act on the Promotion of Subcontracting Small and Medium-sized Enterprises.
* For more information, please visit our Japanese website.
https://www.jftc.go.jp/houdou/pressrelease/2025/mar/250311_kakugikettei.html
PRESS RELEASE
The transaction, involving the two largest natural gas distributors in Italy, was likely to harm competition. Following the Authority’s investigation, Italgas will need to comply with a number of important divestiture and behavioural measures.
The Italian Competition Authority has authorised the acquisition of 2i Rete Gas Spa by Italgas Spa subject to conditions. The transaction, involving the two largest natural gas distributors in Italy, may well have led to competitive concerns with respect to future area-based tenders for the identification of gas distribution concession holders in 65 Italian minimum territorial areas (so-called ATEMs).
Following a complex investigation, which saw the participation of numerous market players and industry associations, the Authority authorised the transaction subject to compliance with divestiture and behavioural measures.
In particular, in 31 ATEMs, Italgas is required to divest a share of at least 20% of the gas redelivery points it manages based on existing concessions. In other 4 ATEMs, it will need to sell a share equivalent to that acquired. Such transfers, which must follow specific procedures and the timeline set forth in the final decision, will be made under the supervision of a monitoring trustee approved by the Authority.
Moreover, with respect to all 65 ATEMs under investigation, the company will need to adopt behavioural remedies (financial, contractual, technical and informational measures) aimed at incentivising tender participation, by ensuring other players are in a position to compete effectively against Italgas during tender procedures.
Rome, 11 March 2025
Requerentes: SINTOKOGIO, LTD. e Elastikos (France) S.A.S.
Advogados: Marcio Soares, João Marcelo Lima, Paulo Luciano Júnior e Beatriz Vergette.
Com fulcro no §1º do art. 50, da Lei nº 9.784, de 1999, integro as razões da Nota Técnica nº 3/2025/CGAA3/SGA1/SG/CADE (SEI 1528184) à presente decisão, inclusive como sua motivação, para, nos termos do artigo 56 da Lei 12.529, de 2011, declarar o Ato de Concentração nº 08700.007319/2024-66 complexo, e determinar a realização das diligências indicadas na Nota Técnica nº 3/2025/CGAA3/SGA1/SG/CADE. Esta Superintendência resguarda a sua faculdade de posteriormente, se for o caso, requerer ao Tribunal Administrativo do Cade a dilação do prazo de que trata o artigo 56, parágrafo único, e o artigo 88, § 9º da Lei nº 12.529, de 2011.
Secteur(s) :
Décision de contrôle des concentrations|
Publication du sens de la décision le : 11 mars 2025
Secteur(s) :
Décision de contrôle des concentrations|
Publication du sens de la décision le : 11 mars 2025
https://webadvocacy.com.br/category/clipping-da-concorrencia
CADE – Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica
FTC – Federal Trade Commission
USDOJ – Departamento de Justiça dos EUA
Comissão Europeia – Autoridade da concorrência Europa
CMA – Autoridade da concorrência do Reino Unido
Autorité de la Concurrence – Autoridade da França
AdC -Autoridade da concorrência de Portugal
CNMC – Autoridade da concorrência da Espanha
CNDC – Autoridade da concorrência da Argentina
AGCM – Autoridade da concorrência da Itália
COFECE – Autoridade da concorrencia do México
Publicado em 11/03/2025 às 07h09
Conteúdo da página
The European Commission is carrying out unannounced inspections at the premises of companies active in the non-alcoholic drinks sector in several Member States. In parallel, the Commission has sent out a formal request for information to a company active in the personal care sector.
The Commission has concerns that the companies concerned may have violated EU antitrust rules that prohibit cartels and restrictive practices, and abuses of a dominant position (Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union).
In particular, the Commission is investigating possible restrictions on the trade of goods in the Single Market and market segmentation. The investigations concern conducts that may potentially still be ongoing and involve several Member States.
The Commission officials were accompanied by their counterparts from the relevant national competition authorities.
