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Este é um informativo diário que traz para o(a) leitor (a) notícias e casos de defesa da concorrência das principais jurisdições antitruste do mundo (CADE, FTC, Comissão Europeia, CMA etc).
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Publicada pauta da sessão de julgamento da próxima quarta-feira (14/8). Confira!
Cinco casos serão apreciados durante a 233ª reunião do Tribunal Administrativo
Publicado em 08/08/2024 17h18 Atualizado em 08/08/2024 17h27
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Foi publicada, no Diário Oficial da União desta quinta-feira (8/8), a pauta da próxima sessão de julgamento do Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (Cade). A 233ª Sessão Ordinária de Julgamento acontecerá quarta-feira (14/8), às 10h, com transmissão pelo YouTube.
Ao total, cinco casos serão apreciados pelo Tribunal Administrativo, sendo dois processos administrativos, dois requerimentos de TCC e um embargo de declaração de processo administrativo.
Confira a pauta de julgamento:
1. Processo Administrativo nº 08700.002066/2019-77
Representados: Itaú Unibanco S.A. e Redecard S.A.
Relator: conselheiro Gustavo Augusto Freitas de Lima.
Voto-vista: conselheiro Victor Oliveira Fernandes
2. Processo Administrativo nº 08700.001805/2017-41
Representado: Afrânio Manhães Barreto.
Relator: conselheiro Gustavo Augusto Freitas de Lima.
Voto-vista: conselheiro Carlos Jacques Vieira Gomes.
3. Embargos de Declaração do Processo Administrativo nº 08700.003699/2017-31
Embargantes: Medtronic Comercial Ltda, Ricardo Portilho Pettená e Boston Scientific do Brasil.
Relator: conselheiro Luis Henrique Bertolino Braido.
Voto-vista: conselheiro Victor Oliveira Fernandes
4. Requerimento de TCC nº 08700.006557/2023-73
Representante: acesso restrito.
5. Requerimento de TCC nº 08700.004057/2022-16
Requerente: acesso Restrito
FTC Outlines Remedy Concerns in Amicus Brief After Jury Finds Google Illegally Monopolized App Store
Effective relief shouldn’t allow Google to reap the rewards of illegal monopolization, the FTC’s brief says
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The Federal Trade Commission filed an amicus brief in a case brought by online video game maker Epic Games Inc. against Google LLC’s app store, which outlines how the court should consider potential remedies when determining effective relief to restore competition after Google was found liable for illegal monopolization.
The FTC filed its amicus brief in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California in an ongoing antitrust case where a jury found Google liable for multiple antitrust violations related to its Google App Store, including finding that Google monopolized the Android App Distribution and Android In-App Payment Solutions markets for digital goods and services transactions. Google’s App Store serves as an essential platform used by developers, which includes Epic, to market their software. Google’s App Store is also critical for users that seek to purchase applications, such as Epic’s online game Fortnite.
In its amicus brief, the FTC encourages the court to use its broad power to order a remedy that stops the illegal conduct, prevents its recurrence, and restores competition. Injunctive relief should also restore lost competition in a forward-looking way and should ensure a monopolist is not continuing to reap the advantages and benefits obtained through the antitrust violation, the FTC’s brief stated. Looking forward in cases like Epic v. Google often requires the consideration of network effects, data feedback loops, and other key features of digital markets. This could help ensure that potential competitors can overcome the advantages established digital platforms often gain, which include network effects and data incumbency. These advantages allow established digital platforms to lock-in users, advertisers, and other stakeholders, which create barriers to entry for future competition.
In the Epic case, Google has raised several concerns about the administrability of potential injunctions that impose duties to deal with competitors and the implications of any requirement that Google provide access to its Application Programming Interfaces to non-customers for free. Despite these concerns, courts still have wide latitude to impose these sorts of requirements on monopolists when crafting remedies to restore competition, the FTC stated in its brief.
Google also has expressed concern that the cost of complying with Epic’s proposed remedy may be overly burdensome. Complaints about the burdens of compliance are no excuse, the FTC stated in its brief. Google’s monopolistic behavior has significantly harmed millions of users in the United States. Allowing monopolists to reap the rewards of illegal monopolization while avoiding the costs of restoring the competition that they unlawfully eliminated would undermine deterrence, the FTC stated in its brief.
