Notícias
Cade aprova venda da Amil pelo United Health Group
Investidor brasileiro deterá 100% das ações da empresaCompartilhe:
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Publicado em 17/01/2024 14h31
ASuperintendência-Geral do Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (SG/Cade) aprovou a compra, por um investidor brasileiro, da Amil, atualmente pertencente ao United Health Group. O despacho aprovando a operação foi publicado no Diário Oficial da União desta quarta-feira (17/01).
A Amil atua na operação de planos de saúde médico-hospitalares e de planos exclusivamente odontológicos, individuais, familiares e coletivos em todo o Brasil. O grupo possui ainda hospitais e centros médicos (unidades ambulatoriais) para a prestação de serviços médico-hospitalares, além de contar com rede credenciada de médicos, hospitais e laboratórios. Já o comprador possuiu atividades no ramo de investimentos financeiros e imobiliários.
De acordo com o Grupo UHG, o negócio permitirá um desinvestimento no Grupo Amil, uma subsidiária de baixa representatividade nas operações globais do grupo.
Em seu parecer, a SG observou que todas as empresas nas quais o comprador detém participação indireta pertencentes ao Grupo QSaúde não estão em operação, e o mesmo não possui ações em outras empresas com atividades em mercados horizontal ou verticalmente relacionados àqueles em que atua o Grupo Amil. Assim, a operação representa apenas uma substituição de agente econômico e decidiu pela sua aprovação sem restrições.
O negócio está sujeito também à aprovação da Agência Nacional de Saúde Suplementar (ANS).
Se o Tribunal do Cade não avocar os atos de concentração para análise ou não houver interposição de recurso de terceiros interessados, no prazo de 15 dias, as decisões da Superintendência-Geral terão caráter terminativo e as operações estarão aprovadas em definitivo pelo órgão antitruste.
Cade aprova ampliação de acordo entre Delta e Latam
Novo arranjo inclui Equador e o transporte aéreo de cargas no escopo dos serviços ofertados por joint ventureCompartilhe:
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Publicado em 16/01/2024 15h12 Atualizado em 17/01/2024 11h19
ASuperintendência-Geral do Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (SG/Cade) aprovou o aditamento do acordo de joint venture celebrado entre Delta e Latam com objetivo de aumentar sua abrangência a nível geográfico e dos produtos incluídos. O despacho aprovando a operação foi publicado no Diário Oficial da União desta terça-feira (16/01).
O acordo original, aprovado em 2020, consiste num arranjo contratual de longo prazo com objetivo de combinar as malhas aéreas complementares da Delta nos Estados Unidos e no Canadá e da Latam na América do Sul, permitindo que as companhias comercializem serviços de transporte aéreo integrados, como um único agente. Nesse sentido, o aditamento aprovado pela autarquia consiste em incluir o Equador entre os países atendidos pela joint venture e o transporte aéreo de carga em aviões de carga no escopo dos serviços abrangidos pelo acordo.
A Latam é uma sociedade anônima de capital aberto, chilena, com subsidiárias no Brasil, Chile, Colômbia, Equador, Paraguai e Peru, que atua majoritariamente nos mercados de transporte aéreo de passageiros e de carga. Já a Delta também é uma sociedade anônima de capital aberto, norte-americana, que atua majoritariamente nos mercados de transporte aéreo de passageiros e de carga. No Brasil, a empresa opera somente rotas internacionais entre o Brasil e os EUA.
Em sua análise, a SG constatou a presença de rivalidade e de capacidade ociosa no mercado relevante de transporte aéreo de carga na rota EUA-Brasil e concluiu ser improvável o exercício unilateral de poder de mercado pelas empresas requerentes, decidindo pela aprovação sem restrições.
Se o Tribunal do Cade não avocar os atos de concentração para análise ou não houver interposição de recurso de terceiros interessados, no prazo de 15 dias, as decisões da Superintendência-Geral terão caráter terminativo e as operações estarão aprovadas em definitivo pelo órgão antitruste.
CMA wins appeal on legal challenge to overseas information requests
The Court of Appeal agrees that companies outside the UK must provide information requested by the CMA – entirely dismissing legal challenges from BMW and VW.From:Competition and Markets AuthorityPublished17 January 2024
In a unanimous judgment, the Court of Appeal has confirmed that the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) has the power to require overseas companies to produce documents and information when it is investigating suspected anti-competitive conduct.