Background
Unannounced inspections are a preliminary investigatory step into suspected anticompetitive practices. The fact that the Commission carries out such inspections does not mean that the companies are guilty of anticompetitive behaviour, nor does it prejudge the outcome of the investigation itself. The Commission respects the rights of defence, in particular the right of companies to be heard in antitrust proceedings.
Requests for Information under Article 18(3) of EC Regulation 1/2003 are another way to gather information relating to suspected anticompetitive practices. Companies have an obligation to provide a complete reply to the request within the timeframe indicated by the Commission.
There is no legal deadline to complete inquiries into anticompetitive conduct. Their duration depends on a number of factors, including the complexity of each case, the extent to which the companies concerned cooperate with the Commission and the exercise of the rights of defence.
Under the Commission’s leniency programme companies that have been involved in a secret cartel may be granted immunity from fines or significant reductions in fines in return for reporting the conduct and cooperating with the Commission throughout its investigation. Individuals and companies can report cartel or other anticompetitive behaviour on an anonymous basis through the Commission’s whistle-blower tool. Further information on the Commission’s leniency programme and whistle-blower tool is available on DG Competition’s website.
Commission carries out unannounced antitrust inspections
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A speech by Sarah Cardell, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) Chief Executive, delivered at the techUK Tech Policy Conference 2025.
From:Competition and Markets Authority and Sarah Cardell
Published10 March 2025Location:Tech Policy Conference 2025, LondonDelivered on:10 March 2025 (Speaker’s notes, may differ from delivered version)
Good morning.
I must confess I hadn’t realised when I accepted the invitation to speak today that techUK had turned 10 within just a few months of the CMA’s 10th anniversary last year. We thought a lot about what this milestone meant at the CMA. How much our operating environment had changed over the course of a decade; how we needed to change with it, while staying true to the fundamentals of our mandate to promote competition and protect consumers.
We have been progressing that change rapidly over recent months and I’ll talk more about that shortly. I will just say, though, that techUK’s mission at the beginning of its second decade – to make the UK the best place for technology companies to locate and thrive – is very much a mission the CMA shares.
So what does the landscape look like for the CMA today? What has changed, and where are we headed?
Well, the eagle-eyed amongst you may have noticed that CMA has been in the news once or twice recently… not just in the daily course of our announcements, but as part of an important wider conversation about the role of competition in driving growth.
I know the power of effective competition is something techUK members live and breathe. We hear directly from you how critical it is for your businesses that opportunities exist to enter and scale in open, competitive markets. I want to leave you in no doubt that the CMA is committed to this goal. These markets – your markets – are the lifeblood of the UK tech sector and foundational to the success of the whole UK economy. I know we will continue to work closely together to help realise the enormous opportunities they represent for our country.
Over the last 6 months, I’ve been speaking to businesses and investors to better understand how the CMA can maximise our contribution to the growth that we all wish to see – in the tech sector and across the economy. I have heard that, while our commitment to promoting competition is critical, it is not enough. How we go about our work in practice matters a great deal, particularly to business and investor confidence in the UK regulatory environment.
Some of you may, by now, be familiar with the ‘4Ps’ framework that I set out before Christmas – a framework to upgrade the way the CMA works, based directly on helpful feedback from a wide range of businesses and representative groups including techUK. It’s based on four key principles of pace, predictability, proportionality and process (by which I really mean our direct engagement with business). In practice, the ‘4Ps’ mean some fundamental changes to the way we go about our work, which I am confident will enhance business and investor confidence in the UK’s competition and consumer protection regimes, and the attractiveness of the UK as a destination for capital.
I’ve spoken recently about applying the ‘4Ps’ framework to our merger regime – and there is more to come on that later this week. Today, I would like to talk about the ‘4Ps’ and the new digital markets competition regime, including what this might mean for the CMA’s approach to our first Strategic Market Status – or SMS – designation investigations, which we launched in relation to search and mobile ecosystems back in January.
