Este é um informativo diário que traz para o(a) leitor (a) notícias e casos de defesa da concorrência das principais jurisdições antitruste do mundo (CADE, FTC, Comissão Europeia, CMA etc).
Notícias
Commission opens investigation into possible anticompetitive agreements in the online food delivery sector
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The European Commission has opened a formal antitrust investigation to assess whether Delivery Hero and Glovo have breached EU competition rules by participating in a cartel in the sector of online ordering and delivery of food, grocery and other daily consumer goods in the European Economic Area (‘EEA’).
Delivery Hero and Glovo are two of the largest food delivery companies in Europe. From July 2018, Delivery Hero held a minority share in Glovo, and in July 2022 it acquired its sole control.
The Commission is concerned that, before the takeover, Delivery Hero and Glovo may have allocated geographic markets and shared commercially sensitive information (e.g., on commercial strategies, prices, capacity, costs, product characteristics). The Commission is also concerned that the companies may have agreed not to poach each other’s employees. These practices could have been facilitated by Delivery Hero’s minority share in Glovo.
If proven, the companies’ behaviour may breach EU competition rules that prohibit cartels and restrictive business practices(Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’) and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement).
The Commission will now carry out its in-depth investigation as a matter of priority. The opening of a formal investigation does not prejudge its outcome.
Background
In June 2022 and November 2023, the Commission carried out unannounced inspections at the premises of Delivery Hero and Glovo, as part of its own-initiative inquiry into possible collusion in the food delivery sector.
Delivery Hero, headquartered in Germany, is a company active in the food ordering and delivery business. It is currently present in more than 70 countries worldwide and partners with more than 500,000 restaurants. Delivery Hero is listed on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange
Glovo, headquartered in Spain, is a company active in the food ordering and delivery business. It is currently present in more than 1,300 cities in 25 countries across the globe. In July 2022, Delivery Hero acquired the majority of shares in Glovo, and Glovo became Delivery Hero’s subsidiary.
Today’s investigation is part of the Commission’s efforts to ensure that online food delivery and the groceries sector deliver choice and reasonable prices to consumers. In a young and dynamic market such as the one at stake, anticompetitive agreements and restrictive business practices, including cartels through market allocation, may lead to hidden market consolidation, with potential negative effects on competition.
This investigation is also part of the Commission’s efforts to ensure a fair labour market where employers do not collude to limit the number and quality of opportunities for workers but compete for talents. It is the first investigation on no-poach agreements formally initiated by the Commission.
This investigation is also the first by the Commission into anti-competitive agreements that may have occurred in the context of a minority shareholding by one operator in a competitor.
Article 101 TFEU prohibits agreements and concerted practices which may affect trade and prevent or restrict competition. The implementation of this provision is defined in Regulation No 1/2003. Article 101 TFEU can also be applied by national competition authorities.
Article 11(6) of Regulation No 1/2003 provides that the opening of proceedings by the Commission relieves the competition authorities of the Member States of their competence to also apply EU competition rules to the practices concerned. Article 16(1) further provides that national courts must avoid adopting decisions that would conflict with a decision contemplated by the Commission in proceedings it has initiated. The Commission has informed the companies and the competition authorities of the Member States that it has opened proceedings in this case.
There is no legal deadline for bringing an antitrust investigation to an end. The duration of an antitrust investigation depends on a number of factors, including the complexity of the case, the extent to which the companies concerned cooperate with the Commission and the exercise of the rights of defence.
For more information on the Commission’s actions against cartels, including on how individuals or companies can report suspicious cartel behaviour, see the Commission’s dedicated cartels website. The website also provides statistics on cartel enforcement. A periodic compilation of antitrust and cartel news is available in the Competition Weekly News Summary.
More information on the investigation will be available on the Commission’s competition website, in the public case register under the case number AT.40795.
Commission accepts commitments by Vifor to address possible anticompetitive disparagement of iron medicine
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The European Commission has made commitments offered by Vifor legally binding under EU antitrust rules. The commitments address the Commission’s competition concerns relating to Vifor’s potential disparagement of Monofer, the closest – and potentially only – competitor of Vifor’s flagship intravenous iron medicine in Europe, Ferinject.
The Commission’s preliminary concerns
The Commission preliminarily found that Vifor may be dominant in several national markets for the provision of intravenous iron medicines, namely in Austria, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden and the Netherlands.
The Commission is concerned that for many years, Vifor may have restricted competition in the above markets for intravenous iron treatment by disseminating potentially misleading information about the safety of Monofer, an iron deficiency treatment marketed by Vifor’s closest competitor in Europe, Pharmacosmos. Vifor’s messages, primarily targeting healthcare professionals, may have unduly hindered Monofer’s uptake in the European Economic Area (‘EEA’). They appear to be aimed at shielding Vifor’s own blockbuster high-dose intravenous iron treatment medicine, Ferinject, from competition.
