Notícias
Cade lança segundo relatório sobre economia digital
Material aprofunda debate sobre políticas de concorrência na economia digitalCompartilhe:
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Publicado em 02/02/2024 17h53
OConselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (Cade) lançou, nesta sexta-feira (02/02), o relatório Brics in the Digital Economy: Competition Policy in Practice (2nd Report). Este trabalho busca apresentar os resultados do grupo de trabalho criado durante a 5ª Conferência sobre Concorrência Brics, que ocorreu em Brasília, em 2017.
A série dos documentos elaborados tem como objetivo melhorar a compreensão das políticas de concorrência na economia digital, além de aprimorar a cooperação futura entre as autoridades.
O propósito deste segundo relatório, que não tem caráter de norma, é aprofundar o escopo do debate sobre mercados digitais, tanto na avaliação de fusões e aquisições como de condutas anticoncorrenciais no ambiente digital, identificando pontos comuns e promovendo debate sobre algumas das principais características dos mercados digitais.
Estão entre os temas tratados no material: a definição de “mercado relevante” nos mercados digitais, critérios para avaliar o poder de mercado, análise de desafios específicos suscitados em casos de condutas anticompetitivas, fusões e remédios em mercados digitais, entre outros.
O primeiro relatório foi lançado em 2019 durante a VI Conferência sobre Concorrência do Brics (VI Brics Competition Conference), realizada em Moscou, na Rússia. O material fornece uma visão geral da política de concorrência e enforcement nos países do bloco econômico, abordando diferentes experiências na aplicação de normas antitruste e explorando desafios e insights de cada um dos países representados.
A atividade do grupo de trabalho partiu de um questionário que sondou as práticas e desafios enfrentados no âmbito da economia digital pelas autoridades de concorrência do Brasil, Rússia, Índia, China e África do Sul, então partícipes do bloco econômico até 2023. A expectativa é que o material crie uma base sólida para os integrantes do bloco fortalecerem a cooperação.
Clique aqui para acessar o relatório na íntegra.
A transatlantic perspective from the UK’s CMA
A speech delivered by Sarah Cardell, Chief Executive of the CMA, to the GCR Live: Law Leaders Global 2024 conference.From:Competition and Markets Authority and Sarah CardellPublished2 February 2024Location:MiamiDelivered on:2 February 2024 (Speaker’s notes, may differ from delivered version)
Introduction
Thank you for the opportunity to deliver the closing address at the end of a fascinating conference. It’s particularly timely for me to follow the panel discussion just now on “Atlantic convergence or divergence” and to provide some perspectives directly from the United Kingdom.
Many of you will be familiar with the work of the UK Competition and Markets Authority to some extent: most likely in the context of merger control, or perhaps the incoming digital markets competition regime in the UK. I would like to take this opportunity to put the CMA’s work in context for you all as a predominantly US-based audience, including explaining a little about how we operate as a competition and consumer protection agency – what motivates the outcomes we seek to achieve and the way we work. In doing that, I’ll venture a little myth-busting, to address some of the misconceptions I hear from time to time. I will give some particular insights into our merger control and digital markets work, together with a few practical tips on how best to engage with the CMA if you are a US business or advisor. And I’ll offer my own perspective on both the importance, and limits, of international coordination.
What makes the CMA tick: our purpose and ambition
The CMA is the UK’s principal competition and consumer protection authority. We have a range of legal powers and responsibilities including merger control, enforcing against breaches of competition law and consumer protection law, and conducting wider ranging market studies and investigations. In our 2023 to 2024 Annual Plan we set out the CMA’s purpose: “to help people, businesses and the UK economy by promoting competitive markets and tackling unfair behaviour.”
We also set out how this purpose shapes our ambition in terms of the outcomes we want to deliver, so that:
- “people can be confident they are getting great choices and fair deals
- competitive, fair-dealing businesses can innovate and thrive; and
- the whole UK economy can grow productively and sustainably”
As representatives of US businesses, you may be thinking that this is of little relevance to your own interests. Perhaps, for you, UK merger control chiefly represents a barrier standing in the way of getting a great deal through.