Many of your businesses also provide products and services direct to consumers, and you will be aware that the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act also introduces a new consumer protection regime, to be enforced by the CMA, which will come into effect from April. At the end of the speech, I will preview some of our thinking in that area too – including responding to some of the concerns that have been raised with us on behalf of techUK members.
Before I come to the ‘4Ps’, I’d like to offer a few reflections on the government’s draft strategic steer for the CMA which was published last month, including how it affects our work in digital markets.
Our purpose, and our statutory mandate to promote competition and protect consumers, are unchanged. Those fundamentals remain front and centre in the draft steer. But they are firmly situated within the government’s number 1 priority of growth and investment, providing helpful clarity to guide the CMA as we independently carry out our statutory functions.
5 key points are worth highlighting:
Underpinning all of this – and directly aligning with the ‘4Ps’ framework – is a steer for the CMA to discharge our duties in a way which helps drive growth and build investor and business confidence.
So how will the CMA apply the ‘4Ps’ and respond to the strategic steer as we operate the new digital markets competition regime?
I believe this regime creates a unique opportunity to deliver benefits for companies of all shapes and sizes across the UK tech ecosystem, and the wider economy. Opportunities for the largest firms to continue investing and innovating in a stable, predictable and proportionate regulatory environment; but also opportunities for new entrants and disrupters, investors and entrepreneurs, start-ups and scale-ups (many UK-based) to innovate and thrive. Greater access to data and key functionality, more interoperability, fair terms, more choice.
How we operate this new regime will be critical to its success – and to ensuring it carries the confidence of businesses and investors, both in the UK and abroad. Unlike merger reviews, we are starting with a blank canvas. Or perhaps it’s more accurate to say a canvas on which the 4Ps have already been sketched out, and to which we can add colour and texture as we implement the new regime. Because this is a regime in which the ‘best-in-class’ features of regulation are already baked in.
Let me give you a flavour of our proposed approach – both how the 4Ps are already reflected and how we will go further in applying them and taking account of the strategic steer. In April we will also publish a short document setting this out in more detail.
Perhaps more than in any other part of our economy, it’s essential that our work in digital markets is developed and implemented at a pace that keeps up with market dynamics – and avoids creating protracted uncertainty that could chill investment and innovation.
The DMCCA already imposes tight statutory time limits and a broader statutory duty of expedition.
In practice, we want to move through our work as quickly as possible, for example by progressing thinking on potential interventions alongside our SMS investigations. We are, however, mindful, that pace must be balanced with engagement and effectiveness, especially at the outset of a new regime.
Delivering effectively at pace means streamlining our approach to our investigations. Focusing as quickly as possible on key areas of potential concern. Rapidly standing down lines of enquiry where no clear evidence of concern arises. Prioritising issues where we can deliver positive outcomes for UK businesses and consumers quickly and effectively. Avoiding gold plating, by requesting only salient information, and keeping our decisions as short and clear as possible.
At the outset of our 2 live SMS investigations, we published ‘invitation to comment’ documents. These were intentionally and necessarily broad, to be refined by evidence and responses we received, which is what we are now doing now. As we move through those investigations you should expect to see clear and explicit streamlining and prioritisation in our approach.
The evolution of next-generation technologies may be unpredictable. The regulatory environment should not be. Certainly not if we want to sustain high levels of investment and innovation.
One of the strengths and distinguishing features of the UK approach is the targeted, bespoke nature of the regime. There are no default designations and no broad-brush rules. This has many advantages; but one potential downside is the risk of uncertainty about whether a firm will be designated and, if it is, what rules will apply. We have had understandable feedback from businesses and investors asking for greater certainty about how the regime will work in practice.
As with pace, some clarity is provided by the legislation. For a firm to be considered for SMS designation, the thresholds are £1 billion UK turnover, or £25 billion globally. Substantial and entrenched market power is required in relation to a digital activity, and a position of strategic significance in the market. Only a handful of firms are likely to fall within scope. And, of course, designation is not automatic. It follows an evidence-led investigation, with decisions grounded in an in-depth understanding of the realities of an industry.