The Commission’s preliminary view is that Vifor’s conduct may have restricted competition in the market for intravenous iron treatment and potentially amount to an abuse of dominant position, in breach of Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’).
The commitments
To address the Commission’s preliminary concerns, Vifor offered certain commitments. Between 22 April and 22 May 2024, the Commission market tested those commitments and consulted all interested third parties to verify whether the commitments would remove its competition concerns. In light of the outcome of this market test, Vifor adjusted the initially proposed commitments and offered the following:
- To launch a comprehensive and multi-channel communication campaign to rectify and undo the effects of the potentially misleading messages previously disseminated by Vifor regarding the safety of Monofer. In particular, Vifor commits to: (i) disseminate via email, mail and in-person meetings a succinct and factual clarificatory communication to a significant number of healthcare professionals in the nine Member States where the Commission preliminarily found Vifor may be dominant; (ii) to publish such communication prominently on its website; (iii) to publish such communication in leading medical journals in each of the Member States concerned; and (iv) to allow third parties, including Pharmacosmos, to use such communication when contacting healthcare professionals.
- Not to engage in external promotional and medical communications, in writing or orally, about Monofer‘s safety profile using information that is neither based on Monofer‘s label nor derived from clinical trials specifically designed to compare Ferinject and Monofer across the entire EEA.
- To implement a number of measures and safeguards to ensure compliance, including internal mechanisms to ensure that all relevant external promotional and medical communications as well as internal training materials are in line with the commitments prior to their use, as well as annual internal trainings of staff and a system of certification of compliance.
The Commission concluded that Vifor’s final commitments would address its competition concerns over Vifor’s potential disparagement of Monofer. It therefore decided to make them legally binding on Vifor.
The implementation of the commitments offered by Vifor will be monitored by a monitoring trustee appointed by Vifor and will last for a period of 10 years.
Background
Iron helps producing healthy red blood cells that move oxygen across the body. Iron deficiency is quite common, especially among women and persons suffering from chronic inflammatory diseases, cancers and blood losses (for example, after an accident or during surgery). In severe cases, iron deficiency can cause serious complications, such as heart failures, lung problems, pregnancy complications, as well as poor cognitive and motor development in children. It is a major cause of morbidity and mortality worldwide.
Vifor Pharma‘s Ferinject and Pharmacosmos’ Monofer high-dose intravenous iron medicines are indicated for the treatment of iron deficiency when, for instance, oral preparations are ineffective or cannot be used.
Vifor is a global pharmaceutical company part of the biotechnology group CSL that develops, manufactures and markets worldwide pharmaceutical products to treat iron deficiency, nephrology and cardio-renal therapies. Pharmacosmos, a Danish family-owned specialist pharmaceutical company, focuses on the treatment of iron deficiency conditions.
The Commission opened a formal antitrust investigation into Vifor’s behaviour in June 2022, following a complaint filed with the Commission by Pharmacosmos. In February 2024, Vifor and Pharmacosmos reached a confidential commercial settlement agreement on this matter, which was taken into consideration by the Commission in its decision to explore the commitments procedure in this case. In April 2024, the Commission adopted a Preliminary Assessment summarising the main facts of the case and identifying the preliminary competition concerns.
Article 102 of the TFEU, which can also be applied by the national competition authorities, prohibits the abuse of a dominant position that may affect trade within the EU and prevent or restrict competition. The implementation of this provision is defined in Regulation No 1/2003.
Article 9(1) of Regulation 1/2003 enables companies investigated by the Commission to offer commitments in order to meet the Commission’s concerns and empowers the Commission to adopt a decision to make such commitments binding on the companies. Article 27(4) of Regulation 1/2003 requires that before adopting such decision the Commission shall provide interested third parties with an opportunity to comment on the offered commitments.
If the market test indicates that the commitments are a satisfactory way of addressing the Commission’s competition concerns, the Commission may adopt a decision making the commitments legally binding on the company concerned. Such a decision would not conclude that there is an infringement of EU antitrust rules but would legally bind the company to comply with the commitments it has offered.
If the company concerned does not honour such commitments, the Commission may impose a fine of up to 10% of its total annual turnover, without having to find an infringement of EU antitrust rules, or a periodic penalty payment of 5% per day of its daily turnover for every day of non-compliance.
This is the Commission’s second investigation into potential abuses relating to exclusionary disparagement of competing products in the pharmaceutical industry. In October 2022, the Commission sent a Statement of Objections to Teva over misuse of the patent system and disparagement of a competing multiple sclerosis medicine with a view to hinder its market entry and uptake.
