Este é um informativo diário que traz para o(a) leitor (a) notícias e casos de defesa da concorrência das principais jurisdições antitruste do mundo (CADE, FTC, Comissão Europeia, CMA etc).
Notícias
La CNDC y la Secretaría de Industria y Comercio impusieron una multa por notificación tardía en diciembre de 2024
La multa, que recae sobre la empresa Totalenergies, asciende a 484 millones de pesos argentinos.
06 de enero de 2025
El 30 de diciembre de 2024, y siguiendo la recomendación de la CNDC, el Secretario de Industria y Comercio impuso una multa a la empresa Totalenergies SE por notificar fuera del plazo legal la adquisición del control conjunto sobre la firma Total Eren Holding S.A. y su subsidiaria, la firma Total Eren S.A
En función de que la operación fue perfeccionada en diciembre de 2017, previo a la sanción de la Ley 27.442 de Defensa de la Competencia (LDC), vigente en la actualidad, la operación fue analizada bajo los parámetros de la ley vigente en el momento del cierre de la operación, Ley 25.156, y la multa por notificación tardía, calculada en función del criterio de dicha normativa.
En este sentido, la operación fue aprobada sin condicionamientos en los términos del artículo 13 de la Ley 25.156. Asimismo, la notificación de la adquisición mencionada se presentó con una demora de mil trescientos ochenta y un (1381) días hábiles administrativos, por lo que la CNDC decidió imponer una multa aplicando la norma anterior para la graduación de la sanción a la parte compradora.
En efecto, el Artículo 9° de Ley 25.156 dispone que, en caso de incumplimiento con el deber de notificar la concreción de una operación de concentración económica dentro del plazo estipulado, se aplicará la multa establecida en el Artículo 46, inciso d), la que puede ser fijada hasta el monto de $1.000.000 diarios. Asimismo, en lo que se refiere a la graduación de la multa, el Artículo 49 del mismo ordenamiento establece que la Autoridad de Aplicación deberá considerar la gravedad de la infracción, el daño causado, el tamaño del mercado afectado, la duración de la práctica o concentración y la reincidencia o antecedentes del responsable, así como también la capacidad económica.
En virtud de estos elementos, y considerando un conjunto de atenuantes, la CNDC estableció una multa de trescientos cincuenta mil pesos ($350.000) por cada día de retraso, lo que suma un total de $484.350.000.
DBT and CMA memorandum of understanding: international cooperation
Memorandum of understanding between the Department for Business and Trade (DBT) and the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) regarding international cooperation on competition and consumer law enforcement.
The Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers (DMCC) Act introduced provisions to enhance cooperation between the UK’s competition and consumer authorities and their overseas counterparts.
This MoU sets out expectations, roles and responsibilities related to cooperation between DBT and the CMA on matters including:
the disclosure of relevant information for use in civil and criminal investigations and proceedings
the provision of investigative assistance to overseas regulators, and
Partes: Pontal 2 Geração de Energia e Participações S.A., RZK Energia S.A., RZK Soluções e Participações S.A., RZK Energia Fundo de Investimentos em Participações Infraestrutura e NM RZK Energia Fundo de Investimentos em Participações Infraestrutura. Aprovação sem restrições.
Este é um informativo diário que traz para o(a) leitor (a) notícias e casos de defesa da concorrência das principais jurisdições antitruste do mundo (CADE, FTC, Comissão Europeia, CMA etc).
Notícias
La CNMC sanciona a Corporación Alimentaria Peñasanta S. A. con 135.000 euros
Compró la empresa Lácteas Flor de Burgos en diciembre de 2023 y lo notificó meses más tarde.
Antes de ejecutar una adquisición, las compañías están obligadas a notificárselo a la CNMC
La Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia (CNMC) ha multado a Corporación Alimentaria Peñasanta, S. A. (CAPSA) con 135.000 euros por adquirir, en diciembre de 2023, la empresa Lácteas Flor de Burgos S. L. sin haberlo notificado previamente (SNC/DC/045/24).
Esta práctica, conocida como gun jumping en el argot de competencia, supone incumplir el artículo 9.1 de la Ley 15/2007, de 3 de julio, de Defensa de la Competencia (LDC), que obliga a las empresas a notificar sus adquisiciones a la CNMC antes de ejecutarlas.
Retraso de varios meses
CAPSA adquirió el control exclusivo de Flor de Burgos mediante un contrato de compraventa de 20 de diciembre de 2023, formalizado el 27 de diciembre de 2023, según informó a la CNMC tres meses después —ya en marzo de 2024—.
La notificación formal de la operación tuvo lugar el 8 de abril. El 17 de abril de 2024, la CNMC aprobó la compra en primera fase (C/1459/24). En septiembre de 2024, inició un procedimiento sancionador contra CAPSA por haber incumplido su deber de notificación.
Tras instruir el expediente, la CNMC declara a CAPSA responsable de una infracción grave del artículo 62.3.b) de la LDC y le impone una sanción de 135.000 euros.
Contra esta resolución podrá interponerse directamente recurso contencioso-administrativo ante la Audiencia Nacional en el plazo de dos meses a partir del día siguiente al de su notificación.
Documento no oficial, destinado a los medios de comunicación, y que no vincula a la CNMC. Reproducción permitida solo si se cita la fuente.
La CNDC modifica los criterios de inclusión y exclusión para el PROSUM
La disposición modifica los criterios de elegibilidad para que una operación de concentración pueda tramitar bajo el «procedimiento sumario», conforme lo prevé la Resolución 905/2023
03 de enero de 2025
El 3 de enero de 2025, se publicó en el Boletín Oficial la Disposición 156/2024 de la Comisión Nacional de Defensa de la Competencia (CNDC), la cual establece modificaciones en los criterios de inclusión y exclusión para que una operación de concentración económica pueda tramitar bajo el «procedimiento sumario» (PROSUM), que fuera reglamentado por la Resolución 905/2023 de la entonces Secretaría de Comercio.
La Resolución (ex) SC 905/2023 aprobó el «Reglamento para la Notificación de Operaciones de Concentración Económica», aplicable a todos los actos de concentración que se notifiquen para su autorización de acuerdo a lo dispuesto en el Capítulo III de la Ley 27.442 de Defensa de la Competencia (LDC). La resolución delegó en la CNDC determinar los criterios de elegibilidad que una operación de concentración económica debe reunir para que pueda tramitar bajo el PROSUM, que fueron establecidos por medio de la Disposición 62/2023 de la CNDC
La Disposición 156/2024 modifica estos criterios de inclusión y exclusión, basándose en la experiencia acumulada por la CNDC desde la implementación de los criterios originales, con el objetivo de incorporar nuevas pautas y realizar aclaraciones sobre determinados artículos de la Resolución SC 905/2023.
La CNDC considera que las modificaciones implementadas contribuirán a optimizar los recursos administrativos del organismo, fomentar un entorno regulatorio previsible que promueva la inversión y la competitividad, y garantizarán un análisis eficiente de los actos de concentración económica, en línea con lo establecido en la LDC.
Los cambios en los criterios para que una operación de concentración económica pueda tramitarse bajo el PROSUM que se describen a continuación.
Respecto a las concentraciones horizontales, se estableció que la participación de mercado conjunta en cada uno de los mercados relevantes afectados por la transacción notificada debe ser inferior al 50% (y no inferior al 35%, como se estipulaba originalmente), y el aumento del IHH debe ser menor a 150 puntos, para poder tramitar bajo el procedimiento sumario.
Respecto a los criterios de exclusión, se estableció que una operación de concentración económica no podrá tramitar bajo el PROSUM cuando un ente regulador, en ocasión de tomar la intervención que le compete en los términos del artículo 17 de la Ley 27.442, se oponga expresamente a la transacción notificada.
Asimismo, la nueva disposición eliminó los siguientes criterios de exclusión del PROSUM:
Cuando la operación notificada supone la creación de una empresa en participación (joint venture) por parte de empresas que permanecen independientes;
Cuando, en un cambio de control de conjunto a exclusivo, se presente alguna de las siguientes situaciones:
La empresa que adquiere el control exclusivo de la entidad objeto es a su vez competidora directa de dicha entidad, siempre que la participación de mercado sea sustancialmente alta.
La autoridad de aplicación no hubiera examinado la operación previa de adquisición del control conjunto respecto de la entidad objeto por parte de la empresa que adquiere el control la empresa que deja de ser controlante en virtud de la operación notificada.
Cuando, en forma contemporánea a la operación, la adquirente o la objeto tengan participaciones societarias en empresa/s competidora/s que sean superiores al 5% del capital social o de los votos.
