Notícias

Sugar deal could raise prices for UK shoppers

The CMA’s initial investigation has found that TLS’ purchase of Tereos UK & Ireland could result in higher sugar prices.From:Competition and Markets AuthorityPublished8 March 2024

Following an initial Phase 1 investigation, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) has found that T&L Sugars Limited’s (TLS) purchase of Tereos UK & Ireland’s ‘business to consumer’ packed sugar business (TUKI B2C) from Tereos SCA (Tereos), could lead to a substantial lessening of competition. TLS and Tereos now have 5 working days to offer solutions which fully resolve the CMA’s competition concerns, otherwise it will refer the deal to an in-depth Phase 2 investigation.

TLS is a sugar producer which refines and distributes sugar and related products, including under the Tate and Lyle brand, to supermarkets and other businesses such as grocery wholesalers, hotels, and cafes in the UK. TUKI B2C sources sugar from its Europe-based parent company, Tereos, and uses a facility in Normanton (West Yorkshire) as a packing and distribution site to sell packed sugar in the UK, including under the Whitworths brand.

These two companies only face competition from one other company, British Sugar, in the supply of packed sugar to a range of businesses, including supermarkets. The loss of competition from the deal could lead to supermarkets paying more for packed sugar and shoppers could see higher prices for packs of sugar on shelves as a result.

Sorcha O’Carroll, Senior Director of Mergers at the CMA, said:

The supply of sugar to grocery retailers in the UK is already highly concentrated. This deal would bring together two of the three players in the UK sugar sector, reducing competition and choice further for people and businesses.

It’s now up to TLS and Tereos to find a way to address our competition concerns to avoid the deal being referred to an in-depth Phase 2 investigation.

For more information, visit the T&L Sugars/Tereos merger inquiry case page.

Notes to editors:

1. T&L Sugars Limited announced the deal to buy the UK packing and distribution site and ‘business-to-consumer’ activities from Tereos UK & Ireland on 2 November 2023 and the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) launched a merger review into the deal on 12 January 2023.
2. The CMA believes that the merger gives rise to a realistic prospect of a substantial lessening of competition as a result of horizontal unilateral effects in the supply of multiple types of packed sugar to business to consumer (B2C) customers in the UK.
3. As part of its initial Phase 1 investigation, the CMA considered alternative counterfactual scenarios on what would have happened if the merger had not gone ahead.  TUKI B2C has faced profitability challenges in recent years. The evidence indicates that Tereos considered various options for the UK business at the same time that they decided to investigate the possible sale of the business. The CMA considers, based on its review of the evidence, that the appropriate counterfactual in this case is the prevailing conditions of competition (namely, that the Target would have continued to compete in the UK B2C markets as an independent competitor).
4. Under the Act, the CMA has a duty to make a reference to Phase 2 if the CMA believes that it is or may be the case that a relevant merger situation has been created, or arrangements are in progress or contemplation which, if carried into effect, will result in the creation of a relevant merger situation; and the creation of that situation has resulted, or may be expected to result, in a substantial lessening of competition within any market or markets in the United Kingdom for goods or services.
5. All media enquiries should be directed to the CMA press office by email on press@cma.gov.uk or by phone on 020 3738 6460.

Rail, Road and Inland Waterway Transport Block Exemption Regulation

The CMA is reviewing the Rail, Road and Inland Waterway Transport Block Exemption RegulationFrom:Competition and Markets AuthorityPublished11 March 2024Case type:CA98 and civil cartelsCase state:OpenMarket sector:TransportOpened:11 March 2024

Contents

1. Administrative timeline
2. Context
3. The CMA’s review of the RRIWTBER
4. Background
5. Personal data
6. Contact

The CMA is reviewing the Rail, Road and Inland Waterway Transport Block Exemption Regulation (‘RRIWTBER’) to inform its recommendation to government on whether to vary or revoke it and, if revocation is recommended, whether to replace it with a new block exemption order.