For More Information
More information, including the full text of today’s decision and the full version of the commitments will be available on the Commission’s competition website, in the public case register under the case number AT.40577.
La CNMC propone medidas para acabar con el monopolio en la gestión de los residuos de envases en España
22 Jul 2024 | Promoción de Competencia Nota de prensa
- Las empresas que producen bienes envasados —en vidrio, plástico, briks, latas, etc.— deben financiar la recogida y el tratamiento de esos residuos.
- Lo hacen a través de unas organizaciones llamadas ‘Sistemas Colectivos de Responsabilidad Ampliada del Productor’ (SCRAPs).
- Estas organizaciones firman los convenios y pagan a los Ayuntamientos, que se encargan de organizar la recogida de basuras en las localidades.
- Hasta 2024, Ecoembes (para envases ligeros y papel-cartón) y Ecovidrio (envases de vidrio) han sido las dos únicas organizaciones activas.
- Para mejorar el sector es crucial que entren nuevos competidores, evitar conflictos de interés y potenciar la transparencia.
La CNMC ha analizado la gestión de los residuos de envases destinados al contenedor amarillo —plástico, briks, latas metálicas, etc.— y al de vidrio. En España, el sector históricamente ha funcionado como un monopolio, a diferencia de otros países europeos, por lo que favorecer la competencia es esencial para mejorar su funcionamiento. (E/CNMC/004/21).
La gestión de los residuos tiene un gran impacto sobre la salud pública, la sostenibilidad medioambiental y la transición ecológica e implica a muchos agentes públicos y privados.
Se inicia en los hogares —un individuo genera de media al año más de 180 kilos de residuos de envases— donde los ciudadanos separan los residuos que depositan en los contenedores (amarillo para el plástico, latas, etc. y verde para el vidrio). Posteriormente, la recogida, traslado, separación y clasificación los organizan los ayuntamientos y las administraciones públicas encargadas de estos servicios.
Quien contamina paga
En virtud de este principio, la normativa obliga a las empresas que producen los bienes envasados (por ejemplo, cerveza, refrescos, detergentes, agua embotellada, etc.) a hacerse cargo de los costes asociados a la gestión de los residuos de sus envases.
Para canalizar esos pagos hacia los ayuntamientos por la recogida de sus residuos, existen unas organizaciones: los Sistemas Colectivos de Responsabilidad Ampliada del Productos (SCRAPs).
En España hasta este año, para los envases domésticos ligeros y papel-cartón, el único SCRAPs activo ha sido Ecoembes, y para los envases de vidrio, Ecovidrio. Recientemente, ha recibido autorización, al menos, un nuevo SCRAP de envases.
Los SCRAPs firman los convenios donde se establecen las cantidades que deben pagar a las administraciones para cubrir el coste de los residuos. A su vez, las empresas que producen bienes envasados sufragan el gasto de los SCRAPs y, de esta manera, cumplen con su obligación legal de “pagar por contaminar”.
Recomendaciones de la CNMC
Los múltiples actores públicos y privados que intervienen en la gestión, su coordinación y la complejidad del sistema obstaculiza la entrada de competidores.
Es crucial que la regulación y las autoridades promuevan la competencia de forma activa a través de las siguientes medidas:
- Reducir las barreras de entrada, facilitando la autorización de nuevos SCRAPs, eliminando o flexibilizando el plazo para la firma de convenios y agilizando que las empresas puedan cambiar de SCRAP.
- Establecer un marco de coordinación entre agentes públicos y privados eficiente y procompetitivo que implica regular en detalle la coexistencia entre SCRAPs competidores, establecer un organismo de coordinación y supervisión, introducir un sistema de convenio único con cada AA.PP., elaborar un convenio tipo, consensuar los requisitos mínimos de calidad y dotar a las AA.PP. de los medios necesarios.
- Fomentar la transparencia, con medidas que mejoren la trazabilidad y la detección del fraude.
- Prevenir y remediar conflictos de interés, en particular respecto a la participación de asociaciones en SCRAPs y, por otro lado, en el caso de que los recicladores se tengan que adherir a SCRAPs.
- Fomentar la competencia en la adjudicación de residuos de los SCRAPs a los recicladores, desarrollando la regulación en detalle.
La CNMC es el organismo independiente regulador de los mercados que garantiza y promueve la existencia de una competencia efectiva en beneficio de los consumidores y usuarios. Este estudio se realiza en el marco de sus funciones de promoción de la competencia.
