Notícias

Cade condena cartel em licitação para urbanização de favelas no Rio de Janeiro

Multas aplicadas aos envolvidos no conluio ultrapassam R$ 20 milhões

Publicado em 17/04/2024 20h44

OConselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (Cade) condenou, na sessão desta quarta-feira (17/04), as empresas Queiroz Galvão, OAS e Delta Construções, e duas pessoas físicas por formação de cartel em licitação, no contexto da Concorrência Nacional nº 002/2007/SEOBRAS/MCIDADES/CAIXA, realizada pela Secretaria de Obras do Governo do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (Seobras), visando à contratação de serviços de engenharia e construção para urbanização do Complexo do Alemão, Complexo de Manguinhos e Comunidade da Rocinha no Rio de Janeiro (RJ), entre março de 2007 e fevereiro de 2008.

A investigação teve início em novembro 2016, após celebração de um Acordo de Leniência entre a Superintendência-Geral do Cade (SG/Cade) e o Ministério Público Federal no Rio de Janeiro (MPF/RJ) com a empresa Andrade Gutierrez.

De acordo com a investigação, os envolvidos na infração econômica teriam implementado acordos de fixação de preços das propostas, condições e vantagens na licitação pública, além de divisão de mercado entre concorrentes. Ademais, teriam, ainda, trocado informações concorrencialmente sensíveis, a fim de frustrar o caráter competitivo do certame. Os contatos entre os concorrentes ocorreram entre março de 2007 a fevereiro de 2008.

Em seu voto-vista, o presidente do Cade, Alexandre Cordeiro, ressaltou a importância de respeitar as regras processuais em um Estado Democrático de Direito, pois a Lei se aplica a todos, inclusive ao próprio Estado em suas mais diversas funções, principalmente no âmbito persecutório. A partir de uma detida análise do arcabouço probatório, decidiu-se pelo arquivamento do processo em relação a dez pessoas físicas e cinco pessoas jurídicas e pela suspensão do processo aos signatários dos Termos de Compromisso de Cessação (TCCs).

Por outro lado, as empresas Queiroz Galvão, OAS e Delta Construções foram sancionadas com multas que ultrapassam R$ 20 milhões, enquanto duas pessoas físicas foram penalizadas com multas cujo valor conjunto ultrapassa os R$ 842 mil.

Processo Administrativo n° 08700.007776/2016-41

Cade reprova compra da Trevo pela Knauf

Alta concentração do mercado de drywall motivou a decisão unânime do Tribunal da autarquia

Publicado em 17/04/2024 17h48

Oplenário do Tribunal do Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (Cade), por unanimidade, reprovou a compra, pela Knauf do Brasil, da planta de fabricação de placas de gesso drywall da Trevo Industrial de Acartonados. A decisão foi proferida nesta quarta-feira (17/04), durante a 228ª Sessão Ordinária de Julgamento.

No Brasil, a utilização de gesso drywall – placas produzidas a partir de minério gipsita, água, aditivos e papel acartonado – tem uso na construção civil, especialmente em prédios comerciais. De acordo com o conselheiro-relator, Victor Oliveira Fernandes, não existem substitutos equivalentes ao produto, havendo apenas quatro fornecedores, incluindo a Knauf e a Trevo. Além disso, apesar de o mercado ter crescido mais de oito vezes entre 2006 e 2022, não foi registrada a entrada de novos concorrentes nos últimos anos.

O conselheiro-relator ressaltou, ainda, que a Superintendência-Geral do Cade já havia recomendado a impugnação da aquisição, em razão dos riscos concorrenciais. Destacou, também, a tentativa de aplicação de remédios concorrenciais, que evitariam a impugnação do requerimento. Observou que os remédios comportamentais propostos consistiam principalmente em metas de produção e de regulação de preços, remédios de difícil monitoramento e com elevados riscos de ineficácia. “A proposta apresentada pelas requerentes foi insuficiente para mitigar o potencial prejuízo ao ambiente concorrencial decorrente da operação, impondo-se a reprovação da operação”, afirmou.

A análise da operação também apontou que as condições de rivalidade do mercado poderiam ser prejudicadas principalmente na região Nordeste do país. Considerando o potencial dessa região para o crescimento da demanda nacional, o Tribunal do Cade entendeu importante que esse crescimento fosse continuadamente disputado com vigor.