Este é um informativo diário que traz para o(a) leitor (a) notícias e casos de defesa da concorrência das principais jurisdições antitruste do mundo (CADE, FTC, Comissão Europeia, CMA etc).
Notícias
Statement of Chair Lina M. Khan Joined by Commissioners Rebecca Kelly Slaughter and Alvaro M. Bedoya In the Matter of The Kroger Company and Albertsons Companies, Inc.
Requerentes: Fortis 333, Inc., INEOS Composites Holdings Company (UK) Limited, INEOS Enterprises US Holdco LLC, INEOS Composites International Holdings LLC e INEOS Composites Finland Oy. Aprovação sem restrições.D
Este é um informativo diário que traz para o(a) leitor (a) notícias e casos de defesa da concorrência das principais jurisdições antitruste do mundo (CADE, FTC, Comissão Europeia, CMA etc).
Notícias
Prioridades 2025: AdC quer contribuir para crescimento económico, investimento e inovação
Comunicado 28/2024 30 de dezembro de 2024
A Autoridade da Concorrência (AdC) publica hoje na sua página eletrónica as Prioridades de Política de Concorrência para 2025. A AdC orienta-se pelo critério do interesse público na promoção e defesa da concorrência, podendo atribuir diferentes graus de prioridade às questões analisadas. As Prioridades da Política de Concorrência para o ano seguinte são divulgadas no último trimestre de cada ano, garantindo uma visão clara e estratégica sobre os objetivos da AdC, mas sem qualquer referência setorial no que se refere ao exercício dos poderes sancionatórios. As prioridades pretendem contribuir para o crescimento económico, o investimento e a inovação, nomeadamente, através da recomendação de remoção de barreiras à entrada e expansão em diversos setores da economia nacional. Assim, para 2025, as prioridades da AdC incluem:
Combate a práticas anticoncorrenciais A AdC intensificará os esforços para investigar práticas anticoncorrenciais que geram maior impacto negativo na economia e nos consumidores, como cartéis e outras práticas horizontais, com especial atenção aos setores da contratação pública e dos mercados de trabalho. Paralelamente, a AdC continuará a examinar restrições verticais e decisões tomadas por associações empresariais que lesem a concorrência. A capacidade de deteção proativa de infrações será reforçada pela concretização de novos modelos de organização interna e pela utilização mais generalizada de ferramentas de informática forense. O instituto da clemência continuará a ser promovido como um instrumento essencial para combater práticas anticoncorrenciais.
Abuso de posição dominante A deteção e investigação de abusos de posição dominante será uma prioridade, especialmente em setores de elevada relevância económica e impacto direto nos consumidores.
Controlo de operações de concentração A análise de operações de concentração continuará a ser realizada de forma célere e rigorosa. Será dada especial atenção às cláusulas restritivas acessórias. A AdC iniciará também uma reflexão sobre a adequação do atual regime jurídico aplicável ao controlo das concentrações, em especial no que se refere a mercados caraterizados por elevada dinâmica de inovação.
Promoção da concorrência A AdC lançará um ciclo de divulgação e diálogo com setores estruturantes da economia portuguesa, destinado a reforçar a perceção dos agentes para a importância do combate ao conluio na contratação pública e para a promoção de mercados de trabalho competitivos e para a interação entre concorrência e sustentabilidade.
Acompanhamento da economia digital e da inteligência artificial (IA) A AdC acompanhará a evolução dos mercados digitais, não só na perspetiva de identificação de potenciais constrangimentos jusconcorrenciais, como também tendo em vista a aplicação do Regulamento dos Mercados Digitais (DMA), em estreita colaboração com a Comissão Europeia. A AdC continuará a explorar os impactos do desenvolvimento da IA generativa na política de concorrência, incluindo a publicação de análises temáticas que, além de promoverem a contestabilidade, previnam que estrangulamentos no mercado se materializem numa consolidação do poder de mercado.
Implementação de tecnologias inovadoras Para fortalecer a sua capacidade de deteção de práticas anticoncorrenciais, a AdC introduzirá ferramentas de informática forense inovadoras, integrando a Inteligência Artificial nos processos de investigação.
Luz Saúde e C2 MedCapital notificam a aquisição do controlo conjunto sobre o Grupo Hospitalar das Beiras, a Infrapetagi e o Hospital de Loulé
Guidance on the CMA’s procedure and approach to its assessment when reviewing mergers involving energy network enterprises. From: Competition and Markets Authority Published3 April 2024 Last updated2 January 2025 — See all updates Get emails about this page
This guidance provides advice and general information on the Competition and Markets Authority’s procedures and assessment in energy network mergers in Great Britain under the Enterprise Act 2002 as amended by the Energy Act 2023.
2 January 2025: updated guidance published
The guidance has been updated to reflect the changes introduced by the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024 which commenced on 1 January 2025.
Mergers exceptions to the duty to refer and undertakings in lieu
How the CMA applies exceptions to the duty to refer in operating the merger control regime. From: Competition and Markets Authority Published12 March 2014Last updated 2 January 2025 — ee all updates Get emails about this page
This document provides guidance on the circumstances where the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) has a discretion not to make a reference for a Phase 2 investigation despite the fact that there is a realistic prospect that the merger will lead to a substantial lessening of competition (SLC).
Those circumstances are:
when the markets concerned are not of sufficient importance to justify a reference
in the case of anticipated mergers, when the arrangements concerned are insufficiently far advanced, or insufficiently likely to proceed, to justify a reference; or
when any relevant customer benefits arising from the merger outweigh the SLC concerned and any adverse effects of the SLC concerned
2 January 2025: revised guidance published
The guidance has been updated to draw a distinction between the markets of insufficient importance exception to the duty to refer and the new hybrid jurisdictional test introduced by the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024 (DMCCA24) which commenced on 1 January 2025.
The revised guidance replaces the previous version of the Mergers: Exceptions to the duty to refer (dated 25 April 2024).
Mergers – the CMA’s jurisdiction and procedure: CMA2
Guidance for businesses and their advisers on CMA’s procedures for operating the merger control regime under the Enterprise Act 2002. From: Competition and Markets Authority Published10 January 2014 Last updated2 January 2025 — See all updates Get emails about this page
This guidance provides advice and general information to companies and their advisers on the procedures used by the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) in operating the merger control regime set out in the Enterprise Act 2002, as amended. It also includes guidance on when the CMA will have jurisdiction to review mergers under the Act.
This guidance reflects the jurisdictional and procedural changes to the mergers regime made by the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024 (DMCCA24) which commenced on 1 January 2025.
Any merger that qualifies for reference for a phase 2 investigation is subject to a fee. This is irrespective of whether a reference is made. Further information on the fees and how to pay them are in the merger fees information document.
Summary of transitional provisions
The parts of the 2025 revised guidance dealing with the DMCC Act changes related to jurisdiction, ie the increased turnover threshold (paragraphs 4.3, and 4.52 to 4.57), the share of supply test incorporating the new safe harbour threshold (paragraphs 4.58 to 4.71), and the new hybrid test (paragraphs 4.72 to 4.91) will apply to (i) completed mergers where completion took place on or after 1 January 2025 and (ii) anticipated mergers where the formal Phase 1 investigation (ie the start of the 40 working day initial period) commences on or after 1 January 2025. Chapter 4 of the April 2024 guidance will continue to apply to (i) completed cases where completion took place prior to 1 January 2025, (ii) anticipated cases where the formal Phase 1 investigation (ie the start of the 40 working day initial period) commenced prior to 1 January 2025. For the avoidance of doubt, Chapter 4 of the 2024 guidance will also apply to all cases referred to phase 2 prior to 1 January 2025.
The parts of the 2025 revised guidance dealing with the new statutory phase 2 fast track process (paragraphs 7.13 to 7.26) will apply to mergers (excluding mergers of water enterprises and mergers of energy networks) where the formal Phase 1 investigation (ie start of the 40 working day initial period) commences on or after 1 January 2025. The administrative fast track process explained in the April 2024 guidance (paragraphs 7.14 to 7.17) will continue to apply to all cases where the formal Phase 1 investigation (ie the start of the 40 working day initial period) commenced prior to 1 January 2025.
The parts of the 2025 revised guidance dealing with the extension of the phase 2 timetable by mutual agreement between the CMA and the merger parties (paragraph 11.70) will apply to mergers (including energy and public interest mergers) referred to Phase 2 on or after 1 January 2025. The extensions explained in the April 2024 guidance (paragraphs 11.69 and 11.70) will continue to apply to all cases referred to Phase 2 prior to 1 January 2025.