Preguntas y respuestas sobre el estudio
Contenido relacionado:
- E/CNMC/004/21: Estudio sobre residuos de envases
- Preguntas y respuestas: Estudio sobre residuos de envases
- Nota de prensa (22/02/2022): La CNMC lanza un estudio sobre la gestión de residuos de envases en España
- Blog (16/03/2022): ¿Cómo gestionar los residuos de envases? La CNMC lanza un estudio y una consulta pública
- Blog (18/05/2022): Gestión de residuos de envases: primeros resultados de la consulta pública de la CNMC
- MET/DP/001/16 (21/05/2016): Metodología para la elaboración de estudios de mercado en la CNMC
Documento no oficial, destinado a los medios de comunicación, y que no vincula a la CNMC. Reproducción permitida solo si se cita la fuente.
Investigation into Google’s ‘Privacy Sandbox’ browser changes
The CMA has accepted commitments offered by Google that address the CMA’s competition concerns resulting from investigating Google’s proposals to remove third-party cookies and other functionalities from its Chrome browser.From:Competition and Markets AuthorityPublished8 January 2021Last updated22 July 2024 — See all updatesCase type:CA98 and civil cartelsCase state:OpenMarket sector:CommunicationsOpened:7 January 2021
Contents
- Quarterly reports
- 2022 case information
- Industry testing
- Monitoring Trustee
- Case timetable
- Change log
- Decision to accept binding commitments
- Consultation on modified commitments
- Consultation on commitments
- Case launch
- Notes
- Personal data
- Contacts
A Euroatla Navegação e Trânsitos, Lda., notifica a aquisição do controlo exclusivo sobre a empresa Igacargo Transitários, Lda.
Ficha do processo
Atos de concentração – Decisões
CADE
Ato de Concentração nº 08700.004833/2024-40
Requerentes: Rima Industrial S.A., Casa dos Ventos S.A. e RDVE Subholding S.A. Advogados: Fabricio Cardim de Almeida, Gláucia Menato, Gustavo Köhnen e Ivan Mariotto. Decido pela aprovação sem restrições.
Ato de Concentração nº 08700.005020/2024-77
Requerentes: Infraestrutura e Energia Brasil S.A., Equatorial Transmissora 7 SPE S.A. e Equatorial Transmissão S.A. Advogados: Cristianne Saccab Zarzur, Roberto Sampaio Amaral, Ana Paula Paschoalini e Beatriz Kenchian. Decido pela aprovação sem restrições.
Ato de Concentração nº 08700.004984/2024-06
Requerentes: ZAMP S.A., SB Brasil Ltda. – Em Recuperação Judicial e São Paulo Airport Restaurantes Ltda. – Em Recuperação Judicial. Advogados: Barbara Rosenberg, Luiz Antonio Galvão, Matheus Augusto Gomes Barreto, Brenda Souza Corrêa, Daniel Costa Rebello e Gabriela Leão F. A. de Oliveira. Decido pela aprovação sem restrições.
Ato de Concentração nº 08700.004811/2024-80
Requerentes: CCISA177 Incorporadora Ltda. e HM Engenharia e Construções S.A. Advogados: Bruna Anklam e Fabio Santana. Decido pela aprovação sem restrições.
Ato de Concentração nº 08700.004812/2024-24
Requerentes: REC Syslog Guarulhos I S.A., REC Syslog Guarulhos II S.A., REC Syslog Guarulhos III S.A. e TAG Bom Sucesso Empreendimentos Imobiliários Ltda. Advogados: Barbara Rosenberg, Luís Bernardo Coelho Cascão, Luiz Antonio Galvão, Matheus Augusto Gomes Barreto e Brenda Souza Corrêa. Decido pela aprovação sem restrições.
Ato de Concentração nº 08700.005027/2024-99
Requerentes: Serasa S.A. e Zetra Participações S.A. Advogados: Renê Medrado, Alessandro Giacaglia, Catarina Lobo Cordão, Bernardo Freitas, Adriano Ferraz e Rodrigo Amaral. Decido pela aprovação sem restrições.
FTC
Tapestry, Inc./Capri Holdings Limited, In the Matter of
Type of Action
Administrative
Last Updated
July 22, 2024
FTC Matter/File Number
231 0133
Docket Number
9429
Case Status
Pending
Kroger Company/Albertsons Companies, Inc., In the Matter of
The Federal Trade Commission sued to block the largest proposed supermarket merger in U.S. history—Kroger Company’s $24.6 billion acquisition of the Albertsons Companies, Inc.—alleging that the deal is anticompetitive.
Type of Action
Administrative
Last Updated
July 22, 2024
Docket Number
9428
Case Status
Pending
Comissão Europeia
LGP / FRANCISCO PARTNERS / REDSAIL
Merger
Last decision date: 22.07.2024 Super simplified procedure
BLACKSTONE / WINTHROP TECHNOLOGIES
Merger
Last decision date: 22.07.2024 Simplified procedure
CINVEN / ALTER DOMUS
Merger
Last decision date: 22.07.2024 Simplified procedure