The legislation also provides a limiting framework for the design of conduct requirements: they can only be implemented in pursuit of at least one of 3 objectives (fair trading, open choices and trust and transparency) and they must be one of 13 ‘permitted types’.
We are also creating greater predictability through published guidance, extensive stakeholder engagement and transparent timelines.
But I want to go further, by incorporating a new step into our SMS designation investigations – an initial ‘roadmap’ for possible future interventions if the firm were to be designated with SMS. We will publish the roadmap when we consult on a proposed designation decision, providing clarity on which issues are likely to be prioritised for earlier action, which we propose to deprioritise, and which remain subject to further consideration.
For our current SMS investigations, we intend to publish roadmaps alongside our consultations on the proposed decisions in June (for search), and July (for mobile). Providing greater predictability, and also greater transparency for stakeholders about which issues to engage with us on at a particular point in time.
Consultation proposals on the interventions that we do prioritise for early action will then follow alongside the final decision on the SMS investigation, currently expected in October 2025.
To spur investment and innovation across digital markets, any regulatory intervention must be proportionate.
That principle of proportionality is really the heart of the UK’s digital markets competition regime. As I have just explained, and unlike some other jurisdictions, there is no automatic process for designations and no automatic regulatory requirements.
Proportionality also underpins our choices about which issues to tackle and which interventions to select – in other words, our prioritisation approach. The following considerations are key and directly connect to the government’s strategic steer:
First, impact. We will prioritise those interventions which have a clear and direct impact for UK consumers and businesses.
Second, strategic significance – including prioritising those interventions which strongly support business investment and economic growth in line with the strategic steer.
Third, whether the CMA is best placed to act. Reflecting the steer, we will consider the interplay with other regulators domestically and internationally. For global issues:
Of course, we look at these issues in the round. And as you would expect, we also carefully consider both risk levels and whether we have adequate resources available to deliver impactful outcomes at pace. That includes ensuring we have the right expertise and deep understanding of the markets we are looking at. We have been investing in this capability intensely over recent years, particularly through our new Data, Technology and Insights Directorate.
We are also building out a new ‘business and strategic analysis’ capability to deepen our understanding of firms’ strategies and business models. Bringing the perspective of business and investors directly into our work is vital to create the best conditions for innovation, investment and growth.
The regime will only deliver on its enormous potential for growth and wider benefits if we – the CMA and innovative, ambitious businesses across the tech sector – work together, constructively and collaboratively. That is why it was designed from the outset to be highly participative, based on deep engagement with diverse stakeholders. In practice, this means wide-ranging consultation and inclusive engagement at every step – some of you in this room may already be taking part in these processes.
Now, we are challenging ourselves to make sure this engagement really works for businesses and investors. We will put in place a regular and defined programme of engagement – a ‘go to you’ approach where the CMA pro-actively makes that connection in a way that is quick, easy, and informal for businesses.
We will engage relevant members of our Growth and Investment Council during our SMS investigations, so that we hear key industry and expert perspectives. We will continue to strengthen ties with trade associations and UK-based venture capital firms, partnering on a series of events over 2025. We will deepen direct engagement with the UK startups and scaleups that stand to gain from our work. The new regime supports an ecosystem with opportunities for everyone, and we will engage with large UK-listed companies – including beyond the tech and digital sectors – to understand their perspectives.
techUK is, of course, a valued member of our Growth and Investment Council and represents thousands of diverse member organisations. I hope you will all take away what I have said today about our willingness to engage with open minds and an open door.
Now, I know many of you are business-to-consumer (B2C) businesses and keen to understand more about how we are approaching our refreshed mandate for consumer protection under the DMCCA.
The new powers, coming into force in April, offer an opportunity – and I think this is well put in the strategic steer – to grow the economy by promoting consumer trust and confidence, while deterring poor corporate practices. Because consumers deserve to know that the CMA has their back; and fair-dealing businesses deserve to know that their competitors are playing by the same rules and can’t gain a competitive advantage by breaking the law.