The parts of the 2025 revised guidance dealing with penalties for supplying false or misleading information (paragraphs 9.34 to 9.37) will apply to cases where false or misleading information was provided in relation to a section 109 notice or a section 5 information request issued on or after 1 January 2025. The April 2024 guidance (paragraphs 9.12 and 9.18) will apply to false or misleading information provided in relation to a section 109 notice or a section 5 information request issued prior to 1 January 2025.
The parts of the 2025 revised guidance dealing with penalties for breaches of section 109 notices (paragraphs 9.38 to 9.43) will apply in relation to section 109 notices issued on or after 1 January 2025. The April 2024 guidance (paragraphs 9.11, 9.19, and 11.22) will apply in relation to section 109 notices issued prior to 1 January 2025.
Updates to this page
Published 10 January 2014 Last updated 2 January 2025 + show all updates
Requerentes: Salinas Administração e Participações S.A., Unimed-Rio Participações e Investimentos S.A. e Domus Cuidados e Serviços em Saúde S.A. Aprovação sem restrições.
Requerentes: Melnick Desenvolvimento Imobiliário S.A., Even SP 105 Empreendimentos Imobiliários Ltda., Even Construtora e Incorporadora S.A. e Evenpar Participações Societárias Ltda. Aprovação sem restrições.
Requerentes: Goldcup 101357 AB (alteração de nome pendente para Mohinder FinCo AB), MacGregor Pte Ltd, MacGregor Norway AS e Cargotec Corporation. Aprovação sem restrições.
Este é um informativo diário que traz para o(a) leitor (a) notícias e casos de defesa da concorrência das principais jurisdições antitruste do mundo (CADE, FTC, Comissão Europeia, CMA etc).
Notícias
Superintendência-Geral do Cade recomenda condenação de empresa de tecnologia em cartel internacional
Prática impactou mercado global de componentes de discos rígidos
Publicado em 27/12/2024 11h37 Atualizado em 27/12/2024 13h59
Nesta sexta-feira (27/12), a Superintendência-Geral do Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (SG/Cade) recomendou a condenação de uma empresa e três pessoas físicas pela prática de cartel internacional no mercado global de suspension assemblies, com efeitos no Brasil.
O suspensions assembly é um componente de discos rígidos (HDs) que, por sua vez, funcionam como um sistema de armazenamento de dados e são usados em diversos dispositivos, como computadores pessoais (PCs – desktops e laptops), gravadores de vídeo, jogos, leitores de MP3, navegação, sistemas para carros e telefones celulares.
Segundo a SG/Cade, o cartel teria atuado de forma coordenada para estabelecer acordos anticompetitivos envolvendo a divisão de mercado, a combinação de preços em resposta a pedidos de cotação de clientes e a troca de informações comercial e concorrencialmente sensíveis, consolidando, assim, o controle do mercado.
As irregularidades teriam sido registradas, ao menos, pelo período de 2003 até abril de 2016.
Agora, o processo será enviado ao Tribunal Administrativo do Cade e será distribuído a um conselheiro-relator para posterior decisão do colegiado. Se condenada, a empresa estará sujeita ao pagamento de multa de até 20% de seu faturamento bruto, enquanto os administradores eventualmente responsáveis pela infração podem pagar até 20% do valor aplicado à empresa.
Market Study on Transactions Between Performers and Entertainment Agencies in the Music and Broadcasting Industry (Market Study on Ensuring Fair Transactions to Support Creators)
December 26, 2024 Japan Fair Trade Commission
1. Purpose of the Market Study Content such as animation, music, broadcasting programs, films, games, and manga are proud assets of Japan. With advancements in technology, the source of competitiveness in content creation is increasingly shifting to individual creators. On the other hand, there is a growing demand to address transactional practices that hinder appropriate return of earnings to creators, in order to establish an environment where individual creators can fully realize their creative potential.
The Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) has undertaken various initiatives to promote fair and free competition in the human resource and entertainment fields. These efforts include the publication of the “Report of Study Group on Human Resource and Competition Policy” by the Competition Policy Research Center in February 2018 and the release of “Examples of Practices in the Entertainment Sector That May Violate the Antimonopoly Act” in September 2019.
Subsequently, the Content Industry Revitalization Strategy (formulated and specified in the “Grand Design and Action Plan for a New Form of Capitalism 2024 Revised Version,” approved by the Cabinet on June 21, 2024) stated “It is essential to correct trade practices in order to create a comfortable working environment for performers and others. In light of the current technological innovation, the content industry is shifting its emphasis to individual creativity. With the cooperation of the Japan Fair Trade Commission, we will conduct a fact-finding survey on trade practices in the music and broadcast program fields with an emphasis on preventing abuse of a superior bargaining position and protecting individuals, ….”
In light of these circumstances, the JFTC conducted a market study on contracts and other arrangements between performers in fields such as music and broadcasting (including artists, actors, and talents) and the entertainment agencies or production companies they are affiliated with (hereinafter referred to simply as “entertainment agencies”). This initiative aims to establish a transactional environment where individual creators can fully realize their creative potential.
2. Methods of Study (1) Questionnaire From August to November 2024, a questionnaire was conducted targeting 2,628 entertainment agencies. A total of 810 responses were received, resulting in a response rate of 30.8%.
(2) Voluntary Interview From April to November 2024, interviews were conducted with a total of 95 persons and entities, as outlined below. Performers: 29 persons Entertainment Agencies: 37 entities Broadcasting Companies and Program Production Companies: 10 entities Record Companies: 8 entities Industry Organizations: 9 entities Experts (Lawyers): 2 persons
(3) Information Submission Form In April 2024, the JFTC launched an information submission form on its official website. By November 2024, a total of 901 submissions were received.
3. Study Results Please refer to the main report, summary, and key points for details.
Analiza un proyecto de Orden Ministerial y un proyecto de Convenio entre la Jefatura de Tráfico y la Asociación de Desguace del Automóvil (AEDRA).
Los cursos teóricos del permiso de moto podrían impartirse no solo en presencial y debería examinarse la reserva de actividad de las autoescuelas.
En vez de un convenio bilateral entre Tráfico y AEDRA, sería más recomendable tramitar las bajas de los vehículos a través de otro sistema.
La Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia (CNMC) ha analizado el proyecto de Orden Ministerial (POM) por el que se regula la formación para el acceso progresivo al permiso de conducción de la clase A (IPN/CNMC/029/24) y el proyecto de convenio entre la Jefatura Central de Tráfico y la Asociación Española de Desguace y Reciclaje del Automóvil (AEDRA) (INF/CNMC/183/24).
Permiso de clase A
La norma regula el contenido y duración del curso teórico y práctico para obtener el permiso de clase A —permite conducir cualquier tipo de motocicletas y triciclos de motor—. Además, considera a las autoescuelas los únicos centros autorizados para impartir los cursos.
Las limitaciones de la norma deben adecuarse a los principios de buena regulación. La CNMC recomienda:
Permitir que la formación teórica del curso pueda ser presencial, online o híbrida.
Si se mantiene que sea presencial, considerar el impacto negativo sobre la competencia y justificarlo bajo los citados principios.
Desarrollar el reglamento pendiente para evitar la reserva de actividad de los centros autorizados para impartir la formación.
Considerar que los alumnos puedan aportar los vehículos para el curso, o que la escuela acredite que está facultada para utilizar estos vehículos.
Justificar la prohibición de aplazar los cursos en más de una ocasión y especificar que se realizará sin coste para el alumno.
Convenio entre Tráfico y AEDRA
Digitalizar los expedientes de baja definitiva que gestionan los centros autorizados de tratamiento de vehículos es el objetivo del convenio.
La CNMC lo considera positivo, pero propone al Ministerio del Interior utilizar alternativas al convenio —como instrucciones regulatorias o actuaciones de aprovisionamiento—. Estas no plantean riesgos para la competencia, como podría ser fortalecer la posición de los operadores, AEDRA en este caso.
En caso de mantener el convenio, recomienda:
Garantizar la no exclusividad a la hora de firmar convenios análogos con otros operadores.
Asegurar un acceso a la plataforma de digitalización de expedientes en igualdad de condiciones a todos los operadores.
Verificar que ni AEDRA ni los centros autorizados de tratamiento de vehículos tengan acceso a información comercial sensible.
Garantizar la neutralidad tecnológica
La CNMC puede actuar de oficio (de acuerdo con el artículo 5.1.h de la Ley 3/2013, de 4 de junio, de creación de la Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia) o a petición de las Cámaras Legislativas, el Gobierno, los departamentos ministeriales, las Comunidades Autónomas, las Corporaciones locales, los Colegios Profesionales, las Cámaras de Comercio y las Organizaciones Empresariales y de Consumidores y Usuarios (de acuerdo con su artículo 5.2).