Unsurprisingly, I am going to offer a different perspective: that it is in the interests of every US company that does business in the UK to have a robust, independent UK competition authority protecting free and open markets. Why? Because those are the market conditions that foster growth and innovation. The conditions which drive genuine competitive benefits for companies – large and small – selling products or services to UK businesses or consumers. The competitive pressure, the dynamism which I’m describing, has been one of the cornerstones of America’s economic success. It establishes a powerful drive for value creation. These market conditions which the CMA protects and fosters are exactly those which generate positive returns to investors, as well as delivering a wealth of benefits for consumers and the broader economy.
So, supporting investment, innovation and growth by protecting competitive markets is an explicit focus for the CMA. We do this in the interests of UK consumers, businesses, and our economy. But in doing so, we also advance the interests of every fair-dealing US company serving UK markets that strives to grow and to compete on a level playing field. And we advance the interests of every investor seeking to make a fair return on their capital by doing business in the UK.
UK merger control: a view from the inside – out
I said at the start that I would like to do a little myth-busting, and in particular address some misconceptions that sometimes arise about the scope, purpose, and impact of the UK merger control regime.
Jurisdictional reach of UK merger control
First, when and why do we look at deals involving non-UK companies? I sometimes hear it said that the CMA is over-reaching by reviewing a deal between 2 US companies. Or that a US investor is reluctant to fund a UK start-up for fear a subsequent sell-out would be blocked by the CMA. Let me address these concerns directly.
The jurisdictional tests in our legislation are designed to ensure that we can review deals that have a material effect on the UK, even if the transaction takes place between two non-UK companies, with its ‘centre of gravity’ elsewhere. More precisely, our legal thresholds give the CMA jurisdiction to review a transaction in 2 scenarios: either where the UK turnover of the company being acquired exceeds £70 million; or where the merging companies will together supply more than 25 per cent of a particular good or service in the UK, or a substantial part of it (and where the merger results in an increment to that share of supply).
In many cases, large international deals will comfortably meet the UK turnover threshold. But some global deals may come within our jurisdiction because they satisfy the share of supply test. This test is a long-standing feature of the UK regime. It is worth noting that the Digital Markets Competition and Consumers Bill currently going through UK Parliament, which I’m going to come to later, will also enable the CMA to review a deal where there is no horizontal increment. This could be a purely vertical or conglomerate merger, or the acquisition of a nascent competitor.
These tests enable the CMA to review a deal. But we must apply a further and separate test before we can block it. That requires us to find that it is “more likely than not” that the transaction will result in a substantial lessening of competition.
A detailed explanation of our approach to jurisdiction is available in guidance published on our website. And there are other mechanisms parties can use to help manage concerns or questions. It’s worth emphasising here that the UK regime doesn’t require mandatory notifications so for deals where there is genuinely no competitive impact in the UK there is no need for us to review. To assist with understanding whether a review is needed, merging parties can submit a short briefing paper to our Mergers Intelligence Committee for an early view on jurisdiction and whether we think a deal needs to be called in for a what we call a ‘phase 1 review’. Do look on our website for more details about this process if you are not aware of it.
It is important to emphasise that the CMA only looks at deals where there is an impact on UK markets. So, for example, we would not on our own initiative review a merger between 2 US companies which had no competitive impact in the UK, regardless of whether it exceeded our jurisdictional thresholds. Equally, we do not review a deal simply because the target company happens to be based in the UK. This applies to start-ups in exactly the same way it does to established businesses – if an acquisition impacts UK consumers in the way I have outlined, a start-up based here in Miami will be equally within our jurisdiction as one based in the UK. So the scope of UK merger control really shouldn’t be a relevant factor for investors considering whether to fund a UK start-up.
The CMA is a more active global merger control authority than previously but we are not “anti-mergers”, and our interventions are proportionate
Turning from jurisdiction to the substantive purpose of merger control in the UK – the second misconception I’d like to tackle is around the reason for the CMA’s intervention in more of these larger, international mergers in recent years. In large part this reflects a legal change brought about by the UK’s exit from the EU. Prior to that, the UK element of many of these transactions would have been reviewed by the European Commission. Now, that is the responsibility of the CMA.
