Apresentação
Este é um informativo diário que traz para o(a) leitor (a) notícias e casos de defesa da concorrência das principais jurisdições antitruste do mundo (CADE, FTC, Comissão Europeia, CMA etc).
Notícias
Spreadex and Sporting Index merger raises provisional competition concerns
An independent panel has provisionally found that Spreadex has bought its only remaining rival in licensed online sports spread betting in the UK.
From: Competition and Markets Authority Published25 July 2024
Last year, Spreadex acquired the ‘retail business’ of Sporting Index from Sporting Group Holding Limited (Sporting Group). Spreadex and Sporting Index both provide fixed odds betting and sports spread betting to customers based in the UK.
Sports spread betting involves betting on a range of outcomes of sporting events rather than the standard ‘win or lose’ outcomes offered by fixed-odds betting. In spread betting, the closer a customer’s bet is to an outcome, the more money they stand to win, and the further away from the outcome they are, the more they stand to lose. This means that, in contrast to fixed odds betting, customers’ wins and losses in spread betting can be far higher than the amount they bet.
The Competition and Market Authority’s (CMA) Phase 2 investigation, which is led by an independent panel, focused on licensed online sports spread betting, where Sporting Index and Spreadex are the only two operators.
Having assessed the evidence, the panel provisionally considers that the merger has substantially lessened, or could substantially lessen, competition in the supply of licensed online sports spread betting services in the UK. The panel provisionally found that the deal would remove the only other licensed provider in the UK, and suppliers of other betting services, such as fixed odds betting and financial spread betting, only provided a weak constraint on the new business.
The panel are provisionally concerned that this could lead to worse user experience, a more limited range of products and/or higher prices than would otherwise have been the case absent the Merger.
The panel are also consulting on possible remedies for this substantial lessening of competition, including whether Spreadex should sell a business made up of all or some of the Sporting Index assets that it acquired as part of the merger, and whether it should also have to include any Spreadex assets in the sale.
Richard Feasey the chair of the independent panel reviewing the merger, said:
Having assessed this deal, our provisional conclusion is that it raises serious competition concerns in the licensed online sports spread betting market. It would remove the only other licensed provider of sports spread betting in the UK and could lead to a worse user experience for consumers.
We will now be considering how best to remedy this lessening of competition. Given that Spreadex has already acquired certain Sporting Index assets, our initial view is that Spreadex would need to divest sufficient assets to allow a purchaser to operate a rival licenced spread betting business on a standalone basis.
The CMA welcomes responses to its provisional findings by 15 August 2024 and its notice of possible remedies, which sets out potential options for addressing its provisional concerns, by 8 August 2024. These will be considered ahead of the CMA issuing its final report, which is due by 26 November 2024.
Further details are available on the Spreadex / Sporting Index case page.
Notes to editors:
- The CMA launched its formal Phase 1 investigation in February 2024. This review identified a realistic prospect that the deal would lead to a ‘substantial lessening of competition’ – focusing on the potential impact on consumers and businesses in the UK – and therefore required an in-depth, Phase 2 investigation. Phase 2 investigations last 24 weeks (extendable by up to 8 weeks for special reasons) and allow an independent panel of experts to probe in more depth initial concerns identified at Phase 1. Upon making these provisional findings, the panel has decided to extend the statutory timetable by eight weeks which means that the deadline for preparing and publishing the final report is now 26 November 2024.
- Sporting Group Holding Limited (Sporting Group) is a subsidiary of La Française des Jeux (FDJ). FDJ has retained ownership of Sporting Group which includes sports betting technology and the trading service provider Sporting Solutions.
- For media enquiries, contact the CMA press office on 020 3738 6460 or press@cma.gov.uk.
Annual report on concurrency 2024
A report on the operation of the concurrency arrangements in the regulated sectors from 1 April 2023 to 31 March 2024.
From: Competition and Markets Authority
Published24 July 2024
Documents
Annual report on concurrency 2024
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In the regulated sectors, both the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) and the relevant sector regulator have concurrent powers to apply competition law. This is the tenth annual concurrency report to be published by the CMA since the enhanced concurrency arrangements came into effect on 1 April 2014.
The annual concurrency report assesses the operation of the concurrency arrangements, as required by the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 (ERRA), from April 2023 to March 2024.
Updates to this page
Published 24 July 2024
La CNMC investiga al grupo Apple por posibles prácticas anticompetitivas relacionadas con la distribución de aplicaciones en sus dispositivos
24 Jul 2024 | Competencia Nota de prensa
- Podría estar imponiendo condiciones comerciales inequitativas a los desarrolladores que utilizan su tienda de aplicaciones (Apple App Store).
- A través de ella, los desarrolladores distribuyen sus aplicaciones a los usuarios de Apple.