El Consejo General de Protésicos Dentales debería reconsiderar algunas de las medidas de su futuro Código deontológico
Incluye aspectos muy restrictivos sobre la base de conceptos que pueden generar inseguridad jurídica en los propios protésicos.
Son deberes que no están justificados por razones de interés general, como es la protección de la salud pública de los pacientes.
La normativa exige a la CNMC informar sobre las propuestas de Códigos deontológicos.
La Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia (CNMC) considera que el futuro Código deontológico del Consejo General de Colegios de Protésicos Dentales de España contiene artículos que deberían ser más proporcionales y menos restrictivos. (INF/CNMC/125/24).
Los protésicos dentales son profesionales que se dedican al diseño, preparación, elaboración, fabricación y reparación de prótesis dentales. Estas únicamente pueden ser prescritas y colocadas al paciente por un odontólogo.
La legislación diferencia entre la actividad de ambos profesionales (protésicos y odontólogos) y señala que debe ejercerse en libre competencia y respetando el derecho de los pacientes a elegir a su protésico dental.
Nuevo código
La CNMC es responsable de analizar las propuestas de códigos deontológicos profesionales aplicando la normativa derivada del test de proporcionalidad, obligatorio para las normas que regulan el acceso y ejercicio de profesiones en la Unión Europea (Real Decreto 472/2021).
El Consejo General de Protésicos plantea algunos artículos muy restrictivos, como evitar que el odontólogo o dentista —cuando prescribe una prótesis a un paciente— intermedie en dicha relación o que el protésico tenga una relación de dependencia económica con respecto a aquel.
Por tanto, debe reforzarse la argumentación para probar que el ordenamiento jurídico no es suficiente para proteger la salud de los pacientes y que el ejercicio de la profesión de los protésicos y su relación con los odontólogos —en los términos problemáticos en que, según el Consejo general, se está aparentemente produciendo en la práctica— supone también un riesgo para los pacientes y explicar de qué manera y en qué grado las medidas concretas del Código contribuirán a alcanzar los objetivos perseguidos.
El informe señala que buena parte de los conceptos son jurídicamente indeterminados (por ejemplo, no se define qué debe considerarse dependencia económica o si toda intermediación del dentista asesorando al paciente debe considerarse prohibida) por lo que van a introducir inseguridad jurídica en los propios protésicos, ya que no hay que olvidar las consecuencias disciplinarias que conllevaría su incumplimiento.
Recomendaciones
Reforzar la justificación de los objetivos de interés público que persiguen ciertas medidas y su proporcionalidad, de acuerdo con la normativa.
Reconsiderar las obligaciones impuestas a los protésicos y analizar alternativas menos restrictivas, pero igual de efectivas, como garantizar que los dentistas informan a los pacientes sobre su derecho de elección, o clarificar el precio de los servicios protésicos en los presupuestos y facturas.
Eliminar cualquier obligación de colegiarse mientras no esté contemplada en ley estatal, sin perjuicio de la normativa autonómica vigente.
Garantizar la existencia de canales de denuncia anónimos de comportamientos ilícitos entre compañeros con las debidas garantías de protección del denunciante.
Replantear la prohibición relativa a la publicidad comparativa para ajustarla a las previsiones de la Ley de Competencia Desleal.
Eliminar juicios de valor a la hora de referirse a los honorarios y precisar que su fijación será libre, en consonancia con la normativa de defensa de la competencia.
Aclarar el régimen disciplinario aplicable y que la intervención del colegio vía conciliación o arbitraje es voluntaria y adicional a otras formas de reclamación.
La CNMC puede actuar de oficio (de acuerdo con elartículo 5.1.hde la Ley de creación de la CNMC) o a petición de las Cámaras Legislativas, el Gobierno, los departamentos ministeriales, las Comunidades Autónomas, las Corporaciones locales, los Colegios Profesionales, las Cámaras de Comercio y las Organizaciones Empresariales y de Consumidores y Usuarios (artículo 5.2).
Boyden notifica a aquisição do controlo exclusivo sobre um conjunto de Ativos da Stahl Holdings.
Requerentes: Electra Hydra Participações Societárias Ltda., Pitangui Geração de Energia S.A., Salto do Vau S.A., Melissa Geração de Energia S.A., Chopim I S.A., Marumbi Geração de Energia S.A., São Jorge S.A., Apucaraninha S.A., Palmas Energias Renováveis S.A., Cavernoso I Geração de Energia S.A., Cavernoso II Geração de Energia S.A., Chaminé Geração de Energia S.A., Guaricana Geração de Energia S.A., UTE Figueira S.A. e Copel Geração e Transmissão S.A. Aprovação sem restrições.
Arila Fundo de Investimento Financeiro Multimercado, DIA Brasil Sociedade Limitada – Em Recuperação Judicial, DBZ Administração, Gestão de Ativos e Serviços Imobiliários Ltda. – Em Recuperação Judicial e Lyra Fundo de Investimento Multimercado Crédito Privado Investimento no Exterior. Aprovação sem restrições.
Partes: Plano Fosfato Empreendimentos Imobiliários Ltda., São José Desenvolvimento Imobiliário 18 Ltda., Jorge’s Imóveis e Participações Ltda. e Frec Desenvolvimento Imobiliário Ltda. Aprovação sem restrições.
Este é um informativo diário que traz para o(a) leitor (a) notícias e casos de defesa da concorrência das principais jurisdições antitruste do mundo (CADE, FTC, Comissão Europeia, CMA etc).
Notícias
Market Study on Transactions Between Performers and Entertainment Agencies in the Music and Broadcasting Industry (Market Study on Ensuring Fair Transactions to Support Creators)
December 26, 2024 Japan Fair Trade Commission
1. Purpose of the Market Study Content such as animation, music, broadcasting programs, films, games, and manga are proud assets of Japan. With advancements in technology, the source of competitiveness in content creation is increasingly shifting to individual creators. On the other hand, there is a growing demand to address transactional practices that hinder appropriate return of earnings to creators, in order to establish an environment where individual creators can fully realize their creative potential.
The Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) has undertaken various initiatives to promote fair and free competition in the human resource and entertainment fields. These efforts include the publication of the “Report of Study Group on Human Resource and Competition Policy” by the Competition Policy Research Center in February 2018 and the release of “Examples of Practices in the Entertainment Sector That May Violate the Antimonopoly Act” in September 2019.
Subsequently, the Content Industry Revitalization Strategy (formulated and specified in the “Grand Design and Action Plan for a New Form of Capitalism 2024 Revised Version,” approved by the Cabinet on June 21, 2024) stated “It is essential to correct trade practices in order to create a comfortable working environment for performers and others. In light of the current technological innovation, the content industry is shifting its emphasis to individual creativity. With the cooperation of the Japan Fair Trade Commission, we will conduct a fact-finding survey on trade practices in the music and broadcast program fields with an emphasis on preventing abuse of a superior bargaining position and protecting individuals, ….”
In light of these circumstances, the JFTC conducted a market study on contracts and other arrangements between performers in fields such as music and broadcasting (including artists, actors, and talents) and the entertainment agencies or production companies they are affiliated with (hereinafter referred to simply as “entertainment agencies”). This initiative aims to establish a transactional environment where individual creators can fully realize their creative potential.
2. Methods of Study (1) Questionnaire From August to November 2024, a questionnaire was conducted targeting 2,628 entertainment agencies. A total of 810 responses were received, resulting in a response rate of 30.8%.
(2) Voluntary Interview From April to November 2024, interviews were conducted with a total of 95 persons and entities, as outlined below. Performers: 29 persons Entertainment Agencies: 37 entities Broadcasting Companies and Program Production Companies: 10 entities Record Companies: 8 entities Industry Organizations: 9 entities Experts (Lawyers): 2 persons
(3) Information Submission Form In April 2024, the JFTC launched an information submission form on its official website. By November 2024, a total of 901 submissions were received.
3. Study Results Please refer to the main report, summary, and key points for details.
Este é um informativo diário que traz para o(a) leitor (a) notícias e casos de defesa da concorrência das principais jurisdições antitruste do mundo (CADE, FTC, Comissão Europeia, CMA etc).
Notícias
Superintendência-Geral do Cade aprova operação envolvendo as empresas Amil e Dasa
Joint Venture envolve controle de hospitais, clínicas oncológicas e clínicas médicas
Publicado em 24/12/2024 12h56
ASuperintendência-Geral do Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (SG/Cade) aprovou, nesta terça-feira (24), a operação referente à combinação dos ativos da Amil e da Dasa. Por meio da transação, 25 hospitais, seis clínicas oncológicas e seis clínicas médicas, anteriormente pertencentes a Amil e Dasa, passarão a ser controlados pela Ímpar Serviços Hospitalares, joint venture de gestão compartilhada entre as duas empresas.