I have heard it suggested in some quarters that the CMA is “anti-mergers” almost by default, particularly when it comes to deals involving the so-called GAMMA firms. Fortunately, our well-documented track record on merger control demonstrates that we take an objective, evidence-based and proportionate approach. It is certainly correct that we have evolved our analytical approach when assessing mergers in digital markets, in part reflecting well-documented and widely recognised historic under-enforcement in this area. But each case we consider is reviewed objectively on its own merits.
And you don’t have to just take my word for it, let’s look at the numbers. The latest estimates that I’ve seen suggest that there were around 50,000 M&A deals last year (PWC, Bloomberg) during which period the CMA looked at around 700 cases. The large majority of these, including the great majority of those involving start-ups, were considered by our Mergers Intelligence Committee and dismissed without any formal review. In fact, in the 2022 to 2023 financial year (from 1 April 2022 to 31 March 2023), we conducted only 14 in-depth phase 2 investigations and prohibited only 3 deals (with a further 3 abandoned during the review process). And this balanced approach applies in the tech sector too. Over recent years, we have cleared a number of high-profile transactions either unconditionally or subject to remedies. Recent examples include: Broadcom’s acquisition of VMware; Viasat’s acquisition of Inmarsat; Facebook’s acquisition of Kustomer; Amazon’s acquisition of iRobot; and Microsoft’s acquisitions of Nuance and, following a substantial restructuring of the transaction, Activision.
I hope this data is making clear what is not, perhaps, always clear from reading media headlines. That whilst the CMA will not shy away from taking, and defending, robust decisions to prevent anti-competitive mergers which would harm UK consumers or businesses, our interventions are proportionate and focus only on the handful of deals that are problematic each year.
And coming back to start-ups again briefly, our merger control regime exists to safeguard and nurture free and competitive markets in which all businesses can grow and thrive. But it also helps maintain a range of exit strategies for investors. In many cases a trade sale will be unproblematic from a merger control perspective, including to a larger company, provided there is sufficient competition remaining in the market. Of course, if the only exit route that has been contemplated is the sale to a dominant incumbent competitor, that might suggest an unduly narrow exit strategy.
UK merger control is subject to robust and effective scrutiny
I have talked about when we intervene, and why we intervene. Now I want to turn to how we intervene, and to explain the safeguards that have been built into the UK merger control regime to ensure robust, independent and effective scrutiny.
First, it’s important to emphasise that the CMA is set up by law to take its merger control decisions free from political influence.
Turning to our process, the UK merger control system (in common with many other jurisdictions but unlike here in the US) provides for ‘administrative decision-making’. This means it is the CMA taking decisions in the first instance, rather than a court. Because we are decision-makers, we must weigh up both sides of the argument and set out an objective, balanced view of the evidence underpinning our decision. We engage extensively with the merger parties to make sure we understand their arguments, and to give them a fair opportunity to present their views around the potential competition concerns that have been identified, and any possible remedies. We also consult widely with third parties and gather a large amount of information from multiple sources. As a practical tip for engaging with the CMA, I really would emphasise that we welcome and encourage early contact with merging companies, and we are genuinely open to discussions and early feedback.
I am going to become a bit technical about our process here, but bear with me – because this is one of the key features which should give businesses and investors confidence in the integrity of the UK regime.
Like many other jurisdictions, we operate a two-stage review. In both our phase 1 and phase 2 processes, the UK model allows parties to make their arguments directly to the decision makers who take their decisions independently, and in circumstances that minimise the risk of confirmation bias. But for phase 2, meaning the most complex merger cases requiring in-depth investigation, the decision to approve or prohibit the merger (or to accept remedies) is taken by an independent Inquiry Group. The group members are selected for each case from an independent CMA panel appointed by the UK government and are not CMA employees. They have deep expertise drawn from a variety of relevant professions. This independence is hard-wired into the statutory regime and deeply embedded in the long-standing practice of the CMA. This is a crucial piece of institutional governance design, which has earned the UK a strong reputation for high-quality independent decision-making.
And, of course, our decisions can be challenged before the courts. The UK Competition Appeal Tribunal (or CAT) is a specialist appeal body which holds the CMA accountable for the legality and rationality of our merger decisions, and the fairness of our decision-making process. The CAT’s scrutiny is every bit as challenging as you would expect, as some of the lawyers in the room who may follow these cases will know.
