Apresentação
Este é um informativo diário que traz para o(a) leitor (a) notícias e casos de defesa da concorrência das principais jurisdições antitruste do mundo (CADE, FTC, Comissão Europeia, CMA etc).
Notícias
CMA sets out provisional view on Vodafone / Three merger
Merger could lead to millions of customers having to pay more. CMA will explore potential solutions to its concerns before final decision by 7 December.
From: Competition and Markets Authority
Published13 September 2024
- Merger could lead to tens of millions of mobile customers having to pay more.
- Merger could improve the quality of mobile networks, but incentives to follow through on the investment once deal is complete are uncertain.
- CMA will explore potential solutions to its concerns before final decision by 7 December.
An in-depth investigation by the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) has provisionally found competition concerns over Vodafone’s planned merger with Three in the UK.
The investigation, led by an independent inquiry group, has provisionally concluded that the merger would lead to price increases for tens of millions of mobile customers, or see customers get a reduced service such as smaller data packages in their contracts. The CMA has particular concerns that higher bills or reduced services would negatively affect those customers least able to afford mobile services as well as those who might have to pay more for improvements in network quality they do not value.
The CMA has also provisionally found that the merger would negatively impact ‘wholesale’ telecoms customers – Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs) such as Lyca Mobile, Sky Mobile and Lebara – which rely on the existing network operators to provide their own mobile services. The merger would reduce the number of network operators from 4 to 3 making it more difficult for MVNOs to secure competitive terms, restricting their ability to offer the best deals to retail customers.
While identifying these concerns, the CMA has also found that the merger, by integrating the Vodafone and Three networks, could improve the quality of mobile networks and bring forward the deployment of next generation 5G networks and services, as claimed by Vodafone and Three. But the CMA currently considers that these claims are overstated, and that the merged firm would not necessarily have the incentive to follow through on its proposed investment programme after the merger.
As a result, the CMA has provisionally concluded that the merger would lead to a substantial lessening of competition in the UK – in both retail and wholesale mobile markets.
The CMA will now consult on its provisional findings. It will also consult on potential solutions to its competition concerns, including the options set out in its remedies notice (also published today). These include legally binding investment commitments overseen by the sector regulator, and measures to protect both retail customers and customers in the wholesale market. The CMA will retain the option to prohibit the merger should it conclude that other remedy options will not address its competition concerns effectively.
Stuart McIntosh, chair of the inquiry group leading the investigation, said:
We’ve taken a thorough, considered approach to investigating this merger, weighing up the investment the companies say they will make in enhancing network quality and boosting 5G connectivity against the significant costs to customers and rival virtual networks.
We will now consider how Vodafone and Three might address our concerns about the likely impact of the merger on retail and wholesale customers while securing the potential longer-term benefits of the merger, including by guaranteeing future network investments.
The CMA welcomes responses to its provisional findings by 04 October 2024 and its notice of possible remedies by 27 September 2024. These will be considered ahead of the CMA issuing its final report, which is due by 7 December 2024.
More information can be found on the Vodafone / CK Hutchison JV case page and on the detailed guidance page.
Notes to editors
- Vodafone UK (which is owned by Vodafone Group Plc) and Three UK (which is owned by CK Hutchison Holdings Limited) are two major providers of mobile telecommunication services in the UK. Last year both businesses announced a new joint venture agreement which would bring their 27 million customers under a new, single network operator.
- The 4 mobile network operators in the UK are Vodafone UK, Three UK, BTEE and Virgin Media O2.
- ‘Virtual’ network operators – such as Sky Mobile, Tesco Mobile, Lebara and Lyca Mobile – do not own their own networks and rely on access to a mobile network operator’s network to supply mobile services to their customers.
- The CMA’s remit, by law, is to assess the potential impact of a merger on competition. It cannot consider other potential effects that a merger might have, for example, on access to personal data. National security concerns are a matter for the UK government, which may choose to intervene under the National Security and Investment Act (NSIA) if it finds concerns. On 9 May 2024, the Secretary of State responsible for the NSIA approved the deal, subject to certain conditions.
- During the course of its Inquiry, the CMA has drawn on support from Ofcom, the communications industry regulator. As part of the remedies process the CMA will consider Ofcom’s involvement in any possible remedies.
- All media enquiries should be directed to the CMA press office by email on press@cma.gov.uk or by phone on 020 3738 6460.
How we are investigating the Vodafone / Three potential merger
Why the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) is investigating the potential Vodafone / Three merger and what it might mean for consumers.
From: Competition and Markets Authority
Published29 April 2024Last updated13 September 2024 — See all updates Get emails about this page
Contents
- Why is the CMA investigating the Vodafone / Three potential merger?
- What we have found so far
- What happens next?