The Commission vote approving the filing of the amicus brief was 3-0-2, with Commissioners Melissa Holyoak and Andrew N. Ferguson recused. Commissioner Holyoak is recused due to her work on behalf of Utah in Utah v Google. Commissioner Ferguson recused himself in light of Virginia’s participation in Epic v. Google when he was Solicitor General.
The Federal Trade Commission works to promote competition, and protect and educate consumers. The FTC will never demand money, make threats, tell you to transfer money, or promise you a prize. You can learn more about how competition benefits consumers or file an antitrust complaint. For the latest news and resources, follow the FTC on social media, subscribe to press releases and read our blog.
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ACCC accepts undertaking from TPG in ongoing investigation into Google’s search services
Date
13 August 2024
Topics
Digital platforms and services
Telecommunications and internet
The ACCC has accepted a court-enforceable undertaking from TPG as part of the ACCC’s ongoing competition investigation into Google’s search services in Australia, after recent undertakings accepted from Telstra and Optus.
During the investigation into Google’s conduct, the ACCC became aware of agreements that Google had initiated and entered into with TPG since at least 2018 which meant Google’s search services were pre-installed as the default search service on an exclusive basis on Android devices supplied by TPG.
“We are pleased that now all three mobile network operators in Australia have responded to the ACCC’s competition concerns by offering these undertakings,” ACCC Commissioner Liza Carver said.
TPG has fully cooperated with the ACCC’s investigation and has now undertaken it will not renew or enter into any new agreements with Google that require Google’s search services to be pre-installed and set as the default search function on an exclusive basis on devices they supply.
The undertaking from TPG resolves the ACCC’s concerns in relation to their involvement in the alleged anticompetitive conduct.
“In our view, this undertaking from TPG, following those recently accepted from Telstra and Optus, is another important step towards providing Australian consumers with more choice about the digital platforms and services they use, and to encourage more competition in these markets,” Ms Carver said.
TPG, Telstra and Optus are each able to continue to offer Google’s search services, and enter into agreements with Google to offer Google’s search services, as long as any agreement complies with their undertaking to the ACCC.
The ACCC is continuing to investigate Google’s conduct in entering into such agreements more broadly, and no further comment on the investigation will be made at this time.
A copy of the undertaking is available at TPG Telecom Limited.
Background
On 2 July 2024, the ACCC accepted similar undertakings from Telstra and Optus during its ongoing investigation into Google’s search services.
In Australia, mobile devices represent the largest and fastest growing distribution channel for general search services, with 95 per cent of Australian adults having used a mobile phone to access the internet in 2023. Securing preinstallation and default rights to devices distributed in Australia ‘out of the box’ is a key distribution channel for a provider of a search service.
Google developed the Android operating system, and Google’s agreements with the three mobile network operators in Australia limited the ability for rival search engines to be pre-installed and promoted on Android devices, in return for a share of Google’s advertising revenue. These agreements expired on 30 June 2024.
The ACCC’s ongoing competition investigation into Google’s search services in Australia arose from the ACCC’s consideration of competition and consumer issues in its Digital Platform Services Inquiry (DPSI). The third interim report of the Inquiry found that Google’s search engine being pre-installed as a default search service on devices was contributing to it being the dominant search engine in Australia. The ACCC found there are strong consumer biases towards default settings.
On 5 August 2024, in a case considering these issues, a US judge found that Google is a monopolist in the US in markets for general search services and general search text ads and has acted as one to maintain its monopoly.
In its fifth interim report of the DPSI, submitted in September 2022, the ACCC recommended a range of new measures to address harms from digital platforms to Australian consumers, small businesses and competition. The report has also proposed mandatory codes of conduct for certain platforms and services to protect and promote competition.
On 8 December 2023, the Government provided in-principle support for all recommendations in the fifth interim report of the ACCC’s Digital Platform Services Inquiry, which focused on regulatory reform. The United Kingdom, Germany, Japan and the European Union have already announced or implemented significant new competition and consumer regulations for digital platforms.