Acesse o Ato de Concentração 08700.003198/2023-01.

Tribunal do Cade decide por arquivamento de processo relacionado a mercado de pneus

Decisão considerou diferença entre fixação de preço de revenda e práticas anticompetitivas

Publicado em 17/04/2024 17h46

OTribunal do Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (Cade) julgou, nesta quarta-feira (17/04), o Processo Administrativo nº 08700.003266/2022-42, que envolve empresas do mercado de pneus. O plenário acompanhou, por unanimidade, o voto do conselheiro-relator, Gustavo Augusto, e decidiu pelo arquivamento dos autos.

Segundo o relator, após exame dos detalhes sobre as diferentes nuances das práticas comerciais apuradas no processo, evidenciou-se uma distinção entre as condutas que caracterizam uma Fixação de Preço de Revenda (FPR) e as práticas anticompetitivas que caracterizam o cartel.

O conselheiro-relator registrou, ainda, que não foram encontradas provas suficientes para justificar uma condenação por cartel. No entanto, expressou preocupação com possíveis trocas de informações sensíveis entre as empresas, destacando a importância de coibir práticas que possam prejudicar a concorrência e, consequentemente, os consumidores.

A decisão, no entanto, não encerra o assunto, uma vez que a decisão recomendou cautela e alertou para a possibilidade de realização de novas diligências para investigar a fundo possíveis práticas anticompetitivas, sugerindo que a preservação da concorrência continua sendo uma prioridade.

A jurisprudência do Cade permite que fornecedores de bens sugiram preços de revenda para os revendedores de sua marca, se não houver abuso de posição dominante. O relator destacou que esse ponto poderia ser acompanhado em investigação própria, se houver indícios de dano ao consumidor.

Processo Administrativo nº 08700.003266/2022-42 

Cade reconhece prática de gun jumping entre empresas de geração de energia

Proposta de acordo foi aprovada por unanimidade pelo Tribunal da autarquia

Publicado em 17/04/2024 17h43

Oplenário do Tribunal do Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (Cade) homologou, por unanimidade, a proposta de acordo em Procedimento Administrativo para Apuração de Ato de Concentração (Apac) firmado entre as empresas Illian Energias Renováveis, Solar Irecê e Solar Irecê 3. O termo, firmado durante a Sessão Ordinária de Julgamento desta quarta-feira (17/04), estabelece recolhimento de contribuição pecuniária ao Fundo de Defesa de Direitos Difusos (FDD).

O Apac foi instaurado com o objetivo de apurar a aquisição, pela Illian, da integralidade do capital social da Solar Irecê e da Solar Irecê 3 antes da apreciação obrigatória da compra pelo Cade. No formulário de notificação da operação submetido à autarquia, as partes reconheceram que consumaram a operação em setembro de 2021, mas a notificação à autarquia só ocorreu em fevereiro de 2023.

De acordo com o voto do conselheiro-relator, Diogo Thomson, a prática caracteriza-se como gun jumping, o que pode resultar em pena de nulidade, multa, além de eventuais sanções administrativas.  “As partes manifestaram a intenção por resolver a penalidade por via de acordo”, explicou o relator.

Procedimento Administrativo de Apuração de Ato de Concentração nº 08700.001524/2023-37 

Cade lança guia de análise de atos de concentração não horizontais

Documento apresenta as melhores práticas e procedimentos analíticos adotados pela autarquia na análise de atos de concentração verticais e conglomerais

Publicado em 17/04/2024 11h35 Atualizado em 17/04/2024 12h18

OConselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (Cade) lançou, nesta quarta-feira (17/04), o Guia de Análise de Atos de Concentração Não Horizontais, o Guia V+. O documento visa conceder maior transparência à análise feita pela autarquia federal, fornecendo diretrizes claras para a condução dos processos dos chamados atos de concentração vertical e conglomeral.  

O Guia tem como objetivo também orientar o poder público na adoção das melhores práticas de concorrência em relação a esses assuntos, promovendo uma atuação consistente e eficaz. Além disso, tem como propósito auxiliar os agentes de mercado a compreender as etapas, técnicas e critérios adotados pelo Cade em seus processos de análise, fornecendo um referencial para a tomada de decisão em negócios.  

