Apresentação
Este é um informativo diário que traz para o(a) leitor (a) notícias e casos de defesa da concorrência das principais jurisdições antitruste do mundo (CADE, FTC, Comissão Europeia, CMA etc).
Notícias
Justice Department Sues Six Large Landlords for Algorithmic Pricing Scheme that Harms Millions of American Renters
Tuesday, January 7, 2025 
For Immediate Release
Office of Public Affairs
Landlord Cortland Agrees to Cooperate with Justice Department and Enter into a Settlement to End the Use of Common Rental Pricing Algorithms and Competitively Sensitive Data to Set Rents
Attorneys General of Illinois and Massachusetts Join Suit Against RealPage and Apartment Landlords, Bringing Total State and Commonwealth Co-Plaintiffs to 10
The Justice Department, together with its state co-plaintiffs, filed an amended complaint today in its antitrust lawsuit against RealPage, to sue six of the nation’s largest landlords for participating in algorithmic pricing schemes that harmed renters.
The amended complaint alleges the landlords — Greystar Real Estate Partners LLC (Greystar); Blackstone’s LivCor LLC (LivCor); Camden Property Trust (Camden); Cushman & Wakefield Inc and Pinnacle Property Management Services LLC (Cushman); Willow Bridge Property Company LLC (Willow Bridge) and Cortland Management LLC (Cortland) — participated in an unlawful scheme to decrease competition among landlords in apartment pricing, harming millions of American renters. Together, these landlords operate more than 1.3 million units in 43 states and the District of Columbia. The Attorneys General of Illinois and Massachusetts joined the amended complaint as co-plaintiffs, increasing the total number of State and Commonwealth co-plaintiffs to 10. At the same time, the Justice Department filed a proposed consent decree with landlord Cortland that requires it to cooperate with the government, stop using its competitors’ sensitive data to set rents and stop using the same algorithm as its competitors without a corporate monitor.
“While Americans across the country struggled to afford housing, the landlords named in today’s lawsuit shared sensitive information about rental prices and used algorithms to coordinate to keep the price of rent high,” said Acting Assistant Attorney General Doha Mekki of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division. “Today’s action against RealPage and six major landlords seeks to end their practice of putting profits over people and make housing more affordable for millions of people across the country.”
The amended complaint alleges that the six landlords actively participated in a scheme to set their rents using each other’s competitively sensitive information through common pricing algorithms. Along with using RealPage’s anticompetitive pricing algorithms, these landlords coordinated through a variety of means, including:
- Directly communicating with competitors’ senior managers about rents, occupancy, and other competitively sensitive topics. In one example, Greystar supplied Camden with information not only about very recent renewal rates, but also its approach to pricing for the upcoming quarter, its acceptance of RealPage’s pricing recommendations, use of concessions and competitively sensitive information about occupancy. Likewise, executives at Camden and LivCor communicated over the course of months about their pricing strategies, including plans for certain price increases.
- Regularly conducting “call arounds.” During these discussions, euphemistically referred to as “market surveys,” property managers called or emailed competitors to share, and sometimes discuss, competitively sensitive information about rents, occupancy, pricing strategies and discounts.
- Participating in “user groups” hosted by RealPage. For instance, landlords discussed via user groups how to modify the software’s pricing methodology, as well as their own pricing strategies. In one example, LivCor and Willow Bridge executives participated in a user group discussion of plans for renewal increases, concessions and acceptance rates of RealPage rent recommendations.
- Sharing information with competitors about parameters in RealPage’s software. As an example, at the request of Willow Bridge’s director of revenue management, Greystar’s director of revenue management supplied its standard auto-accept parameters for RealPage’s software, including the daily and weekly limits and the days of the week for which Greystar used “auto-accept.”
The Justice Department also announced a proposed consent decree that, if approved by the court, would resolve its claims against Cortland, a landlord that manages over 80,000 rental units in 13 states. Under the proposed consent decree, Cortland would cooperate in the Justice Department’s investigation and litigation and be barred from, among other things:
- Using competitors’ competitively sensitive data to train or run any pricing model;
- Using third-party software or algorithms to price apartments without the supervision of a court-appointed monitor; and
- Soliciting, disclosing or using any competitively sensitive information with any other property manager as part of setting rental prices or generating rental pricing recommendations.