A Amil e seu grupo controlador atuam em todo território nacional na oferta de planos de saúde médico-hospitalares e de planos odontológicos. O grupo possui ainda hospitais e centros médicos, além de contar com rede credenciada de médicos, hospitais, clínicas e laboratórios. Já a Dasa atua no mercado de serviço de apoio diagnóstico (SAD) em seus laboratórios, bem como no mercado de hospitais gerais, clínicas médicas e clínicas odontológicas.
A operação implicará em sobreposição horizontal, ou seja, atuação conjunta das duas empresas, nos mercados de hospitais gerais, centros médicos, hemodinâmica e SAD nos municípios do Rio de Janeiro/RJ, São Paulo/SP e Brasília/DF. Nos serviços de oncologia ambulatorial, a sobreposição foi identificada nesses mesmos municípios, além da cidade de Niterói/RJ.
No entanto, a análise conduzida pela SG/Cade indica a presença de elementos de entrada e rivalidade suficientes para afastar a probabilidade de exercício de poder de mercado por parte das empresas em todos os mercados relevantes.
Já em relação à verticalização, a operação resultará na integração vertical entre diversas atividades desempenhadas pela joint venture, incluindo serviços de apoio diagnóstico (SAD), hospitais gerais, centros médicos, hemodinâmica e oncologia ambulatorial (quimioterapia), com os serviços de planos de saúde oferecidos pela Amil. Além disso, a operação gerará integração vertical entre os serviços de apoio a terceiros prestados pela Dasa e os serviços de SAD fornecidos pela Amil, bem como entre a distribuição de medicamentos e materiais médico-hospitalares, incluindo vacinas, realizada pela Dasa, e os serviços de planos de saúde ofertados pela Amil.
Sobre essa questão, a análise da SG/Cade indicou que a operação não acarretaria risco de fechamento de mercado.
Acesse o ato de concentração nº 08700.006781/2024-46.
Private Motor Insurance Market Investigation Order 2015
The order provides measures to increase competition in the car insurance market and reduce the cost of premiums for drivers.
Este é um informativo diário que traz para o(a) leitor (a) notícias e casos de defesa da concorrência das principais jurisdições antitruste do mundo (CADE, FTC, Comissão Europeia, CMA etc).
Notícias
【The 7th CPRC Osaka Symposium】Statement by the Secretary General at a regular press conference (December 18, 2024)
December 18, 2024 Japan Fair Trade Commission
The 7th CPRC Osaka Symposium
Today, I would like to introduce the 7th Osaka Symposium to be held by the Competition Policy Research Center (CPRC) on Friday, January 24, 2025. The symposium is scheduled to take place at a venue in Osaka Prefecture and will also be accessible online. We just started accepting registrations for participation today.
The theme of this symposium is “Civil Litigation in Antimonopoly Cases.” The Antimonopoly Act (the Act) provides civil remedies in the form of claims for damages and injunctions. These remedies allow enterprises and consumers who have suffered damage due to violations of the Act to take independent measures to prevent further harm or recover their losses.
This symposium will include lectures and a panel discussion regarding civil litigation under the Act including the claims by researchers and practitioners of the Act on the current situation of the utilization in Japan, issues for its further utilization, the role to be played by the JFTC, and comparisons with other countries.
The civil remedies system under the Act was established in 2001, and nearly a quarter-century has passed since then. However, there are opinions that it has not been fully utilized. Furthermore, some suggest that the JFTC’s enforcements and recommendations should be leveraged more effectively in civil litigation. At this symposium, discussions among experts on the future direction of civil remedies will provide meaningful insights and contribute significantly to the ongoing development of this system.
Details about the symposium, including the speakers and lecture topics, are available in the flyer (in Japanese) we are distributing. The event is supported by the Kansai Economic Federation and co-organized by the Osaka Bar Association, the Osaka Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Japan Electronics and Information Technology Industries Association, the Fair Trade Institute, the Kobe University Center for Social Systems Innovation, etc.
We encourage your active participation.
El Consejo General de Protésicos Dentales debería reconsiderar algunas de las medidas de su futuro Código deontológico
Incluye aspectos muy restrictivos sobre la base de conceptos que pueden generar inseguridad jurídica en los propios protésicos.
Son deberes que no están justificados por razones de interés general, como es la protección de la salud pública de los pacientes.
La normativa exige a la CNMC informar sobre las propuestas de Códigos deontológicos.
La Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia (CNMC) considera que el futuro Código deontológico del Consejo General de Colegios de Protésicos Dentales de España contiene artículos que deberían ser más proporcionales y menos restrictivos. (INF/CNMC/125/24).
Los protésicos dentales son profesionales que se dedican al diseño, preparación, elaboración, fabricación y reparación de prótesis dentales. Estas únicamente pueden ser prescritas y colocadas al paciente por un odontólogo.
La legislación diferencia entre la actividad de ambos profesionales (protésicos y odontólogos) y señala que debe ejercerse en libre competencia y respetando el derecho de los pacientes a elegir a su protésico dental.
Nuevo código
La CNMC es responsable de analizar las propuestas de códigos deontológicos profesionales aplicando la normativa derivada del test de proporcionalidad, obligatorio para las normas que regulan el acceso y ejercicio de profesiones en la Unión Europea (Real Decreto 472/2021).
El Consejo General de Protésicos plantea algunos artículos muy restrictivos, como evitar que el odontólogo o dentista —cuando prescribe una prótesis a un paciente— intermedie en dicha relación o que el protésico tenga una relación de dependencia económica con respecto a aquel.
Por tanto, debe reforzarse la argumentación para probar que el ordenamiento jurídico no es suficiente para proteger la salud de los pacientes y que el ejercicio de la profesión de los protésicos y su relación con los odontólogos —en los términos problemáticos en que, según el Consejo general, se está aparentemente produciendo en la práctica— supone también un riesgo para los pacientes y explicar de qué manera y en qué grado las medidas concretas del Código contribuirán a alcanzar los objetivos perseguidos.
El informe señala que buena parte de los conceptos son jurídicamente indeterminados (por ejemplo, no se define qué debe considerarse dependencia económica o si toda intermediación del dentista asesorando al paciente debe considerarse prohibida) por lo que van a introducir inseguridad jurídica en los propios protésicos, ya que no hay que olvidar las consecuencias disciplinarias que conllevaría su incumplimiento.
Recomendaciones
Reforzar la justificación de los objetivos de interés público que persiguen ciertas medidas y su proporcionalidad, de acuerdo con la normativa.
Reconsiderar las obligaciones impuestas a los protésicos y analizar alternativas menos restrictivas, pero igual de efectivas, como garantizar que los dentistas informan a los pacientes sobre su derecho de elección, o clarificar el precio de los servicios protésicos en los presupuestos y facturas.
Eliminar cualquier obligación de colegiarse mientras no esté contemplada en ley estatal, sin perjuicio de la normativa autonómica vigente.
Garantizar la existencia de canales de denuncia anónimos de comportamientos ilícitos entre compañeros con las debidas garantías de protección del denunciante.
Replantear la prohibición relativa a la publicidad comparativa para ajustarla a las previsiones de la Ley de Competencia Desleal.
Eliminar juicios de valor a la hora de referirse a los honorarios y precisar que su fijación será libre, en consonancia con la normativa de defensa de la competencia.
Aclarar el régimen disciplinario aplicable y que la intervención del colegio vía conciliación o arbitraje es voluntaria y adicional a otras formas de reclamación.
La CNMC puede actuar de oficio (de acuerdo con elartículo 5.1.hde la Ley de creación de la CNMC) o a petición de las Cámaras Legislativas, el Gobierno, los departamentos ministeriales, las Comunidades Autónomas, las Corporaciones locales, los Colegios Profesionales, las Cámaras de Comercio y las Organizaciones Empresariales y de Consumidores y Usuarios (artículo 5.2).
Crest II e Manuel Saraiva dos Santos notificam a aquisição do controlo conjunto sobre a Vigobloco
Requerentes: Yeti Private Holdings I LLC, Ginsberg Intermediate LP e Gigamon Inc. Advogados: Daniela Maria Tavares Moreira da Silva, Marcos Drummond Malvar e Isabela Pannunzio. Decido pela aprovação sem restrições.