Administrative timeline

11 March 2024: The CMA has issued a Call for Inputs to enable interested parties to share their views, in particular on any UK-specific issues relating to the RRIWTBER. The Call for Inputs runs until 5pm on 10 April 2024.

• Rail, Road and Inland Waterway Transport Block Exemption Regulation consultation (11.3.24)
• Call for inputs (PDF. 334KB) (11.3.24)

Context

The Competition Act 1998 prohibits agreements between businesses that restrict competition in the UK (unless they meet the conditions for exemption in section 9(1) of the Competition Act 1998 or are otherwise excluded). This is known as the Chapter I prohibition.

An agreement can be exempt from the Chapter I prohibition on the basis that it produces benefits which outweigh its impact on competition. Ordinarily, businesses must make their own assessment of whether an agreement which restricts competition can be justified based on its benefits.

In certain cases, it may be clear that all agreements in a particular category are likely to be exempt agreements. In these circumstances, a ‘block exemption’ may be made to automatically exempt agreements in that category provided that they satisfy the conditions set out in the block exemption.

A block exemption regulation automatically exempts agreements of a certain category from the Chapter I prohibition if the agreement satisfies the conditions set out in the block exemption regulation. In this way, a block exemption regulation provides legal certainty for businesses.

Following the UK’s exit from the EU, the EU block exemption regulations that were in force under EU law at the end of the Transition Period on 31 December 2020 were retained in UK law. For details on what these block exemptions cover, see Guidance on the functions of the CMA after the end of the Transition Period (paragraphs 4.31 to 4.36).

Under the Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Act 2023, what was previously ‘retained EU law’ became ‘assimilated law’ on 1 January 2024.

The RRIWTBER therefore forms part of UK competition law as an assimilated block exemption, subject to certain amendments that were made as part of the EU withdrawal process. A copy of the instrument is available for review.

The RRIWTBER automatically exempts two categories of agreements insofar as they meet certain conditions set out in the RRIWTBER:

• certain agreements relating to technical improvements or technical cooperation in the fields of rail, road and inland waterways
• certain agreements the purpose of which is the constitution and operation of groupings of small or medium-sized road or inland waterway transport undertakings with a view to carrying on transport activities and related agreements concerning the joint financing or acquisition of transport equipment or supplies

The CMA’s review of the RRIWTBER

The CMA’s review will assess whether the RRIWTBER is fit for purpose and will take account of any specific features of the UK economy and the interests of UK businesses and consumers.

The information stakeholders provide in response to this Call for Inputs will help inform a proposed recommendation to government, on which we would consult.

Background

The CMA is reviewing the RRIWTBER for the purpose of making a recommendation to the Secretary of State in accordance with the Competition Act 1998 about whether to vary or revoke the RRIWTBER and, if it is to be revoked, whether to replace it with a new block exemption order.

In accordance with the Competition Act 1998, the CMA has a role in advising the Secretary of State for Business and Trade (Secretary of State) on the making of new block exemptions and varying or revoking existing assimilated block exemption regulations.

The CMA has completed reviews of a number of retained/assimilated block exemption regulations, most recently the Liner Shipping Consortia Block Exemption Regulation. The CMA will be reviewing the remaining assimilated block exemption regulation, the Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation, in due course in order to make a recommendation to the Secretary of State.

Personal data

When handling personal data (like your contact details), we comply with data protection law, as set out in the UK GDPR and the Data Protection Act 2018 and other law designed to protect sensitive information. For more information about the CMA’s statutory functions, how the CMA processes personal data and your rights relating to that personal data (including your right to complain), please visit the CMA’s Personal Information Charter.