Merger investigation process reforms
It is worth noting that we are currently in the process of consulting on planned reforms to our phase 2 merger investigation process with the aim of maintaining “best in class” procedures for merger control in the UK which are clear, transparent, agile, and efficient. Proposals include an earlier focus during the phase 2 investigation on the key issues at stake in the case, as well as improving the opportunities for all businesses affected by a merger to engage with the CMA Inquiry Group overseeing the investigation and changes to our process for considering remedies. We’ll be publishing an update on those reforms in the next couple of months so do look out for that.
A new UK regime to promote competition in digital markets
Turning now from merger control – one of the CMA’s most established regimes – to a new regime for competition in digital markets, which the UK government has designed with the intention of making the UK one of the best places in the world for technology innovation and investment.
The pace and scale of digital transformation has been extraordinary, bringing enormous benefits for people, businesses and economies across the globe. In the UK, the digital sector is growing rapidly, attracting substantial investment, contributing billions of pounds to the economy and creating millions of jobs.
At the same time, we’ve seen the concentration of market power in the hands of a small number of technology firms across various digital markets. Many jurisdictions around the world have concluded that traditional competition law regimes and powers are insufficient to address the impact of that concentration of power in a timely and effective way. We are now seeing new powers being introduced, for example in the EU and Germany.
The UK’s trajectory on this has been consistent for some years. In 2018, the UK government commissioned Professor Jason Furman (a former advisor to President Obama) to lead a review of the UK’s own competition framework in relation to digital markets. In response to recommendations in that review, and recognising the many benefits of digital markets, the UK government is now introducing a new pro-competition digital markets regime to address the market power of a small number of technology firms.
It is important to understand that this is not broad brush, one-size-fits-all regulation of the sort that creates barriers to innovation or an unnecessary burden for businesses. Quite the opposite. The regime has been consciously designed to be highly flexible, bespoke, and targeted in its approach. It will focus on what we expect to be a very small number of firms with substantial and entrenched market power in a digital activity linked to the UK; a position of strategic significance; and a global turnover of more than £25 billion or UK turnover of more than £1 billion. These firms will be designated with Strategic Market Status (SMS) in relation to one or more digital activities.
Tools – CRs and PCIs
Once the CMA designates a firm with SMS, 2 tools become available: Conduct Requirements and Pro-Competition Interventions.
The CMA will be able to impose Conduct Requirements where this would be proportionate to achieve one or more of 3 legislative objectives: fair dealing, open choices, and trust and transparency. The requirements would then be used to guide the behaviour of SMS firms not only to address existing issues, but also to prevent them taking advantage of their powerful positions to exploit consumers and businesses or to undermine fair competition.
Through Pro-Competition Interventions, we will be able to address factors underpinning these firms’ market power in a particular activity. This might include giving people the power to easily transfer their data between providers, or requiring interoperability so that different products and services work with each other. The aim is to create longer-term, dynamic changes in these activities, opening up opportunities for greater competition and innovation.
What I am describing here is a modern, fit-for-the-future digital markets competition regime. One designed to prevent harmful practices that hold back innovation and growth, opening up new paths for entrepreneurs, challengers and start-ups struggling to enter, grow, and compete in digital markets. A regime which can keep pace with developments in fast-moving digital markets. And one which, crucially, will include ongoing dialogue with potential designated firms and broader stakeholders, to ensure the CMA maintains a deep understanding of relevant markets and technologies to inform our assessments and any potential interventions.
A targeted, evidence based, proportionate and participative approach
The new powers that the Digital Markets competition regime will grant the CMA are substantial and we are committed to taking a demonstrably targeted, evidence-based and proportionate approach to implementing them. Understandably, stakeholders are keen to know more about what this means in practice. I would encourage anyone with this in mind to read the overview document the CMA published last month providing further detail on how we will operate the new regime. Once the UK Parliament passes the DMCC Bill (which we hope will be later this Spring), we will release more detailed draft guidance for consultation so do please look out for that. We expect the operation of the new regime will formally commence towards the end of this year. We anticipate launching the first SMS investigations soon after we receive the powers to do so and expect to initiate approximately 3 to 4 SMS investigations in the first year of the new regime. In our Overview document we emphasise how important it will be for this regime to be truly participative, built on wide-ranging engagement with stakeholders large and small and we encourage you all to play a part in that.