O Guia V+ é fruto de discussões e atividades promovidas por Grupo de Trabalho (GT) composto por representantes de todas as unidades do Cade, além de ter contado com a colaboração do Instituto Brasileiro de Estudos de Concorrência, Consumo e Comércio Internacional (Ibrac). O GT teve início em julho de 2022 e dedicou-se à elaboração de estudos e pesquisas sobre integrações verticais e suas implicações no direito concorrencial, bem como da primeira minuta do guia. O documento contou com a contribuição de consultoria do Programa das Nações Unidas para o Desenvolvimento (PNUD) na fase de revisão e também com a participação da sociedade civil, quando agentes econômicos e especialistas puderam contribuir para o aprimoramento do Guia V+ por meio de consulta pública.   

A publicação está estruturada em cinco seções, entre elas uma que trata especificamente sobre procedimentos para análise de atos de concentração não horizontal. Outras seções, por sua vez, trazem informações sobre integrações verticais e conglomerais.   

De acordo com o documento, o guia não possui caráter vinculativo ou normativo. Dessa forma, a não observância a alguma disposição do documento não causa qualquer tipo de nulidade na análise. A publicação ressalta também que processo analítico empreendido pelo Cade se adequará a cada caso concreto, considerando as características dos mercados envolvidos, atividades exercidas pelas empresas, dentre outros elementos.  

O Guia V+ reflete a missão do Cade de zelar por um ambiente concorrencial saudável, buscando sempre atualizar suas práticas e adotar os melhores padrões internacionais. A iniciativa reforça a visão do órgão como agente indutor do aumento da competitividade no Brasil.  

Acesse o Guia V+ na íntegra. 

The CMA at 10: Why an independent, impartial competition and consumer protection authority is needed now, more than ever

A speech by Marcus Bokkerink, Chair of the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), delivered at the CMA’s 10 year anniversary event.

From: Competition and Markets Authority and Marcus Bokkerink Published18 April 2024

Location:Competition and Markets Authority (CMA)Delivered on:18 April 2024 (Speaker’s notes, may differ from delivered version)

Welcome everyone and thank you for joining us today. It’s an honour to chair the UK’s Competition and Markets Authority as we reach 10 years in action. It’s a major milestone in the lifetime of any organisation – particularly when we consider how much has changed in the UK, and around the world, over the last decade.

I believe we should use milestone moments like this to look forward. So, with that in mind, on the CMA’s 10 year anniversary, the question I want to ask today is this: why is an independent, impartial CMA needed more than ever today and in the future?

And to discover the answer, I’d like to take the vantage point of: what are the opportunities the CMA exists to create and the problems we exist to solve? And I’m going to look across 3 timeframes: the past, the present, and the future. What were the big issues we tackled in the past? How have they changed today? And what are they going to be in the future?

Context setting

The CMA was formed through a merger of the Office of Fair Trading and the Competition Commission. But the goal was not simply an administrative one to improve efficiency. It was to create a single organisation with the resources, capabilities and mandate to effectively enforce the spirit and the letter of the competition and consumer protection laws that had been enacted by Parliament.

And what was Parliament’s intent? I think it comes down to a clear understanding that if you want a vibrant economy, if you want a thriving society – and if you want both of these to be resilient to external shocks – well then you need choice, you need innovation, you need investment. And that means you need competition.

The single most effective lever, indeed, the prerequisite for driving innovation, productivity and investment, is to have free, open, effective competition in our markets. And this is inherently understood by every one of us. In life, as in business, we instinctively favour choice over constraint. Diversity over uniformity. Quality and value over rip-offs. Where we encounter barriers, we instinctively seek to overturn them. Faced with old, inefficient ways of doing things ‘just because’, we have always, in a multitude of creative and determined ways, pushed for advancement. And, where we see that some are not playing by the rules, where we see vested interests imposing their will – in those situations we know that it’s not right, and we do something about it.