Contact

• rriwtberreview@cma.gov.uk
• press@cma.gov.uk

Commission fines Apple over €1.8 billion over abusive App store rules for music streaming providers

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The European Commission has fined Apple over €1.8 billion for abusing its dominant position on the market for the distribution of music streaming apps to iPhone and iPad users (‘iOS users’) through its App Store. In particular, the Commission found that Apple applied restrictions on app developers preventing them from informing iOS users about alternative and cheaper music subscription services available outside of the app (‘anti-steering provisions’). This is illegal under EU antitrust rules.

The infringement

Apple is currently the sole provider of an App Store where developers can distribute their apps to iOS users throughout the European Economic Area (‘EEA’). Apple controls every aspect of the iOS user experience and sets the terms and conditions that developers need to abide by to be present on the App Store and be able to reach iOS users in the EEA.

The Commission’s investigation found that Apple bans music streaming app developers from fully informing iOS users about alternative and cheaper music subscription services available outside of the app and from providing any instructions about how to subscribe to such offers. In particular, the anti-steering provisions ban app developers from:

• Informing iOS users within their apps about the prices of subscription offers available on the internet outside of the app.
• Informing iOS users within their apps about the price differences between in-app subscriptions sold through Apple’s in-app purchase mechanism and those available elsewhere.
• Including links in their apps leading iOS users to the app developer’s website on which alternative subscriptions can be bought. App developers were also prevented from contacting their own newly acquired users, for instance by email, to inform them about alternative pricing options after they set up an account.

Today’s decision concludes that Apple’s anti-steering provisions amount to unfair trading conditions, in breach of Article 102(a) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’). These anti-steering provisions are neither necessary nor proportionate for the protection of Apple’s commercial interests in relation to the App Store on Apple’s smart mobile devices and negatively affect the interests of iOS users, who cannot make informed and effective decisions on where and how to purchase music streaming subscriptions for use on their device.

Apple’s conduct, which lasted for almost ten years, may have led many iOS users to pay significantly higher prices for music streaming subscriptions because of the high commission fee imposed by Apple on developers and passed on to consumers in the form of higher subscription prices for the same service on the Apple App Store. Moreover, Apple’s anti-steering provisions led to non-monetary harm in the form of a degraded user experience: iOS users either had to engage in a cumbersome search before they found their way to relevant offers outside the app, or they never subscribed to any service because they did not find the right one on their own.

Fine

The fine was set on the basis of the Commission’s 2006 Guidelines on fines (see press release and MEMO).

In setting the level of the fine, the Commission took into account the duration and gravity of the infringement as well as Apple’s total turnover and market capitalization. It also factored in that Apple submitted incorrect information in the framework of the administrative procedure.

In addition, the Commission decided to add to the basic amount of the fine an additional lump sum of €1.8 billion to ensure that the overall fine imposed on Apple is sufficiently deterrent. Such lump sum fine was necessary in this case because a significant part of the harm caused by the infringement consists of non-monetary harm, which cannot be properly accounted for under the revenue-based methodology as set out in the Commission’s 2006 Guidelines on Fines. In addition, the fine must be sufficient to deter Apple from repeating the present or a similar infringement; and to deter other companies of a similar size and with similar resources from committing the same or a similar infringement.

The Commission has concluded that the total amount of the fine of over €1.8 billion is proportionate to Apple’s global revenues and is necessary to achieve deterrence.

The Commission has also ordered Apple to remove the anti-steering provisions and to refrain from repeating the infringement or from adopting practices with an equivalent object or effect in the future.

Background to the investigation

In June 2020, the Commission opened formal proceedings into Apple’s rules for app developers on the distribution of apps via the App Store. In April 2021, the Commission sent Apple a Statement of Objections, to which Apple responded in September 2021.

In February 2023 the Commission replaced the 2021 Statement of Objections by another Statement of Objections clarifying the Commission’s objections, to which Apple responded in May 2023.

Procedural background

Article 102 of the TFEU and Article 54 of the European Economic Area Agreement prohibit the abuse of a dominant position.