Requerentes: Direcional Engenharia S.A., GTIS L Participações Ltda. e Pateo do Cambuci Lote 06 Empreendimentos e Participações Ltda. Advogados: Luiz Eduardo Salles, Lucas Mandelbaum Bianchini, Ana Clara Appolinário de Almeida e Marco Chung. Decido pela aprovação sem restrições.
Requerentes: Allrede Participações Ltda. e Ligga Telecomunicações S.A. Advogados: Bruno Crepaldi Esteves, Rafael dos Santos Queiroz, Felipe Vieira de Melo, Paula Neves, Denise Junqueira, Maíra Isabel Saldanha Rodrigues, Felipe Carvalho Eleutério de Lima e Marcos Tadeu Pastor. Decido pela aprovação sem restrições.
Requerentes: Sylvamo do Brasil Ltda. e Engie Brasil Energias Complementares Participações Ltda. Advogados: Luciana Martorano, Ana Paula Paschoalini, Izabella Passos e Beatriz Kenchian. Decido pela aprovação sem restrições.
Partes: Mosaic Fertilizantes P&K Ltda., Casa dos Ventos S.A. e São Canuto IV Energias Renováveis S.A. Advogados: Fabricio A. Cardim de Almeida, Gláucia Gomes Menato, Gustavo Amaral Santos Köhnen e Ivan Lago Mariotto. Decido pela aprovação sem restrições.
Requerentes: Vinci Impacto e Retorno IV Fundo de Investimento em Participações Multiestratégia, Vinci Impacto e Retorno IV Master P Fundo de Investimento em Participações Multiestratégia, Vinci Strategic Partners I Fundo de Investimento em Participações Multiestratégia e O Varejão Auto Peças Ltda. Advogados: Ricardo Lara Gaillard, Mayara Lins Ogea e Lucas Longhitano. Decido pelo não conhecimento da operação.
Requerentes: Nacional Cimentos Participações S.A. e ETP Paraíba Participações S.A. Advogados: Luis Nagalli, Julia Haddad Niemeyer e Marco Volpini Micheli. Decido pela aprovação sem restrições.
Requerentes: Be8 S.A., Biopar Produção de Biodiesel Parecis Ltda., Unibras Indústria e Comércio de Biocombustível Ltda., União Indústria e Comércio do Pará Ltda. e Biopar Participações e Gestão de Negócios Ltda. Advogados: Ana Paula Paschoalini, Izabella Passos e Beatriz Kenchian. Decido pela aprovação sem restrições.
Partes: Rio Energy Participações S.A. e UFV Verdão Geradora de Energia Ltda. Advogados: Enrico Spini Romanielo e Fernanda Lins Nemer. Decido pela aprovação sem restrições.
Partes: Ibero Indústria Brasileira de Equipamentos Rodoviários S.A. e Zurlo Implementos Rodoviários Ltda. Advogados: Eduardo Caminati, Marcio Bueno, André Ferraz, Vítor Fuks, Fernando Zanotti Schneider, Pedro Saad Abud, Danilo Henrique Zanichelli, Zulmar Neves e Fábio Branchi. Decido pela aprovação sem restrições.
Requerentes: Minasligas S.A., Jaíba V Holding S.A., Jaíba NO2 Energias Renováveis S.A., Jaíba CE Energias Renováveis S.A. e Jaíba SO Energias Renováveis S.A. Advogados: Marcela Matiuzzo e Vívian Ianelli. Decido pela aprovação sem restrições.
Partes: Ultrapar Logística Ltda. e Hidrovias do Brasil S.A. Advogados: Barbara Rosenberg, Maria Sampaio e Maria Eduarda de Jesus Genova. Decido pela aprovação sem restrições.
Requerentes: IHS Brasil – Cessão de Infraestruturas S.A. e Oi S.A. – Em Recuperação Judicial. Advogados: Milena Mundim, Pedro Milhomem e Rafaela Sanches. Decido pela aprovação sem restrições.
Requerentes: Iguana Fix Desenvolvimento e Intermediação Ltda. e Juntos Somos Mais Fidelização S.A. Advogados: Sérgio Varella Bruna, Natalia Salzedas Pinheiro da Silveira e Marina Lissa Oda Horita. Decido pela aprovação sem restrições.
Requerentes: Assuruá 5 Energia S.A. e Cargill Agrícola S.A. Advogados: Eduardo Caminati, Marcio Bueno, Guilherme Misale e Tatiane Zichi. Decido pela aprovação sem restrições.
Requerentes: Indorama Ventures Oxides LLC, Cargill Bioindustrial UK Limited e Cargill Incorporated. Advogados: Eduardo Frade e Maria Izabella Vilas Boas. Decido pela aprovação sem restrições.
Requerentes: CDP Supermercados Ltda. e Bompreço Bahia Supermercados Ltda. Advogados: Barbara Rosenberg, Guilherme Morgulis, Marcela Abras Lorenzetti e Giulia Gizzi Smith Angelo. Decido pela aprovação sem restrições.
Partes: Lesaffre et Compagnie S.A., SAF do Brasil Produtos Alimentícios Ltda. e Biorigin S.A. Advogados: Cristianne Zarzur, Jackson Ferreira, Daniel Williams, Renata Zuccolo, Raphaela Boffe Palma e Roney Olimpio Barbosa Junior. Decido pela aprovação sem restrições.
Este é um informativo diário que traz para o(a) leitor (a) notícias e casos de defesa da concorrência das principais jurisdições antitruste do mundo (CADE, FTC, Comissão Europeia, CMA etc).
Notícias
Commission approves acquisition of Run:ai by NVIDIA
The European Commission has approved unconditionally, under the EU Merger Regulation (‘EUMR’), the proposed acquisition of Run:ai Labs Ltd (‘Run:ai‘) by NVIDIA Corporation (‘NVIDIA’). The Commission concluded that the transaction would raise no competition concerns in the European Economic Area (‘EEA’).
The transaction does not reach the notification thresholds set out in the EUMR as Run:ai’s current revenues are negligible. It was notified in Italy, as required by the Italian Competition Act, upon request by the national competition authority, which used its “call-in” powers. Such powers enable the Italian authority to review transactions not meeting the relevant national turnover thresholds where it finds that a transaction may pose concrete risks for competition and the other conditions laid down in the Italian Competition Act are met. Italy submitted a referral request to the Commission pursuant to Article 22(1) of the EUMR. This provision allows Member States to request the Commission to examine a merger that does not have an EU dimension but affects trade within the Single Market and threatens to significantly affect competition within the territory of the Member State(s) making the request. On 31 October 2024, the Commission’s accepted Italy’s request and the transaction was notified to the Commission on 15 November 2024.
The Commission’s investigation
NVIDIA designs and supplies Graphic Processing Units (‘GPUs’), a type of semiconductor for datacentre applications. Run:ai supplies GPU orchestration software allowing corporate customers to schedule, manage and optimise their artificial intelligence compute infrastructure, whether on premises, in the cloud or in hybrid environments.
The Commission investigated the impact of the transaction on the markets for the supply of (i) discrete GPUs for use in datacentres; and (ii) GPU orchestration software.
The activities of NVIDIA and Run:ai do not overlap, but GPUs and GPU orchestration software must be compatible. The Commission assessed whether, post-transaction, NVIDIA would be able to hamper the compatibility between its GPUs and the GPU orchestration software of Run:ai’s competitors, and the compatibility between Run:ai’s software and the GPUs of NVIDIA’s competitors.
Based on its market investigation, the Commission found that:
NVIDIA likely holds a dominant position in the global market for discrete GPUs for use in datacentres. However, NVIDIA will have neither the technical ability nor the incentive to hamper the compatibility of its GPUs with competing GPU orchestration software due to the availability and widespread use of tools that ensure such compatibility, a point that has been confirmed by Run:ai’s competitors.
Run:ai does not have a significant position on the market for GPU orchestration software today. Customers will continue to have access to sufficient credible alternatives to Run:ai with similar advanced software features, as well as the possibility of building their GPU orchestration software in-house.
The Commission therefore concluded that the proposed acquisition would not raise competition concerns on any of the markets examined in the EEA or in Italy. It therefore cleared the transaction unconditionally.
Companies and products
NVIDIA, headquartered in the US, designs and supplies accelerated computing platforms including GPUs for datacentres, gaming, professional visualization, and automotive applications. NVIDIA also supplies network interconnect products and solutions. NVIDIA is listed on the NASDAQ.
Run:ai, headquartered in Israel, is a private start-up company that makes GPU orchestration software that helps customers schedule workloads on clusters of GPUs for use in datacentres.
Merger control and procedure
The transaction was notified to the Commission on 15 November 2024 following a referral request pursuant to Article 22(1) of the EUMR by the Italian national competition authority on 30 September 2024, which the Commission accepted on 31 October 2024.