- How merger investigations work
- Follow the progress of this investigation
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Why is the CMA investigating the Vodafone / Three potential merger?
The CMA investigates the impact of certain potential mergers and assesses how they could impact competition in the UK. This is to promote a fair and competitive environment, where businesses and the UK economy thrive, and consumers can be confident they are getting great choices and fair deals.
Competition can help to keep prices low, as well as provide an important incentive for businesses to improve their services.
What we have found so far
In its initial investigation (called a ‘Phase 1 investigation’) which began in January 2024, the CMA found that the merger, which combines 2 of the 4 mobile network operators in the UK, could lead to a substantial lessening of competition on the basis that mobile customers might face higher prices and a reduction in quality.
This meant that a more detailed (Phase 2) merger inquiry was required.
Provisional findings
On 13 September 2024, the CMA published provisional findings on the Phase 2 investigation.
The independent inquiry group has provisionally concluded that:
- the merger would lead to price increases for tens of millions of mobile customers, or see customers get a reduced service such as smaller data packages in their contracts
- there are concerns that higher bills or reduced services would significantly impact those customers least able to afford mobile services
- there are also significant concerns about the impact of the merger on the large number of consumers who might have to pay more for improvements in network quality that they don’t value
- the deal could negatively impact ‘wholesale’ telecoms customers such as Sky Mobile and Lebara which rely on the existing 4 network operators to provide their own mobile services
- the deal would affect these wholesale customers by reducing available network operators to just 3, likely meaning they are less able to secure competitive terms and offer the best deals to retail customers
At the same time, the merger could improve the quality of mobile services and bring forward the deployment of next generation 5G networks and services. However, the CMA considers that:
- the merger firm would not necessarily have the incentive to follow through on its proposed investment programme after the merger
- the CMA also has doubts as to whether those improvements, if delivered, would be as significant as claimed
As a result, the CMA has provisionally concluded that the deal is likely to lead to a substantial lessening of competition in the UK.
What happens next?
It’s important to remember that these are provisional findings. The CMA will now publicly consult on its findings and explore potential solutions to its concerns before reaching a final decision by mid-December. The CMA has set out potential solutions to Vodafone and Three in a remedies notice.
These range from legally binding ‘investment commitments’ overseen by the sector regulator and measures to protect both retail customers and customers in the wholesale market, to prohibiting the merger.
How merger investigations work
Merger investigations go through the following 6 key stages:
Our Phase 1 investigation
The CMA first carries out an initial review of the merger to determine whether there is a realistic prospect of a substantial lessening of competition. This is known as our Phase 1 investigation.
If the CMA isn’t concerned about the merger, it clears it. But if there are competition concerns that are not solved following its initial review, the CMA carries out a more in-depth investigation, known as Phase 2.
In this investigation, the CMA completed its Phase 1 investigation in March 2024.
Phase 2 investigation begins
At Phase 2, the CMA will build on the work at Phase 1 and gather more evidence from the merging businesses and others to investigate potential issues with competition that could arise as a result of the merger.
The CMA will meet with the businesses proposing to merge and their representatives ‘on site’ to learn more about their business.
Every Phase 2 inquiry is run by an appointed inquiry group. This is an independent panel made up of 3 to 5 people with a range of business, finance, economic and legal experience. They are responsible for making the final decision on the case.
For Vodafone / Three, the CMA began a Phase 2 investigation in April 2024. The inquiry group was appointed at the same time.
Issues Statement published
The Issues Statement shows the focus of the Phase 2 investigation and sets out what are called ‘theories of harm’, which are the potential concerns being investigated.
At this point anyone, including members of the public, is invited to share their views with the CMA.
Analysis of evidence
After publishing the Issues Statement, the CMA continues gathering and reviewing evidence. Hearings are held with the main parties (and sometimes third parties) to ask questions about the evidence received and explore key issues.
If the inquiry group thinks the merger could have a negative impact on competition, it will also start thinking about potential solutions to those concerns (known as ‘remedies’).
Provisional findings
Once the inquiry group has a good understanding of the business of the organisations proposing to merge, and a strong evidence base, it will publish the ‘provisional findings’.
This document outlines the provisional decision on the merger.
If there are concerns, the inquiry group will also send the merging businesses its thoughts on possible solutions, in a document referred to as a ‘remedies notice’.
Final report
This includes the final decision on the merger, including whether the inquiry group believes it would harm competition for consumers or businesses in the UK.
- if the inquiry group finds no competition concerns, the merger can go ahead as planned
- if the inquiry group finds that the merger may be expected to result in a substantial lessening of competition, it will decide how its concerns should be remedied; for example, this can include selling part of the business, prohibiting the merger altogether, or requiring the companies to commit to take certain actions
Follow the progress of this investigation
For detailed information visit the Vodafone / Three merger inquiry case page.