These new direct enforcement powers mean that the CMA will be able to decide whether consumer protection laws have been breached without having to take businesses to court; and we will be able to take direct action to tackle these breaches including through fines and redress.
At the beginning of April, alongside final guidance, we will publish an approach document. This will include detail on our enforcement priorities for the first 12 months of the new regime, with a focus on the most egregious harms. Today I’d like to preview some of those plans.
In recent months, we have consulted extensively on guidance for the new consumer regime, receiving constructive feedback from a range of stakeholders (including techUK). We have heard loud and clear that businesses – large and small – want to do the right thing for their customers and many are working hard to ensure they comply. But for smaller businesses especially, the compliance burden must be proportionate.
Taking that feedback on board, we will be streamlining the drafting of our Guidance on Unfair Commercial Practices considerably to make it as clear and accessible as possible, whilst retaining the case studies and examples which we know businesses and advisors find helpful. We’ll be publishing that final guidance in early April.
It is worth touching briefly on 2 areas where we received particular feedback, including from techUK, during our consultation.
This was where we received the most substantive feedback to our consultation. We want to reflect carefully on that feedback before finalising our position. So I am announcing today that we will take a phased approach to the guidance here. In April, we will provide a clear framework for complying with the parts of the law which are already well understood and largely unchanged. By this, I mean the prohibition of genuinely unexpected and untrailed mandatory charges added on at the end of a purchasing journey. These ‘dripped fees’ harm consumers, and fair dealing businesses, by hindering effective price competition – which we know primarily happens on headline prices.
For those aspects of the drip pricing guidance that have created more uncertainty (including fixed-term periodic contracts) we will run a further consultation on revised draft guidance in the summer, with a view to producing finalised guidance in this area in the autumn. In the meantime, we will only take enforcement action against drip pricing which clearly breaches the rules in line with the April guidance.
Fake reviews is a banned practice under the DMCCA. Although we can tackle fake reviews under our existing powers, and indeed you may have seen Google recently offered undertakings on this, we recognise that new provisions may require changes to systems and compliance programmes. We hear that you need time to bed these in, and so for the first 3 months of the new regime we will focus on supporting businesses with their compliance efforts rather than enforcement.
The remaining law where our new direct enforcement powers can be used hasn’t changed materially. However, we recognise that the risks of getting it wrong are changing substantially. Businesses have told us they are preparing to comply and will be relying on the clarity and certainty provided by our final guidance to be published at commencement in April.
Reflecting that, our early enforcement action is likely to focus on the most egregious breaches. For example, aggressive sales practices that prey on vulnerability; providing information to consumers that is objectively false; contract terms that are very obviously imbalanced and unfair.
At the same time, we will support the vast majority of well-intentioned businesses who want to do the right thing, but may be unclear on exactly what is needed to ensure compliance – especially in areas where the law has been updated or is less clear-cut. When considering the appropriate level for any penalty, we will also take into account where businesses have taken proactive steps to correct infringing conduct.
I am confident this approach will deliver robust protections for consumers, focusing on clearly illegal conduct that results in tangible harms. At the same time, it gives businesses the clarity to comply as quickly as possible – and the confidence that early enforcement action will be proportionate. This is, after all, in the interests of both businesses and consumers; when businesses get it right, consumers benefit.
I want to finish by broadening the lens for a moment, to the wider work the CMA does to support growth and investment in UK digital and technology markets.
In particular, we are supporting government on its industrial strategy and the roll-out of the AI Opportunities Action Plan. Whether it be through removing barriers to competition and scaling in priority sectors identified by the industrial strategy; unlocking opportunities for new and diverse players in cross-economy areas like procurement and smart data; or facilitating legitimate collaboration between businesses to achieve a step change in productivity and innovation – the CMA is committed to playing its part.
I know techUK and its members will provide valuable insights and collaboration across much of our work this year. I am looking forward to continuing to work closely together.