CMA perspective on international cooperation
Now, perhaps it goes without saying, as I deliver this speech at an international conference, that in this globalised world of interconnected markets, international cooperation and communication is more important than ever for the competition community. To have positive impact in the UK, the CMA must be an active member of that community internationally.
One reason for this, which I think we are all conscious of, is the importance for businesses of international alignment. Whilst all competition authorities remain independent and sovereign in their decisions, we do strive for close relationships and knowledge sharing with our fellow enforcement agencies in the US, the EU and elsewhere. International fora like the OECD and ICN offer great opportunities to bring agencies together. Businesses themselves can also help facilitate a joined-up approach, through waivers and through keeping agencies updated on international developments, for example.
Areas of cooperation and overall approach
How does this inter-agency cooperation play out in practice?
Well, in mergers, our experience is that open channels of communications between different authorities internationally reviewing the same transaction are generally beneficial – both for the authorities themselves and the merging parties. We see procedural benefits in allowing us, as far as possible, to align on process and timing. And where the markets concerned have regional or global dynamics, it can assist our substantive assessments, including resulting in more aligned outcomes across different jurisdictions.
The recent Adobe/Figma deal, for example, involved a merger in the creative design sector. A number of agencies were reviewing the merger alongside the CMA, including the US Department of Justice and the European Commission. The Commission published its Statement of Objections on 17 November, followed closely by the publication of our Provisional Findings on 28 November. Soon after that, on 18 December 2023, the merger parties abandoned the deal.
Having recognised some efficiencies in coordination, I do want to be clear that consistency of outcome is not an end in itself. With different statutory regimes and different decision makers, as well as variances in market features and evidence bases, instances of divergence are inevitable and entirely proper. This is true both for assessments of competition concerns raised by a merger, and the appropriate solutions to remedy them.
The Microsoft/Activision merger is a case in point. The CMA intervened to prevent Microsoft from reinforcing its incumbency advantage in cloud gaming, an important and rapidly growing form of entertainment for millions of UK consumers. These concerns were shared by the European Commission, with whom we engaged closely throughout. However, while the Commission accepted Microsoft’s original behavioural remedy, we did not. Ultimately the parties put forward a substantially restructured deal to the CMA which addressed our concerns.
International cooperation also extends beyond merger control. For example, in March 2023 we launched an investigation into anti-competitive conduct in the fragrances sector simultaneously, and in consultation with, the Antitrust Division of the US Department of Justice, the European Commission, and the Swiss Competition Commission. That cooperation is important because again, post-Brexit, the CMA’s remit now extends to the UK impact of global cartels and anti-competitive conduct where that UK element might previously have been investigated by the European Commission.
An absolutely key area for international cooperation, as you will no doubt have anticipated, is digital markets which, by dint of their global nature, mean that similar competition issues arise in multiple jurisdictions. For example, the CMA and many of our counterpart organisations in the EU, US, Australia, Japan and beyond are investigating or have investigated issues related to Google’s position in ad tech, Meta’s use of advertising data, Apple’s restrictions on browser engines, Amazon’s use of third-party seller data, and so on. Whilst each authority naturally focuses on what is right for businesses and consumers in its own jurisdiction, none of us wants divergence for its own sake, and it is in all our interests to maximise synergies where we can.
This is why, during the UK’s 2021 G7 Presidency, the CMA worked with our counterparts to develop a compendium of approaches to improving competition in digital markets.
This need for international cooperation will be particularly important as we and other jurisdictions move towards the sorts of ex-ante pro-competition regimes for digital markets I described earlier. The Overview document I referred to earlier makes clear that cooperation with other authorities is front of mind, particularly in relation to the EU Digital Markets Act.
Conclusion
To conclude, I hope this speech has served to demystify the CMA a little, and to lay to rest some of the misconceptions surrounding competition enforcement in the UK. We are rigorous and robust: we will take action where we identify competition concerns that impact UK consumers and businesses. But we are also open-minded, evidenced-based and proportionate. And we are keen to talk – especially directly to businesses, including those from around the world for whom the UK’s free, open and competitive markets offer powerful opportunities for innovation and value creation.