As required by the Tunney Act, the proposed consent decree, along with the competitive impact statement, will be published in the Federal Register. Any person may submit written comments concerning the proposed consent decree during a 60-day comment period to Chief, Technology and Digital Platforms Section, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, 450 Fifth Street NW, Suite 8600, Washington, D.C. 20530. At the conclusion of the 60-day comment period, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina may enter the final judgment upon finding it is in the public interest.
Co-plaintiffs in the case are the Attorneys General of California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, North Carolina, Oregon, Tennessee and Washington.
Greystar is headquartered in Charleston, South Carolina; LivCor and Cushman & Wakefield (whose residential property management business formerly operated independently as Pinnacle) are headquartered in Chicago; Willow Bridge (formerly known as Lincoln Residential) is headquartered in Dallas; Camden is headquartered in Houston; and Cortland is headquartered in Atlanta. All manage multifamily apartment buildings; several own some or all of the properties under their management.
Proposed Final Judgment – US et al. v. RealPage Inc.pdf
Amended Complaint – U.S. et al. v. RealPage Inc..pdf
Updated January 7, 2025
Topic
Antitrust
Component
Antitrust Division Press Release Number: 25-21
Oil Companies to Pay Record Civil Penalty for Violating Antitrust Pre-Transaction Notification Requirements
Tuesday, January 7, 2025Share
For Immediate Release
Office of Public Affairs
The Justice Department’s Antitrust Division, at the request of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), filed a civil antitrust lawsuit today in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against crude-oil producers XCL Resources Holdings LLC (XCL), Verdun Oil Company II LLC (Verdun) and EP Energy LLC (EP).
The lawsuit alleges that the three companies violated the pre-transaction notification and waiting period requirements of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act of 1976 (HSR Act), following Verdun’s $1.4 billion purchase agreement for EP on July 26, 2021. At the time of transaction, Verdun was under common management with XCL.
According to the complaint, the three companies failed to observe a required waiting period following such a large transaction, in which federal agencies can investigate a potential merger before it closes. Instead, EP allowed Verdun and XCL to assume operational and decision-making control over significant aspects of its day-to-day business operations, including a stoppage to EP’s planned well-drilling and development at a time when the U.S. crude-oil market faced significant supply shortages and consumers faced soaring gasoline prices.
Simultaneous to filing its complaint, the department filed a proposed settlement, subject to approval by the court, under which the defendants have agreed to pay a $5.6 million civil penalty to resolve the lawsuit, a record civil penalty for illegal pre-merger coordination in violation of the HSR Act.
Further details about this matter are described in the FTC’s press release issued today, and in the complaint and competitive impact statement.
Consistent with the requirements of the Tunney Act, the proposed settlement, along with the competitive impact statement, will be published in the Federal Register. Any person may submit written comments concerning the proposed settlement during a 60-day comment period via email to bccompliance@ftc.gov or by post to Maribeth Petrizzi, Special Attorney, United States, c/o Federal Trade Commission, 600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, CC-8416, Washington, D.C. 20580. At the conclusion of the 60-day comment period, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia may approve the proposed settlement upon finding that it is in the public interest.
Updated January 7, 2025
Topic
Antitrust
Component
Antitrust DivisionPress Release Number: 25-20
Oil Companies to Pay Record FTC Gun-Jumping Fine for Antitrust Law Violation
XCL Resources, EP Energy, Verdun Oil to pay $5.6 million penalty for unlawful coordination that led to crude oil supply shortage for EP
Tags:
- Competition
- Bureau of Competition
- Merger
- dual enforcement/DOJ
- exchange of pricing information
- gasoline prices
- Hart-Scott-Rodino Act (HSR)
- oil and gas competition
- Energy
Today, the Federal Trade Commission announced that crude oil producers XCL Resources Holdings, LLC (XCL), Verdun Oil Company II LLC (Verdun), and EP Energy LLC (EP) will pay a record $5.6 million civil penalty to settle allegations they engaged in illegal pre-merger coordination, known as gun jumping, in violation of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act (HSR Act).
According to the complaint, Verdun, which was under common management with XCL at the time of the transaction, agreed to acquire EP in a $1.4 billion transaction that was subject to the HSR Act. The HSR Act requires merging parties to submit an HSR form to the federal antitrust agencies and observe a waiting period before completing a transaction. EP, however, allowed XCL and Verdun to assume operational and decision-making control over significant aspects of EP’s day-to-day business operations prior to the transaction closing, in violation of the HSR Act’s waiting period requirements, the complaint states.
