Apresentação
Este é um informativo diário que traz para o(a) leitor (a) notícias e casos de defesa da concorrência das principais jurisdições antitruste do mundo (CADE, FTC, Comissão Europeia, CMA etc).
Notícias
Commission seeks feedback on draft antitrust Guidelines on exclusionary abuses
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The European Commission has launched today a public consultation inviting all interested parties to comment on draft Guidelines on exclusionary abuses of dominance.
Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’) prohibits dominant companies from engaging in abusive behaviour, including behaviour that excludes competitors from the market. Examples of such exclusionary abuses of dominance include predatory pricing, margin squeeze, exclusive dealing and refusal to supply.
The enforcement of Article 102 TFEU is key to ensuring that competition works effectively, that all businesses get a fair chance to compete and that consumers can reap the benefits of competitive markets. The Commission has gained extensive experience in enforcing Article 102 TFEU, in particular with regard to exclusionary abuses. At the same time, Article 102 TFEU is the only area of European competition law where no Guidelines currently clarify its application.
The draft Guidelines published today aim at reflecting the Commission’s interpretation of the EU courts‘ case law on exclusionary abuses and the Commission practice. This will help increase legal certainty to the benefit of consumers, and businesses, as well as national competition authorities and courts.
In particular, the draft Guidelines provide guidance on various key issues concerning exclusionary abuses by dominant companies, including:
- The purpose of competition law enforcement and the concept of consumer welfare under EU law, including in relation to exclusionary abuses.
- The main principles applicable to the assessment of single and collective dominance.
- The application of general principles to determine if a conduct by a dominant company is likely to constitute an abuse and, in particular, on the concepts of “competition on the merits” and “exclusionary effects”.
- The evidence necessary to show that a conduct is capable of producing exclusionary effects. In particular, the draft Guidelines identify: (i) categories of conduct for which it is necessary to demonstrate the capability of producing exclusionary effects; (ii) categories of conduct that have a high potential to lead to exclusionary effects, and (iii) naked restrictions, which by their very nature lead to exclusionary effects.
- The substantive legal standard to establish a conduct’s capability to produce exclusionary effects.
- The analytical framework applicable to certain types of conduct by dominant companies. The draft distinguishes between: (i) conduct subject to a specific legal test set out in EU case law (i.e.exclusive dealing, tying and bundling, refusal to supply, predatory pricing and margin squeeze); and (ii) conduct not subject to a specific legal test (i.e. conditional rebates, multi-product rebates, self-preferencing and access restrictions).
- The general principles applicable to the assessment of objective justifications that the dominant company may argue.
Next Steps
All interested parties can submit their comments on the draft Guidelines by 31 October 2024. More information including on how to submit a contribution is available here.
The Commission is currently planning to finalise the draft Guidelines on Exclusionary Abuses on the basis of the comments received in this public consultation in the course of 2025.
Background Information
Article 102 of the TFEU, which can also be applied by the national competition authorities and courts, prohibits the abuse of a dominant position that may affect trade within the EU and prevent or restrict competition. The implementation of this provision is defined in the Regulation No 1/2003.
In its 2008 Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities, the Commission set out its enforcement priorities with regard to exclusionary abuses of dominance. The 2008 Guidance contributed to promote an approach focused on the potential effects of alleged abusive conduct, through the analysis of market dynamics (“effects-based approach”). Since the adoption of the 2008 Guidance, the Court of Justice of the European Union has delivered 34 judgments on exclusionary abuses. This rich body of case law endorsed the effects-based approach to Article 102 TFEU promoted by the Commission and substantially clarified the scope of the rules.
In March 2023, the Commission launched a Call for Evidence seeking feedback on the adoption of Guidelines on exclusionary abuses of dominance. Stakeholders generally welcomed the initiative and called for clarity and legal certainty in the application of Article 102 TFEU to exclusionary conduct.
In parallel to the call for evidence, the Commission published a Communication (and Annex) amending its 2008 Guidance on enforcement priorities concerning exclusionary abuses. Following the adoption of the Guidelines, the Commission will withdraw the 2008 Guidance on enforcement priorities, as amended by the March 2023 Communication.
The Directorate-General for Competition also published in March 2023 a Policy Brief titled “A dynamic and workable effects-based approach to Article 102 TFEU”which further explains the background to the launch of the Guidelines initiative as well as the changes to the 2008 Guidance on enforcement priorities introduced in the Communication.