And of course, Parliament also understood that, while fair, open, competitive markets are clearly in everyone’s interests, well, competing day in  day out is really hard work. So hard, that there will be a temptation, for those who have amassed market power, to take unfair advantage, to take shortcuts. Shortcuts to do away with competition. To lock out rivals and future challengers. To lock up a market. Competing day in day out is really hard, yes. But that’s why it works. Because it forces us to deliver and to improve. And so we move forward, always.

This is the core of the fair, open and effective competition the CMA was established to protect, to foster, and of the consumer protections it was established to safeguard. Markets, where the best products and services win out on their merits. Where fair-dealing businesses can innovate and grow on a level-playing field.

And policymakers across the political spectrum understand that the investment, innovation, productivity, and growth which flow from this fair, open, effective competition are the bedrock of a thriving economy in which everyone has an opportunity to prosper.

With that in mind, what are the biggest issues, shortcuts and opportunities that the CMA has been tackling over the last 10 years?

Broadly speaking, I think these fall into 4 big categories:

First, the consolidation of market power through horizontal mergers. Situations where 2 already major players competing for customers and market share decide to try to combine their businesses. Sainsbury and Asda; viagogo and StubHub; JD Sports and Footasylum. And the common factor in these cases, usually, is that the CMA’s independent panel determines that the planned consolidation causes a substantial lessening of competition, resulting in the negative outcomes I described earlier.

Second, anti-competitive behaviour. Effectively, subverting the proper working of fair, open and effective competition. Like using a dominant market position to inflate the price of life-saving NHS medicines by tens of millions of pounds. Or colluding to fix the price of football shirts, robbing fans of a fair deal. These practices are not only exploitative; they stunt the benefits of competition. They are economic sabotage.

Third, opening up markets to create that enormously powerful competitive tension, that ‘feet to the fire’ dynamism, which I saw first-hand again and again in my 30 years working with businesses of all shapes and sizes. Open banking is a terrific example, but by no means the only one. Opening up electric vehicle charging infrastructure to healthy competition. Recommendations being taken forward by government to overhaul regulation of heat networks . There are many such cases, and each have their own story to tell in terms of enabling more innovation, more choice, more investment, downward pressure on prices, and ultimately contributing to more growth across the wider economy.

And finally, shielding consumers from harm by enforcing against breaches of consumer protection law. This is another core pillar of our work, and our action here has been, and remains, incredibly wide-ranging. From care homes, package travel and events ticket sales; to online marketplaces and the claims companies make about the sustainability of their products, to name just a few. Consumers not only deserve to be treated fairly, but their confidence to engage in markets is a key ingredient of the growth we all wish to see. That’s also why you’ve seen us run national campaigns, like Online Rip-Off Tip-Off, to make sure people know their rights and how to protect themselves.

So, these have been the fundamental opportunities that the CMA has been enabling, the fundamental challenges that we have been tackling. And they continue to keep us busy.

But the big issues the CMA is tackling today have also shifted in 3 ways. This reflects the macro-economic forces underway that will shape our economy and society for years to come – in particular, heightened economic and geo-political volatility, the continuous, accelerating technology revolution, and a destabilising climate.

With the CMA coming under new leadership in 2022, we thought hard about how we should anticipate these forces, and adapt what we do and how we do it, to make sure we can continue to drive the positive outcomes we all wish to see for this country. And so at the start of 2023, we set out a new long-term strategy.

Our strategy has a clear purpose: to help people, businesses and the UK economy by promoting competitive markets and tackling unfair behaviour. We set 3 ambitions, with tangible outcomes we’re committed to help deliver over the medium and long-term. Those ambitions help us prioritise and focus our actions on the areas that really matter for people and business in the UK, and where the CMA can have the most positive impact in line with the duties given to us by Parliament.

So, what are the 3 ambitions, and how are they driving the CMA’s focus today?

First, to ensure people can be confident they are getting great choices and fair deals   

In today’s times of economic hardship, that means you see us focusing on areas of essential spend: having somewhere to live, feeding and caring for ourselves and our families, being able to travel and get around, buying the things we need online. Making recommendations for government on bringing down some of the barriers to getting more homes built and making those homes more affordable. Stepping in to drive more transparency and choice in petrol and in the groceries we buy every day. Investigating the markets for funeral care and vet services – areas close to our hearts, where we may be particularly vulnerable to exploitation.