Thank you for listening this afternoon and I look forward to engaging with you all further.
Published 2 February 2024
A Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations (CDC) e a Frey Aménagement et Promotion (FAP) notificam a criação de uma empresa comum.
Ficha do processo
La CNMC inicia un expediente sancionador contra la empresa de armamento militar Rheinmetall
05 Feb 2024 |Competencia Nota de prensa
- En febrero de 2023, la CNMC autorizó la compra de Expal Systems por Rheinmetall.
- Posteriormente la CNMC tuvo conocimiento de que la información aportada por Rheinmetall, en la que se basó la autorización, podría haber sido incompleta y engañosa.
La Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia (CNMC) ha iniciado un expediente sancionador contra Rheinmetall, A.G. por una posible obstrucción a la labor de la CNMC. La empresa de armamento militar habría aportado información incompleta y engañosa en el marco de la notificación de la compra de Expal Systems (SNC/DC/081/23).
Esta obstrucción habría vulnerado el artículo 62.3.c) de la Ley de Defensa de la Competencia.
Obstrucción de la labor de la CNMC
La CNMC autorizó en febrero de 2023 la compra de Expal Systems por Rheinmetall (C/1368/23). No obstante, un cliente de las partes recurrió la autorización ante la Audiencia Nacional.
A raíz del recurso, la CNMC abrió una información reservada para comprobar si la operación afectaba a una serie de mercados (fabricación y comercialización de nitrocelulosa, nitroglicerina y pasta húmeda), que Rheinmetall habría omitido durante la notificación. Además, parte de la información aportada por la empresa podría haber sido engañosa.
Estas prácticas supondrían una infracción grave de la normativa de competencia y podrían implicar una sanción de hasta el 5 % del volumen de negocios total de la empresa infractora en el ejercicio anterior al de la imposición de la multa.
La incoación de este expediente no prejuzga el resultado final de la investigación. Se abre ahora un período máximo de 3 meses para la instrucción del expediente y su resolución por la CNMC.
Contenido relacionado:
- SNC/DC/081/23: Rheinmetall
- C/1368/23: Rheinmetall/Expal
- Nota de prensa (13/03/2023): La CNMC autorizó ocho operaciones de concentración en el mes de febrero
- Blog (25/04/2017): En la CNMC vigilamos las concentraciones entre las empresas
Documento no oficial, destinado a los medios de comunicación, y que no vincula a la CNMC. Reproducción permitida solo si se cita la fuente.
Commission welcomes continued airline competition on the routes from Amsterdam to the US
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The European Commission welcomes the positive developments at Amsterdam airport enabling new entrant JetBlue Airways Corporation (‘JetBlue’) to continue operating at the airport over the IATA Summer 2024 Season.
The Commission has actively and closely monitored the evolution of the market conditions at Amsterdam airport. Specifically, this concerned the degree of congestion of the airport and the operations of the Blue Skies joint venture (‘JV’) between Air France-KLM Group, Delta and Virgin Atlantic, to identify any risk of serious and irreparable damage to competition for transatlantic traffic, in particular on the Amsterdam-New York route. The Commission stood ready to intervene with interim measures in case JetBlue did not secure appropriate access to Amsterdam airport for the IATA Summer 2024 Season.
Between 2010 and 2015, the Commission investigated three JVs related to transatlantic passenger services: (i) Oneworld Atlantic Joint Business(American Airlines, British Airways, Finnair and Iberia), (ii) Star A++ (Air Canada, United Airlines and Lufthansa), and (iii) the TAJV between Skyteammembers Air France-KLM Group, Alitalia and Delta. In 2020, the Blue Skies JV between Air France-KLM Group, Delta and Virgin Atlantic replaced the TAJV and the former JV between Delta and Virgin Atlantic.
The JVs bring together EU and US airlines, which agree to combine their resources and share revenues on transatlantic routes linking their hub airports, as well as routes that connect those hubs to certain ‘behind and beyond’ destinations in Europe and the US.
As a result of its investigations, the Commission found that, on certain hub-to-hub transatlantic routes such as Amsterdam-New York, the entry of a new competitor or the expansion of an existing competitor was necessary to remedy the distortive effects of the joint ventures.