More information on this initiative can be found in the dedicated webpage of DG Competition, which contains a link to the draft Guidelines as well as instructions on how to submit observations.
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Public Consultation Article 102 Guidelines
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Commission clears Bunge’s acquisition of Viterra subject to conditions
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The European Commission has approved, under the EU Merger Regulation, the proposed acquisition of Viterra Limited (‘Viterra‘) by Bunge Global S.A. (‘Bunge‘). The approval is conditional upon full compliance with the commitments offered by the parties.
Bunge and Viterra are both vertically integrated global agribusinesses, active in the origination, trading and processing of agricultural products, with significant overlaps in the sector of oilseeds (i.e., rapeseed, soybean and sunflower seed).
The Commission’s investigation
The Commission’s investigation showed that the acquisition, as initially notified, would have reduced competition in the markets for oilseeds and related products, including oilseed meals for animal consumption, crude oilseed oils and refined oilseed oils for human consumption or for biodiesel production. In particular, the transaction would have negatively affected competition in Central Europe where both parties are active across the whole supply chain.
The Commission found that the transaction would have resulted in a considerable concentration of oilseed processing capacity in Central Europe, with potential negative effects vis-à-vis farmers and downstream customers.
The proposed remedies
To address the Commission’s competition concerns, the parties offered to divest the entirety of Viterra’s oilseed businesses in Hungary and Poland and a number of logistical assets linked to these operations.
These commitments fully address the competition concerns identified by the Commission, by removing the horizontal overlaps and vertical links between the parties’ oilseed businesses in the concerned territories.
Following the positive feedback received during the market test, the Commission concluded that the transaction, as modified by the commitments, would no longer raise competition concerns.
The decision is conditional upon full compliance with the commitments. Under the supervision of the Commission, an independent trustee will monitor their implementation.
Companies and products
Bunge, headquartered in the US, is mainly active in the processing, sale and trading of oilseed meals and oils. Bunge also sells grains (e.g., corn, wheat and barley) and milled products (e.g., wheat flour), as well as unprocessed oilseeds, sugar and other agricultural products.
Viterra, headquartered in the Netherlands, trades agricultural commodities including grains, oilseeds and oilseed-based meals, and oils. Viterra also sells other unprocessed products (e.g., cotton) and milled products (e.g., wheat flour).
For More Information
The transaction was notified to the Commission on 13 June 2024.
The Commission has the duty to assess mergers and acquisitions involving companies with a turnover above certain thresholds (see Article 1 of the EU Merger Regulation) and to prevent concentrations that would significantly impede effective competition in the European Economic Area or any substantial part of it.
The vast majority of notified mergers do not pose competition problems and are cleared after a routine review. From the moment a transaction is notified, the Commission generally has a total of 25 working days to decide whether to grant approval (Phase I) or to start an in-depth investigation (Phase II). If commitments are proposed in Phase I, the Commission has 10 additional working days, bringing the total duration of a Phase I case to 35 working days, such as in this case.
More information will be available on the Commission’s competition website, in the public case register under the case number M.11204.
AdC sanciona empresa de climatização doméstica por fixação de preços nos serviços pós-venda
Comunicado 19/2024
01 de agosto de 2024
A AdC sancionou uma empresa fornecedora de sistemas e serviços de climatização para habitação, ativa em todo o território nacional, por ter firmado um acordo vertical com os concessionários na prestação de serviços de assistência técnica pós-venda.
O acordo vertical previa não só a fixação dos preços dos serviços praticados pelos concessionários aos clientes, como restrições geográficas na prestação desses serviços.
A empresa colaborou com a AdC, abdicando de contestar a imputação factual da AdC, pôs fim à prática e procedeu ao pagamento voluntário da coima no valor de 103 mil euros, por ter acedido ao procedimento de transação.
A empresa fornece aparelhos comocaldeiras domésticas, aparelhos de ar condicionado, radiadores e esquentadores elétricos entre outros.
A prática anticoncorrencial
As referidas cláusulas previam:
– a repartição do mercado entre os concessionários da visada relativamente à prestação de serviços de assistência técnica pós-venda não cobertos pela garantia, vedando a prestação de serviços pelos mesmos fora dos territórios contratualmente atribuídos; e
– a fixação dos preços dos serviços prestados pelos seus concessionários aos respetivos clientes.