Alongside these, we’ve also seen a shift toward tackling ever more sophisticated, often technology-enabled, methods used by unscrupulous actors to mislead or exploit when we buy goods and services online. Dark patterns in online choice architecture, misleading or pressurising online sales tactics, fake reviews, drip pricing. It is challenging to stem the proliferation of these sorts of harms, but we are constantly alert and active here today.

Our second ambition is for competitive, fair-dealing businesses to be free to innovate and thrive

You will not be surprised that the biggest shift here has been the way we approach digital markets. We know and understand a great deal now, which was not clear a decade ago, about the unique features of digital markets from a competition and consumer protection perspective. Massive fixed costs and near zero distribution costs. Unprecedented network effects, at a global scale, thanks to the universality of the customer proposition. Leading to extremely high scalability and platform dependencies; and resulting winner-take-most dynamics. The critical strategic advantages of data and computing power – particularly where these make it possible for a position of power in one market, or economic activity, to be leveraged into multiple others. And, of course, the searing pace of technology development and adoption, so that harms to competition and to consumers can quickly spread, becoming locked in or endemic.

So, how are we tackling this today?

We’ve built up a great deal of expertise, around both the technologies and the business models they underpin. And we’ve learned valuable lessons, about what sorts of harms can result from all of this and how we can tackle them effectively. And so, to the extent possible, we have been using our existing tools to apply those lessons.

For example, securing binding commitments from Amazon and Meta to ensure fair competition on online retail platforms, giving independent sellers a fair chance to compete on their platforms. Looking into mobile ecosystems and digital advertising to identify potential solutions to protect choice and offer a fair deal for consumers and business customers alike.

And taking a conscious decision, transparently signalled over several years, to adapt our approach to digital and technology mergers to the distinct characteristics of digital markets. Merger control has always been forward-looking; but the rapid pace and curve-jumping nature of innovation in digital markets mean that the forward-looking picture is much more dynamic here.

We also need to take account of distinct bases for competition in these markets, which means considering, for example, the power of data across activities, as well as ecosystem theories of harm. And, of course, the fact that consolidation of market power can occur not just horizontally – in cases like Adobe/Figma – but up and down the value chain, with the potential to lock up critical inputs, or lock in access to customers, or even both, in an existing or emerging ecosystem. We saw this with the attempted integration of Nvidia/Arm and with the cloud gaming parts of Microsoft/Activision, for example.

Our third ambition is to help the whole UK economy grow productively and sustainably

To a large extent, if we execute our first 2 ambitions well – if we enable choice and a fair deal for people, and if we foster open, effective competition for businesses – then that takes us a long way toward the ongoing innovation and productivity and growth we all wish to see.

We also know the dividends can be even greater if we prioritise markets of strategic significance. Emerging or developing sectors with particular potential to drive broad-based innovation and productivity, like digital. And because a strong economy must be resistant to shocks, we’ve also looked at the drivers of market resilience, and the role we can play in preventing supply disruption.

Finally, this growth needs to be sustainable – and becoming competitively advantaged in the climate technology of the future will in turn help accelerate the country’s growth. So we’ve been playing our part in helping the UK reach its Net Zero ambitions through tackling greenwashing and enabling the markets for new technologies to develop competitively.

So that’s the focus today. Now, when I look ahead, I see the issues shifting again.  

I want to talk particularly about one critical shift, again caused by the emergence of new, disruptive technologies. I’m talking, of course, about AI. And let me just emphasise the tremendous potential benefits I believe AI can bring for business, for people, for our economy.  

But the shift, the discontinuity, that I’d like to focus on is not the technology itself. Rather it is the fact that, unlike previous waves of technological innovation, the new disruptive technologies are not disrupting the established market power of established incumbents. Instead, they could be entrenching this power further.

To date, a diverse ecosystem of researchers, startups, investors and large players have combined a wealth of resources, expertise and capability to accelerate advances in AI models and their practical applications. But the true potential and value creation of these advances will only be realised – and shared widely in society – if conditions of fair, open and effective competition are sustained in the future.

And there lies the issue. As highlighted in our second report on AI foundation models that came out last week, we see 3 key interlinked risks to fair, open and effective competition.