The three companies’ unlawful gun-jumping activities during the HSR waiting period included XCL and Verdun ordering a stoppage to EP’s planned well-drilling and development activities; XCL and EP coordinating to manage EP’s customer contracts, relationships, and deliveries in the Uinta Basin region of Utah; and Verdun and EP coordinating on prices for EP’s customers in the Eagle Ford region of Texas. This led to a crude oil supply shortage for EP when the U.S. market was facing significant supply shortages and multi-year highs in oil prices, resulting in Americans paying skyrocketing prices at the pump, the complaint states.
The civil penalty settlement reached with XCL, Verdun, and EP provides for the largest dollar penalty ever imposed for a gun-jumping violation in U.S. history.
The HSR Act requires companies and individuals to report large transactions, including securities acquisitions, over a certain threshold to the FTC and DOJ so that the federal agencies can investigate the deals before they close. The agencies have 30 days after a transaction has been reported to conduct an initial investigation and issue a “second request” demand for additional information. It is generally illegal to finalize an acquisition during this investigatory period.
FTC Investigation
The waiting-period obligation for this transaction went into effect on July 26, 2021, the date XCL, Verdun, and EP executed their purchase agreement and began engaging in gun-jumping activities, according to the FTC’s complaint.
The FTC’s investigation of Verdun’s acquisition of EP uncovered significant competitive concerns given that the deal, as originally structured, would have eliminated head-to-head competition between two of only four significant energy producers and would have harmed competition for the sale of Uinta Basin waxy crude oil to Salt Lake City refiners. To resolve those concerns, the FTC entered into a consent agreement with XCL, Verdun, and EP in March 2022 that required the divestiture of EP’s entire business and assets in Utah.
XCL, Verdun, and EP’s illegal gun-jumping conduct lasted through October 27, 2021, when they executed an amendment to the purchase agreement, which allowed EP to operate independently once again and in the ordinary course of business, without XCL’s or Verdun’s control over its day-to-day operations.
The HSR waiting period expired on March 25, 2022, which is the date the FTC accepted a consent agreement and granted termination of the waiting period. In total, XCL, Verdun, and EP were in violation of the HSR Act for 94 days.
The Commission vote to accept the settlement and refer the matter to the Department of Justice for filing was 4-0-1, with Commissioner Holyoak recused. The Department of Justice filed the complaint and proposed stipulated order on the FTC’s behalf in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
As required by the Tunney Act, the proposed settlement, along with a competitive impact statement, will be published in the Federal Register. Any person may submit written comments concerning the proposed settlement during a 60-day comment period to Maribeth Petrizzi, Special Attorney, United States, c/o Federal Trade Commission, 600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20580 bccompliance@ftc.gov. At the conclusion of the 60-day comment period, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia may approve the proposed settlement upon finding that it is in the public interest.
The Federal Trade Commission works to promote competition, and protect and educate consumers. The FTC will never demand money, make threats, tell you to transfer money, or promise you a prize. You can learn more about how competition benefits consumers or file an antitrust complaint. For the latest news and resources, follow the FTC on social media, subscribe to press releases and read our blog.
Press Release Reference
Contact Information
Media Contact
Office of Public Affairs
415-848-5121
La CNMC investiga posibles prácticas restrictivas de la competencia en la gestión de derechos de artistas visuales
Sector: Nota de prensa
Ámbito CNMC: Competencia
- Se examina si VEGAP (Visual Entidad de Gestión de Artistas Plásticos) podría haber fijado precios de explotación singular de obras protegidas por derechos de propiedad intelectual de forma anticompetitiva.
- También se investigan posibles condiciones comerciales no equitativas hacia titulares de derechos y usuarios.
La CNMC ha iniciado un expediente sancionador contra la entidad de gestión de derechos de propiedad intelectual VEGAP (Visual Entidad de Gestión de Artistas Plásticos) por posibles prácticas restrictivas de la competencia en la gestión de derechos de propiedad intelectual de los creadores visuales en España (S/0002/20).
Concretamente, la CNMC investiga si VEGAP habría establecido precios para licencias de explotación de obras que requieren la autorización individualizada de su titular, restringiendo así la competencia.