In December 2022, the CMA imposed a fixed penalty of £30,000 and a daily penalty of £15,000 on BMW AG for failing to comply with an information request issued as part of a competition law investigation involving the car manufacturer.
Both BMW AG and VW AG – which was also subject to a formal information request – issued legal challenges. When a combined judgment from the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) and the High Court found in favour of the firms, the CMA took the case to the Court of Appeal and has today won on all grounds.
The Court of Appeal stated that the CMA’s ability to conduct competition investigations would be compromised were it unable to obtain information from overseas, saying it would create “a perverse incentive for conspirators to move offshore to organise cartels directed at harming the United Kingdom market”.
The Court of Appeal also found that nothing in “logic, policy, case law or legislative history” supported the restrictive interpretation adopted by the CAT and High Court.
Sarah Cardell, Chief Executive of the CMA, said:
We are very pleased with today’s important ruling which confirms that the CMA can secure information from overseas businesses when investigating suspected breaches of competition law.
Our cases increasingly involve cross-border, multi-national businesses and information requests are a key tool by which we can investigate whether those businesses have been engaged in unlawful conduct.
Today’s unanimous judgment strengthens the CMA’s ability to investigate, enforce against and deter any anti-competitive conduct that harms consumers, businesses and markets in the UK.
For more information, see the CMA’s case page: Suspected anti-competitive conduct in relation to the recycling of end of life vehicles.
Notes to editors
- For media queries, please contact the press office on press@cma.gov.uk or on 020 3738 6460.
- Information requests are legal tools used by CMA to obtain documents and information for its investigations into suspected anti-competitive conduct and can include copies of emails, minutes of meetings and/or information about internal roles and responsibilities. The CMA regularly issues mandatory information requests to ensure its investigations are robust and evidence based.
- In March 2022, the CMA launched an investigation into a number of vehicle manufacturers and trade associations over suspected breaches of competition law. The investigation relates to suspected coordination with regard to the use of recycled materials in cars, their recyclability, and the arrangements for recycling old or written-off vehicles.
- The CMA believes that important aspects of the suspected conduct were agreed outside the UK and implemented in the UK. It suspects that VW AG and BMW AG, both of which are based in Germany, or other VW or BMW Group companies based outside the UK, hold information which the CMA considers important to its investigation. The CMA therefore wrote to both the VW Group and BMW Group formally requiring them to produce information, including from their parent companies VW AG and BMW AG. VW AG and BMW AG both issued legal proceedings, challenging the CMA’s request.
- The legislation relevant to the CMA’s investigation is the Competition Act 1998 (CA98). The Chapter I prohibition of the CA98 prohibits agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings, and concerted practices which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition within the UK or a part of it and which may affect trade within the UK or a part of it unless they are excluded or exempt.
- Section 26 CA98 empowers the CMA, in the context of a CA98 investigation, to require any person, including ‘undertakings’, to produce specified documents and information which it considers relates to any matter relevant to its investigation.
- The quashed CAT ruling had held that only entities with a “UK territorial connection” were under a duty to comply with a formal information request under section 26 CA98, and that even they were only required to provide information and documents in their possession or over which they had legal control. On this basis, it found that VW AG and BMW AG had been justified in refusing to respond to the CMA’s information request. The Court of Appeal has rejected the CAT’s restrictive interpretation of the CMA’s powers.
- Volkswagen AG (VW AG) is the ultimate parent company of the undertaking formed by the VW group of companies (VW Group). Volkswagen Group United Kingdom Limited (VW UK) is part of the VW Group.
- Bayerische Motoren Werke AG (BMW AG) is the ultimate parent company of the undertaking formed by the BMW group of companies (BMW Group). BMW (UK) Limited (BMW UK) is part of the BMW Group.
- Both VW AG and BMW AG have applied for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal.
La CNMC analiza los criterios orientativos de honorarios para la tasación de costas del Colegio de Abogados de Murcia y recuerda su carácter excepcional
18 Ene 2024
Promoción de Competencia
nota de prensa
- El Ilustre Colegio de Abogados de Murcia ha remitido a la CNMC una consulta sobre esta materia.
- Los honorarios de los abogados deben fijarse libremente -la normativa prohíbe a los Colegios profesionales los baremos o recomendaciones-.
- Excepcionalmente, se permiten los criterios orientativos, pero siempre de acuerdo con la doctrina del Tribunal Supremo y de la CNMC.
La Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia (CNMC) ha publicado un informe en el que analiza los criterios orientativos elaborados por el Ilustre Colegio de Abogados de Murcia (INF/CNMC/497/23).
Los honorarios de los abogados deben fijarse libremente. La Ley 2/1974, de 13 de febrero, sobre Colegios Profesionales (LCP) y la Ley 15/2007, de 3 de julio, de Defensa de la Competencia (LDC) prohíben a los Colegios profesionales cualquier baremo o recomendación sobre dichos honorarios, con la única excepción de la elaboración de criterios orientativos para la tasación de costas y la jura de cuentas.
Consideraciones
La distinción entre baremos (prohibidos por la LCP y la LDC) y criterios orientativos (permitidos) es muy importante. Se recomienda a los Colegios profesionales que autoevalúen los criterios orientativos de acuerdo con la doctrina del Tribunal Supremo y de la CNMC.
Desde un punto de vista meramente consultivo, y sin perjuicio de las competencias sancionadoras de la CNMC (véase, por ejemplo, el expediente sancionador S/DC/0587/16 COSTAS BANKIA), se señala lo siguiente:
- Ausencia de referencias numéricas o cuantitativas. Se valora positivamente que en el borrador de criterios orientativos facilitados no se incluya ninguna referencia numérica o cuantitativa, en forma de tarifas, porcentajes, coeficientes, escalas o valores de referencia.
- Factores a considerar para la elaboración de los criterios. Los criterios facilitados parece que siguen la línea de los parámetros acogidos por el Tribunal Supremo en sus pronunciamientos, ponderando los factores relativos al interés económico litigioso y al grado de trabajo (permitiendo, a su vez, un mayor margen de libertad para determinar el grado).
- Difusión de los criterios. No entrañaría, a priori, riesgos para la competencia si son auténticos criterios orientativos a los exclusivos efectos de la tasación de costas. En todo caso, cualquier difusión, dentro o fuera del Colegio, no debe contener referencias numéricas o cuantitativas. Tampoco deberían publicarse los informes de tasación remitidos por el Colegio profesional al órgano judicial en el supuesto de impugnación de la tasación.
Este informe se emite a solicitud del Ilustre Colegio de Abogados de Murcia, en ejercicio de las competencias que le atribuye el artículo 5.2 de la Ley 3/2013, de 4 de junio, de creación de la Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia.
Contenido relacionado:
- INF/CNMC/497/23
- Nota de prensa (12/01/2024): Elaborar y difundir criterios orientativos de honorarios para la tasación de costas debe tener un carácter excepcional
- Blog (15/02/2023): Las sentencias del sancionador de la CNMC en el caso de los pleitos contra Bankia
Documento no oficial destinado a los medios de comunicación y que no vincula a la CNMC. Reproducción permitida solo si se cita a la fuente.
Fonte: CNMC
Las recomendaciones de la CNMC a las comunidades autónomas en el diseño de las ayudas del Plan Moves III supondrían más empleo, precios más bajos y más inversión
17 Ene 2024
nota de prensa
Promoción de Competencia
- Un grupo relevante de CC. AA. ya cumplía con las indicaciones de la CNMC al definir los programas de ayudas del Plan Moves III, pero diez comunidades impusieron requisitos restrictivos.
- Tres de ellas (Madrid, Cantabria y Asturias) han implementado las recomendaciones de la CNMC.
- La implementación de las recomendaciones de la CNMC por parte de todas las CC. AA. podría suponer un incremento potencial de 67.150 empleados, 1.997 nuevos distribuidores, la matriculación adicional de 3.959 vehículos ecológicos y la reducción de precio de estos vehículos (en torno a 1.900 euros por vehículo con etiqueta Cero Emisiones y alrededor de 1.600 euros por vehículo con etiqueta ECO).
La CNMC ha publicado el Estudio de evaluación de impacto de las recomendaciones emitidas en el informe relativo a las ayudas concedidas mediante el Plan Moves III, destinado a fomentar la adquisición de vehículos eléctricos y la implantación de la infraestructura necesaria para su recarga.
El sector del automóvil supone alrededor del 10 % del PIB de la economía española (considerando efectos tanto directos como indirectos –distribución, seguros, entidades financieras, etc.–). Además, el Plan Moves III afecta directamente a la distribución de vehículos ecológicos, clave para el cumplimiento de los objetivos medioambientales.