First, that a handful of incumbent corporations, which already hold positions of market power in today’s most important digital markets, start to control the critical resources required to develop AI models going forward – most importantly computing power, data and talent. Our report explained that firms controlling these critical inputs may restrict access to them to shield themselves from competition in the development of AI foundation models.

Second, a risk that those same corporations could start to control how consumers and businesses can practically access and deploy these models in their daily life and work, through control of key routes to market, like mobile ecosystems, apps and platforms. These pre-existing positions could be exploited to restrict choice for customers, and to limit competition in the development and deployment of these models.

Third, the CMA has identified an interconnected web of over 90 partnerships and strategic investments across foundation model capabilities involving those same few corporations. Through investments, licensing, partnerships and other arrangements, the most successful and promising innovators are being drawn into the ecosystems of the established players. And this could exacerbate their market power across the value chain.

As a result, market power risks concentrating ever further, faster, around a handful of corporations, across an ever broader sphere of economic activity. When does such market power become entrenched, irreversible? And where will that lead? History suggests that when this happens, economic freedoms suffer – freedom for customers to choose what’s best for them, freedom for fair-dealing businesses to access customers, freedom for challengers to innovate and invest. And, in the long run, freedom for economies to grow and democracies to thrive.

So what actions is the CMA is taking today to mitigate these risks, and what further actions can we anticipate?

I will touch on 3.

First, we have established principles we expect firms developing and deploying models to have regard to:

• access to key inputs
• diversity of models and model types
• choice for business and consumers in which models they deploy and how
• fair dealing, by which we mean no anti-competitive bundling, tying or self-preferencing
• transparency for consumers and businesses about the risks and limitations of models
• accountability of developers and deployers for the outputs of models

We believe these are fundamental to sustaining vibrant innovation and guiding markets toward positive outcomes.

Second, we’re carefully considering how to apply the full range of legal powers we have today most effectively. For example, in the CMA’s cloud market investigation, the independent panel carrying out the inquiry is including an assessment of the potential impact of foundation models on the provision of cloud services. We’re also keeping a very close watch on current and emerging AI partnerships, and last week announced we will be stepping up our merger review activities; we’re already reviewing Microsoft’s partnership with OpenAI.

Third, although competition is the best form of regulation to drive positive market outcomes, it only works where there really is genuine competition. In situations where market power has become substantial and entrenched, where effective competition is lacking, we need targeted and proportionate regulation to do the job that competition is not around to do for us. It is for that reason that the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers (DMCC) Bill is passing through Parliament. This will give the CMA new powers to safeguard and promote competition in digital markets more effectively. We haven’t yet taken any provisional decisions on which digital activities to tackle first, but our update last week did make clear that we will evaluate developments around AI foundation models as part of our prioritisation.

Across all of these activities – reflecting the collaborative approach that underpins the operation of the new digital markets regime – we are encouraging the incumbent firms to work with us, to help us shape these markets towards the positive outcomes that will benefit participants and users alike.

Conclusion

I want to close by saying that I think we are living through a pivotal period in economic history. Where global forces – macro-economic, technological, environmental – could bring us closer together on a path to unprecedented progress; or could drive us further apart. Where technology that has the promise to fundamentally reshape our economies, and by extension our lives, has reached a tipping point. And, underpinning this, where the balance of power between people, their elected governments, and corporations could shift in ways which will define how we live, work and advance for generations to come. I believe these are challenges we can and will rise to meet, and protecting competition and tackling unfair behaviour have a critical role to play in helping us do so.

I am hugely privileged to be here with Sarah, with our Board, and everyone else at the CMA, in this room, with you – our partners and stakeholders – to commit to playing that part.

Published 18 April 2024

La CNMC autoriza con múltiples compromisos la compra de Centro Médico El Carmen por Hospitales Cosaga

18 Abr 2024 | Competencia Nota de prensa

• La adquisición afecta a la prestación de servicios de asistencia sanitaria privada en Orense, donde solo operará Cosaga. 
• Los compromisos pretenden garantizar la calidad de estos servicios y mantener la colaboración con la sanidad pública.
• La CNMC vigilará los precios de los servicios médicos y del alquiler de espacios durante cinco años para garantizar el acceso de competidores.
• Cosaga realizará inversiones en tres años para renovar y mejorar la dotación actual de personal y equipamiento.

La Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia (CNMC) ha aprobado en primera fase con compromisos la compra de Centro Médico El Carmen por Hospitales Cosaga (Grupo Recoletas), en la provincia de Orense (C/1438/24).

Los múltiples compromisos pretenden mejorar la calidad de los servicios médicos, evitar el encarecimiento de precios y garantizar el acceso de competidores. La CNMC vigilará su cumplimiento durante cinco años.

Riesgos para la competencia

Tras la operación, Cosaga será el único prestador de servicios de asistencia sanitaria con internamiento en Orense. Por ello, la CNMC llevó a cabo una investigación y un test de mercado con competidores, aseguradoras, Administraciones Públicas y otros agentes afectados por la operación. 

Este análisis permitió identificar, en primera fase, tres tipos de problemas: empeoramiento de la calidad de los servicios (incluida la posible reducción de especialidades y especialistas), incremento de precios, y problemas de acceso a instalaciones con internamiento (quirófanos) por parte de otros competidores. 

Los riesgos detectados afectarían a varios mercados: la prestación privada de asistencia sanitaria a pacientes privados (con y sin internamiento), la prestación privada de asistencia sanitaria a pacientes públicos derivados (con y sin internamiento) y el alquiler o cesión de espacios con internamiento. 

Compromisos presentados

La CNMC considera que los compromisos presentados en primera fase por Cosaga son suficientes para evitar estos problemas de competencia.

• Garantía de calidad en los servicios sanitarios

La gran mayoría de los compromisos pretenden evitar una reducción en la calidad de los servicios y garantizar la colaboración actual con la sanidad pública. 

Cosaga se ha comprometido a implementar indicadores de calidad generales y específicos, y a mantener los certificados actuales de calidad en sus centros (ISO 9001 y certificado de calidad de la Consejería de Sanidad de la Xunta de Galicia).

También mantendrá la relación jurídica con todos los profesionales médicos, garantizará su acceso a los espacios sanitarios, e invertirá en mejora asistencial en los próximos tres años. 

Asimismo, Cosaga se ha comprometido a mantener la cartera de servicios global y el cuadro médico actuales.

Para garantizar la colaboración con la sanidad pública, Cosaga seguirá prestando la misma cartera de servicios al Servicio Gallego de Salud y no empeorará los indicadores de calidad asistencial para los pacientes derivados de la sanidad pública. Tampoco cerrará determinadas especialidades, como las que no presta el Hospital Público de Orense.  

• Vigilancia de precios

Cosaga informará cada año sobre la evolución de precios de los alquileres de consultas y quirófanos, y de los diez procesos con mayor facturación de los servicios a pacientes privados y públicos. Esto permitirá que la CNMC supervise y detecte posibles subidas abusivas de precios, de acuerdo con el artículo 2 de la Ley de Defensa de la Competencia.

Además, algunos de los compromisos -como el mantenimiento de la cartera de servicios y las inversiones para mejorar la calidad asistencial- ayudarán a evitar un posible incremento de precios. 

• Alquiler de espacios hospitalarios a terceros

Por último, para evitar el riesgo de cierre de mercado frente a otros competidores reales o potenciales, Cosaga se ha comprometido a mantener las relaciones jurídicas con los profesionales sanitarios que ya prestaban sus servicios en los hospitales, y a garantizar el acceso a aquellos médicos que alquilaban espacios. 

Contenido relacionado:

•  C/1438/24: Hospitales Cosaga – Centro Médico El Carmen 
• Blog (29/09/2023): En la CNMC vigilamos las concentraciones entre las empresas

Nota de prensa

Press release

Documento no oficial, destinado a los medios de comunicación, y que no vincula a la CNMC. Reproducción permitida solo si se cita la fuente.

KKR Génesis reconoce que debió notificar la compra de GeneraLife Clinics y paga la multa correspondiente por el incumplimiento

17 Abr 2024 | Competencia Nota de prensa

• En enero de 2022, la compañía adquirió el control exclusivo del grupo de fertilidad GeneraLife.
• KKR tenía que haber notificado previamente la compra a la CNMC, según establece la Ley de Defensa de la Competencia.
• La CNMC finaliza el sancionador abierto contra KKR porque asume su responsabilidad y paga por anticipado la multa.

La Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia (CNMC) ha sancionado a la compañía KKR Génesis Bidco, S. L. U. con 1.138.870 euros porque adquirió el control exclusivo de GeneraLife, en enero de 2022, sin notificarlo previamente (SNC/DC/077/23 KKR GeneraLife).

Esta práctica se conoce en el argot de competencia como gun jumping e implica incumplir el artículo 9.1 de la Ley de Defensa de la Competencia, que obliga a las empresas a notificar sus operaciones antes de ejecutarlas. 

KKR notificó la operación en agosto de 2023, después de que se lo requiriera la CNMC. En diciembre de 2023, la Comisión aprobó la compra en primera fase (C/1407/23). En enero de 2024, inició un expediente sancionador (nota de prensa) por el citado incumplimiento.

Reconocimiento y reducción de la multa

Durante la instrucción del sancionador, KKR ha reconocido su responsabilidad y se ha acogido al artículo 85.3 de la Ley 39/2015, que permite reducir hasta el 40 % el importe de la sanción —KKR ha pagado 683.322 euros finalmente— si la empresa reconoce su responsabilidad y paga por anticipado.

La CNMC da por finalizado el expediente sancionador después de que KKR haya reconocido su responsabilidad y aceptado el pago voluntario de la multa.

Contenido relacionado:

• SNC/DC/077/23 KKR GeneraLife
• C/1407/23: KKR / GeneraLife
• Nota de prensa (19/01/2024): La CNMC inicia un expediente sancionador contra KKR Genesis
• Blog (21/04/2024): Gun jumping, o cuando las prisas no son buenas consejeras en la notificación de concentraciones

Nota de prensa

Press release

Documento no oficial, destinado a los medios de comunicación, y que no vincula a la CNMC. Reproducción permitida solo si se cita la fuente.

Decisões

CMA

Theramex/European Rights to Viatris’ Femoston and Duphaston products

• The CMA is investigating the acquisition by Theramex HQ UK Limited of the certain rights to Viatris Inc’s Femoston and Duphaston products.
  • Updated: 18 April 2024

Spreadex / Sporting Index merger inquiry

• The CMA is investigating the completed acquisition by Spreadex Limited of the B2C business of Sporting Index Limited.
  • Updated: 18 April 2024

FTC

Kroger Company/Albertsons Companies, Inc., In the Matter of

The Federal Trade Commission sued to block the largest proposed supermarket merger in U.S. history—Kroger Company’s $24.6 billion acquisition of the Albertsons Companies, Inc.—alleging that the deal is anticompetitive.

Type of Action

Administrative

Last Updated

April 17, 2024

Docket Number

9428

Case Status

Pending

Ingressos

CADE

Ato de concentração nº 08700.002309/2024-34

Cervejaria Petrópolis S.A – Em Recuperação Judicial
Imcopa – Importação, Exportação e Indústria de Óleos S.A. – Em Recuperação Judicial

Edital: 15.04.2024

Ato de concentração nº 08700.002378/2024-48

CIP S.A.
CERC SA

Edital: 16.04.2024

Ato de concentração nº 08700.002342/2024-64

Cencosud Brasil Atacado Ltda.
Makro Atacadista S.A.

Edital: 16.04.2024

Ato de concentração nº 08700.002307/2024-45

Plano Capivari Empreendimentos Imobiliários Ltda.
Tencasa Investimentos Imobiliários Ltda.

Edital: 15.04.2024

Ato de concentração nº 08700.002264/2024-06

VEOLIA SERVIÇOS AMBIENTAIS BRASIL LTDA.
RAC SANEAMENTO LTDA

Edital: 15.04.2024

Ato de concentração nº 08700.002265/2024-42

CSS United Aut Group Comércio de Veículos Ltda.
BCLV Comércio de Veículos S.A.
José Renato Polyceno Bernardes
Nova Sociedade Incorporações e Participações Ltda.
ABCTA Participações Ltda.
Guilherme Gonçalves Passalacqua
Roberto David Bittencourt Cury
BMMOT Comércio de Veículos Ltda.

Edital: 16.04.2024