- Las conductas podrían constituir un abuso de posición de dominio prohibido por el artículo 2 de la Ley de Defensa de la Competencia y 102 del Tratado de Funcionamiento de la Unión Europea.
La Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia (CNMC) investiga a Apple Distribution International Ltd. y a Apple INC. (Apple) por supuestas conductas contrarias al artículo 2 de la Ley 15/2007, de 3 de julio, de Defensa de la Competencia (LDC) y al 102 del Tratado de Funcionamiento de la Unión Europea (TFUE). (S/0005/24)
En concreto, Apple podría estar llevando a cabo prácticas anticompetitivas consistentes en imponer condiciones comerciales inequitativas a los desarrolladores que utilizan las tiendas de aplicaciones del grupo Apple (Apple App Store) para distribuir aplicaciones a los usuarios de productos de dicha empresa.
La investigación se inició de oficio, dada la relevancia que está cobrando en España la actividad económica que se lleva a cabo en las tiendas de aplicaciones.
En caso de confirmarse, las conductas podrían constituir un abuso de posición de dominio prohibido por el artículo 2 de la LDC y 102 del TFUE.
Estas prácticas podrían ser consideradas como una infracción muy grave de la LDC, que puede conllevar multas de hasta el 10 % del volumen de negocio total mundial de las empresas infractoras en el ejercicio anterior al de imposición de la multa.
La incoación de este expediente no prejuzga el resultado final de la investigación. Se abre ahora un periodo máximo de 24 meses para la instrucción del expediente y para su resolución por la CNMC.
Contenido relacionado:
- S/0005/24: Apple App Store
Documento no oficial, destinado a los medios de comunicación, y que no vincula a la CNMC. Reproducción permitida solo si se cita la fuente.
Joint Statement on competition in generative AI foundation models and AI products
Joint statement between the competition authorities of the United Kingdom, European Union and the United States of America on competition in generative AI foundation models and AI products.
From: Competition and Markets Authority
Published 23 July 2024
Documents
Joint statement on competition in generative AI foundation models and AI products
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Details
The competition authorities of the United Kingdom, European Union and the United States of America have published a joint statement on competition in generative AI foundation models and AI products, setting out their joint commitment to working together to protect competition and consumers.
The statement sets out key principles to support competition, protect consumers and help businesses to innovate and thrive.
The statement marks the latest step in the CMA’s work on AI foundation models.
In April 2024, the CMA published an update which set out six principles to support competition and consumer protection as AI foundation models continue to be developed and deployed.
Updates to this page
Published 23 July 2024
Atos de concentração – Decisões
CADE
Ato de Concentração nº 08700.004365/2024-11.
Requerentes: Âmbar Energia S.A., Centrais Elétricas do Norte do Brasil S.A. e Furnas Centrais Elétricas S.A. Aprovação sem restrições.
Comissão Europeia
LOGISTEED / ALPS ALPINE / ALPS LOGISTICS
Merger
Last decision date: 24.07.2024 Simplified procedure
CMA
Spreadex / Sporting Index merger inquiry
- The CMA is investigating the completed acquisition by Spreadex Limited of the B2C business of Sporting Index Limited.
- Updated: 25 July 2024
Atos de concentração – Ingressos
| Ato de concentração | Requerentes | Descrição da operação | Ingresso | Rito | Edital (DOU) |
| 08700.005158/2024-76 | Empresa Folha da Manhã S/A; Triple A Fundo de Investimento Imobiliário | A operação proposta consiste na aquisição, pela Empresa Folha da Manhã S/A (“EFM” ou “Compradora”), do Imóvel HUMA SBC, localizado no município de São Bernardo do Campo/SP (“Imóvel-Alvo”), atualmente detido por Triple A Fundo de Investimento Imobiliário (“Vendedor” ou “Triple A” e, juntamente com a EFM, as “Requerentes”) (“a Operação”). | 19.07.2024 | Sumário | 24.07.2024 |
| 08700.005127/2024-15 | Cabo Serviços de Telecomunicações S.A.; Azza Telecom Serviços em Telecomunicações S.A. | Este Ato de Concentração trata da aquisição pela Cabo Serviços de Telecomunicações S.A. (“Alares”), subsidiária da holding Triple Play Brasil Participações S.A., da Azza Telecom Serviços em Telecomunicações S.A. (“Azza”) (em conjunto, “Requerentes”), por meio (i) da aquisição direta de ações representativas de aproximadamente 25,48% (vinte e cinco vírgula quarenta e oito por cento) do total de ações vinculadas ao capital social da Azza; e (ii) da aquisição de 100% (cem por cento) das ações vinculadas ao capital social da Sevi Participações S.A (“Sevi Participações”), sociedade empresária esta controladora da Azza (a “Operação”). | 18.07.2024 | Sumário | 24.07.2024 |
Elaboração: WebAdvocacy – Direito e Economia