Updates to this page
Published 29 April 2024
Last updated 13 September 2024 + show all updates
La CNMC resalta el papel fundamental de la competencia en la nueva política industrial española
13 Sep 2024 | Promoción de Competencia Nota de prensa
- La nueva norma busca modernizar la política industrial española, y reforzar su autonomía en recursos estratégicos.
- La CNMC enfatiza la necesidad de simplificar trámites administrativos y eliminar barreras innecesarias a la competencia.
- Recomienda revisar ciertas certificaciones empresariales y garantizar la competencia en el aprovisionamiento de bienes y servicios estratégicos.
La Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia (CNMC) ha analizado el anteproyecto de ley de industria y autonomía estratégica (IPN/CNMC/019/24).
La nueva norma, alineada con las directrices de la UE, establece los principales instrumentos de gobernanza para aumentar la autonomía estratégica de España, impulsar la industria, mejorar su competitividad internacional y alcanzar la neutralidad climática antes de 2050.
La CNMC ya informó la versión previa al borrador de APL en 2023 y, aunque algunas recomendaciones han sido incluidas, hay otros aspectos que no se han adoptado como, por ejemplo, la necesidad de tener en cuenta los límites a las redes de cooperación empresarial, en especial en el intercambio de información.
Recomendaciones
La CNMC subraya que la competencia es un catalizador clave para la innovación y para mejorar la competitividad, productividad y empleo en el sector industrial. Esta perspectiva es compatible con los desafíos de la doble transición ecológica y digital, así como con el fortalecimiento de la autonomía estratégica.
Aunque el proyecto menciona la simplificación administrativa, algunos cambios propuestos (como el reforzamiento de la autonomía estratégica o la imposición de nuevas certificaciones) pueden ir en sentido contrario. La CNMC recuerda que, además de las ayudas públicas, es fundamental eliminar barreras innecesarias a la competencia para fomentar un entorno industrial dinámico y eficiente.
La CNMC ofrece su colaboración para el desarrollo reglamentario de esta normativa y destaca varias áreas de mejora:
- Participación en el Consejo Estatal de Política Industrial. Se sugiere incluir a la CNMC como miembro de pleno derecho, con voz, pero sin voto.
- Obligación de mantenimiento de la actividad de los beneficiarios de ayudas. Se recomienda justificar el umbral elegido de ser beneficiario de ayudas de más de 6 millones de euros para imponer ciertas obligaciones, y asegurar su alineamiento con las Directrices de ayudas regionales de la UE.
- Protección a la industria intensiva en energía. Las medidas de apoyo deben respetar la normativa de ayudas de Estado y ser financiadas por los Presupuestos Generales del Estado.
- Certificaciones empresariales. Las certificaciones de empresa industrial excelente y estratégica deben ser voluntarias y permitir otras formas de acreditación.
- Reserva estratégica. El desarrollo reglamentario debe promover la competencia efectiva y la neutralidad competitiva. Para ello, se debe acudir, siempre que sea posible, a sistemas de aprovisionamiento de bienes o servicios que garanticen la aplicación de aquellos principios de forma efectiva.
- Comunicación de cierre o reducción de actividad. Se recomienda evaluar el impacto de las nuevas exigencias, así como comunicar el proceso de cierre o reducción de actividad a las organizaciones empresariales más representativas y que la obligación para la empresa de contratar una asistencia técnica para valorar alternativas sea asumida por las administraciones públicas.
- Fondo de apoyo a la inversión industrial productiva. Se sugiere tener en cuenta que las inversiones que realice puedan ser consideradas ayudas de Estado si se reúnen los requisitos contemplados por el Tratado de Funcionamiento de la UE.
La CNMC reafirma su compromiso con la promoción de un entorno competitivo que beneficie a la industria española y contribuya a su modernización y sostenibilidad.
La CNMC puede actuar de oficio (de acuerdo con el artículo 5.1.h de la Ley de creación de la CNMC) o a petición de las Cámaras Legislativas, el Gobierno, los departamentos ministeriales, las Comunidades Autónomas, las Corporaciones locales, los Colegios Profesionales, las Cámaras de Comercio y las Organizaciones Empresariales y de Consumidores y Usuarios (de acuerdo con el artículo 5.2).
Contenido relacionado:
- IPN/CNMC/001/23 APL de industria
- IPN/CNMC/0011/14 PRD por el que se modifica el reglamento de la infraestructura de seguridad y calidad industrial
- IPN/CNMC/012/19 e IPN/CNMC/45/22, borradores del PRD por el que se regula el estatuto de consumidores electrointensivos
Feu vert sous conditions au rachat de Kindred (Unibet) par La Française des jeux
Publié le 13 septembre 2024
Le 14 mai 2024, la société La Française des jeux a notifié à l’Autorité de la concurrence le projet de prise de contrôle exclusif de la société Kindred Group.