In late IATA Summer 2023 Season, US carrier JetBlue started offering daily direct passenger transport services on the Amsterdam-New York and Amsterdam-Boston routes. JetBlue’s entry revived competition to the benefit of consumers between the three airlines offering direct transatlantic services at Amsterdam airport, namely: two Blue Skies members (KLM and Delta) and United Airlines.
However, due to the tight capacity constraints at Amsterdam airport, JetBlue had not been able to obtain all of the slots it had requested during the initial phases of the slot allocation procedure for the IATA Summer 2024 Season. There was therefore a risk that JetBlue would have had to discontinue its operations on those routes as of 30 March 2024.
JetBlue has improved its slot portfolio at Amsterdam airport during the later phases of the slot allocation procedure and has eventually obtained all the slots it needs to continue operating at Amsterdam airport throughout the IATA Summer 2024 Season. As a result, consumers will not be deprived of choice at a time of strong demand for transatlantic services.
The Commission will continue its monitoring ahead of the IATA Summer 2025 Season.
Related topics
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Casos
CADE
Ato de Concentração nº 08700.000562/2024-53
Requerentes: Stima GD Investimentos em Geração de Energia S.A. e Serena Desenvolvimento S.A. Advogados: Luis Nagalli, Julia Haddad Niemeyer e Carolina Furlani. Decido pela aprovação sem restrições.
Ato de Concentração nº 08700.000160/2024-59
Requerentes: Crala Empreendimentos e Participações Ltda. e Crescera Oba Growth Co-Invest I – Fundo de Investimento em Participações Multiestratégia. Advogados: Renata Fonseca Zuccolo Giannella e Paloma Caetano Almeida. Decido pela aprovação sem restrições.
Ato de Concentração nº 08700.000491/2024-99
Requerentes: Krosaki Harima Corporation e Indústrias Brasileiras de Artigos Refratários – IBAR – Ltda. Advogados: Eduardo Caminati, Marcio Bueno, Giuliana Gonçalves, Roberto Potter e Clara Lim. Decido pela aprovação sem restrições.
Ato de Concentração nº 08700.000244/2024-92
Requerentes: Boskalis Holding B.V. e ALP Maritime Group B.V. Advogados: Marcio Dias Soares, Renata Caied e Pedro Pendeza Anitelle. Decido pela aprovação sem restrições.
Ato de Concentração nº 08700.004702/2023-81
Requerentes: International Consolidated Airlines Group e Air Europa Holding, S.L.
Advogados dos requerentes: Ricardo Inglez de Souza, Stefanie Schmitt Giglio e Paula Santos Fialho.
Com fulcro no §1º do art. 50 da Lei nº 9.784, de 1999, integro as razões da NOTA TÉCNICA Nº 11/2024/CGAA4/SGA1/SG/CADE (SEI 1341831) à presente decisão, inclusive como sua motivação. Pelos fundamentos apontados na Nota Técnica citada, decido pelo deferimento precário do pedido de intervenção como terceiro interessado formulado por TAM Linhas Aéreas, concedendo-lhe 15 (quinze) dias para manifestação complementar, nos termos do §2° do art. 118 do Regimento Interno do Cade.
CMA
RedBird IMI / Telegraph Media Group merger inquiry
- Thermo Fisher Scientific / Olink merger inquiryThe CMA is investigating the anticipated acquisition by Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc. of Olink Holding AB.
- Updated: 2 February 2024
Autorité de la Concurrence
Décision 24-DCC-11 du 05 février 2024
relative à la prise de contrôle exclusif des sociétés Centre auto SBH, Turbe car rental et Turbe car rental II par la société Socipar
Publication du sens de la décision le : 05 février 2024 |
Secteurs :
Présentation de la décision
Informations sur la décision
| Type d’opération | Prise de contrôle |
|---|---|
| Partie notifiante | Socipar |
| Dispositif(s) | Autorisation |
| Décision de phase | Phase 1 |
| Décision simplifiée | Oui |
| Entreprise(s) ou organisme(s) concerné(s) | Centre Auto SBHTurbe Car RentalTurbe Car Rental II |
Recours et Pourvois
Cette décision est susceptible de faire l’objet d’un recours.