Restricciones a la competencia
El Plan Moves III se articula a través de una regulación nacional (Real Decreto 266/2021) que canaliza los fondos a las comunidades autónomas. Cada una de estas ha establecido con posterioridad los requisitos para acceder a las subvenciones a través de sus respectivas convocatorias.
Así, diez comunidades autónomas impusieron requisitos de oferta que reducían la competencia. En concreto, que la compraventa del vehículo debía producirse en un concesionario situado en el territorio de la comunidad autónoma cuya ayuda se solicitara. Este requisito fragmenta el mercado nacional y limita la competencia en la distribución de vehículos ecológicos, ya que los compradores pierden incentivos para comprar los vehículos fuera de la comunidad autónoma donde residen.
En el informe PRO/CNMC/003/21, la CNMC recomendaba a las CC. AA. evitar las exigencias territoriales sobre los intermediarios de las ayudas del Plan Moves III y permitir la tramitación de la ayuda directamente por parte de los compradores ante las Administraciones correspondientes, sin tener que tramitar el expediente a través del concesionario.
En la actualidad existen tres comunidades autónomas (Madrid, Cantabria y Asturias) que han implementado las recomendaciones de la CNMC.
Impacto potencial de las recomendaciones
Las recomendaciones de la CNMC buscan corregir fallos de mercado como los mencionados anteriormente. En este estudio se analizan los beneficios potenciales sobre la economía española en caso de que todas las CC. AA. implementasen las recomendaciones de la CNMC.
Según la metodología empleada (1), la implementación de estas recomendaciones podría suponer en el mercado de la distribución de vehículos a motor en España un incremento potencial de 67.150 empleados, 1.997 nuevos distribuidores, más de 267 millones de euros en la facturación de los distribuidores de vehículos ecológicos, la matriculación adicional de 3.959 vehículos ecológicos, y una potencial reducción del precio de 1.922 euros por vehículo con etiqueta Cero Emisiones y de 1.585 euros por vehículo con etiqueta ECO. Además de estos efectos sobre el mercado específico del vehículo ecológico, existe un potencial impacto sobre otros sectores de la economía general (fabricación de vehículos a motor, industria auxiliar del automóvil, mercado de seguros, servicios financieros, o la instalación de puntos de recarga, entre otros).
La CNMC es el organismo independiente regulador de los mercados que garantiza y promueve una competencia efectiva. En virtud de lo dispuesto en el apartado primero del artículo 5 de la Ley 3/2013, de 4 de junio, de creación de la CNMC, tiene entre sus funciones la promoción de una competencia efectiva en los mercados mediante, entre otros, la realización de estudios y trabajos de investigación en materia de competencia, así como informes generales sobre sectores económicos.
(1) Elaborada por KPMG y VVA en el proyecto de análisis ex post de actuaciones de promoción de la competencia y unidad de mercado (EI/01/21).
Contenido relacionado:
- EI/03/2023
- Nota de prensa (12/05/2022): La CNMC recomienda a las comunidades autónomas evitar las exigencias territoriales sobre los intermediarios de las ayudas del Plan Moves III a la compra de vehículos eléctricos
Documento no oficial destinado a los medios de comunicación y que no vincula a la CNMC. Reproducción permitida solo si se cita a la fuente.
Fonte: CNMC
Commission accepts commitments by Renfe opening up competition in online rail ticketing in Spain
Page contents
The European Commission has made commitments by Renfe legally binding under EU antitrust rules. The commitments address the Commission’s preliminary competition concerns relating to Renfe’s refusal to supply all its content and real-time data related to its passenger rail transport services to rival ticketing platforms.
The Commission’s preliminary concerns
Renfe, the Spanish state-owned rail incumbent operator, competes with companies providing online ticketing services to customers through apps or websites. These third-party ticketing platforms need to have access to Renfe’s full content and real-time data displayed on Renfe’s own digital channels to tailor their offers to the customers’ needs and compete effectively with Renfe’s online distribution channels.
In April 2023, the Commission opened a formal investigation over concerns that Renfe may have abused its dominant position in the Spanish passenger rail transport market by refusing to provide rival ticketing platforms with: (i) full content concerning its range of tickets, discounts and features; and (ii) real-time data (pre-journey, on-journey or post-journey) related to its passenger rail transport services.
The Commission preliminarily found that Renfe’s refusal to provide its full content and real-time data may have prevented rival platforms from competing with Renfe’s own direct digital channels to the detriment of consumers. Such behaviour may breach EU competition rules, which prohibit the abuse of a dominant position (Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’)).