Après examen de l’opération, l’Autorité a autorisé celle-ci sous conditions. Afin de remédier aux risques d’atteinte à la concurrence identifiés, FDJ a souscrit des engagements comportementaux
COMMUNIQUÉ DE PRESSE DU 12 SEPTEMBRE
L’Autorité autorise le rachat de Kindred (Unibet) par La Française des jeux, en le conditionnant à une séparation des activités sous monopole et concurrentielles, notamment en ce qui concerne les marques
A Câmara Federal manteve a medida preventiva imposta à Visa
A medida para suspender a implementação de qualquer cláusula contratual de exclusividade territorial foi recomendada pela CNDC no âmbito de uma investigação de conduta anticoncorrencial
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redes sociales
Em 5 de setembro de 2024, a Câmara I do Tribunal Federal Civil e Comercial negou provimento aos recursos da Visa International Service Association e da Visa Inc. contra a Resolução 2084/2023, emitida em 17 de novembro de 2023.
A resolução foi emitida no âmbito da investigação iniciada após uma reclamação da Câmara Argentina de Fintech à Comissão Nacional de Defesa da Concorrência (CNDC), que denunciou a implementação do Payment Intermediary Foreign Exchange Operators (PIFO) e do Expanded Merchand Location Pilot Program (EMLP) pela MasterCard e Visa, respectivamente.
No processo de investigação, a CNDC identificou que a Visa celebra contratos com adquirentes e comerciantes nos quais, presumivelmente, são estabelecidas cláusulas de exclusividade territorial. Nesse contexto, e a fim de evitar possíveis danos ao interesse econômico geral, o CNDC ordenou a cessação de qualquer comportamento que pudesse ser considerado discriminatório ou que implicasse uma recusa injustificada de acesso à rede Visa até que a investigação fosse concluída.
A medida agora confirmada pela Câmara Federal ordena à Visa que suspenda qualquer cláusula contratual que impeça um facilitador de pagamentos na Argentina de processar transações de comerciantes estrangeiros feitas por consumidores no país, e que se abstenha de implementar qualquer política comercial que limite a subadquirência de transações transfronteiriças e de encerrar comerciantes de fora do país afiliados por facilitadores de pagamentos locais, bem como de bloquear o acesso à rede Visa para transações transfronteiriças envolvendo tais comerciantes.
Vale mencionar que os procedimentos administrativos correspondentes aos autos do processo por suposta conduta anticoncorrencial ainda estão pendentes perante a CNDC.
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Trámites
Acerca de la República Argentina
Atos de concentração – Decisões
CADE
Ato de Concentração nº 08700.006234/2024-61
Requerentes: ArcelorMittal Brasil S.A. e Atlas Luiz Carlos Holding 1 Ltda. Aprovação sem restrições.
Ato de Concentração nº 08700.006605/2024-12
Requerentes: Arch Resources Inc. e Consol Energy Inc. Aprovação sem restrições.
Ato de Concentração nº 08700.006656/2024-36
Requerentes: Mongeral Aegon Holding Ltda. e Seven Participações S.A. Representantes: Helder Molina e Luiz Augusto Santos Abdo. Aprovação sem restrições.
Ato de Concentração nº 08700.006493/2024-91
Requerentes: CBR 179 Empreendimentos Imobiliários Ltda. e Notre Dame Intermédica Saúde S.A. Aprovação sem restrições.
Ato de Concentração nº 08700.006087/2024-29
Requerentes: Cacique Petróleo Ltda. e Companhia Brasileira de Distribuição. Advogados: Eduardo Caminati, Marcio Bueno, Guilherme Misale e Matheus Carvalho Silva. Aprovação sem restrições.
Comissão Europeia
KKR / SUPERSTRUCT
Merger
Last decision date: 12.09.2024 Simplified procedure
CMA
Vodafone / CK Hutchison JV merger inquiry
- The CMA is investigating the anticipated joint venture between Vodafone Group Plc and CK Hutchison Holdings Limited concerning Vodafone Limited and Hutchison 3G UK Limited.
- Updated: 13 September 2024
Atos de concentração – Ingressos
| Ato de concentração | Requerentes | Descrição da operação | Atividade econômica | Rito | Edital (DOU) |
| 08700.006743/2024-93 | ESAB Indústria e Comércio Ltda.; The ESAB Group, Inc.; Sumig Soluções para Solda e Corte Ltda.; Sumig USA Corporation | A operação notificada envolve a aquisição, pela ESAB Indústria e Comércio Ltda. e por The ESAB Group Inc., da totalidade do capital social da Sumig Soluções para Solda e Corte Ltda. e da Sumig USA Corporation. | Sumário | 12/09/2024 |
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