Published 10 March 2025
Secteur(s) :
Décision de contrôle des concentrations|
Publication du sens de la décision le : 10 mars 2025
Secteur(s) :
Décision de contrôle des concentrations|
Publication du sens de la décision le : 10 mars 2025
Secteur(s) :
Décision de contrôle des concentrations|
Publication du sens de la décision le : 10 mars 2025
Merger
Last decision date: 10.03.2025 Simplified procedure
https://webadvocacy.com.br/category/clipping-da-concorrencia
CADE – Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica
FTC – Federal Trade Commission
USDOJ – Departamento de Justiça dos EUA
Comissão Europeia – Autoridade da concorrência Europa
CMA – Autoridade da concorrência do Reino Unido
Autorité de la Concurrence – Autoridade da França
AdC -Autoridade da concorrência de Portugal
CNMC – Autoridade da concorrência da Espanha
CNDC – Autoridade da concorrência da Argentina
AGCM – Autoridade da concorrência da Itália
COFECE – Autoridade da concorrencia do México
Publicado em 10/03/2025 às 07h05 – Atualizado em 10/03/2025 às 07h27
Requerentes: SOFTYS S.A., FALCON DISTRIBUIÇÃO, ARMAZENAMENTO E TRANSPORTE S.A. ACTIVE INDÚSTRIA DE COSMÉTICOS S.A. (“ONTEX BRASIL”).
aprovação sem restrições.
Merger
Last decision date: 07.03.2025 Super simplified procedure
Em 5 de março de 2025, o Conselho de Administração da Autoridade da Concorrência, no uso da competência que lhe é conferida pela alínea d) do n.º 1 do artigo 19.º dos Estatutos, aprovados pelo Decreto-Lei n.º 125/2014, de 18 de agosto, delibera adotar uma decisão de não oposição à operação de concentração, nos termos da alínea b) do n.º 1 do artigo 50.º da Lei da Concorrência, uma vez que a mesma não é suscetível de criar entraves significativos à concorrência efetiva no mercado nacional ou numa parte substancial deste.
Em 5 de março de 2025, o Conselho de Administração da Autoridade da Concorrência, no uso da competência que lhe é conferida pela alínea d) do n.º 1 do artigo 19.º dos Estatutos, aprovados pelo Decreto-Lei n.º 125/2014, de 18 de agosto, declara extinto o procedimento correspondente à análise da operação Ccent. n.º 14/2025 – Growth Inov*Agile Content / Wetek, nos termos do artigo 131.º do Código do Procedimento Administrativo.
Em 5 de março de 2025, o Conselho de Administração da Autoridade da Concorrência, no uso da competência que lhe é conferida pela alínea d) do n.º 1 do artigo 19.º dos Estatutos, aprovados pelo Decreto-Lei n.º 125/2014, de 18 de agosto, delibera adotar uma decisão de não oposição à operação de concentração, nos termos da alínea b) do n.º 1 do artigo 50.º da Lei da Concorrência, uma vez que a mesma não é suscetível de criar entraves significativos à concorrência efetiva no mercado nacional ou numa parte substancial deste.
https://webadvocacy.com.br/category/clipping-da-concorrencia
CADE – Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica
FTC – Federal Trade Commission
USDOJ – Departamento de Justiça dos EUA
Comissão Europeia – Autoridade Europa
CMA – Autoridade do Reino Unido
Autorité de la Concurrence – Autoridade da França
AdC -Autoridade de Portugal
CNMC – Autoridade da Espanha
CNDC – Autoridade da Argentina
AGCM – Autoridade da Itália
COFECE – Autoridade do México
Este é um informativo diário que traz para o(a) leitor (a) notícias e casos de defesa da concorrência das principais jurisdições antitruste do mundo (CADE, FTC, Comissão Europeia, CMA etc).
Este é um informativo diário que traz para o(a) leitor (a) notícias e casos de defesa da concorrência das principais jurisdições antitruste do mundo (CADE, FTC, Comissão Europeia, CMA etc).
Este é um informativo diário que traz para o(a) leitor (a) notícias e casos de defesa da concorrência das principais jurisdições antitruste do mundo (CADE, FTC, Comissão Europeia, CMA etc).