The Commission has the duty to assess mergers and acquisitions involving companies with a turnover above certain thresholds (see Article 1 of the EUMR) and to prevent concentrations that would significantly impede effective competition in the EEA or any substantial part of it.
The vast majority of notified mergers do not pose competition problems and are cleared after a routine review. From the moment a transaction is notified, the Commission generally has 25 working days to decide whether to grant approval (Phase I) or to start an in-depth investigation (Phase II).
Commission opens in-depth investigation into the proposed acquisition of Dorna Sports by Liberty Media
The European Commission has opened an in-depth investigation to assess, under the EU Merger Regulation, the proposed acquisition of Dorna Sports by Liberty Media. The Commission has preliminary concerns that the transaction could lead to higher prices for the licensing of broadcasting rights for motorsports events hosted by both parties.
Liberty Media and Dorna Sports are both international media companies. Liberty owns the Formula One Group and holds the exclusive commercial rights for the FIA Formula One World Championship. Dorna Sportsholds exclusive commercial rights for the FIM World Championship Grand Prix (‘MotoGP’) as well as other motorcycle racing championships.
The Commission’s preliminary concerns
The Commission’s preliminary investigation indicates that the transaction may reduce competition between Liberty Media and Dorna Sports in the licensing of broadcasting rights for motorsports content. In particular, the transaction may remove important competitive constraints on Liberty Media and Dorna Sports, which may strengthen their position vis-à-vis broadcasters of motorsports content and could ultimately lead to higher prices.
More specifically, the Commission found that:
The transaction raises serious competition concerns in potential narrow national markets for the licensing of broadcasting rights for motorsports content in the European Economic Area (‘EEA’), where Formula One is the clear market leader in all European countries and MotoGP is most often its only competitor.
The transaction may remove important competitive constraints between the parties on some potential wider national markets for the licensing of broadcasting rights for all sports content or possible segments of such markets. In particular, this is because it appears that Formula One and MotoGP compete closely.
The Commission will now carry out an in-depth investigation into the effects of the proposed transaction to determine whether its initial competition concerns are confirmed.
During its in-depth investigation, the Commission will also further investigate whether Liberty Media’s and Liberty Global’s largest shareholder, Mr. John Malone, is able to exert decisive influence over both companies. If confirmed, the transaction could also give rise to concerns that Liberty Media may foreclose rival broadcasters in countries in which Liberty Global is active, namely in Belgium, Ireland and the Netherlands.
The proposed transaction was notified to the Commission on 14 November 2024. The Commission now has 90 working days, until 14 May 2025, to take a decision.
The opening of an in-depth inquiry does not prejudge the outcome of the investigation.
Companies and products
Liberty Media, headquartered in the US, operates and owns interests in a broad range of media, sports and entertainment businesses. Those businesses are attributed to two groups: the Formula One Group and the Liberty Live Group.
Dorna Sports, headquartered in Spain, is active in sports management, marketing and media. In particular, Dorna Sports is the organiser and the holder of exclusive commercial and television rights of the MotoGP since 1992.
Merger control rules and procedures
The Commission has the duty to assess mergers and acquisitions involving companies with a turnover above certain thresholds (see Article 1 of the EU Merger Regulation) and to prevent concentrations that would significantly impede effective competition in the EEA or a substantial part of it.
The vast majority of notified mergers do not pose competition problems and are cleared after a routine review. From the moment a transaction is notified, the Commission generally has 25 working days to decide whether to grant approval (Phase I) or to start an in-depth investigation (Phase II).
There are currently no other ongoing Phase II merger investigations.
The Japan Fair Trade Commission (hereinafter referred to as the “JFTC”) today issued a warning to DAIZEN CO., LTD (hereinafter referred to as the “Daizen”). In this case, Daizen was likely to be in violation of the provision of Article 19 (falling under the Article 2, paragraph (9), item (v), (b) [Abuse of Superior Bargaining Position]) of the Antimonopoly Act (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”).
Summary of Warning (1)Daizen (Note 1) was found to have engaged in the following conducts with its suppliers who delivered products to Daizen continuously during the period from June 2022 to November 3, 2024, at the latest. (Note 1) Daizen operates a retail chain of grocery stores and other goods under the name “DZ Mart.”
a.During events such as new store opening sales, annual September fiscal year-end sales, and year-end sales in December held at its stores, Daizen required suppliers to provide monetary contributions under the pretext of sponsorship. This was done without clearly specifying the basis for calculating the amount, the purpose of the contributions, or any justification. Furthermore, suppliers were unable to gain any benefits, such as promotional effects, from their contributions.
b.For new store openings or renovations of its stores, Daizen required suppliers to dispatch their employees or staff to carry out opening preparation tasks, such as product displays, without clearly specifying the conditions for such dispatch in advance. Moreover, suppliers were unable to gain any benefits, such as promotional effects, from these dispatches.
(2)The conducts of Daizen mentioned in (1) were likely to be in violation of the provision of Article 19 (falling under the Article 2, paragraph (9), item (v), (b) [Abuse of Superior Bargaining Position]) of the Act. Therefore, the JFTC issued a warning to Daizen to refrain from engaging in similar conducts described in (1) in the future by exploiting its superior bargaining position over its business counterpart.
* This announcement is a tentative translation. Please refer to the original text written in Japanese.
Las ayudas aumentaron en 2022 hasta alcanzar el 1,27 % del PIB (frente al 1,11 % de 2021), mientras que en la Unión Europea se redujeron significativamente.
España ocupó el undécimo puesto de la UE en términos de ayudas sobre el PIB nacional.
Las empresas que más ayudas públicas recibieron pertenecían a los sectores: industrial, construcción y telecomunicaciones.
La Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia (CNMC) ha aprobado y remitido a las Cortes Generales el Informe Anual de Ayudas Públicas de 2024 (IAP/CNMC/001/24).
El análisis de las ayudas concedidas por España se refiere al año 2022, último ejercicio del que el Marcador de ayudas de Estado de la Unión Europea (UE) ofrece datos. La CNMC realiza un seguimiento para identificar si existen distorsiones injustificadas en los mercados, y con ello contribuye a su correcto funcionamiento.
Conclusiones
• Las ayudas concedidas en España aumentaron respecto a 2021 (1,27 % del PIB en 2022, frente al 1,11 % del PIB en 2021). En cambio, en la UE se produjo un descenso significativo (del 2,23 % en 2021 al 1,42 % en 2022).
• España ocupó el undécimo puesto de la UE en términos de ayudas sobre el PIB nacional, en total 17.124 millones de euros.
• El 42 % de las ayudas (0,54 % del PIB) se destinó a paliar los efectos de la crisis energética provocada por la guerra de Ucrania. En la UE, estas ayudas correspondieron al 17 % (0,24 % del PIB).
• El 10 % de las ayudas se destinó todavía a paliar los efectos del Covid-19. En la UE, estas ayudas alcanzaron el 33 % (0,48 del PIB).
• El desarrollo regional fue otro de los principales objetivos de las ayudas: 22 % (frente al 15 % en el resto de la UE). El medio ambiente y la eficiencia energética representaron el 16 % de las ayudas en España (el 45 % en la UE).
• Desde 2014, no se otorgaron ayudas al sector financiero en España.
• Las ayudas de minimis, no incluidas en el Marcador de ayudas de Estado de la UE, representaron una ayuda equivalente total de más de 2.323 millones de euros (0,17 % del PIB de España de 2022).
• Las empresas que más ayudas públicas recibieron en España en 2022 pertenecían a los sectores: industrial, construcción y telecomunicaciones. En concreto, Barna Steel, Técnicas Reunidas y Volotea fueron las tres más beneficiadas, según la base de datos nacional de subvenciones.
Otros aspectos del informe
• Las novedades normativas y resoluciones administrativas y judiciales de las autoridades de la UE en 2023 en materia de ayudas de Estado:
o Modificación de los Reglamentos de Minimis y de Exención por Categorías y el Marco Temporal de crisis y transición por el que se otorga mayor flexibilidad a los Estados Miembros para ejecutar programas de ayudas. o Directrices sobre ayudas estatales a las redes de banda ancha.
• Actividad de la CNMC en materia de ayudas en 2023. Las actuaciones más relevantes se centraron en los sectores de telecomunicaciones y energía, así como en iniciativas para garantizar la unidad de mercado. Además, el informe incluye referencias a la labor realizada por las autoridades de competencia autonómicas.
• Además, la CNMC prevé publicar en los próximos meses un estudio sobre las ayudas públicas al autoconsumo fotovoltaico y su impacto sobre la estructura del mercado minorista de electricidad.