Market dominance is, as such, not illegal under EU antitrust rules. However, dominant companies have a special responsibility not to abuse their powerful market position by restricting competition, either in the market where they are dominant or in separate markets.

Fines imposed on companies found in breach of EU antitrust rules are paid into the general EU budget. These proceeds are not earmarked for particular expenses, but Member States’ contributions to the EU budget for the following year are reduced accordingly. The fines therefore help to finance the EU and reduce the burden for taxpayers.

In accordance with the EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement, the EU continues to be competent for this case, which was initiated before the end of the transition period (“continued competence case”) for the UK. The EU will reimburse the UK for its share of the amount of the fine collected by the EU once the fine has become definitive.

More information on this case will be available under the case number AT.40437 in the public case register on the Commission’s competition website, once confidentiality issues have been dealt with.

Action for damages

Any person or company affected by anti-competitive behaviour as described in this case may bring the matter before the courts of the Member States and seek damages. The case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Regulation 1/2003 both confirm that in cases before national courts, a Commission decision constitutes binding proof that the behaviour took place and was illegal. Even though the Commission has fined the company concerned, damages may be awarded by national courts without being reduced on account of the Commission fine.

The Antitrust Damages Directive makes it easier for victims of anti-competitive practices to obtain damages. More information on antitrust damages actions, including a practical guide on how to quantify antitrust harm, is available here.

Casos

CADE

Ato de Concentração nº 08700.005720/2023-81

Requerentes: SALIC International Investment Company e BRF S.A. Advogados: Eduardo Frade, Venicio Filho, Marianne Reis, Fernanda Hormung Victor, Paola Pugliese, Maria Luiza Geraldi e Stephanie Penereiro. Com fulcro no §1º do art. 50 da Lei 9.784/99, integro as razões do Parecer nº 101/2024/CGAA5/SGA1/SG (1358931) à presente decisão, inclusive quanto à sua motivação. Nos termos dos arts. 13, XII, e art. 57, I, da Lei nº 12.529/11, decido pela aprovação sem restrições do presente ato de concentração.

Ato de Concentração nº 08700.001302/2024-03

Requerentes: Milhão Indústria e Comércio de Ingredientes e Cereais Ltda. e Louis Dreyfus Company Brasil S.A. Advogados: Ademir Antonio Pereira Jr., Yan Villela Vieira, Andre Funtowicz, Sérgio Varella Bruna, Natalia Salzedas Pinheiro da Silveira e Marina Lissa Oda Horita. Decido pela aprovação sem restrições.

FTC

Kroger Company/Albertsons Companies, Inc., In the Matter of

The Federal Trade Commission sued to block the largest proposed supermarket merger in U.S. history—Kroger Company’s $24.6 billion acquisition of the Albertsons Companies, Inc.—alleging that the deal is anticompetitive.

Type of Action

Administrative

Last Updated

March 7, 2024

Docket Number

9428

Case Status

Pending

CMA

T&L Sugars/Tereos merger inquiry

• • 11 March 2024
  • Competition and Markets Authority case

Spreadex / Sporting Index merger inquiry

• • 11 March 2024
  • Competition and Markets Authority case

RedBird IMI / Telegraph Media Group merger inquiry

• The CMA is investigating the anticipated acquisition by RedBird IMI of Telegraph Media Group.
  • Updated: 11 March 2024

CNMC

Competencia

Concentraciones – Adquisición control conjunto

C/1454/24 – TENSILE/ PORTOBELLO/ PLENOIL

Entrada de la notificación | 06 Mar 2024

Competencia

Concentraciones – Adquisición control exclusivo

C/1453/24 – EASYPARK / MOBILITY 1 SAS

Entrada de la notificación | 05 Mar 2024

Comissão Europeia

MABANAFT / WESTFA

Merger

M.11463

Last decision date: 08.03.2024 Simplified procedure

CLEARLAKE / INSIGHT / ALTERYX

Merger

M.11440

Last decision date:08.03.2024Simplified procedure