The ACCC will submit the inquiry’s ninth interim report in September 2024 and its final report in March 2025.
On mobile devices, Google Search’s market share in Australia has remained consistently around 98 per cent from September 2021 to July 2024, with other search engines, including Microsoft’s Bing, only having a small presence.
Release number
100/24
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La CNMC informa sobre la contratación interna entre sociedades del Grupo Correos
13 Ago 2024 | Promoción de Competencia Nota de prensa
- La normativa de contratación pública permite los contratos entre sociedades públicas del mismo grupo cuando, entre otros requisitos, no se distorsione la competencia en los mercados.
- Las entidades públicas deben solicitar a la autoridad de competencia un informe que valore la contratación interna antes de la entrada en vigor de los contratos.
La CNMC ha publicado un informe sobre la contratación interna realizada entre determinadas sociedades del Grupo Correos, de acuerdo con el artículo 321.6 de la Ley de Contratos del Sector Público (INF/CNMC/026/24).
Análisis del Grupo Correos
Correos es una sociedad anónima de capital enteramente público que se dedica al mercado postal y de paquetería. Además, es el operador designado por Ley para prestar el Servicio Postal Universal en todo el territorio nacional. Posee una participación del 100 % de la filial Correos Express, dedicada a la paquetería urgente.
La solicitud de informe se centra en la relación contractual intragrupo para la prestación recíproca de servicios de transporte/arrastre entre ambas sociedades.
Contratación entre empresas de un mismo grupo
Las sociedades del Grupo Correos pertenecen al sector público, de forma que sus contratos deben respetar los principios generales de la contratación pública: publicidad, concurrencia, transparencia, confidencialidad, igualdad y no discriminación.
Desde 2021 la normativa permite la adjudicación directa de contratos entre sociedades públicas del mismo Grupo empresarial, siempre que se cumplan ciertos requisitos, como que no se distorsione la competencia en los mercados.
Para valorarlo, la autoridad de competencia debe emitir un informe. Esta evaluación se realiza sin afectar a las demás competencias de inspección, supervisión y sanción que tiene la CNMC.
Valoración de la CNMC
La CNMC ha identificado algunos riesgos que podrían afectar a la competencia en este tipo de contratos: (i) subvenciones cruzadas, en particular si los precios no son de mercado; (ii) sobrecompensación en el Servicio Postal Universal; (iii) empaquetamiento o vinculación de servicios y (iv) ventajas de acceso a infraestructuras públicas.
Sin embargo, la CNMC no ha detectado indicios de que estos riesgos vayan a materializarse en el contrato analizado. Además, Correos está sujeto a obligaciones legales y controles posteriores que reducen la probabilidad de que estos riesgos se materialicen y aumentan la posibilidad de que, si ocurren, sean detectados y corregidos a tiempo.
Por lo tanto, la CNMC concluye que la celebración del contrato intragrupo analizado no supone, en sí mismo, un falseamiento de la competencia.
La CNMC puede actuar de oficio (de acuerdo con el artículo 5.1.h de la Ley de creación de la CNMC) o ser consultada por las Cámaras Legislativas, el Gobierno, los departamentos ministeriales, las Comunidades Autónomas, las Corporaciones locales, los Colegios Profesionales, las Cámaras de Comercio y las Organizaciones Empresariales y de Consumidores y Usuarios (de acuerdo con el artículo 5.2).
Contenido relacionado:
- INF/CNMC/028/21: Informe Grupo CESCE
- INF/CNMC/063/21: Informe Grupo Hunosa
- INF/CNMC/074/21, INF/CNMC/154/21, INF/CNMC/026/22, INF/CNMC/027/22, INF/CNMC/028/22, INF/CNMC/029/22, INF/CNMC/041/22 e INF/CNMC/057/22: Informes Grupo Correos
- INF/CNMC/551/23: Informe Grupo ENUSA
Atos de concentração – Decisões
CADE
Ato de Concentração nº 08700.005491/2024-85
Requerentes: GBio Energia S.A e Metagás Biogás e Energia S.A. Advogados: Camilla Paoletti, Lea Jenner de Faria e Bruna Silveira de Alencar. Decido pela aprovação sem restrições.