The Commitments
To address the Commission’s preliminary concerns Renfe offered certain commitments. Between 26 June and 8 August 2023, the Commission market tested those commitments and consulted all interested third parties to verify whether the commitments would remove its competition concerns. In light of the outcome of this market test, Renfe amended the initially proposed commitments and offered the following:
- To make available to third-party ticketing platforms, irrespective of the channels they use to access Renfe content and real time data, all the current and future content and real-time data displayed on any of its own online channels. Renfe’s commitment will therefore be dynamic and not limited to content or real-time data already provided through its own online channels.
- To make available all its current content or real-time data by, at the latest, 29 February 2024, with some limited exceptions. The exceptions concern content and real-time data for which Renfe is required to launch a tender procedure to grant access.
- To require from third-party ticketing platforms a maximum monthly average Look-to-Book ratio (‘L2B’) of no less than either 600, 200 or 140, depending on the number of availability requests made by the platforms. L2B is the ratio between the number of availability requests related to the sale of tickets (“look”) made to Renfe’s ticket sales system and the number of actual sales (“book”) during a given period of time. Renfe will be allowed to temporarily suspend a rival platform’s access to its sales system only if it exceeds the applicable maximum L2B ratio, and this either negatively affects Renfe’s sales system or immediately threatens to impede sales of Renfe’s tickets. This mechanism effectively ensures that Renfe can operate seamlessly while preserving the competitiveness of third-party ticketing platforms. At the same time, it guarantees parity between third-party ticketing platforms and Renfe’s own platforms regarding the applicable maximum L2B and the consequences in case of non-compliance.
- To not exceed a maximum Error Rate (‘ER’) of 4% as of 2024 and a maximum monthly Unavailability Rate (‘UR’) of 1% as of 2025. ER is the ratio between the number of failed reservation requests and the total reservation requests, while the UR relates to the level of availability of Renfe’s sales system between 06:00 and 23:00 hours. These commitments will ensure that third-party ticketing platforms will benefit from high quality IT services from Renfe.
The commitments contain a non-circumvention clause whereby Renfe commits not to use any unfair, not reasonable or discriminatory technical or commercial measures that would impede or hamper access to and distribution of Renfe’s content and real-time data.
The Commission concluded that the final commitments would address its preliminary competition concerns over Renfe’s alleged abuse of dominant position in the Spanish online passenger rail ticket distribution market. It therefore decided to make them legally binding on Renfe.
The commitments offered by Renfe will remain in force for an indefinite period. Their implementation will be monitored by a monitoring trustee appointed by Renfe who will report to the Commission for a period of 10 years.
Background
Article 102 TFEU prohibits the abuse of a dominant position that may affect trade and prevent or restrict competition. The implementation of this provision is defined in the Antitrust Regulation (Regulation No 1/2003), which can also be applied by the national competition authorities.
The Commission opened a formal antitrust investigation into Renfe’s behaviour in April 2023. In parallel to the opening of proceedings, the Commission adopted a Preliminary Assessment summarising the main facts of the case and identifying its preliminary competition concerns.
Article 9(1) of the Antitrust Regulation enables companies investigated by the Commission to offer commitments in order to meet the Commission’s concerns and empowers the Commission to adopt a decision to make such commitments binding on the companies. Article 27(4) of the Antitrust Regulation requires that before adopting such decision the Commission shall provide interested third parties with an opportunity to comment on the offered commitments.
If the market test indicates that the commitments are a satisfactory way of addressing the Commission’s competition concerns, the Commission may adopt a decision making the commitments legally binding on Renfe. Such a decision would not conclude that there is an infringement of EU antitrust rules but would legally bind Renfe to comply with the commitments it has offered.
If Renfe does not honour such commitments, the Commission could impose a fine of up to 10% of the company’s worldwide turnover, without having to find an infringement of the EU antitrust rules.
More information, including the full text of the commitments, will be available on the Commission’s competition website, in the public case register under the case number AT.40735. The full text of the commitments will be available also in the Spanish language as a “working document”, but only the English version is authentic.
Quote(s)
Today’s decision opens up competition in online rail ticketing services in Spain. From now on, independent ticketing platforms will have access to all the information necessary to innovate and compete effectively with Renfe’s online distribution channels. This is crucial for more affordable rail services and promoting environmentally-friendly means of transport.
Margrethe Vestager, Executive Vice-President in charge of competition policy
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