A Lei da Concorrência proíbe os acordos entre empresas, as práticas concertadas entre empresas e as decisões de associações de empresas que tenham por objeto ou como efeito impedir, falsear ou restringir de forma sensível a concorrência no todo ou em parte do mercado nacional, nomeadamente os que consistam em:
a) Fixar, de forma direta ou indireta, os preços de compra ou de venda ou quaisquer outras condições de transação; […)]
b) Repartir os mercados ou as fontes de abastecimento; […]”
Para mais informações sobre o processo identificado como PRC/2023/6, consulte a página eletrónica da AdC.
O procedimento de transação
A coima foi reduzida em 30% face ao valor que seria imposto se a empresa não tivesse colaborado e acedido ao procedimento de transação.
Este procedimento permite alcançar ganhos processuais relevantes, sem deixar de sancionar as empresas que cometem infrações à concorrência.
A AdC aprovou recentemente regulamentação para a concretização de termos do procedimento de transação, sistematizando e detalhando os trâmites adotados pela AdC no âmbito deste instrumento, de forma a propiciar uma melhor cooperação entre a instituição e as partes envolvidas e que pode ser consultada aqui
Atos de concentração – Ingressos
CADE
Ato de Concentração nº 08700.005296/2024-55
Requerentes: J. Safra Holding S.A. e Banco Safra S.A.
Operação: A operação trata da aquisição, por David Joseph Safra (“DJS”) e Jarrocks Holdings Limited (“Jarrocks”), de todas as ações de propriedade ou nua propriedade de Alberto Joseph Safra (“AJS”) na J. Safra Holding S.A. (“JSH”) – a “Operação”.
Rito sumário
Edital: 01.08.2024
Ato de Concentração nº 08700.005299/2024-99
Requerentes: J. Safra Holding S.A. e Banco Safra S.A.
Operação: A operação trata da aquisição, por David Joseph Safra (“DJS”) e Jacob Joseph Safra (“JJS”), de todas as ações de propriedade ou nua propriedade de Alberto Joseph Safra (“AJS”) no Banco Safra S.A. (“BSSA”) – a “Operação”.
Rito sumário
Edital: 01.08.2024
Ato de Concentração nº 08700.005313/2024-54
Requerentes: Compass Dois Ltda.; Companhia Paranaense de Energia – COPEL
Operação: Nos termos do Contrato de Compra e Venda do Bloco de Controle e Outras Avenças (“CCV”), a operação (“Operação”) consiste na aquisição do controle da Companhia Paranaense de Gás – Compagas (“Compagas” ou “Empresa-Alvo”) pela Compass Dois Ltda. (“Compass Dois” ou “Compradora”), mediante a aquisição das ações representativas de 51% do capital social da Compagas, atualmente detidas pela Companhia Paranaense de Energia – Copel (“Copel” ou “Vendedora” e, em conjunto com a Compradora, as “Requerentes”). A Compass Gás e Energia S.A. (“Compass”), controladora da Compass Dois, já detém participação minoritária indireta na Empresa Alvo através de sua controlada Commit Gás S.A. (“Commit”).
Rito sumário
Edital: 01.08.2024
Atos de concentração – Decisões
Comissão Europeia
IAG / AIR EUROPA
Merger
Last decision date: 02.08.2024
Ongoing
Investigation phase: 2
ICG / DGS
Merger
Last decision date: 01.08.2024 Simplified procedure
CLEARLAKE / FRANCISCO PARTNERS / SOFTWARE INTEGRITY GROUP OF SYNOPSYS
Merger
Last decision date: 01.08.2024 Simplified procedure
ICIG / EVONIK SUPERABSORBER COMPANIES
Merger
Last decision date: 01.08.2024
HPE / JUNIPER
Merger
Last decision date: 01.08.2024
CMA
Boparan / ForFarmers (Burston and Radstock mills) merger inquiry
- The CMA is investigating the anticipated acquisition by Boparan Private Office Limited (via 2 Agriculture Limited) of ForFarmers UK Limited’s Burston and Radstock feed mills
- Updated: 2 August 2024
Vodafone / CK Hutchison JV merger inquiry
- The CMA is investigating the anticipated joint venture between Vodafone Group Plc and CK Hutchison Holdings Limited concerning Vodafone Limited and Hutchison 3G UK Limited.
- Updated: 2 August 2024
Eurofins / Cellmark merger inquiry
- The CMA is investigating the anticipated acquisition by Eurofins Forensics Lux Holding Sarl (Eurofins) of DNACO Limited (Cellmark).
- Updated: 2 August 2024