Este informe se emite de oficio de acuerdo con el artículo 11 de la Ley de Defensa de la Competencia. Además, la CNMC puede actuar de oficio o a petición de las Cámaras Legislativas, el Gobierno, los departamentos ministeriales, las Comunidades Autónomas, las Corporaciones locales, los Colegios Profesionales, las Cámaras de Comercio y las Organizaciones Empresariales y de Consumidores y Usuarios.
Documento no oficial, destinado a los medios de comunicación, y que no vincula a la CNMC. Reproducción permitida solo si se cita la fuente.
Grupo Arrow notifica a aquisição do controlo exclusivo sobre a Minor Vilamoura
Synopsys’ purchase of Ansys raises competition concerns in the supply of semiconductor chip design and light simulation products in the UK – but deal could be approved by the CMA if its concerns are resolved.
Este é um informativo diário que traz para o(a) leitor (a) notícias e casos de defesa da concorrência das principais jurisdições antitruste do mundo (CADE, FTC, Comissão Europeia, CMA etc).
Notícias
Commission opens in-depth investigation into the proposed acquisition of Dorna Sports by Liberty Media
The European Commission has opened an in-depth investigation to assess, under the EU Merger Regulation, the proposed acquisition of Dorna Sports by Liberty Media. The Commission has preliminary concerns that the transaction could lead to higher prices for the licensing of broadcasting rights for motorsports events hosted by both parties.
Liberty Media and Dorna Sports are both international media companies. Liberty owns the Formula One Group and holds the exclusive commercial rights for the FIA Formula One World Championship. Dorna Sportsholds exclusive commercial rights for the FIM World Championship Grand Prix (‘MotoGP’) as well as other motorcycle racing championships.
The Commission’s preliminary concerns
The Commission’s preliminary investigation indicates that the transaction may reduce competition between Liberty Media and Dorna Sports in the licensing of broadcasting rights for motorsports content. In particular, the transaction may remove important competitive constraints on Liberty Media and Dorna Sports, which may strengthen their position vis-à-vis broadcasters of motorsports content and could ultimately lead to higher prices.
More specifically, the Commission found that:
The transaction raises serious competition concerns in potential narrow national markets for the licensing of broadcasting rights for motorsports content in the European Economic Area (‘EEA’), where Formula One is the clear market leader in all European countries and MotoGP is most often its only competitor.
The transaction may remove important competitive constraints between the parties on some potential wider national markets for the licensing of broadcasting rights for all sports content or possible segments of such markets. In particular, this is because it appears that Formula One and MotoGP compete closely.
The Commission will now carry out an in-depth investigation into the effects of the proposed transaction to determine whether its initial competition concerns are confirmed.
During its in-depth investigation, the Commission will also further investigate whether Liberty Media’s and Liberty Global’s largest shareholder, Mr. John Malone, is able to exert decisive influence over both companies. If confirmed, the transaction could also give rise to concerns that Liberty Media may foreclose rival broadcasters in countries in which Liberty Global is active, namely in Belgium, Ireland and the Netherlands.
The proposed transaction was notified to the Commission on 14 November 2024. The Commission now has 90 working days, until 14 May 2025, to take a decision.
The opening of an in-depth inquiry does not prejudge the outcome of the investigation.
Companies and products
Liberty Media, headquartered in the US, operates and owns interests in a broad range of media, sports and entertainment businesses. Those businesses are attributed to two groups: the Formula One Group and the Liberty Live Group.
Dorna Sports, headquartered in Spain, is active in sports management, marketing and media. In particular, Dorna Sports is the organiser and the holder of exclusive commercial and television rights of the MotoGP since 1992.
Merger control rules and procedures
The Commission has the duty to assess mergers and acquisitions involving companies with a turnover above certain thresholds (see Article 1 of the EU Merger Regulation) and to prevent concentrations that would significantly impede effective competition in the EEA or a substantial part of it.
The vast majority of notified mergers do not pose competition problems and are cleared after a routine review. From the moment a transaction is notified, the Commission generally has 25 working days to decide whether to grant approval (Phase I) or to start an in-depth investigation (Phase II).
There are currently no other ongoing Phase II merger investigations.
The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) will oversee the Digital Markets Competition Regime (DMCR) for the most powerful digital firms, promoting greater competition and innovation in these markets and protecting consumers and businesses from unfair practices.
About the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024
The Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers (DMCC) Act granted the CMA with powers to enforce the new digital markets competition regime.
The regime applies only to those firms who are designated as having strategic market status (SMS) in relation to a digital activity linked to the UK. To be designated, a firm must have substantial and entrenched market power and a position of strategic significance in that digital activity , as well as having a global turnover exceeding £25 billion, or a UK turnover exceeding £1 billion.
Designations are reviewed a minimum of every 5 years.
The regime has 3 pillars:
conduct requirements that set out how firms with SMS are expected to behave in relation to the relevant activity
pro-competition interventions to address adverse effects on competition
merger reporting requirements, so that SMS firms will have to report mergers with a value of at least £25m, and UK connection, to the CMA
Request a DMU speaker for your event
Requests for DMU speakers or panellists at events should be submitted using our speaker request form.
Please fill in the form accurately and include as much detail as possible. Complete the form as far in advance as possible ahead of the event.
The memorandums of understanding between the CMA and other organisations set out how we will work together to avoid duplication of effort and share best practice.
Relevant Cabinet Order and Rules to be Developed with the Partial Enforcement of the Act on Promotion of Competition for Specified Smartphone Software
December 10, 2024 Japan Fair Trade Commission
The Japan Fair Trade Commission (hereinafter referred to as the “JFTC”) has requested public comments regarding the necessary Cabinet Order and relevant Rules following the partial enforcement (note) of the Act on Promotion of Competition for Specified Smartphone Software (Act No. 58 of 2024) (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”). Today, the Cabinet Order was approved by the Cabinet. The JFTC hereby publishes the final version of the Cabinet Order and relevant Rules through the results of the public comments, as outlined below. (note) the enforcement of the provisions set forth in Article 1, item (ⅱ) of the Supplementary Provisions of the Act
1.Development of Relevant Cabinet Order and Rules The JFTC announced the draft version of “Cabinet Order Specifying Business Scale under Article 3, Paragraph (1) of the Act on Promotion of Competition for Specified Smartphone Software,” and “Rules for Enforcement of the Act on Promotion of Competition for Specified Smartphone Software” on October 28, 2024. Public comments were requested from relevant stakeholders until November 26, 2024. After carefully reviewing the 14 submissions received, the JFTC made partial amendments and legal adjustments to the original drafts. The finalized documents are published as Annex 1-1 and Annex 1-2. Summaries of the submitted comments and the JFTC’s responses are provided in Annex 2.
2. Enforcement Date of Relevant Cabinet Order and Rules The partial enforcement of the Act will take effect on December 19, 2024. Accordingly, the relevant Cabinet Order and Rules mentioned above will also come into effect on the same date. The full enforcement of the Act is scheduled on a date specified by Cabinet Order, no later than December 19, 2025. The JFTC will continue its efforts to promote awareness of the Act and to make necessary preparations for its full enforcement.
AdC adotou uma decisão de inaplicabilidade na operação de concentração 81/2024 – Crest Agro I / Grupo Frutas Lurdes.
Em 18 de dezembro de 2024, o Conselho de Administração da Autoridade da Concorrência, no uso da competência que lhe é conferida pela alínea d) do n.º 1 do artigo 19.º dos Estatutos, aprovados pelo Decreto-Lei n.º 125/2014, de 18 de agosto, delibera adotar uma decisão de inaplicabilidade à operação de concentração, nos termos da alínea a) do n.º 1 do artigo 50.º da Lei da Concorrência, uma vez que a mesma não se encontra abrangida pela obrigação de notificação prévia a que se refere o artigo 37.º deste diploma.
AdC adotou uma decisão de não oposição na operação de concentração 83/2024 – Explorer/JASE
Em 18 de dezembro de 2024, o Conselho de Administração da Autoridade da Concorrência, no uso da competência que lhe é conferida pela alínea d) do n.º 1 do artigo 19.º dos Estatutos, aprovados pelo Decreto-Lei n.º 125/2014, de 18 de agosto, delibera adotar uma decisão de não oposição à operação de concentração, nos termos da alínea b) do n.º 1 do artigo 50.º da Lei da Concorrência, uma vez que a mesma não é suscetível de criar entraves significativos à concorrência efetiva no território nacional ou numa parte substancial deste.
Publication du sens de la décision le : 19 décembre 2024
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