Además, se investigan posibles condiciones no equitativas hacia los titulares de derechos que encomiendan su gestión a VEGAP y hacia los usuarios que contratan licencias para usar estas obras.
Tras recopilar información durante la fase de información reservada, la CNMC considera que existen indicios racionales de la comisión, por parte de VEGAP, de una posible infracción de los artículos 1 y 2 de la Ley 15/2007, de 3 de julio, de Defensa de la Competencia (LDC) y de los artículos 101 y 102 del Tratado de Funcionamiento de la Unión Europea (TFUE).
La incoación de este expediente no prejuzga el resultado final de la investigación. Se abre ahora un periodo máximo de 24 meses para la instrucción del expediente y para su resolución por la CNMC.
Documento no oficial, destinado a los medios de comunicación, y que no vincula a la CNMC. Reproducción permitida solo si se cita la fuente.
Brose Sitech e Inversiones Carcarosa notificam a aquisição do controlo conjunto sobre a Covercar
Ficha do processo
Guia
How the UK’s digital markets competition regime works
Details on the new digital markets competition regime, and how it will promote competition in digital markets.
From: Competition and Markets Authority
Published7 January 2025
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Contents
- The digital markets competition regime
- Benefits of the regime for the UK
- Criteria for Strategic Market Status
- Stages of an SMS investigation
- What happens as a result of an investigation
- Design and approach
- Administering the regime
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The digital markets competition regime
From January 2025, new responsibilities for the CMA came into force under the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024.
The new ‘digital markets competition regime’ enables the CMA to promote competition in fast-moving digital markets, while protecting UK consumers and businesses from unfair or harmful practices by the very largest technology firms.
The regime will unlock opportunities for more innovation and economic growth across the UK tech sector, benefitting companies of all shapes and sizes – along with the investors who back them. It will also help people and businesses across the UK, who rely on access to critical digital markets, to get a fair deal.
Benefits of the regime for the UK
The regime provides a unique opportunity to encourage the benefits of investment and innovation from the largest digital firms, while ensuring a level playing-field for the many start-ups and scale-ups across the UK tech sector. The multitude of UK businesses and consumers who depend on the largest firms for critical products and services will also benefit from more innovation, more choice and more competitive prices.
- opportunities to harness the benefits of continued investment and innovation by the very largest firms
- unlocking expanded opportunities for investment and innovation by creating a level playing field for start-ups and scale-ups (many UK-based) to succeed
- strengthened opportunities for UK consumers and business customers, those who rely on key platform services, to benefit from greater choice, more innovation and lower prices
People can:
- make informed choices, with defaults and choice architecture aiding decision-making
- use the products and services that best meet their needs, regardless of what other products and services they use and who they are provided by
- easily switch providers, without losing access to their data and content
- be protected from exploitation and unfair or misleading practices
To ensure that businesses:
- that rely on Strategic Market Status (SMS) firms do not face exploitation or anti-competitive behaviour by those firms
- have a fair chance to compete with SMS firms, including through appropriate access to data and functionality
Driving economic growth and improved productivity by:
- harnessing the benefits of continued investment and innovation by the very largest firms
- expanding opportunities for investment and innovation by creating a level playing field for start-ups and scale-ups (many UK-based) to succeed
Criteria for Strategic Market Status
The heart of the regime is proportionality. It is designed to apply only to the very largest firms. If certain conditions are met, these firms can be designated with Strategic Market Status (SMS) in relation to a particular digital activity. The CMA will carry out investigations within a 9 month statutory timeframe to consider whether to designate a firm with SMS.
To assess whether the conditions for an SMS designation are met, the CMA will carry out evidence-based investigations, consulting and engaging with a wide range of stakeholders.
The conditions are:
- UK turnover of more than £1 billion or global turnover of more than £25 billion
- substantial and entrenched market power in relation to the digital activity
- a position of strategic significance
The CMA must carry out a forward-looking, five-year assessment to decide whether a firm has ‘substantial and entrenched’ market power in a particular digital activity. To make sure the regime keeps up with developments in fast-moving digital markets, SMS designations are time-bound for review every 5 years.