Ato de Concentração nº 08700.005128/2024-60
Requerentes: Casa dos Ventos Comercializadora de Energia S.A., América Holding Participações S.A. e América Comercializadora Varejista de Energia Ltda. Aprovação sem restrições.
Ato de Concentração nº 08700.005083/2024-23
Requerentes: Scan Global Logistics A/S e Blu Logistics Brasil Transportes Internacionais Ltda. Aprovação sem restrições.
Ato de Concentração nº 08700.005106/2024-08
Requerentes: Bunge Alimentos S.A. e Vega Monitoramento e Originação Agroambiental S.A. Aprovação sem restrições.
Comissão Europeia
JUMBO / VERMAAT / LA PLACE
Merger
Last decision date: 12.08.2024 Simplified procedure
CMA
Theramex/European Rights to Viatris’ Femoston and Duphaston products
- The CMA investigated the anticipated acquisition by Theramex HQ UK Limited of the European Rights to Viatris’ Femoston and Duphaston Products.
- Updated: 12 August 2024
Global Business Travel Group, Inc / CWT Holdings, LLC merger inquiry
- The CMA is investigating the anticipated acquisition by Global Business Travel Group, Inc of CWT Holdings, LLC.
- Updated: 12 August 2024
Synopsys / Ansys merger inquiry
- The CMA is investigating the anticipated acquisition by Synopsys, Inc. of ANSYS, Inc.
- Updated: 12 August 2024
Atos de concentração – Ingressos
Ato de concentração nº 08700.005714/2024-12
Requerentes: Companhia Riograndense de Saneamento; Irapuru Holding S.A.
Operação: O presente ato de concentração envolve contrato celebrado entre a Companhia Riograndense de Saneamento – Corsan (“Corsan”) e a Irapuru Holding S.A. (“Irapuru Holding” e, em conjunto com a Corsan, “Requerentes”), por meio de suas controladas, i.e., Irapuru IV Energia S.A. (“Irapuru IV”), Irapuru V Energia S.A. (“Irapuru V”) e Irapuru VI Energia S.A. (“Irapuru VI”), para constiuição de consórcios (aqui denominados como “Consórcio Irapuru IV”, “Consórcio Irapuru V”, “Consórcio Irapuru VI”, e, em conjunto, os “Consórcios”) para exploração compartilhada de três usinas fotovoltaicas localizadas na cidade Janaúba, em Minas Gerais (a “Operação”).
Edital: 06/08/2024
Ato de concentração nº 08700.005746/2024-18
Requerentes: UnidaSul Distribuidora Alimentícia S.A.; WMS Supermercados do Brasil Ltda.
Operação: A operação trata da aquisição, por Unidasul Distribuidora Alimentícia S.A. (“UnidaSul”), de loja física fechada localizada na Rua Soledade, nº 100, Esteio/RS (“Ativo Objeto”) atualmente detido por WMS Supermercados do Brasil Ltda. (“WMS” e, em conjunto com UnidaSul, “Requerentes”) – a “Operação”.
Edital: 13/08/2024
Ato de concentração nº 08700.005749/2024-43
Requerentes: M12 Participações Empresariais S.A.; Plastilit Produtos Plásticos do Paraná S.A.
Operação: Trata-se da aquisição, pela M12 Participações Empresariais S.A. (“M12”), holding não operacional do Grupo Ferragens Negrão, de parte das ações ordinárias do capital social da Plastilit Produtos Plásticos do Paraná S.A. (doravante “Plastilit” ou “Target”) detidas pela Rafab Participações Societárias Ltda. (“Rafab”), conforme Contrato de Compra e Venda de Ações e Outras Avenças firmado em 25 de julho de 2024, doravante “Contrato” (DOC. 03 – ACESSO RESTRITO ÀS REQUERENTES E AO CADE) (“Operação”).
Edital: 13/08/2024
Ato de concentração nº 08700.005700/2024-91
Requerentes: Abu Dhabi Marine Business and Services Company PJSC; Navig8 Topco Holdings Inc.