A firm has a position of strategic significance if it has at least 1 of the following:
- significant size or scale in the digital activity
- a significant number of other firms use the digital activity to carry out business it can extend its market power to a range of other activities
- it can substantially influence how other firms behave, in respect of the digital activity or otherwise
Stages of an SMS investigation
An SMS investigation will usually last 9 months. The stages are:
- launch of the designation investigation
- consultation period
- provisional decision
- consultation period
- final decision
At least 9 months before the end of the five-year designation period, the CMA must open a new SMS investigation to re-assess the firm’s status.
What happens as a result of an investigation
If the CMA designates a firm with SMS, it will have 2 key tools: Conduct Requirements and Pro-Competition Interventions.
Through Conduct Requirements, the CMA will be able to guide the behaviour of SMS firms, tackling conduct that could undermine fair competition, or exploit people and businesses.
Through Pro-Competition Interventions, the CMA will be able to address specific competition problems arising from a firm’s market power in a particular digital activity.
The regime also provides for additional merger reporting requirements on SMS firms, to make sure the CMA has earlier sight of mergers and acquisitions that could harm competition in digital markets.
Conduct requirements
The CMA may put in place one or more tailored rules for SMS firms – steps that require them to take certain action or to stop a specific activity. These requirements may be put in place where doing so would be proportionate to achieve specific positive outcomes for users (or potential users) of the digital activity. These are fair dealing, open choices, or trust and transparency.
Pro-competition interventions
Once a firm has been designated with strategic market status, the CMA may investigate whether anything relating to the designated digital activity (for example, the behaviour of a firm or the structure of a sector) is harming competition.
If the CMA finds an adverse effect on competition, it can design and test interventions to address these competition problems and any harmful effects on users. This might include giving people the power to transfer their data easily between providers; or requiring firms to make sure different products and services work smoothly together (‘interoperability’), so businesses can more easily innovate and compete.
New merger reporting requirements
SMS firms must report mergers with a UK connection, and a value of £25 million or more, to the CMA before their completion. Where the CMA is concerned a merger might cause competition problems, it will launch a merger investigation under its normal merger review process.
Design and approach
The way rules are designed and applied matters if the UK is to maximise its international attractiveness to innovators and investors. The new regime has been created with this in mind, representing a unique combination of ‘best-in-class’ features, which the CMA is committed to implementing in an open, transparent, solutions-focused way.
Proportionality
The regime applies only to the very largest technology firms – those with substantial and entrenched market power in a particular digital activity. The CMA will also take a highly tailored, bespoke approach to identifying and addressing specific harms.
Process
The process for investigations and interventions will be participative and transparent, including constructive engagement with SMS firms and other stakeholders to resolve concerns quickly and effectively where possible.
Predictability
Interventions are developed through a forward-looking, iterative and open process, providing the predictability that is critically important to businesses. Designations are limited to a maximum of 5 years before the CMA must consider whether they should be renewed, varied or revoked. This provides certainty whilst enabling the CMA to take account of technological and broader market changes.
Pace
Designation investigations have a 9-month statutory timeline, with the CMA able to consult on remedies at the same time, helping us to reach positive outcomes faster. The Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act also provides for a new general duty of expedition for the CMA, including in relation to the digital markets competition regime, which means pace will be a key focus.
Administering the regime
The CMA will actively monitor interventions to make sure they are effective, avoid unintended consequences, and are targeted where they can have the most positive impact.
The most significant decisions under the regime will be taken by the CMA Board and a new Digital Markets Board Committee.
The CMA will coordinate with other regulators domestically and set out arrangements for doing this in published memoranda of understanding.
Many of the issues the CMA will tackle are cross-border in nature, so it is also working closely with international partners to help shape a regulatory landscape that supports investment and innovation in the UK.
Read the full guidance for the digital markets competition regime and merger reporting requirements for SMS firms.
Updates to this page
Published 7 January 2025
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Decisões
Autorité de la concurrence
Secteur(s) :
25-DCC-02
relative à la prise de contrôle conjoint de la société Calao 83 par les sociétés Caponga et Levant Armor aux côtés de la société ITM Entreprises
Décision de contrôle des concentrations|
Publication du sens de la décision le : 08 janvier 2025
Secteur(s) :
Agriculture / Agro-alimentaire
25-DCC-01
relative à la prise de contrôle exclusif d’un actif industriel détenu par la société CPK Production France par la société Choco Barou
Décision de contrôle des concentrations|
Publication du sens de la décision le : 07 janvier 2025