Operação: A operação proposta diz respeito à aquisição de controle unitário da Navig8 Topco Holdings Inc. (“Navig8” ou “Empresa-Alvo”) pela Abu Dhabi Marine Business and Services Company PJSC (“ADMBS”), uma subsidiária integral da ADNOC Logistics & Services PLC (“ADNOC L&S PLC”). A ADMBS, ou uma subsidiária integral a ser incorporada pela ADMBS e nomeada pela ADMBS (a “Adquirente”), adquirirá inicialmente 80% do capital social emitido da Empresa-Alvo, anteriormente detido pela Navig8 Limited (“Vendedora” ou “Acionista Minoritária”).
Edital: 13/08/2024
Atos de concentração nº 08700.005698/2024-50
Requerentes: HCL Technologies Limited; Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company
Operação: A proposta operação consiste na aquisição pela HCL Technologies Limited (“HCLTech,” ou “Compradora”) de certos ativos e obrigações destacados da linha de negócios Communications Technology Group (“CTG”) da Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company (“HPE” ou a “Vendedora”) (o “Negócio-Alvo” ou “Negócio”) (a “Operação”).
Edital: 13/08/2024
Ato de concentração nº 08700.005646/2024-83
Requerentes: Engelhart CTP (Brasil) S.A.; Serglobal Participações Ltda.
Operação: A operação proposta (“Operação”) consiste na aquisição, pela Engelhart CTP (Brasil) S.A. (“Engelhart” ou “Compradora”), da totalidade do capital social da Serglobal Participações Ltda. (“Serglobal” ou “Empresa-Alvo” e, em conjunto com Engelhart, as “Requerentes”), atualmente detida por um conjunto de pessoas físicas (“Vendedores”).
Edital: 12/08/2024
Ato de concentração nº 08700.005661/2024-21
Requerentes: TE Connectivity Brasil Indústria de Eletrônicos Ltda.; Brycon Participações Ltda.; Sense Eletrônica Ltda.
Operação: A operação envolve a aquisição (a) direta de 100% do capital social, total e votante, da empresa Brycon Participações Ltda. (“Brycon”) e (b) indireta de 100% do capital social, total e votante, da empresa Sense Eletrônica Ltda. (“Sense” e, em conjunto com Brycon, “Empresas Objeto”), por TE Connectivity Brasil Indústria de Eletrônicos Ltda. (“TE” ou “Compradora”) (“Operação”). A Operação foi estruturada em um Quota Assignment Agreement and Other Covenants (“QPA”) assinado em 8.7.2024. Compradora e Empresas Objeto são conjuntamente referidas como “Partes” ou “Requerentes”.
Edital: 12/08/2024
Ato de concentração nº 08700.005648/2024-72
Requerentes: BRASOL PARTICIPAÇÕES E EMPREENDIMENTOS S.A.; BRITO CUNHA PARTICIPAÇÕES E INVESTIMENTOS LTDA.; BC AROEIRA GERAÇÃO E COMERCIALIZAÇÃO DE ENERGIA S.A.; BC TAMBORIL GERAÇÃO E COMERCIALIZAÇÃO DE ENERGIA LTDA.
Operação: A operação consiste em acordo de investimentos entre a Brasol Participações e Empreendimentos S.A. (“Brasol”) e as empresas Brito Cunha Participações e Investimentos Ltda. (“Brito Cunha”), BC Aroeira Geração e Comercialização de Energia S.A. (“BC Aroeira”) e BC Tamboril Geração e Comercialização de Energia Ltda. (“BC Tramboril” e, em conjunto com Brito Cunha e BC Aroeira, “BC Energia”) para o desenvolvimento e a exploração de usinas de geração solar distribuída atualmente detidas pelo Grupo BC Energia (“Grupo BC Energia”) e localizadas nos Estados de São Paulo (“SP”), de Goiás (“GO”) e de Tocantins (“TO”) e no Distrito Federal (“DF”) (“Projetos Fotovoltaicos”) (“Fase de Desenvolvimento”).
Edital: 12/08/2024